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Abstract 
Indonesian colonisation of West Papua and the lack of a democratic 
tradition have been the main root causes of the current political problems in 
this area, triggering the emergence of an increasingly strong Papuan 
nationalism that finds its expression in a resistance movement, led by the 
OPM, seeking self-determination and independence. These problems have 
continued over many years, having serious social, political, economic, and 
environmental effects for West Papua but, despite the widespread local 
resistance, the OPM has so far been unable to end the colonial domination 
and practices. 
This study analyses the impact of Indonesian colonisation on the 
people of West Papua and their reactions to it. It investigates how different 
views about the political status of West Papua are also reflected in views 
about the future of the Papuans. In doing so, it draws heavily on the often 
neglected perspectives of the West Papuan people. The main purpose is to 
affirm that, as the Indonesian colonisation policies have been the main root 
cause of the conflict, any approaches to ending the conflict must encompass 
a political solution and not merely temporary economic and social 
measures. 
The West Papuan conflict is analysed in the light of current theories 
relating to colonialism and to a range of approaches to conflict resolution. 
After reflecting on the history of the national liberation struggle, focusing 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the conflicting parties, and on the 
balance of power and the role of international support, it is concluded that 
military victory by either side can only be a utopian dream. As the level of 
lV 
v 
can only increase intensify a new 
approach is needed to start the peace process. 
The empirical findings of this study show the extent to which 
colonisation has produced the bitter political conflict which threatens 
regional stability and security. The study also reaffirms that since national 
sentiments continue to strengthen, any end to the conflict is unlikely in the 
near future. Despite the relative strength of the Indonesian military forces 
and the lack of significant international support for the OPM, the struggle 
will continue in the future. By examining in detail the leadership, 
organisational structures and general programs of the OPM, it is concluded 
that the movement is seriously weakened by its factionalised organisation. 
The responses of the Indonesian government to the conflict by presenting 
social and military reform packages are also doomed to failure. The study 
concludes with a summary of the main findings 
determined demands West Papuans for independence 
possible strategies for achieving this in the future. 
relation to the 
explores some 
To gain a clearer picture of the relationship between the local effects of 
colonisation and ethnic nationalism in relation to wider Papuan 
nationalism and how those concepts have influenced the current situation 
in West Papua and the more local reactions, a detailed case study of the 
Amungme-Kamoro people in relation to Freeport and the colonial 
government in Mimika regency has been presented. Despite there is a clear 
relationship, yet the level of success has been more evident at the local level 
than nationally, for obvious reasons. 
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Chapter One : Introduction 
1.1. The Nature of Colonialism in West Papua 
"Every struggle against colonialism will end with victory for those who 
fight for freedom, because history has always shown that those who fight for 
freedom will win".1 This statement, made by Sukarno, the first president of 
Indonesia, reminds us that any struggle for self determination and 
independence by colonised peoples will finally achieve success no matter 
how long it takes or what odds have to be overcome. Colonised peoples 
believe strongly in this notion of final freedom, although they may express 
it in different ways. Such notions have also been clearly stated in both 
normative and international law. Such law sets out the obligations of the 
international community to fight against all forms of colonialism and 
imperialism, defending and protecting this fundamental right. These 
principles are already agreed upon by most of the international community 
which in one way or another has signed or ratified relevant international 
laws, conventions and protocols. 
Despite this, the history of colonialism has shown that these rights 
have frequently been denied, violated and ignored by colonialist powers or 
by national governments even though they have agreed and ratified those 
international laws in the name of the security, stability and development of 
the state. The common characteristics of colonialism include oppression, 
exploitation of natural resources, and the genocide of indigenous and 
colonised peoples. These violations of human rights too easily become a 
socio-political disease. Like cancer, this deadly disease spreads to the nervous 
system-the ideologies, networks and supporters of the separatist 
movement. The colonised peoples become paralysed, if they do not slowly 
Alan Smith (1991). Crossing the Border: West Papuan Refugees and Self-Determination 
of Peoples, Monash University, Melbourne, p.26. 
2 
die. The hostile relationship is made worse when the colonial power 
continues to deny political power, access to wealth, education, and social 
services, and the preservation of the environment. Such developments 
encourage the emergence of separatist sentiment among colonised peoples, 
that may be expressed in resistance movements. 
But how is colonialism to be defined in ways relevant to such 
situations? There are many definitions and interpretations of the concept, 
reflecting different times and perspectives, but broadly colonialism is the 
subordination by a dominant culture or foreign power of other peoples for 
political, economic, social and strategic reasons. In academic debate, a 
distinction is often made between "neo-colonialism" and "conventional 
colonialism"; but in the experience of the oppressed and colonised peoples, 
the ultimate impact of the two systems is not much different. Neo-
colonialism, which is also called "internal colonialism", is defined as the 
direct and overall subordination of a group of people by dominant power 
elites within an existing nation-state for economic and political interests. It 
is a policy that allows one dominant cultural group to impose its cultural 
values on other groups in the name of national unity and assimilation. 
Forcible integration, oppression, exploitation of resources in the periphery, 
accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite or in the 
centre, and forcing all peoples within the state to use the same national 
symbols and slogans are general characteristics of internal colonialism. This 
type of colonialism still prevails in many recently independent countries. 
Authoritarian regimes such as Indonesia, the Philippines during the Marcos 
regime, Burma and Cambodia exhibit features of neo-colonialism. A more 
detailed discussion of this type of colonialism can be found in the next 
chapter. 
3 
Opposition to this type of colonial system has often been characterised 
by rising regional and ethnic sentiments that lead to serious engagement in 
civil wars. The primary objective of such conflicts is, apart from some 
exceptional cases, the demand for more social and political reforms, 
involving a meaningful participation in the political and development 
process. These are not secessionist movements that aim to bring 
fundamental political change in the society. Such resistance movements are 
often labelled "social movements" or "resource conflicts" because the nature 
of the conflict is such that a solution may be reached through a compromise 
on the basis of a consensus agreement such as power sharing, land and 
agricultural reform, and an egalitarian distribution of wealth and power in 
the country. It can lead to the granting of special autonomous status. If both 
sides can agree on these policies, then the solution of "internal self-
determination" can be reached.2 
In Indonesia this type of resistance against neo-colonialism has 
occurred since the 1950s. Civil war between the centre, in Jakarta, and the 
periphery, or outer islands, broke out in many parts of the archipelago. 
Except perhaps for the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) in the Moluccas, the 
major objectives were to demand social improvements, equal participation 
in and distribution of political powers, and social progress, not to seek 
secession. The Darul Islam in South Sulawesi in 1953, the Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and 
PERMESTA in North Sulawesi in 1963 are three examples of such 
movements. All these movements challenged the regime of the central 
2 H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer and Patricia L Small (1992). Self-Determination in the 
New World Order, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, p.17. 
4 
government m Jakarta at the regional level without attempting to secede 
from Indonesia.3 
On the other hand, "conventional colonialism", which is also called 
"external colonialism" ,4 is defined as the domination of a foreign power by 
imposing its own values, culture and traditions on colonised peoples. A 
colonised territory is most often located abroad, separated by "blue waters" 
from the colonising country; this is also called "territorial colonialism". 
Conventional colonialism most often refers to Western colonialism because 
it was historically associated with the territorial expansion of the Western 
imperial powers from the sixteenth century and with imperial domination 
as a consequence of the industrial revolution that occurred in many parts of 
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Actually, this system is 
not markedly different from its successor, neo-colonialism, in behaviour, 
objectives and general characteristics such as oppression, exploitation and 
genocide; the one significant difference is that conventional colonialism was 
generally more coercive and inhumane in establishing territorial 
occupation. 
Opposition to colonial systems has varied, but it commonly incites the 
further emergence of national sentiments. Resistance is shaped by 
distinctive features of geography, culture, race, historical experiences and 
existing levels of oppression, exploitation and genocide. It is characterised by 
the growth of "political movements" whose primary objective is to secede 
from the existing nation-state or gain freedom from external coercion or 
4 
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1984). "Issues and politics of regionalism in Indonesia: 
Evaluating the Achenese experience" in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), Armed 
Separatism in Southeast Asia, Regional Strategic Studies Programme, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp.111-112. 
Ibid.:16. 
5 
alien domination in order to establish a new sovereign independent state 
within which the people can decide their own future in accordance with 
normative international law. Such an outcome is often called "external self-
determination" ,5 a term which will appear as "territorial self-
determination" in Chapter Two. 
From these definitions it becomes clear that the opposition to neo-
colonialism is normally a socially oriented movement, while opposition to 
conventional colonialism is a politically oriented movement. Yet despite 
this apparently clear distinction, the line between neo-colonial and 
conventional colonialism is difficult to draw in many non-Western 
occupied territories such as West Papua in 1962 and East Timor in 1975. A 
particular problem emerges when the international community chooses to 
maintain that conventional colonialism no longer exists as a consequence of 
the independence of most former Western colonial territories in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and Pacific in the 1950s and 1960s. International law has 
also implicitly accepted that a decolonisation process can only proceed in 
those territories that were affected by Western colonisation. This means that 
the remaining colonial territories occupied by non-Western colonial powers 
are automatically not regarded as experiencing conventional colonialism 
but rather neo-colonialism. 
The level of general public understanding about the real political status 
of West Papua and the way in which a solution must be found has suffered 
from this misperception over the last three decades. This creates difficulty in 
defining the current political status of the territory. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Six, there are now two clearly conflicting views on the status of 
Halperin, op.cit.:16. 
6 
those the and 
6 The pro-integrationists, most often represented Indonesians 
claim West Papua is a territory of Indonesia on historical 
grounds, as argued in Chapter Three, and they regard the continuing 
political problem in the territory as a reaction to Indonesian neo-
colonialism. In contrast, the extreme nationalists, mostly Papuans, define 
the territory as a "colony" of a foreign power and, therefore, see the current 
political problems as a response to conventional colonialism. Whatever the 
perceptions, it is dear that the colonial system in some form has seriously 
affected the future of the people of West Papua. 
In this thesis it will be argued that, despite the denials of Indonesia, 
West Papua is indeed a victim of conventional colonialism.7 In the view 
the people of West Papua, the current Indonesian political domination is 
nothing colonialism. Geographically, West 
located "overseas", separated by the "blue waters" of the Arafura Sea and the 
Indian Ocean; militarily, West Papua was forcibly annexed by a foreign 
power, during the brief war of 1962; and the level of oppression, exploitation 
and genocide that has been carried out in the territory over the last three 
decades is further justification for this conclusion. On these political 
grounds, West Papua is undoubtedly a colony in the traditional meaning. 
6 
"I know there are some who would prefer to call West Papua a 'territory' rather than a 
'colony.' But, whatever the semantics, one thing is obvious: Indonesia's annexation of 
West Papua in 1962 will increasingly be scrutinised by the international community in 
the near future", Otto Ondawame "West Papua Demands Freedom", Canberra Times (18 
September 1999). 
Otto Ondawame (1997). "The Impact of Freeport Mining activities on the Amungme and 
Kamoro Peoples in West Papua" in S. Wareham (ed.), Vision and Actions for Peace, 
Australian Medical Association, Canberra, p. 227-228. 
7 
1.2 The Issues To Be Addressed 
Traditional colonialism has caused problems in West Papua since direct 
colonisation began in the mid-nineteenth century. The relationship 
between the people of West Papua and the colonial powers has inevitably 
brought about inequalities. The inhuman treatment, racial prejudice, and, 
most importantly, the failure to address key human rights issues by the 
colonial powers, including the right to self-determination and 
independence, have dug a deep gap between them and the Papuans. 
This political imbalance has increased during the one and a half 
centuries of foreign occupation, first by the Dutch, starting from 1848, and 
then by Indonesia after 1963. Superficially, the colonial powers and the ways 
in which they deployed colonial policies seem to be quite different, but in 
practice both colonialists carried out essentially the same policies for the 
same objectives. Their common weapons have been oppression, 
exploitation, and discrimination, even though they have more recently also 
developed the soothing rhetoric of development, rehabilitation, stability 
and security.8 Such treatment has merely nurtured the growth of a Papuan 
nationalism which is expressed through resistance movements. Despite 
some variation in the styles of these movements in West Papua, their 
general objectives have always been consistent, namely to secede from 
foreign colonial domination and control, and to establish a free and 
independent state. Historically, Papuan resistance to the Dutch colonial rule 
can be traced back to the period before World War II, though in this period 
and also much later the anticolonial movements were often associated with 
millenarian tendencies.9 However these movements were mostly very 
localised, and so they were easily and quickly crushed. 
Ibid.:228. 
9 Nonie Sharp (1994). The Morning Star in Papua Barat, Arena Publications, Melbourne. 
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More recently, opposition to Indonesian colonialism has been 
expressed primarily through the activities of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM) or Free Papua Movement. The OPM was established by the Loedwik 
Mandatjan brothers on 26 June 1965 and later strengthened by Ferry A worn 
during the first military uprising which occurred in Manokwari. Their 
primary objective is to liberate the country from foreign colonial 
domination, as the history of their continuing and often heroic struggle 
(described in Chapter Four) will show. The OPM was born in response not 
only to the inequity of the socio-political system created by the colonial 
power of Indonesia but also to the policies of denial pursued by the 
international community in the 1960s, as discussed later in this thesis. The 
OPM continues to promote those aspirations and desires of the people of 
West Papua to destroy the colonial power and establish the democratic state 
of West Papua.10 
The OPM has led one of the longest and "the most isolated struggles" in 
the world.11 East Timor and Bougainville have attracted much greater 
international support than West Papua, over a shorter period of time. There 
are many reasons for this isolation but external misperceptions fostered by 
the colonial government and its allies have long undermined the 
reputation and credibility of the OPM. Indonesia and the international 
community continue to ignore the rights of the people of West Papua and 
describe the OPM as a terrorist group or "Gerakan Pengacau Liar" (GPK) or 
Wild Security Disturbers, denigrating the movement as "motionless and 
10 
II 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1991). Ten Point Political Program of the OPM in 
This is West Papua: A Presentation of the OPM, OPM/FFP, Malmo. 
Stanley Simpson (March 1999). "Fighting on for a 'forgotten' struggle", Pacific News 
Bulletin, Vol.14 No.3, p. 7. 
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their leadership does not exist",1 2 and the people of West Papua as being a 
primitive people, a lazy and inferior race who are living in an 
unenlightened dark age.13 They attempt to discredit the movement by 
describing it as highly factionalised, dominated by internal rivalries and 
mismanagement, lacking leadership, clear direction, political commitment 
and willpower. Indonesia claims that the opposition in West Papua exists 
only because of unequal development. It argues that dissatisfaction with 
"development", combined with the backwardness of the people, hinders the 
improvement of social and economic conditions in the province. 
On the basis of these negative attitudes to the Papuans and the OPM, 
Jakarta sees the situation in West Papua as a social and economic problem 
rather than a political issue. It accepts the hypothesis that by improving the 
economic and social living conditions of the people of West Papua, the 
political conflict will end. The Papuan-born academic, John R.G. Djopari, in 
line with the view of the colonial government, also portrays the problem as 
a social and economic one, and argues that the resistance movement in 
West Papua will probably decline if the Indonesian authorities deploy a 
more social approach: 
12 
13 
14 
To destroy the OPM and its influences in Irian Jaya, first of all, the 
ideology of the OPM must be destroyed. This can only be done if 
there exists political will and good will on the part of the central 
government for recruiting the indigenous people of Irian Jaya 
selectively into leadership positions and appointing them as 
department officers both in the regional as well as in national 
offices as an implementation of integration. 14 
Cenderawasih Post 25 January 1993. 
Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples (RIOP)(1985). The Tragedy of the Papuans and 
the International Political Order, RIOP Report No.l. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, 
pp.12-13. 
John R.G. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Grasindo, 
Jakarta, p.169. 
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Another source of criticism comes from some academics in Australia. 
Ian Bell et al., for example, in their analysis of Papuan nationalism and of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM, conclude that if Jakarta were to 
engage in serious reform programs, Papuan nationalism would certainly 
weaken. 15 They also criticise the OPM as being weak because of its lack of 
capacity to provide central direction for local actions; it is, they consider, 
more a movement than an organisation. Such criticisms, based on a neo-
colonialist analysis of the West Papua situation, have further damaged the 
credibility and reputation of the OPM, raising questions about the strength 
of Papuan nationalism and the effectiveness of the movement.16 This 
relates to a second hypothesis: that if the OPM can overcome its internal 
weaknesses, international support will flow. On the other hand the general 
public in Indonesia believes that even though the OPM may be weak and 
divided, "the movement could still be a time bomb for Jakarta that may 
threaten the regional stability and security."17 The OPM remains a political 
cancer for Indonesia. 
The status of West Papua cannot be ignored by accepting the colonial 
legacy and enforcing pro-integrationist solutions. This could lead to the 
extermination of the people of West Papua. The problem must be seen in a 
political context and addressed from a West Papuan perspective. It must be 
analysed in terms of traditional colonialism, not neo-colonialism. The 
important question then becomes how to resolve the differences between 
15 
16 
17 
Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley (1986). "The West Papuan Challenge to 
Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problem, New Possibilities", Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXVI, No.5, p.547. 
Ibid.:547. 
Jakarta Post 18 January 1996. 
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colonial perceptions the principles international 
attempting to address this question, the emphasis of the following 
analysis will be on the political nature of the clash between traditional 
colonialism and Papuan nationalism, and approaches that have been, and 
could be, deployed to resolve the conflict. It is not my intention here to 
attempt a comprehensive analysis of all the social and political relationships 
that can arise between colonisation and nationalist movements. Rather, this 
thesis will focus on specific factors, including the political weaknesses of 
Papuan nationalism, the major reasons for the failure of the OPM to obtain 
international support, and the future prospects for success, by examining the 
denial politics that have characterised the history of the OPM. Different 
views of the political status of West Papua and of the balance of power of the 
two major actors in the conflict be examined in order to suggest possible 
solutions to conflict. Through a detailed case study Amungme 
relations with Freeport McMoRan, colonisation, national sentiment, and 
local responses will be examined at a micro level. 
Starting, therefore, from the assumption that any constructive debate 
about the future of West Papua must be analysed in a political context with 
conventional colonialism as a central focus of attention, this study will be 
structured by the following questions: 
1. How were the Papuans denied their right to self-determination in the 
1960s? 
2. Why have both the Indonesian armed forces and the OPM so far failed 
to achieve their military objectives? 
12 
3. What can be learned from the past experience of the OPM to promote 
new political initiatives for the future? 
4. What is the perception of the political status of West Papua (Irian Jaya) 
and the OPM, and how has this affected international support? 
5. What are the future prospects for West Papua and the OPM? 
The primary objectives of this thesis are: 
to analyse the impact of colonisation on the future of the people of West 
Papua and demonstrate a clear relationship between Indonesian colonial 
domination and the emergence of the West Papuan nationalist 
movement; 
to argue that as a result of denial politics, although the Papuans are still 
clearly subject to colonial oppression, exploitation and genocide, any 
possibility of reopening the case in the international arena is still 
minimal; 
to examine the possible future role of the OPM in the light of past 
experience to promote new debate on the future of the OPM; 
to argue that the continued use of coercive approaches will never solve 
the current political conflict in West Papua; 
to analyse some future scenarios and assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of three alternative approaches to the resolution of 
conflict in the country, and to offer some recommendations relevant to 
future peace processes. 
A case study of the impact of the Freeport mine on the 
Amungme/Kamoro peoples, as well as illustrating the impact of Indonesian 
colonial ruling on the Papuan people, shows how local ethnonationalism 
has contributed to the development of a broader West Papuan nationalism. 
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1.3 Methodology 
This study provides a narrative picture of the political situation in West 
Papua as understood from a Papuan perspective. It focuses on the colonial 
policies which caused the emergence of Papuan nationalism, and in turn 
sparked the resistance movement. The ineffectiveness of the OPM, which 
weakened support for it and hence limited its progress, is also analysed. 
To a large extent, the thesis is based on action research and participant 
observation. From 1969 to 1976 I was a member of the OPM fighting in the 
bush in West Papua. After 1976, having been detained during a visit to 
Papua New Guinea and ultimately granted refuge in Sweden, I became part 
of the OPM government-in-exile and an international spokesman for the 
West Papuan cause. In 2000 I became a member of the Papua Presidium. 
Much of the material in this thesis is thus based on my first hand knowledge 
and personal experience as a freedom fighter in West Papua and as an 
international activist. Inevitably this introduces an element of subjectivity, 
but my recollections have been supplemented by interviews with key actors 
(footnoted where appropriate and not subject to requests for anonymity), 
and have been checked against primary and secondary sources. 
The case study has been employed as a research strategy, especially in 
Chapter 6. This method can address both "how" and "why" questions, 18 and 
the causes and effects of current political phenomena.19 The actions of the 
Amungme/Kamoro peoples in relation to the policies and activities of the 
government of Indonesia and of the international mining company 
Freeport McMoRan were chosen as being particularly relevant to the wider 
18 
19 
Gabriel Baffour Awuah (1994). The Presence of Multinational Companies (MNCS) in 
Ghana, Department of Business Administration, Uppsala University, Uppsala, p.6. 
Judith Bell (1993). Doing Your Research Project, a Guidance for First Time Researchers 
in Education and Social Science, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.6. 
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issues examined in the thesis. Since Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans-
based multinational company, was permitted by the Suharto government in 
1967 to exploit mineral resources on the traditional land of the Amungme 
and Kamoro, the relationship between Indonesia and the company on one 
side and the landowners on the other has been worsening. The denial of the 
rights of landowners and lack of prior consultation, the degradation of 
people, land and environment, and an increase in human rights abuses in 
the region, have raised serious questions about the credibility and 
accountability of the company and the Indonesian government. The Papuan 
response has taken the form of increased ethnic sentiment, which is often 
transformed into violent reactions and a strengthened sense of Papuan 
nationalism. 
A primary objective of this case study is to demonstrate how the 
relationship between the colonists and owners of capital has affected the 
local landowners, and to clarify the social, economic and political 
implications of resource exploitation for these landowners. This also 
demonstrates the failure of economic and social solutions to an essentially 
political conflict. Another important objective is to show the clear link 
between local nationalism and national identity, and to demonstrate that 
ethnic sentiments have become a driving force in the growth of Papuan 
nationalism. Finally, by analysing how the local issues are interpreted 
within the general political and theoretical contexts where the OPM plays a 
major political role, the enduring nature of Papuan nationalism can be 
revealed. 
Primary data was collected from field work that took place at the end of 
1996 in Papua New Guinea. Most of this data was collected by interviewing 
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Papuan refugees, leaders of the OPM, and PNC politicians in Maprik, 
Wewak, and Port Moresby. For political reasons it was not possible for the 
author to visit West Papua. During this visit, some secondary material was 
collected at the library of the Pacific Studies Centre at the University of PNC 
in Waigani. Members of the Australia West Papua Association and West 
Papuan colleagues in Sydney and Canberra were also interviewed. During a 
visit to New York in February 1999, the chairman of the Institute of Human 
Rights Advocacy Studies in Jayapura was interviewed, and the chairman of 
LEMASA, the local organisation in Timika, was interviewed during his 
visit to Canberra in September 1998. All these interviews were recorded. 
One of the many questions consistently asked of those interviewed 
concerned their perception of the future political status of West Papua. 
Detailed data was also collected from community leaders and friends in 
Jayapura, Timika, Tembagapura and Newcastle. Full responses were 
received from Timika, Tembagapura and Newcastle but, for unavoidable 
reasons, not from Port Numbay (Jayapura). Use was also made of internal 
OPM documents in the author's collection. 
Much additional data was collected from secondary sources. This 
included, apart from literature available in the ANU and other libraries, 
daily email messages from Jayapura and Jakarta; internet and internal 
publications of the OPM; articles in periodical publications of the local 
governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in West Papua 
such as Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA/ Amungme 
Council), Yayasan Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa (Rural Development 
Foundation); publications of NGOs in Australia, PNC and USA such as the 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the West Papua Relief 
Association, the Australia West Papua Association, and Tapol in London, 
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and of Freeport McMoRan. Daily newspapers such as Tifa Irian, Kompas, 
The Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald, bulletins such as The 
Economic Review, Inside Indonesia, Pacific News Bulletin, Islands Business, 
Gatra, and Information Kit, have provided useful materials. Periodic reports 
and internal material from the Freeport office in Tembagapura were also 
consulted. It is difficult to obtain current official statistics for the province of 
Irian Jaya and for the Freeport McMoRan enterprise, although older 
statistical data is of some use. 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
Chapter One introduces the study, focusing on the reasons for selecting the 
topic, the background to the problem, research aims and methodology, and 
identification of the key issues to be examined. 
Chapter Two considers some concepts and theories that may be of 
relevance for this study, and presents a brief literature review of earlier 
studies on Papuan nationalism and the OPM. 
Chapter Three looks at the denial politics of the 1960s in Indonesia 
during the Cold War period, and examines the failure of the international 
community to play its role in the promotion of justice, peace and 
democracy. 
Chapter Four presents a detailed analysis of the formation and 
subsequent history of the OPM, focusing on the failure of the organisation to 
play its role as a true national liberation movement. It examines some 
major factors that have restricted the progress of the OPM, and attempts that 
have been made to improve its political image. 
Chapter Five presents a range of views on the political status of West 
Papua and analyses the level of international support for the OPM. A clear 
understanding this situation is an 
and enemies of the movement. 
step in 
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Chapter Six consists of a detailed case study based on the situation of the 
Amungme and the Kamoro in relation to the exploitation of mineral 
resources in their homelands by a foreign multinational company with the 
backing of the Indonesian government. There is analysis of the moves of 
the main actors, of the progress of social change, and of the militarisation of 
the Freeport, and local resistance. The main intention here is to 
demonstrate the dose relationship between local sentiment and the 
emergence of Papuan nationalism. 
Chapter Seven considers the future prospects of the West Papuan 
conflict, looking at some alternative peace solutions. The meaning and 
implications of autonomy, federalism and independence are discussed in 
relation to the future political status of West Papua. 
Chapter Eight presents the findings of this study, summarising the key 
outcomes and considering their implications for West Papua. 

Chapter Two: Concepts and Issues 
2.1. Introduction 
A brief review of the literature reveals the sensitive nature of the issue. 
Most commentators, with a few notable exceptions, recognise West Papua as 
an integral part of Indonesia, locking discussion of conflict resolution into 
the policy framework of the Indonesian state. In contrast, most Papuans 
believe that any solution to the problem must be found within an 
international legal framework; they argue that the presence of Indonesia in 
West Papua is that of an occupying power. In this situation an 
understanding of the concepts of integration, colonialism, and nationalism 
becomes particularly important. Ideological conflict between those for and 
those against self-determination and independence makes it hard to 
establish a common basis for discussion and negotiation. 
2.2. Some Important Concepts. 
2.2.1. The Concept of Integration 
The idea of whether people are part of or outside a dominant culture is 
controversial. The relationship between colonial masters or dominant 
groups and colonised or subordinated people, especially culturally distinct 
minorities, has always been unhealthy; in order to maintain colonial 
control, the rights of such peoples are often denied and they are forced to 
accept the culture of the dominant group. The practical meaning of 
integration is, therefore, a process of assimilating subordinated minorities 
into a dominant culture. 
Two types of integration can be distinguished, based on motivation and 
structure: these are economic integration and political integration. Both 
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or 
can as a decision to integrate a subordinated into 
a or state for economic reasons. A group of people 
freely bring themselves into association with a dominant group, or 
nation-state on the basis of a consensual agreement; 1 this process, wherein 
each interest group desires to join the assimilation process, is called 
horizontal integration.2 In such an arrangement normative consensus is 
sought to regulate political relationships among the population. 
The reasons for such integration include lack of economic viability or 
small size of population of the integrating group, strategic interests, and 
having common social-historical experiences or identity. Stewart Firth has 
discussed this type of integration in relation to Niue and the Cook Islands. 
These two island groups, which have small populations and land mass, 
have a 
matters, but exercise self-government.3 The economies of these island 
countries are heavily dependent on New Zealand. The European Union 
(EU) is another example of this type of integration, aimed at building a 
powerful collective bargaining entity; even though the European member 
countries are advantaged and wealthy states, an individual country alone 
cannot compete as successfully in the global market. Federal systems such as 
the USA, Australia, Germany and Switzerland provide other examples of a 
consensus-based integration; the small Australian island state of Tasmania, 
for example, could not survive economically by itself. 
Claude Ake (1967). A Theory of Political Integration. The Dorsey Press, Homewood, 
pp.12-13. 
John R.G. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisi Papua Merdeka. Grasindo, Jakarta, 
p.10. 
Stewart Firth (1989). "Sovereignty and independence in the contemporary Pacific", 
Contemporary Pacific 1(2):77. 
Ake, op.cit.:12-13. 
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On the other hand, when a group of people is forcibly assimilated into 
a dominant culture or nation-state,4 this is called coercive integration, and it 
generally involves a vertical power structure.5 The primary motivation is to 
satisfy the political and territorial ambitions of the central power, such as its 
need for more land for resettlement or its strategic interests. But because 
there is no inherent logic behind such integration, the consequence has 
generally been negative. Instability, a clash of national sentiments, and 
political unrest emerge over time as responses to incorporation. The 
incorporation into Indonesia of West Papua in 1963 and East Timor in 1975 
are classic examples of such coercive integration. The power relationships 
between the elite and the general population, and between the central 
government and the periphery, are vertically organised and aimed at 
ensuring that the population will obey the state's demands. The Indonesian 
political system under Suharto was an example of such vertical integration. 
The regional governments and their people were subjected to directives set 
by the central government. The governor of "Irian Jaya" for example, was 
appointed by the central government, and any decisions made at regional 
level had to be approved by the central authority in Jakarta. 
These two variants of the concept of integration are helpful in 
analysing the case of West Papua, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five. Jakarta's position is clear: West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia. 
Implicitly, Jakarta uses only one justification, namely the common colonial 
heritage, to defend its stance. Even though the argument remains 
questionable, Jakarta has used it to justify its claims over many years. The 
policy for assimilating Papuan society into mainstream Indonesian culture 
Djopari, op.cit.:10. 
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forms, 
use of a single language (Bahasa Indonesia). Jakarta that 
West Papua returned to the mother-land of Indonesia, the national goal of 
integration has been achieved. The truth of such a statement, however, 
requires examination. 
As I argue throughout this thesis, the general perception of the people 
of West Papua themselves is very different. The vast majority of Papuans 
feel they are one people and one separate nation within the Indonesian state 
(see Chapter 7). The question must be raised: if West Papua were truly an 
integral part of Indonesia, why have the Papuans been treated as foreigners 
in their own land, been discriminated against because of their colour and 
religion, and become the target for oppression, extermination and genocide, 
with landowners dispossessed and traditional land confiscated? The 
Papuans have become a major target rights abuses, 
suffered massive exploitation of natural resources without rece1vmg 
compensation. The Papuans have concluded that West Papua is nothing but 
a colony. To appreciate this conclusion, it is necessary to explore the nature 
of colonialism. 
2.2.2. The Concepts of Colonialism and Imperialism 
A country is considered a colony if it is colonised by imperialistic expansion 
for political, strategic or economic reasons,6 and governed by another state. 
Colonialism may be internal or external. Normally, a colony is located on 
the periphery and the colonists do not have any special obligation to 
improve the local conditions. According to the late President Sukarno of 
Robert Petersen (1995). Colonialism as seen from a Former Colonised Area, Working 
Paper, Vol.32, No.2, presented at the 8th Inuit Studies Conference at Laval University, 
p.2. 
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an area is called a colony a situation a people 
governed another people politically, economically, intellectually 
physically. 7 
Today, colonialism is loosely taken to mean "overseas colonialism" ,8 
and the domination of one nation by another within a given nation-state is 
not recognised as colonialism. For Farely, internal domination does not 
qualify as colonialism because such a label would undermine the state's 
territorial integrity.9 Such conservative views are contestable; in practice, 
colonialism is not limited by location but is an ideology that does not take 
account of geographical limitations. 
Two types of colonialism, namely neo-colonialism and conventional 
colonialism, may be distinguished by their origins. Neo-colonialism, which 
is also called colonialism, defined as oppression lS 
perpetuated by a government over its own people within a nation-state. 
Typically it involves exploitation of resources in the periphery and 
enrichment of the centre, accumulation of power and wealth in the hands 
of a small central power elite while the periphery remains poor, and direct 
and overall subordination of citizens for economic and political interests. 
On the other hand, external colonialism is domination by a foreign power, a 
concept I will explore further in this thesis. 
Colonial ideology was developed in association with the industrial 
revolution in Europe from the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
Ibid.:2. 
Lawrence T. Farely (1986). Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political 
Illegitimacy. Westview Press, Boulder, p.18. 
"The domination of a nation by another-especially if the two are located within the 
boundaries of one state is not labelled 'colonialism' " (ibid.:18). 
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needed new raw materials, 
The dominant power the imperial nations was at 
expense slaves and the working class. The mercantilist symbols of 
wealth were gold and spices, and the colonial powers occupied territories in 
order to open markets and have access to gold, and supplies of raw materials 
in Asia, Africa, the Pacific and America. 
Colonialism and imperialism are two sides of the same coin. Colonial 
power preserves the imperial interests and vice versa. Both are 
characterised by territorial expansion, exploitation and genocide. According 
to Jack Woddis, colonialism is "a direct and overall subordination of one 
country to another on the basis of state power being in the hands of the 
dominating foreign power" .10 The concept implies the use of force to 
expand territory, to control cheap labour and resources, and to maintain 
market at expense of The 
power that colonised the Malay archipelago between 1602 1949, 
renamed it the Dutch East Indies, was one of the leading Western powers. 
Like Chilcote,11 Woddis describes the relationship between colonialism and 
capitalism as an integrated system, saying: /1 colonialism enabled the 
imperialist power to rob the colonial peoples in various ways. They were 
able to secure cheap land, cheap labour, and cheap resources". 12 The 
establishment of new trade centres and ports in Africa, America, Asia and 
the Pacific by the European colonists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
demonstrates how colonists preserved the interests of their imperial 
masters in their host countries. 
10 
11 
12 
Jack Woddis (1967). An Introduction to Neo-Colonialism. International Publishers, New 
York, p.147. 
Ronald H. Chilcote (1984). Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. Westview 
Press, Boulder, p.16. 
Woddis, op.cit.:16. 
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Commonly, colonial practices have involved the exploitation of the 
indigenous peoples of the colonised territories and the extermination of 
their culture through the imposition of the colonial culture and language, 
through introduced laws and orders that preserved the interests of the 
colonialists, through the outnumbering of indigenous people by the 
planned resettlement of immigrants, through the establishment of local 
loyal or puppet regimes, through the exploitation of local natural resources 
in the colony on a large scale, through the imposition of a slave system 
involving social apartheid, through the dispossession of the people and the 
removal of their children, and through the systematic undermining of local 
traditions and cultures which were regarded as evidence of a primitive 
society. Along with this colonial control, over the past three hundred years 
or so millions of immigrant colonists from Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia have settled in the colonial territories of Australia, New Zealand, 
America, Asia and Africa. This demographic movement has brought about 
serious social-economic and political consequences for the indigenous 
peoples-in particular the Aborigines of Australia and the Indians of North 
Central and South America. The colonial ideology prevents any 
development of an autonomous economy within the controlled 
territories.13 Thus colonialism empowers the colonialists but denies the 
rights of indigenous peoples for its own economic, political and strategic 
interests. Colonialism is, therefore, a necessary component of capitalism, 
channelling the accumulation of capital. to the capitalists; colonialism and 
imperialism are intertwined. 
13 Petersen, op.cit.:10-ll. 
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in beginning a 
system arrangements has 
become a major cause political conflict As the relationship 
between the colonised and the colonists inevitably becomes unhealthy, 
mistrust and disobedience become new social diseases. The relationship 
between the core and the periphery becomes unbalanced, with unequal 
distribution of goods and services. For political purposes, a considerable 
number of transmigrants, (whom the Papuans call immigrants), from the 
overpopulated islands of Java and Bali have been moved to West Papua 
and used there as cheap labour to colonise the region. Most of these 
transmigrants are landless and poor. A rapid militarisation of West Papua 
has also brought serious political, economic, environmental and social 
consequences. Discrimination and social injustices are outcomes of this 
colonisation. The large-scale exploitation of the natural resources West 
little benefit to Papuans, but provides an economic surplus 
for government Jakarta and for the capitalist owners, most often 
foreign multinational companies. Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans 
registered mining company that today operates in West Papua (see Chapter 
Six), is one of many examples of such capitalist imperialism. 
West Papua is indeed a colony of Indonesia. Unequal distribution of 
wealth and power, lack of respect for and recognition of the rights of the 
colonised people, widespread human rights abuses, environmental 
destruction, dispossession of population, and cultural domination, all 
encourage stronger national sentiments. In such circumstances, the 
emergence of West Papuan nationalism has been inevitable, and will 
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remain a major problem for the Indonesian government.14 But in this 
context, how are we to understand the concept of Papuan nationalism? 
2.2.3. The Concept of Nationalism: Ethnic vs People 
The term nation refers to "a large community of people who usually share a 
common history and language and live in a particular territory".15 It is 
coterminous with a "people". The suffix "ism" indicates an ideology; in the 
case of nationalism one that encourages both local and national sentiments 
in seeking improvement of social and economic conditions or, in an 
extreme case, secession. Nationalism generally involves devotion to one's 
own nation and patriotic feelings favouring political independence in a 
country that is controlled by another or is part of another.16 Recently, it has 
often been used to indicate a sentiment that emerges or reemerges among 
colonised and oppressed peoples who are seeking self-determination or 
independence. "Ethnicity" is the term for the sense of common identity of a 
national, racial and tribal group that has common cultural traditions, 
language and ways of life. These two terms are interrelated, but politically 
differentiated. The feeling of group nationalism grows from a sense of 
ethnic and territorial identity-people who have in common with each 
other a culture, language, tradition and origin, distinct from the 
mainstream culture. Like Elmslie17 and Bell et al.,18 Michael van 
Langenberg defines nationalism as a sentiment that can be associated with 
ideology, class, geography, cultural identity, political movement, economy, 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
R.J. May (1986). "East of the Border: Irian Jaya and the Border in Papua New Guinea's 
Domestic and Foreign Politics" in R.J. May (ed.), Between Two Nations, Robert Brown and 
Associates (Aust), Sydney, p. 159. 
AP. Cowie (1989). Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 4th 
Edition, London, p.824 . 
Ibid.:824. 
Jim Elmslie (1995). Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan 
Nationalism. University of Sydney, pp.14-19 (unpublished). 
Ian Bell, H. Feith and R. Hatley (1986). "Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in 
Irian Jaya: Old Problems New Possibilities", Asian Survey, Vol.XXVI, No.5, p.544 . 
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self-consciousness. 19 Nationalism can 
this thesis, I use the term "ethnic nationalism" when I discuss 
sentiments of a certain group of people within a given nation state, and I 
use "territorial nationalism" when I refer to the sentiments of multi-ethnic 
groups of peoples who all live in a given territory. As I will discuss in 
Chapter Six, the Papuans see themselves as a large multi-ethnic grouping of 
peoples who share a sense of common values primarily based on racial, 
geographical and cultural distinctiveness, marking a dear divide from the 
Indonesians. Territorial nationalism is thus the appropriate concept for 
understanding Papuan nationalism. 
In contrast, ethnic nationalism may be defined as local sentiments that 
emerge among an individual state 
on the basis of a common sense of identity, colonial experiences, religion, 
ethnicity, class and race. This is sometimes termed 'sub-nationalism' the 
literature of international politics. The reasons for the emergence of ethnic 
nationalism are many, but locally-based sentiment is always present. This 
ethnic sentiment can be sharpened if the relationship between the centre 
and the periphery becomes imbalanced. For example, if the centre becomes 
rich while the periphery is still poor, this disequilibrium will create a social 
gap which encourages sub-nationalist sentiment, and if the division of the 
economic order between centre and periphery is seriously imbalanced then 
a social gap between poor and rich is immediately created.20 In the history of 
colonial occupation and its capitalist development the periphery has 
19 
20 
Michael van Langenberg (1993). "Importing Nationalism, the Case of Indonesia" in Garry 
Tromp£ (ed.), Islands and Enclaves: Nationalism and Separatist Pressures in Islands and 
Littoral Context, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, p.154. 
Chilcote, op.cit.:23. 
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generally suffered most. 21 When resources from the periphery are used to 
strengthen the centre, it is likely that the people from the resource-rich areas 
will engage in sub-nationalist movements. In such situations, a tendency 
for conflict between centre and periphery is inevitable. The Amungme 
sentiment against the government of Indonesia and Freeport McMoRan in 
relation to economic exploitation in Amungme land in West Papua over 
the past twenty-five years is an example of this (see Chapter Six). 
One of the problems with ethnic nationalism is that it involves a very 
localised notion of being; an exaggerated ethnic nationalism can destroy 
national unity and stability. However, the emergence of any ethnic 
sentiment has value and can become a starting point for a wider 
nationalism. Self-identity and recognition at the local level provide a 
kickstart for West Papuan nationalism. 
Many of the existing nation-states of the former European 
territories in the "Third World" have been established on the basis of the 
sanctity of boundaries which were drawn by Western colonial powers in an 
earlier period. Western colonial boundaries define the geo-political map of 
the world that was created by the Western colonial powers, who ignored 
completely the existence of ethnic boundaries. 
A study of 132 current countries found only 12 countries that had been 
established on a homogeneous ethnic basis.22 Europe, which has only 20 per 
cent of the world's population, encompasses many ethnic communities. 
Outside Europe, the colonial order has been preserved with very little 
21 
22 
Ibid.:10. 
Said and Simmons (1976:10) cited in Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Separatism, The 
Moros in Southern Philippines and the Malays in Southern Thailand, PhD Thesis, 
Australian National University, p.l. 
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constructive rearrangement in the post-independence era, and, for 
whatever reasons, the legality of these artificial colonial boundaries has 
been generally accepted by the regimes in the Third World as a valid form of 
nation-state building. There is, however, a crucial need to recognise that 
these colonial boundaries in themselves create a problem because they 
ignore ethnic boundaries. Ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, Zaire, 
the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere in the world today suggest that the 
validity and legitimacy of colonial boundaries are inherently problematic. 
Although there may be many different causes for individual ethno-
nationalist conflicts, a common primary reason is the ignoring of ethnic 
boundaries and imposition of coercive integration. In the case of the 
Kosovo crisis today, for example, ethnic sentiments are a major causal 
factor. Who is wrong and who is right is contestable, but any answer must 
be sought in a historical framework. 
Ethnic sentiments have commonly encouraged territorial sentiments, 
as I argue later in relation to West Papua. It is possible that ethnic 
sentiments will soon dominate international debates about ethnic 
nationalism, redefinition of present boundaries of nation-states, and the 
role of the UN and international law regarding the growing calls for ethnic 
nationhood. The UN may, for example, be forced to redefine Article 73 of 
the UN Charter regarding the political status of colonised and non-self-
governing territories, which currently takes a very narrow view of the 
obligation of the world community to decolonise a people from under a 
colonial power. 
If people's nationalism or territorial nationalism were to be defined as 
the common sense of identity, culture and language within a multi-ethnic 
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society on basis of common historical experiences, race, religion and geo-
position, then political sentiments in West Papua could not be 
simply regarded as an ethnic issue alone but must also be recognised as 
people's nationalism as well. The people of West Papua consist of some two 
hundred and forty ethnic groups with divergent cultures, traditions and 
ways of life. Each of these ethnic groups has unique characteristics that 
differentiate it from the others. Different languages, myths of origin, and 
land boundaries are a few distinctions that mark each of them as a separate 
entity. Despite this, the common colonial experience, geographical position, 
and common language origins also give rise to a common sentiment that 
all Papuans are 110ne People, One Soul11 (the motto of the OPM). 23 As a 
people, the Papuans' nationalism has emerged on the basis of common 
historical experiences over more than two centuries and during different 
colonial periods. Thus, Papuan nationalism is now much stronger than 
ethnic nationalism and when I use the term "nationalism" I am ,,.,...,-,....,.. ... , to 
West Papua nationalism in a national context rather than as expressing a 
purely local or ethnic sentiment. 
The West Papuan nation-state will, on the other hand, be established 
on the basis of Papuan nationalism in the sense of both ethnic and 
territorial sentiments. West Papuan nationalism did not exist before Dutch 
colonisation began in the eighteenth century; it really only emerged in the 
1950s-1960s, encouraged by the Dutch when the decolonisation process 
started. West Papuan nationalism has grown as a response to social-political 
injustice, and is rooted in a sense of common identity, race, religion, culture 
and historical experience. Previously there had only been a sense of ethnic 
nationalism; Papuan ethnic communities each had their own ethnic 
23 The motto of national unity of the OPM is found on the head of the Papuan National 
Symbol. 
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sentiments and loyalties. Local resistance to the Dutch colonial power in 
different parts of West Papua during the Dutch colonial period was 
evidence of an ethnic nationalism that was associated with cult 
movements. The Koreri movement in Biak is a clear example of this early 
type of ethnic nationalism. However, ethnic nationalism had and still does 
have, an important role as a starting point for Papuan nationalism. A sense 
of shared historical experience has also encouraged Papuan nationalism: 
West Papua was colonised by the Dutch under a separate administration 
from the rest of Indonesia and it was not included in the areas handed over 
by the Dutch to what is now the Republic of Indonesia during the 
decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies. 
Instead, during the decolonisation process in the 1960s the Papuans 
were encouraged to establish their own independent state, by developing 
their own national symbols such as an anthem, a flag, a constitution, a 
provisional government and parliament, an army and police force, and 
their own currency. The Papuan national symbols and state apparatus were 
recognised by the Dutch colonial administration. 
All these were factors in the rapidly growing national and political 
consciousness of the Papuans during recent years, which resulted, 
in October 1961, in the foundation of a Papuan National 
Committee, claiming to represent the entire indigenous 
population. In its Manifesto of October 19, 1961, specially 
emphasising Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations as 
well as Resolution 1514(XV), the Papuan National Committee 
requested the government to give official recognition to its flag, as 
that of the territory, to be flown beside the Netherlands tricolour. 
It was also requested that the Papuan national hymn, "Hai 
Tanahku Papua" (Hail, My Country Papua), be designated the 
national hymn of the territory. The use of the name West Papua 
for Netherlands New Guinea was the third request ..... On 
December 1, 1961, all over the territory, the flag of West Papua was 
officially raised beside the flag of The Netherlands ... .In a very 
insecure world, the Papuan people showed great self-confidence 
and a growing faith in their own abilities and the future of their 
country. It was no longer a question of what the Papuans really 
wanted.24 
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This also inspired the other aspect of being different: the Papuans' common 
sense of being Papuan, racially different from the Mongoloid Malays, also 
strengthened Papuan nationalism. When these components of Papuan 
identity - such as different language, culture, ways of life, religion, and 
attitudes to land - were faced with serious threats, a Papuan resistance 
movement was created. In 1965, under the coordination of the OPM, the 
Papuans began striving for political and social recognition and respect as a 
nationalist movement. 
The advantages of people's nationalism are its power and strength, its 
adaptability for economic development, its promise of security and stability, 
and the fact that it unifies divergent ethnic groups; but it also has 
weaknesses, such as power struggles, unequal distribution of resources, and 
other forms of potential domination. These may easily foster ethnic 
sentiments, which are a main cause of state instability even in a democratic 
country such as PNC, where political culture has not yet been well 
developed. 
The relationship between ethnic and territorial nationalism in West 
Papua is very strong. Ethnic sentiment can shape a people's nationalism, as 
the Papuan case demonstrates, but the lack of a strong common sense of 
territorial nationalism may, on the other hand, also shape ethnic 
nationalism. 
24 J.V. de Bruijn (1965). "Changing Leadership in Western New Guinea", in Roland W.Force 
(ed.), Induced Political Change in the Pacific, Bishop Museum Press, The Pacific Science 
Association, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, p.101. 
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Most often, small ethnic groups who live within a bigger nation state 
have not demanded secession but rather asked for recognition of their 
rights, such as the improvement of their education system, the 
maintenance of their culture, and their right to control their land and its 
resources. Minority groups in Indonesia often share values with other 
ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic state. The Papuans, however, do not see 
themselves as either an ethnic group or a minority group; rather they are a 
still colonised people who wish to be decolonised. 
2.3. Review of Literature 
The literature on West Papuan nationalism and the resistance movement, 
the OPM, is sparse. In contrast, there are many anthropological and religious 
studies in which scholars typically describe Papuan society as consisting of a 
people who still live in the stone age, a static society still entering the 
development process. It is implied, therefore, that the Papuans are 
backward. Indonesia has always claimed Irianese were "primitive and 
needed guidance from a superior culture" ,25 and the government of 
Indonesia has argued that the presence of foreign powers was and is still an 
important factor for "civilising" these savage people. Although such 
analyses fail to address the key problems that the Papuans face today, they do 
become an important tool for understanding the dimensions of their 
current social and political problems. Attempts to analyse the political 
situation in West Papua, usually by non-Papuans, generally present an 
inaccurate account of Papuan nationalism, predict a pessimistic future, and 
regard the political problems as an internal affair for Indonesia. As a West 
Papuan, I strongly reject such distorted views, but for the purpose of 
25 Robin Osborne (1985). Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian f aya, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney, p.xvi. 
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academic debate, such views must be taken account seeking 
solution to West Papua's problems. 
A small handful of scholars has tried to analyse the motives behind the 
emergence of nationalism and political resistance in the context of 
Australian and PNG relationships to Indonesia. Robin Osborne (1985) and 
Peter King (1993), for example, have examined the policies of the Australian 
government on security in relation to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, 
and argued that Canberra must rethink its policy in order to prevent 
disintegration and militarisation m Indonesia and PNG.26 King 
acknowledged the seriousness of the problem, arguing that "Timar is one 
conflict that will not go away; the 'forgotten war' in the former Dutch 
colony of West Papua (Irian Jaya) is another" .27 Bilateral and multilateral 
relations with Indonesia have been major concerns of scholarly writing 
regarding regional stability and security. Other scholars identified a 
number of motives behind the political decisions on border agreements, 
military cooperation and the failure of international laws to guarantee 
rights of self-determination of the people of West Papua in 1969, often 
suggesting new procedures for handling ethno-nationalism within the 
international legal framework; but their emphasis is on maintaining 
friendly relations between neighbouring countries, in accordance with 
Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN No: 2625. From such a 
viewpoint, the nationalist movement in West Papua is a destabilising 
factor, and discouragement of the OPM is seen as a strategy to avoid conflict 
with Indonesia. 
26 
27 
Peter King (1993). "Breaking Deadlocks-Peace-making Opportunities for Australia in 
East Timar, West Papua and Papua New Guinea", in Kevin Clements (ed.), Peace and 
Security in the Asia Pacific Region, UNU. Press, 3, Tokyo, p. 93. 
Ibid.:84 . 
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There has also been very little discussion of the motives and origins of 
Papuan nationalism. Analysing the implications of regional politics for the 
OPM, most scholars consider that social approaches provide the best strategy 
to reduce Papuan nationalism. Among the few experts who have attempted 
to analyse Papuan nationalism are Kees Lagerberg (1979), Peter Savage 
(1982), Robin Osborne (1985), Ian Bell et al. (1986), Carmel Budiardjo (1988), 
Alan Smith (1991), Ron May (1991), Peter King (1993), Beverley Blaskett 
(1993), Martin Tsamenyi et al. (1993), and Jim Elmslie (1995). All these 
scholars are reluctant to define West Papua as a colony in literal terms, but 
they are all deeply concerned about the continuing social and political 
repression, exploitation and genocide in the country. Ian Bell et al. and 
RIOP, for example, argue that the early slave trade, the invention of 
national symbols encouraged by the Dutch during the decolonisation 
process, the bitter experiences since the Indonesian takeover, and the 
marginalisation of Papuans are the main factors in the emergence of 
political nationalism. They conclude that Papuan nationalism will continue 
to be a problem in the future, and that any immediate solution is unlikely 
for reasons already mentioned in this thesis. Despite the general pessimism 
of these scholars, their views regarding the method of resolving the conflict 
differ. Many support an autonomy arrangement, and Lagerberg 28 goes even 
further to suggest that a federal arrangement with Papua New Guinea is the 
best solution. However these writers largely fail to recognise the political 
imperative that some ideological acknowledgement is needed that self-
determination and independence are central to any debate about future 
political and legal frameworks. Savage makes a significant point when 
openly condemning Jakarta and the international community for their 
denial of the rights of the people of West Papua: 
28 Lagerberg, op.cit.:153 
The tragic history of West Irian (West Papua) has been one of 
constant betrayal in which the interests of a small Melanesian 
population have been sacrificed to those of its larger neighbours, 
proximately Indonesia and Australia and ultimately the United 
States and Japan 29 
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The most disappointing analysis of the situation in West Papua has 
been made by John R. G. Djopari, a West Papuan born academic. In his book 
Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, he argues that the West Papuan 
nationalism that was encouraged by the Dutch has already died since West 
Papua "returned to Indonesia" in 1969 and he claims that it is social 
divisions that have caused the Papuan national sentiments that are now 
expressed in the resistance movement under the coordination of the OPM. 
In his deep concern for Papuan culture and tradition, Djopari argues 
any solution to the problem must be seen in a social, rather than a political, 
context. This book raises many questions about the the 
and paints a dark future for the people of West Papua. Given Djopari's own 
Papuan background, his argument cannot be as easily dismissed, and so it is 
important to review this book closely and critically. 
Even though the subject of the rights to self-determination has been an 
important issue among political scientists for a long time, Djopari fails to 
address this issue in his book. Some attempt is made to examine the 
relationship between the policy of the Indonesian government in West 
Papua and the resistance movement, and he argues that since the military, 
or security, approach has failed to destroy the OPM, it should be replaced by 
a social approach. This conclusion is of particular significance because 
Djopari, as a Papuan, a scholar, and a senior bureaucrat in the Indonesian 
29 Peter Savage (1982). "West Papua: Handed Over to Indonesian Colonialism," in Politics 
in Melanesia, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
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civil service, could be expected to understand the problem and its 
implications clearly, and hence his support for a new social approach as the 
best way to solve the problem has been regarded as an important 
contribution to debate on West Papua in the circles of power. Yet despite all 
his qualifications, Djopari's views arouse some doubts because most of the 
"facts" presented in his book are actually speculation. 
In his introduction, Djopari discusses the background to political 
integration, resistance, and political development. His main premise 
concerning the political status of West Papua is that West Papua is 
historically an integral part of the Indonesian state because the people of 
West Papua had been sacrificed to the policy of integration in the 1950s and 
1960s. However, unequal treatment and discrimination have since brought 
about severe social and political consequences. He provides data to support 
his arguments for a relationship between the failure of integration and the 
rise of the resistance movement. He also compares the level of social 
achievement between different colonial periods, arguing that under the 
Dutch, the Papuans did better than during the Indonesian colonisation. The 
political theory of integration, developed by James J. Coleman and Carl G. 
Rosberg, is discussed at length, with a description of measures for reducing 
the social gap and addressing cultural development. The concept of 
development that was developed by Lucian W. Pye is also discussed, with 
reference to the four variables of similarity, capacity, division, and 
specialisation. 
The author then raises questions about how far the Papuans feel they 
are truly Indonesian and how far the level of participation of the Papuans in 
development affects their views on being Indonesian. These two concepts 
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are intertwined because one function vertical integration is to 
opportunities for Papuans to participate development as an 
integral part of Indonesia. This would lead to political socialisation, a 
precondition for regional stability and security. But in reality, both the 
system of integration and the participation of the Papuans in the 
development process have failed to meet expectations. 
The book also looks at the centralised state apparatus in Indonesia, and 
criticises the state as failing to address the key social and political issues that 
have triggered unrest in West Papua. According to Djopari, such political 
problems could be solved if governments at all levels focused more on 
contentious issues such as development, increasing Papuan participation in 
the development process, and adopting a social approach rather than a 
security approach to reducing Papuan nationalism. 
scholars, Djopari fails to recognise that West Papua is a 
he discusses the general characteristics and implications 
colonial systems. 
so many 
traditional 
Although Djopari states that he has written the book as a general 
account to assist state officials and the wider public in analysing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the OPM, the extent of international support, 
and the impact of the resistance on the integration process, the account is 
unreliable and often confused. For example, in the discussion of the 
foundation and structure of the OPM, he claims, "the name OPM was for 
the first time introduced in Manokwari in 1964, ... under the leadership of 
Terianus Aronggear (SE) who in the beginning was involved in the 
underground movement organising forces against the government of 
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Indonesia for political and military confrontation" .30 This account contains 
errors about the timeframe; moreover, such a well organised structure as he 
describes never actually existed. He also ignores the OPM of Jacob Prai's 
groups in the border region. In presenting this inaccurate account of the 
OPM, Djopari hopes to convince his readers that the demands of Papuan 
nationalism will gradually disappear. 31 
Djopari makes a strong and pragmatic case for the social approach, 
while challenging the Papuan community to recognise that under a policy 
of assimilation they may in the long run lose their identity. In doing so, he 
argues that ideas such as unity, equality and democracy are mystical 
concepts. On the other hand Djopari failed to predict the political, economic, 
and social changes which have taken place in Indonesia, and the current 
move towards democratisation. 
Djopari's views are extremely important to the discussion of West 
Papuan nationalism and have been one of the main inspirations for this 
study. 
2.4. Theoretical Framework 
Liberation is the ideology of resistance movements. According to Henry di 
Suvero,32 liberation is defined as freedom from any form of foreign 
domination and is recognised in the principles of international law. 
Liberation from colonialism and imperialism implies a people's rights to 
self-determination and independence; it implies that aboriginal or 
30 
31 
32 
Djopari, op.cit.:102-103. 
"In order to destroy the OPM and its influences in Irian Jaya, first of all, the ideology of 
the OPM must be destroyed. This can only be done if there is a political and good will of 
the central government, recruiting the youths of Irianese selectively into leadership 
positions and administrative offices both in and outside Irian Jaya province and also at 
the national level; as a realisation of the integration". Djopari, op.cit.:169. 
Henry di Suvero (1986). The Melanesian Response to Imperial Indonesia: West 
Papua/Irian Jaya Re-Examined, Working Paper, Annual Conference of the Australian 
University of Law Schools Association (AULSA), Goroka, pp. 6-9. 
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indigenous people have a right to maintain the separateness and 
distinctiveness of their cultures and traditions from those of the colonial 
power. 
In relation to rights to self-determination/ autonomy and 
independence, there are two competing world views: liberation ideology 
and neo-imperial ideology. In this thesis I will refer to the neo-imperial 
ideology as colonialism, but the use of the term neo-colonialism is not to be 
taken to imply that I accept Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. Like 
the majority of Papuans, I do not recognise the presence of Indonesia in 
West Papua as legitimate, but see it as a foreign occupation force. 
The Indonesian-supervised Act of Free Choice was in fact an Act of No 
Choice; the result was a product of duress, and the UN Resolution accepting 
the result was legally void.33 Papuans remain strongly of the view that 
Dutch colonialism was simply replaced by Indonesian colonialism. The 
people of West Papua are fully aware they share a common culture, a 
common geography and common racial characteristics with the other 
Melanesians who have qualified for nationhood, and perceive themselves 
as a nation separate from the Indonesians. Liberation ideology supports the 
view that the territory of West Papua is exploited economically by the 
imperial power centred in Jakarta and is governed by a classical colonial 
administration dominated by Javanese and the military, supplemented with 
co-opted local elites and owners of foreign capital. Indonesian immigration, 
both planned and spontaneous, may be seen as an imperial settlement 
strategy for genocidal purposes. This ideology views the OPM as a valid 
independence movement representing the people of West Papua. This view 
33 Ibid.:6. 
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is widely shared throughout Melanesia, among the other indigenous 
peoples, and among international ecological movements. 
On the other hand, neo-imperialism, which I prefer to call colonial 
ideology, sees the "Indonesian nation" as a legitimate collective of peoples, 
cultures and ways of life and asserts that the incorporation of West Papua in 
1969 was a final and irrevocable return to the "motherland" .34 The colonial 
ideology justifies such rule on grounds of equity, asserting that the same 
military rules should apply throughout the nation without exceptions. 
Indonesia claims that rather than exploiting West Papua as an internal 
colony, it has brought it development, creating an infrastructure of roads, 
establishing mines, breaking down isolation, and increasing educational 
possibilities. The immigrant resettlement program is justified in terms of 
equity within the Indonesian nation. It propounds the doctrine of 
assimilation and integration to create a new "Indonesian" identity 
throughout the Indonesian archipelago, replacing separate tribally-based 
ethnic identities. It justifies the predominance of Javanese in the local 
ruling elite as reflecting the "natural" Malay superiority and the inferiority 
of the indigenous peoples of West Papua. It first characterised the OPM as a 
remnant of Dutch colonialism; today it labels the OPM simply as terrorists 
or "wild gangs". The Papuans' desire for self-determination is viewed as 
subversive, and the use of the terms "Papuan" or Melanesian was banned 
until 1998, in favour of "Irianese". The Indonesian state seeks to co-opt 
Papuans through installing a local puppet elite. This ideology above all fears 
the crumbling of the empire, and internationally it invokes UN resolutions 
on incorporation as validating and legitimating Indonesian rule, using the 
language of nationalism in both describing and disguising Jakarta's imperial 
34 Ibid.:7. 
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hold over West Papua, and defining conflict in terms of border control and 
management. 
In short, old colonialism is dressed up in the language of its opposite, 
nationalism. It is called neo-imperial because it is a new form of 
imperialism, one that seeks to be excused from the post World War II 
norms of international law because of its Third World characters. Neo-
imperial ideology dominates most newly independent states throughout the 
world, including Indonesia. But it is clear, as I have argued, that Indonesian 
neo-imperialist ideology is actually part and parcel of conventional 
colonialism, disguised by a different language. Whether the colonial power 
theory or liberation ideology better explains the material reality of West 
Papua can be tested by examining recent events using the model of political 
system change that is presented below. 
2.4.1. Political System Change 
There is no general theory that explains political system change in relation 
to West Papua. Here we consider a hypothetical transition of one political 
system to another, involving the transformation of Papuan society from its 
current political status as a colony to that of a sovereign independent state, 
breaking down old boundaries and replacing them with new ones. This 
requires a total and fundamental political change, within the framework of 
both national and international laws which define the meaning and 
application of self-determination, establish who has rights to it, and indicate 
how such issues can be addressed. 
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Figure 1: Political System Change Model for West Papuan Liberation 
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Independence 1 ..... - - - - Special Autonomy 
2.4.2. Legal Framework for Self-Determination and Independence 
A number of basic principles can be applied in framing self-determination 
and independence. These are defined within normative, national and 
international legal frameworks. 
First, according to normative law, all human beings are born free and 
have the right to live free and to exercise their fundamental rights without 
interference. This principle is strengthened by Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international laws and 
convenants. Secondly, the preamble to the 1945 Indonesian state 
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constitution clearly states that "whereas freedom is the inalienable right of 
all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in 
conformity with humanity and justice" .35 As a people, the Papuans are 
treated under this norm as a social unit who have the right to exercise those 
rights and to enjoy the privileges that belong to them. 
Thirdly, international laws have clearly defined the rights and 
obligations of colonial powers and colonised peoples. The main 
instruments of these international laws are the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, two covenants on political, social, economic and cultural 
rights, international bills on Human Rights, General Assembly Resolutions, 
and UN Charters. According to the United Nations: 
All peoples have the right of self-determination and 
independence. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 36 
It is internationally acknowledged that all peoples have the right to 
self-determination and independence. This is acknowledged in the Charter 
of the UN, Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 55; under the Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of the Peoples, Articles 5, 6, and 11; and under the 
International Covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights and the 
International Covenant on civil and political rights. The provisions of these 
laws are crystal clear. The UN Charter, Chapter XI, Articles 73-74, the 
Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories, authorises "the UN 
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to be responsible for and control the administration of territories who have 
not yet attained a full measure of self government." Article 1 (3) of the same 
Declaration declares that "the parties to the present Covenant, including 
those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realisation of the rights of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" .37 
These laws also set conditions for the implementation of such rights. 
For example, Resolution 1541 of the UN General Assembly, 1960-Rights to 
Self Determination provides three main criteria for determining the 
beneficiaries of the rights: first, the territory must be geographically separate 
from the colonising state (this is referred to as "Blue Water" separation). 
Secondly, the people must be ethnically or culturally distinct from the 
colonising state. Finally, the people of the territory must be shown to be 
suffering from some form of discrimination and to be "arbitrarily placed in 
a situation of subordination"; that is, they are treated differently by the 
governing authorities to other parts of the territory and exist in a less 
developed and lower status situation (ie. they suffer from exploitation and 
discrimination). This Resolution further provides three options for such 
people of non-self-governing territories in their pursuit of self-
determination. They can choose either to become a fully independent 
nation-state, or opt for some form of association with the colonial power, or 
opt for integration. In this way Resolution 1514 sets out the criteria for 
determining those entitled to the rights of self-determination. Additionally, 
the Resolution stipulates, among other things, that "the integrating territory 
should have attained an advanced stage of Self-Government with free 
political institutions, so that its people would have the capacity to make a 
37 Ibid.:10. 
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reasonable choice through informed democratic process" 
"the integration should be the result of freely expressed wishes the 
territory's peoples acting with full knowledge the change in their status, 
their wishes having been expressed through an informed and democratic 
process impartially conducted and based on universal suffrage. The United 
Nations could, when deemed necessary, supervise this process" (1514-Vlll). 
Finally, "all armed actions or repression measures of all kinds directed 
against dependent people shall cease in order to enable them to exercise 
peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity 
of their nation territory shall be respected" (1514-IV). 
Resolution 1514 (XV) also recognises the "passionate desire for liberty 
of all dependent peoples" and proclaims "the necessity of rapidly and 
unconditionally putting an end to colonialism in all its forms;" 38 it sets out 
elements of a definition of a colonial people and provides 
manner and conditions in which the beneficiaries are to exercise and protect 
their rights. 39 This is also strengthened by Article 1-9 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which clearly recognises the inviolable rights 
of each individual, family, and community under law so that they are not 
subject to discrimination on the basis of race, sex, colour, social origin, 
property, birth or other status or held in slavery or subjected to other cruel 
treatment. When the Assembly created a Decolonisation Commission, this 
provision came into effect under Resolution No 2625 (XXV). 
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Additionally, UN Resolution No 1514 (XV) states that "sovereignty in a 
colony or in a non self-governing territory does not lie in the hand of the 
colonial power, or in the hand of an administrative authority, but in the 
hand of the people of this colony" (UN Resolution No 1514 (XV). The same 
Resolution continues: "sovereignty over a colonised territory is not 
transferable by the colonialist power to another power" but "all powers 
must be returned by the colonialist to the native people of each territory."40 
In these terms, the peoples of West Papua have full rights to self-
government and so the power over these peoples must be returned directly 
to them; control of West Papua should have been returned to Papuans not 
to Indonesia under the New York Agreement. Moreover, UN Resolution 
No 2625 XXV declares that "the duty of all states is to end colonialism and to 
stop anyone from using force against people struggling for their 
independence," and that "each colonised territory has a separate legal status 
from other colonised territories and each has the right to independence" .41 
Additionally, UN General Assembly Resolution No 2621-XXV, adopted on 2 
October has recognised any declaration of independence as a valid political 
exercise and rejected categorically all efforts to maintain a colonial 
domination over any people, which is regarded as "a crime", and has 
further recognised the inalienable rights of all colonised peoples to struggle 
with all necessary means against the colonial power.42 Resolution No 2621 
XXV, therefore, legitimates the rights of Papuans to fight against their 
colonialist rulers. 
The UN General Assembly Resolution No 2711 (XXV), adopted on 14 
October 1970, recognises the legitimacy of liberation struggle, including 
40 
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armed struggle, waged by the colonised peoples to gain self-determination; 
moreover, all UN member states were requested to aid such struggles. The 
legal status of freedom fighters who struggle against a colonial power for the 
right to self-determination was defined by the General Assembly in 1973. 
The principles agreed were as follows: "Such struggles are legitimate and in 
full accord with the principles of international law. Attempts to suppress 
struggles against colonial and racist regimes are incompatible with the UN 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as well as 
with the Principles of international law concerning Friendly Co-operation 
Among States. Such attempts constitute a threat to peace and security".43 
The same source has also stated: "the use of mercenaries against national 
liberation movements is a criminal act" .44 
Although the rights of indigenous peoples have been denied for years, 
in 1989 a new Working Group on Indigenous People, a sub-organ of the 
Human Rights groups, was formed. Since then the issue of indigenous 
people has become a major focus of international attention. In the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, the UN recognises the 
rights and freedom of indigenous people, including the preservation and 
development of ethnic and cultural characteristics and distinct identities 
and protection against genocide and ethnocide; and the right to participation 
and self-determination. The Draft also outlines mutually acceptable and fair 
procedures for resolving conflicts between indigenous peoples and states, 
involving such means as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, national 
courts, international and regional human rights reviews, and complaints 
43 
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mechanisms.45 The Vienna Declaration adopted by the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights calls for an Indigenous Decade 1994-2003 and 
the establishment of a permanent forum for Indigenous People within the 
UN system.46 
2.4.3. Referendum 
According to Farley, "a referendum is a type of issues election the function 
of which is to approve or reject a specified proposal, while a plebiscite is a 
type of referendum wherein the proposal at issue concerns the matter of 
sovereignty" .47 A plebiscite is an important mode of political participation 
and it is a principle of popular rights that people have the right to 
participate in a political decision determining the future of their own 
sovereign state. A plebiscite is characterised by popular participation, a free, 
fair and secret ballot, one person one vote in electoral constituencies, and it 
may involve peacekeepers, independent monitoring groups, international 
observers, or the supervision of the UN. Thus, a plebiscite emerges out of 
the ongoing process of diplomatic bargaining in much the same fashion as 
ceasefires, alliances, arbitration panels, wars, economic sanctions and 
international organisations.48 There are many plebiscite procedures and 
conditions that must be followed. For example, the process must include the 
initial creation of a small commission to undertake preliminary surveys on 
locale, secure records, make assessments of the local civilian administration, 
collect demographic data, ensure the withdrawal of troops, estimate the 
required number of observer forces, assess any new changes, determine the 
45 
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extent of participation, set out a time frame, and arrange finance, and civil 
administration. 49 
In a situation of uncompromising conflict, international law affirms 
that a public decision is crucial in settling disputed issues. Where the choice 
is between two or more options, such as independence and autonomy, 
voting is the generally accepted procedure for conflict resolution; the 
involvement of a third party can be crucial in setting out acceptable rules 
and regulations. The final decision usually requires something like a two-
thirds majority vote from a fair, secret and democratic referendum. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, this process was not followed in the case of 
West Papua. 
2.4.4. Autonomy 
The word "autonomy" comes from the Greek words "autos" (self) and 
"nomos" (law), which together mean self-governing, or independent in 
government without outside control.50 In common practice, it means the 
local people are given some powers in a regional government to arrange 
their own home affairs within certain limitations. According to Ramo& B. 
Ocampo, the most important factor in establishing a genuine autonomous 
region is the decentralisation of power. This involves three processes: first, 
the devolution of power or transfer of national government power, 
functions and resources to the local government; second, deconcentration 
or delegation, also involving the transfer of central government powers, 
functions and resources to its line agency field units; and third, the 
privatisation of public services and purely commercial functions to non-
49 
50 
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governmental entities. According to Ocampo, autonomy is achieved 
primarily thorough devolution, but this should be backed up by 
deconcentration and other measures at the regional level.51 
However, autonomy is not the same as decentralisation as it operates 
in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian Constitution: 
The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional 
territories together with the structure of their administration, 
shall be prescribed by statute with regard for and in observance of 
the principles of deliberation in the governmental system of the 
State, and the traditional rights in the regional territories which 
have a special character. 52 
At present Indonesia is still a unitary state; all power is ultimately in the 
hands of the central government, and the regional legislature only has 
powers to propose regulations which must be approved by the central 
government. Indonesia also has its own system of guided democracy and a 
dualistic bottom-up and top-down approach in state planning. It is to some 
degree decentralised, but at the time of writing it does not encompass 
meaningful regional autonomy. 
Autonomy can also be gained through an agreement negotiated and 
signed between the government and the opposition on a consensus basis. 
According to Game Theory, conflict resolution embodies "an assumption of 
perfect information, so that every party perfectly understands everyone's 
else's possible actions and the parties, in the end, coordinate their actions in 
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accordance some agreed-upon •53 Actually, no perfect 
information and understanding exists, an initial understanding can be 
established, based on the information available concerning root cause of 
the problem and different positions, cultures, and desires, and at the end 
parties can then work together towards rational and mutually efficient 
goals.54 Conflict resolution is, therefore, an outcome of a conflict situation 
that satisfies the inherent needs of all. A competitive process of conflict 
resolution is not true conflict resolution but merely dispute settlement.55 
Agreement on autonomy may occur through negotiation, under the 
same preconditions as in a referendum. Success is often achieved by the 
tactic of emphasising the uncontentious factors in the first place, in order to 
establish a foundation for further discussion. If such a process were to take 
place in West Papua it could provide the basis long-term political 
negotiation towards self-determination independence. 
2.4.5. Self-Determination and Independence 
"What we are experiencing ... is not the shaping of new 
coherences but the world breaking into its bits and pieces, bursting 
like big and little stars from exploding galaxies." 56 
The principles inherent in the provisions of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning the rights to self-
determination and independence enshrine these rights in international 
law. But the questions remain: who are entitled to self-determination, and 
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what type of self-determination do those people demand? In the light of 
international law and liberation theory, this thesis attempts to answer these 
questions in relation to West Papua. 
Self-determination means that a "people" determines its own future.57 
"The people" consists of a distinctive social unit within which the members 
share commonalities. Self-determination implies the right to independence 
of peoples in colonies and trust territories58 in accordance with Article 73 of 
the UN Charter. Two important aspects should be clearly understood. First, 
self-determination is a dynamic and continuous process. A people exercises 
self-determination when it determines its own future continuously. As 
illustrated in Figure No 1, the achievement of self-determination is a step 
on the path to final independence. Secondly, self-determination has both 
internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension regulates the 
relationship between rulers and ruled within the community which 
inhabits a defined territory. The external dimension regulates the 
relationship between "a self-defined territory and the outside world. It · 
makes the community a distinct political entity entitled to shape its ties, 
legal and otherwise, with other political entities, be they sovereign states, 
ethnic minority groups or international organisations" .59 Sovereignty is 
only one of the many forms these ties can take, as the examples of Niue and 
the Cook Islands have shown. 
When ethnic groups claim the right to self-determination, most often 
they are primarily interested in the external aspect. According to Kamal 
there are two distinct approaches to self-determination based on different 
forms of nationalism, namely, territorial and ethnic self-determination. 
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self-determination seeks to achieve a political status 
a defined territory and for all the people who reside in International 
law recognises only certain territorial claims as legitimate and it restricts the 
right to self-determination to people who live in territorial units within 
well defined boundaries. This criterion is established m UN General 
Assembly Resolution No 2625, which defines the criteria of legitimacy for 
colonised peoples who wish to be decolonised. Traditionally the UN has 
been concerned with maintaining friendly relationships between 
neighbouring countries and with non-interference in a state's internal 
affairs. "But Resolution No 688 (1991) of the Security Council of the UN 
broke new ground in international law, for the first time approving the 
right to interfere on humanitarian grounds."60 This allows the UN to 
intervene in the internal affairs of a given state to arrange elections, 
referenda, negotiations, and plebiscites to determine the final political status 
of a disputed territory. This approach to achieving consensus on 
determination is based on the international authority of the UN and is a 
response to the inevitable disintegration of many existing nation states. It 
promotes external self-determination. Territorial self-determination may 
also promote internal self-determination, often known as autonomy. This 
is based on civic nationalism in which the right of self-determination is 
given to those communities of individuals freely associated on the basis of a 
social contract or for other reasons. This involves a democratic process in 
which the people define their own political community, its objectives and 
its scope. 
"Ethnic self-determination presupposes identifiable ethnic nations or 
political communities of individuals who share genealogical origins."61 The 
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criteria for determining who is entitled to self-determination in this 
category are the same as those for identifying an ethnic nation; that is, a 
common ancestry, common language, common religion, common culture 
or any combination thereof. Moreover, the group should have its own 
political institutions and international recognition to give it a political 
identity as a nation-state embodying the nation's ethnically distinctive 
political entity. Self-determination entitles people to determine their own 
future, from preserving an ethnic identity to establishing relationships with 
states or other ethnic groups. Yet it poses problems. First, communal groups 
which have exercised self-government or enjoyed a degree of autonomy 
tend to aspire to independent statehood, even though such demands may 
lead to the destabilisation of the region or nation state. Secondly, it excludes 
other ethnic groups who live in the territory. This can lead to devastating 
civil wars. Thirdly, the ethnic approach reduces the importance of 
representative government as an integral part of self-determination.62 
How is this concept of ethnic self-determination relevant to the case of 
West Papua? From both the territorial and the ethnic viewpoint the 
Papuans as a distinct Melanesian ethnic group, are well qualified for self-
determination. The major objective of the OPM, as a resistance movement, 
is to achieve self-determination and independence for West Papua. 
According to Farley,63 there are two major types of resistance movement: 
secessionist and irredentist. A secessionist movement is one that seeks to 
separate a population from the existing state in order to form a new state. 
The liberation movements in West Papua, East Timor, Eriteria and West 
Sahara are examples of such movements. An irredentist movement occurs 
when a population in one state seeks to break away in order to unite with 
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their fellow nationalists in neighbouring states, such as the Somalis in 
Ethiopia. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The concepts of integration, colonialism, and nationalism and the theories 
relating to autonomy, self-determination and independence are useful 
instruments for understanding the complex nature of the issues addressed 
in this thesis. In particular, the concept of coercive integration is relevant to 
the case of West Papua; this will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
However, despite their relevance, these concepts have seldom been 
discussed in the literature covering West Papua, possibly because writers 
have been preoccupied with their own political and strategic interests in 
relation to Indonesia. The few studies which discuss West Papua generally 
paint a biased picture of the political problems and are pessimistic about the 
future of the territory and its people. Even those studies which present a 
neutral position suggest that a social approach offers the best solution to the 
problem, rather than contentious approaches such as self-determination 
and independence. 
In this thesis, a simple model for political change, which I call the 
Political System Change Model, has been constructed. The people of West 
Papua are a distinctive people who live within clear territorial boundaries 
and are entitled to claim their right to self-determination and independence 
in the light of normative, national and international laws. In the next 
chapter we will examine how and why those rights have been denied all 
these years by the international community, who themselves have agreed 
with those principles, taking particular account of international tensions 
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Chapter Three: A History of the Colonial Politics of the Denial of 
Papuan Rights 
3.1. Introduction 
The United Nations has asserted that "All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" .1 
Hassan di Tiro, in an analysis of the rights of the people of Aceh Sumatra, 
further claims that it is the duty of all states to end colonialism and to stop 
anyone from using force against their colonial subjects.2 However, in the 
case of West Papua, the situation was completely reversed. Instead of 
applying these universal principles, international bodies such as the United 
Nations took an active role in denying these rights to the people of West 
Papua by transferring the territory from one colonial power to another, from 
the Dutch to Indonesia in the 1960s. 
In this chapter, the history of West Papua will be briefly described, in 
order to provide a background for a more detailed focus on the colonial 
policy of denial and the reasons for the failure of the United Nations 
human rights principles that took place from 1962-1969. 
3.2. Background to Indonesian Interest In West Papua 
West Papua, which until recently was called Irian Jaya by Indonesia, is the 
western part of the island of New Guinea. It has an area of 421,981 square 
kilometres and shares borders with Papua New Guinea in the east, Australia 
in the south and the Moluccan islands in the west. West Papua is a land of 
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high mountain ranges, mangrove swamps and tropical jungle. The 5,030 
metre Nemang Kawi (in the local language of the Amungme) located in the 
Sudirman (previously Carstensz) mountain range is the highest mountain 
in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. West Papua has similar types of fauna and 
flora to Australia. Marsupials and gumtrees, for example, are found in the 
country, evidence that the island of New Guinea, including West Papua, 
was part of a common land mass with Australia a million years ago. 
West Papua's one and a half million indigenous people are 
Melanesians, of the same racial origin as the people in Papua New Guinea, 
Vanuatu, Kanaky, Solomon Islands, Fiji and the Torres Strait Islands. The 
Papuans' culture has much in common with that of the other Melanesians 
rather than with the Indonesian Malays. More than 257 different languages 
are spoken in West Papua.3 They are divided into two major groups. 
Languages of the Papuan Phylum are spoken mainly in the highlands and 
southern parts of the country; languages belonging to the New Guinea 
group are spoken in the coastal and islands areas, predominantly in the 
north and west of West Papua. 
Seventy-five per cent of the population live in the Baliem and Paniai 
districts and other largely mountainous regions. Warfare in traditional 
society was endemic. Unlike the rice-eating Indonesians, these people 
domesticate pigs, which play an important social role in the society, and 
grow crops such as yam, sweet potato, tapioca, taro and banana. The 
irrigation systems for these crops date back to 10,000 BC. · 
3 Summer Institute of Linguistics/SIL (1995). University of Cenderawasih, Abepura. 
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Papuan culture is now under serious threat with the influx of tens of 
thousands of Indonesian migrants, particularly from the over-populated 
islands of Java and Bali, in the last thirty years. The population on the island 
has rapidly increased. According to the 1990 census, the population reached 
1,648,708, with a growth rate of 3.46 per cent annually, the highest in 
Indonesia. Immigration has been an important component of this growth. 
The country's infrastructure is underdeveloped. The land transport 
network is poorly developed. In the past few years, the central government, 
in cooperation with provincial governments and foreign contractors, has 
been building roads connecting the north to the south, and from the west 
into the east. A primary objective of this road construction has been to 
restrict the movement of the OPM. Along the Trans Irian Highway, which 
will connect Jayapura in the north to Merauke in the south, the 
government has resettled immigrants from Java and Bali. Independent 
observations have indicated that inhabitants of these camps are in various 
ways connected with ABRI's territorial strategy, because military materials 
could be found in those camps. 
In 1960, before the occupation, 93 per cent of the population of West 
Papua were Christians. But this percentage has rapidly changed over the 
thirty-three years of Indonesian occupation. According to the 1981/82 
census, 62.3 per cent were Protestants, who dominate in the north, and 23.6 
per cent were Catholic, mostly in the south and highlands; 11.0 per cent 
were Muslim, 0.1 per cent were Hindu and 0.1 per cent were Buddhist. 4 
Islam which dominates in the west and southwest of the island was 
originally introduced by Arab traders in the early 12th century, 
4 John R.G. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Pt. Gramedia 
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predominantly in the Fakfak and Sarong districts. The number of Muslims, 
Hindus and Buddhists has increased significantly with the influx of 
immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. Papuans also have a strong link 
with the souls of their ancestors through the practice of traditional ritual 
and religions. "Cult" movements have been common. The Hai movement 
of the Amungme, for example, teaches that the souls of their ancestors will 
return and liberate them from oppression, social injustice and exploitation 
and that finally the Amungme will be a prosperous society. 
To Indonesia, West Papua is "the 26th province". It is divided into 
twelve regions, 116 districts and 881 villages. The provincial government 
has limited power to make political decisions; all provincial policies are 
highly centralised. The provincial government's powers cover such matters 
as infrastructure, education, and water and electricity supplies. The 
governor of the province is appointed by the president. Autonomy was 
promised by Indonesia before and during occupation, but has never been 
implemented. In order to restrict the movement of the OPM, Jakarta has 
established new administrative centres in Mulia, Timika and Enarotali. For 
the same purposes, Jakarta in 1999 announced a plan to form three new 
provinces, with capitals in Jayapura, Timika and Sorong5 (see political map 
below). 
West Papua is rich in resources. An article in Pacific Islands Business 
in 1994 referred to it as "Treasure Island" .6 It has oil and mineral deposits 
such as gold, copper, silver and nickel, and agricultural production, fishing, 
and forestry contribute twenty per cent to the provincial economy. The 
Freeport gold, copper and silver mine contributes one quarter of the 
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national income. Freeport Indonesia, one of the biggest gold mines in the 
world and a vital asset of the government, increased its gross revenue from 
$74 million in 1975 to $400 million in 1988.7 West Papua has a pronounced 
trade imbalance: total exports in 1976/77, for example, were valued at 
US$350 million, while the value of imports had sharply declined to US$1 
million in the same budget year. There is also mining exploration activity 
on Waigeo Island in the west and at the Cyclops mountains in Jayapura 
district. Oil found in Klamono, Sarong district, and other regions is 
exploited by multinational companies. Oil exploration started in 1934, with 
Dutch Shell, Standard and Texas Oil. In 1972, Petromer Trend, which is 
controlled by the South African Oil company, owned by Harry 
Oppenheimer, was licensed to resume drilling in Klamono oil field. 8 In 
1997, natural gas was discovered in the west of West Papua in greater 
quantities than the Natuna gas reserves in Indonesia. More than 74 logging 
companies operate in West Papua. Yet, despite these riches, on the basis of 
social indicators West Papua has been classified as one of the poorest 
provinces in the Eastern Indonesia.9 
West Papua has become a major target of Indonesianization, 
particularly through transmigration. According to the 1988 population 
census, immigrants accounted for 270,350 of West Papua's population, and 
52 per cent of these immigrants came from Java and Bali.10 The 
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transmigration program is an integral part of policies aimed at assimilating 
Papuans into Indonesian culture, tradition, and way of life. Most 
transmigrants are settled in the politically and economically strategic areas. 
This strategy of social warfare is an integral part of the Indonesian military's 
territorial strategy. It has devastating effects. By placing the transmigrants in 
the areas where the OPM has been most active, and along the Trans-Irian 
Highway, the OPM's movements have been restricted. 
Like East Timor and Aceh Sumatra, West Papua has been declared a 
military zone and, with West Papua seen as a trouble spot, rapid 
militarisation is considered to be a crucial part of the Indonesian territorial 
strategy. Under state emergency law, Papuans are not permitted to 
undertake any political activity which can be perceived as a challenge to 
Indonesian rule; Papuans are not allowed to form their own independent 
political parties. From Jayapura, the Regional Military Command directs all 
military operations against the OPM. The Irian Jaya military command, 
which is known as the Cenderawasih Division of Kodam XVII, based in 
Jayapura, has 15,000 armed men. This Division is composed of three 
regional military units called Komando Resort Militer (KOREM), eight 
Komando Distrik Militer (KODIM), and three Battalions. These are Battalion 
751 for Jayapura, Merauke and Wamena districts; Battalion 752 for Biak, 
Serui, and Paniai provinces; and Battalion 753 for Sorong, Manokwari and 
Fakfak districts. 11 A new military base for air, naval and land forces, with 
new KOREM and KODIM, was established in Timika in 1994-1996 in 
response to social and political unrest in that region. Under its dual-
function role, the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) have the right to 
intervene in civilian as well as military affairs, and under this arrangement 
11 Martin O'Hare (1989). The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya, Masters thesis, ANU, 
Canberra, p.29. 
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all levels of administration, from the centre down to sub-districts, are 
discharged by military personnel. 
3.3. West Papuan Culture 
Studies have shown that the first migration to this island from Africa to 
Asia and the Pacific islands occurred during the last ice age, about 50,000 
years ago.The migrants arrived at different periods and lived in isolation 
from one another, separated by mountains, swamps, and forests. Each group 
of migrants was thus able to retain its cultural individuality. To a certain 
degree, this explains why over 257 languages are still spoken in West Papua. 
The irrigation ditches typical of the highlands, particularly the Dani people 
of the Baliem valley, were locally invented as early as 10,000 BC. Trading 
relations with neighbouring countries such as the Moluccas, Timor, and 
Melanesian island countries in the South Pacific Ocean, and also with 
mainland Asia, were well-developed 5,000 years ago.12 The production and 
distribution of high quality pottery 'Lapita' pottery began here around 1,500 
BC when the Lapita civilisation reached its zenith. The first Bronze Age 
came to northern New Guinea around 2000 BC, with evidence of the new 
metal culture in Sentani and Tobati.13 
New methods of navigation and fishing were also developed by the 
people of the coastal regions. The coastal areas were well known to Chinese 
and Malayan seafarers long before the arrival of the first European explorers, 
and foreign cultural influences, particularly in language, music and the 
spread of Islam, were evident. 
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Western Colonisation 
The islands of the Moluccas and West Papua produced valuable trade items 
such as spices, plumes, nutmeg, massoy bark, trepang, pearl shell and 
damar. These attracted traders from China, India and Arabia in the tenth to 
twelfth centuries. They introduced such commodities to Europeans in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Europeans, wanting to trade directly 
instead of buying from the middlemen, began what was described as the 
11 discovery 11 of the new world. The Spaniard Ortiz de Retes was the first 
European explorer to land on the island of Papua, in 1545, and he gave it the 
name Nueva Guinea. Spain, however, did not colonise the island. Fifty-
seven years later, in 1602, the Dutch East Indies Company established its 
headquarters in Batavia (now Jakarta) and conquered and colonised the 
sovereign nations in the Malay Archipelago, such as Aceh Sumatra the 
Moluccas. But it did not initially colonise West Papua. 
It was not until 24 August 1828 that the Dutch occupied West Papua 
and claimed it as Dutch territory, fixing the colonial boundary at 141° east 
longitude. After that, the Dutch administered West Papua separately under 
the name the Netherlands New Guinea. During the Dutch colonial period, 
exploitation of natural resources in the colonised territories was extensive 
but there was little development of the Papuans. 14 During the Second 
World War, West Papua saw heavy fighting between the allied forces and 
Japanese troops. More than 15,000 Australian soldiers alone lost their lives 
in West Papua. 
14 Although West Papua generated export earnings in 1956/57 of £A3.6 million in non-
mining exports alone, expenditure m education was very low; it had only two MULO 
(senior high schools), both run by missions. See G.T. Roscoe (1995). Our Neighbours in 
Netherlands New Guinea, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, pp.8, 39. 
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The Papuan people launched resistance struggles against Dutch 
colonialism in many forms. One of the best known resistance movements 
was the Koreri millenarian movement among the people of Biak and 
Jayapura from 1934-1945. It began as a social and religious movement, 
seeking improvement of local social and economic conditions, but in the 
later years became more political; it demanded independence in 1942. 
During the Second World War, many members of the movement 
cooperated with Japanese occupation forces (but also fought against them 
once they realised that the Japanese intended simply to replace their former 
colonial rulers).15 
3.4.1. 1960s Decolonisation: Failure of a "Golden Age" 
The early 1960s represented a prospective "golden age" for change in West 
Papua. However, because of the ineffectiveness of the political parties, the 
lack of strong leadership and international experience, and, most 
importantly, the lack of regional sentiment among the Papuans, and 
external pressure on Indonesia, early liberation movements failed to 
maximise their opportunities. 
The Dutch colonial administration began the decolonisation process 
in 1961, promising that West Papua would be given self-determination and 
independence by 1970, in response to a request submitted by the Nieuw 
Guinea Raad.16 Under a ten year program of Papuanization, both Legislative 
and Executive Councils were established. Administratively, Netherlands 
Nieuw Guinea was divided into six regencies (Hollandia, Geelvinkbaai, 
West Nieuw Guinea, Fakfak, South Nieuw Guinea and Central Bergland) 
15 
16 
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with 73 districts. The provisional government of West Papua was given 
power to make policies in the areas of finance, social justice, culture, 
economy, labour, energy and internal affairs. Under State Regulation 
Stb:454, dated 10 November 1960, a twenty-eight member Nieuw Guinea 
Raad (Parliament) was constituted; sixteen members were elected by the 
people, and twelve were appointed by the governor. 17 
In response to the Luns Plan (a proposal for undertaking the 
decolonisation process - see below), five members of the Nieuw Guinea 
Raad called a meeting in 1961. The meeting was attended by seventy 
educated Melanesians, who formed the National Independence Council of 
West Papua. The primary tasks of the council were to prepare a draft 
constitution, national symbols and an economic plan. At a meeting held in 
Hollandia (Jayapura), a draft of a national manifesto, a national flag 
(Morning Star), a national anthem (Hai Tanahku Papua) and a name for the 
country (Papua Barat) were adopted.18 The proposals were accepted 
unanimously by the parliament.19 From 1 December 1961, the West Papuan 
National flag, the Morning Star, was raised alongside the Dutch flag. Since 
then, 1 December each year has been celebrated as National Flag Day. The 
committee also submitted an economic development program, which was 
later endorsed by the parliament. It was suggested that West Papua should 
achieve its political independence by 1971, but before this the Papuans 
should be prepared economically over ten years. Major elements of the 
development program included oil and mineral exploration in Sorong, 
nickel and copper mining in the Cyclops Mountains (Jayapura), Waigeo, and 
Freeport, and uranium mining in Tawar and the Arfak area; the 
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hydro-electric power on the Mamberamo an 
airport in Jayapura; relocation the Jayapura 
to Nabire; and the development of logging.20 
From the West Papuan point of view, the decolonisation of West 
Papua was not a serious plan but merely a manipulation of public opinion 
in response to increasing military and diplomatic pressure from Indonesia 
concerning the future of West Papua and so intended to forestall Indonesian 
demands.21 This was also the view of Arian Brand, a former Dutch officer in 
Kaimana in 1961.22 After the Round Table Agreement of 1949 signed in Den 
Haag, an agreement that provided that West Papua's future would be 
decided within one year from the date of the agreement, the relationship 
between Indonesia and the Dutch further deteriorated. Indonesian demands 
for incorporation of West Papua the republic were opposed on 
ground that the people of West Papua had little in common with the 
Indonesians in terms of ethnicity, culture, and tradition. This reaction was 
interpreted by Jakarta as a threat to its sovereignty. Jakarta increased 
diplomatic pressure on the Dutch, using the anti-Western colonial card to 
gain support from African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries. Jakarta's 
resentment was further expressed in the seizing of Dutch properties on the 
island of Java and the deportation of Dutch citizens from Indonesia. The 
announced commitment to decolonisation was also a face-saving response 
in particular to the anti-Western feeling that was manifested in declarations 
of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
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Finally, the change of policy was designed to Dutch colonial 
control over West Papua by creating an image among the Papuans of the 
Dutch as liberators. As with France in Kanaky (New Caledonia) today, the 
Dutch considered Nieuw Guinea as part of Holland, but located abroad; in 
reality they did not foresee the territory becoming an independent state. The 
Dutch argued that the Papuans were not ready to govern themselves, and 
that time was needed to educate and train them. In fact, the Dutch had 
ignored education and training during their 134 years of colonial rule in 
West Papua. 
The lack of commitment to their Papuan territory by the Dutch may 
be seen from the episode of the so-called the Luns Plan. Dr Joseph Luns, a 
former Dutch foreign minister, submitted a four-stage decolonisation plan 
to the 15th General Assembly of the UN in 1960,23 as an alternative to a 
proposal that was submitted by Indonesia and India. The Luns Plan 
stipulated that, first, there must be regulations that guaranteed the rights of 
self-determination and independence of the people of West Papua; second, 
there must be definite wishes to constitute a government with agreement of 
the UN; third, in relation to the definite wishes, full political recognition 
would be given; and, finally, the Dutch would continue to finance social 
development programs to a high standard. 
The Luns Plan envisaged the creation of a United Nations 
Trusteeship in West Papua, with the eventual goal of independence.24 The 
General Assembly would not endorse the Plan, however, as it was generally 
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seen as an attempt by Holland to perpetuate colonial Papua. 
The governments of Australia, USA and thirteen African ex-
colonies led by Cameroon rejected the Plan, suggesting that the principle of 
self-determination and independence should be upheld, as stipulated in the 
UN Charter and Convention on Human Rights. 25 Arian Brand, a former 
public servant in Netherlands Nieuw Guinea who witnessed the Act, 
argued that the Netherlands had a deep attachment to West Papua not only 
as its own territory but also on the social-cultural and racial arguments that 
the population was totally different from the rest of Indonesia.26 
3.4.2. Divided Views among West Papuans 
As well as the differences between the Dutch and Indonesians, the Papuan 
community was itself divided between pro-Indonesia, pro-Dutch and what 
Djopari has called pro-independence factions. The first supported the 
Sukarno regime and believed that integration into Indonesia be 
best political solution, the expectation that Indonesia would grant 
independence in the future. This view was manifested in the political party 
known as Suara Rakyat (Voice of People), led by Lukas Rumkorem in Biak. 
The movement was inspired by the Koreri cult, whose supporters believed 
that supernatural powers (the spirit of ancestors) would bring glory and 
prosperity to the society. They assumed that, like the material goods given 
by their colonial masters, independence would be given to West Papuans by 
Indonesia. The primary initial objective of this materialist movement was 
not, as many people believed, the independence of Nieuw Guinea, but 
improvements in the local social conditions of the people on the island 
where the Rumkorem clan ruled. But later, notably during the era of 
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movement became more politically 
oriented and played a crucial role in the process of integrating West Papua 
into Indonesia. 
Like the Suara Rakyat, two other political parties, Komite Indonesia 
Merdeka (KIM) and Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian (PKII), which were 
initiated by pro-Indonesian groups in Hollandia (Jayapura) and Serui, 
wanted West Papua incorporated into Indonesia. As a result of an effective 
propaganda campaign, one third of the West Papuan population, notably 
the people of Biak, Serui, coastal Sorong and Jayapura, became active 
supporters of these movements, and anti-Dutch and pro-independence 
sentiment was widespread. Subsequently, many leaders of the pro-
Indonesian group were arrested and sentenced to long periods 
imprisonment. 
Human rights abuses and a feeling of Asian brotherhood encouraged 
members of the various movements to seek new alliances. The Sukarno 
regime, which was campaigning to take over West Papua, welcomed these 
internal divisions in the struggle to destroy Dutch colonialism in West 
Papua. Before the military occupation occurred, Jakarta sent its own military 
and political agents into the country. In the presence of these pro-
Indonesian groups, the underground network was extended. As an 
expression of Jakarta's gratitude for the excellent work done by pro-
Indonesian groups, Seth Rumkorem, the son of Lukas Rumkorem, for 
example, was given free education in the military academy in Bandung, 
West Java, even though he did not meet physical and academic 
requirements. During his period at the military academy, Rumkorem was 
elected vice chairman XVII of the Communist Party (XVII was the status of 
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Irian . Seth Rumkorem's Rumkorem, was 
promoted to Major Titular of Indonesian Marine Forces.27 
In contrast, pro-Papua groups wanted West Papua to become an 
independent state. They were divided into two groups: those who sought 
cooperation with the Dutch and those who opposed cooperation with the 
Dutch.28 The first group cooperated with the Dutch in the hope that the 
Dutch would uphold their promises and that by 1970 West Papua would be 
independent. Like the pro-Indonesian group, this group became dependent 
on external help. The pro-Dutch group established Gerakan Persatuan 
Nieuw Guinea (GPNG) under the leadership of educated Papuans such as 
Nicolaus Youwe, Markus Kaisiepo, John Eriks and Baldus Mofu. When the 
Dutch were defeated, most leaders of this group, including Nicolaus Youwe 
and Markus Kaisiepo, left the country and sought political asylum 
Netherlands, hoping an international campaign be intensified 
under sponsorship of the Dutch government. For this purpose, Komite 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (KPKPB), chaired by Nin Youwe who 
was assisted by Markus Kaisiepo, the most prominent Papuan leaders at the 
time, established its new operational base in Holland. The relocation of the 
leaders was criticised by the new generation, who called themselves the 
Generation of '69, for leaving the country and abdicating responsibility. But 
a former member of Nieuw Guinea Raad dissented. According to W i m 
Zonggonau, it was important for the movement to maintain the security of 
its leaders. The logic behind the decision was explained in the following 
words: 
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a committee meeting in 1961, we discussed a few important 
points, regarding mobilisation of people and the urgent need of a 
declaration of Independence. But we faced deadlock. The majority 
agreed to accept the New York Agreement in order not to upset 
the Dutch. One reason was the promises that were made by the 
Queen of The Netherlands that her government would not leave 
West Papua and would have a strong commitment to defend the 
country at any cost. This political statement of the Queen created a 
strong impression among the Papuans. This was the basic reason 
why leaders such as Y ouwe and Kaisiepo trusted too much the 
Dutch. We also discussed the security of the leaders. The 
committee decided that prominent leaders-Youwe and 
Kaisiepo-should leave the country and establish a new 
diplomatic base in Holland, hoping that the government of the 
Dutch would uphold its promises, supporting their work. But in 
reality, the Dutch government has done nothing so far. 29 
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In Holland, Youwe was elected chairman of the KPKPB, Markus Kaisiepo 
vice chairman, and Jufuay, Decky Kerewa, Manusway, Henk Inggamer, 
Zacky Zawor, David Hindom, Ben Tanggahma and Herman Womsiwor 
were members. Their hopes intensifying the campaign, however, were 
never met; the government of Holland was reluctant to help them. West 
Papua, the KPKPB was abolished when Indonesia took control of the 
country. 
The non-cooperation groups believed in self-help and argued that any 
fundamental political change in West Papua required that the Papuans 
themselves make a strong commitment and have an effective political 
strategy. These groups were represented by two influential political parties: 
Partai National (PARNA), headed by Herman Wayoi, and Nasional Partai 
Papua (NPP), headed by Nicolaas Tanggahma, a former member of the 
Nieuw Guinea Raad. The NPP represented Catholic political interests 
dominant in the southern and highlands parts of West Papua, while 
P ARNA was based in Protestant-dominated areas in the north. These parties 
29 Wim Zonggonau (18 January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
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played an important role during the transition period, mobilising the people 
and organising an underground network to boycott the Act of Free Choice in 
1969. In cooperation with churches and politicians, the organisations 
planned to have meetings with the central government of Indonesia and its 
special representative to West Papua, Sudjarwo, to discuss the proposed 
Pemungutan Pendapat Rakyat (PEPERA) (plebiscite). These organisations 
suggested that the Papuan leaders in exile, Jouwe and Kaisiepo, be brought 
in to discuss the issue of West Papua and how the plebiscite could be 
implemented. Concerning the crucial need for talks, members of the 
provincial parliament submitted a petition to Ortiz-Sanz, the special 
representative of the UN during the PEPERA. In response, the parliament 
was abolished and the people of West Papua were never given a chance to 
discuss the issue with the government of Indonesia.30 
This division of people on the basis of their political convictions was 
the first sign of weakness of the Papuan community in the liberation 
struggle, and it was used by Indonesia to further its own political and 
strategic interests. 
3.5. Military Confrontation 1961-1962 
As mentioned above, the internationalisation of the issue of West Papua 
posed a serious political threat for Indonesia's strategic interests in West 
Papua. Jakarta's attempts to gain political support at the UN's General 
Assembly were repeatedly defeated, challenging the logic behind the 
territorial claim. West Papuan claims were supported by most newly 
independent African states of the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups. The 
Sukarno regime attempted to persuade newly-elected American President 
30 Ibid., interview. 
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Kennedy his counterpart in Canberra, but neither Washington nor 
Canberra wanted to embarrass their longstanding ally, the Dutch. On the 
other hand, Washington and Canberra had strategic interests the South 
Pacific. Indonesia, with one of the biggest Communist parties in the world, 
could have posed a real danger to Western interests in the region. The 
Western interests were already under threat, following their loss of 
influence in North Korea and Vietnam and the emergence of the 
Communist movement in the Philippines. Washington's concern over 
these developments was exacerbated when the Sukarno regime sought 
military and financial support from the Soviet Union and China. In January 
1961, General Nasution, who led the arms mission to Moscow as Armed 
Forces Commander, came back with $400 million of arms; this represented a 
substantial increase in power for the Indonesian armed forces. 31 
Thus strengthened, Indonesia increased military pressure on 
Dutch in early 1961. The Sukarno regime mobilised the masses and declared 
Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikora or Three People's Commands) on 19 
December 1961 in Jogyakarta. The declaration abolished the state of West 
Papua created by the Dutch, authorised the raising of the Red and White flag 
of Indonesia in Irian Barat, and urged people to be ready to participate in a 
general mobilisation in order to defend national independence, unity and 
the people.32 President Sukarno declared war against the Dutch over West 
Papua in 1962. More than 75,000 troops, who were stationed in Ambon, the 
capital city of the Moluccas, supported by warships bought on credit from 
Eastern Europe33 launched attacks on Dutch military bases in West Papua, 
particularly on the southern coast. Considerable number of the Indonesian 
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paratroops were dropped not only in the coastal and urban cities but also in 
the interior areas. The operation went quickly and smoothly, partly because 
an information and intelligence network had already been established ten 
years previously before the actual military annexation occurred. This was in 
part due to the work of pro-Indonesian Papuan groups, such as KIM and 
PKII (which are generally known as Gerakan Merah Putih (GMP)). The 
Dutch forces consisted of a West Papuan Battalion (Kasoari Battalion), 
prepared by the Dutch as an integral part of its Papuanization program, and 
Dutch air, marine and land forces equipped with modern arms. But the 
Dutch could not defend themselves from the attack once the Western allies 
had shifted their support to Indonesia. Like the Japanese and the USA, 
Australia refused to assist and its harbours were denied to Dutch cargo ships. 
The position of the Dutch deteriorated, leading to a deadlock. But the most 
humiliated people were the people of West Papua, because their rights were 
denied and their future became uncertain. 
3.6. The Politics of Denial 
The rapid gain of communist influences in Indonesia, notably through the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the second largest Communist party in 
the world after China, and the strong commitment of Jakarta to gain 
political control over West Papua at any cost, alarmed Washington and 
Canberra. Such developments were seen as a threat to regional stability and 
security, and, most importantly, as undermining the hegemonic power of 
the USA and its Western allies in the South Pacific. Washington did not 
want a repetition of the Vietnam and Korean wars in the South Pacific. 
Canberra and Washington therefore turned away from the Dutch and gave 
their support to the Sukarno regime. Washington argued: 
At all events, the US did not want immerse itself a war with 
Indonesia over 700,000 Papuans and nothing else. The war would 
be unwinnable for both sides and would involve the Soviets. On 
every count, the costs were too high to contemplate backing the 
Dutch with troops.34 
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These international actors considered regional security more 
important than the right of the Papuans to form an independent state. The 
USA, one-time champion of democracy and opponent of colonialism, 
abandoned these values when its interests in Asia and Pacific regions were 
in danger. Washington handed over responsibility to its ambassador to the 
UN, Ellsworth Bunker, who acted as special ambassador for the Acting 
Secretary General in formulating a document, referred to as the Bunker 
Plan, which posed an alternative plan to the Dutch and Indian proposals. 
Unlike the Dutch proposal, which favoured the Papuans (with some 
reservations), the Bunker Plan attempted to create a balance interests 
between Indonesia, the Dutch and the Papuans. it failed. fact, 
Washington had already chosen sides, favouring Indonesia. 
In order to present the USA as a world champion of democracy, 
liberty and peace, Washington played a mediating role in the conflict. Based 
on the Bunker Plan, the New York Agreement (NYA) was signed on 15 
August 1962 between the Dutch, Indonesia and the USA; the Papuans, the 
subject of the conflict, were excluded. The twenty-nine articles of the 
Agreement satisfied Indonesia, the USA and Australia; the Dutch suffered 
the pains of growing isolation. These political manipulations and the 
reluctance to take a humanistic approach, in the name of regional political 
stability and security, were the starting point of political alienation for the 
Papuans. 
34 Morris, op.cit.: 110-111. 
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The future of West Papua was decided by the New York Agreement, 
not by the later Act of Free Choice (AFC) in 1969, as many people believe. 
The Agreement transferred political power from the colonial power, the 
Dutch, to a new colonial power, Indonesia, through direct pressure from the 
Kennedy government of the USA and contrary to UN Resolution 1514-X, 
which says: 
Sovereignty in a colony or in a non self-governing territory does 
not lie in the hand of the colonial power, or in the hand of an 
administrative authority, but in the hand of the people of this 
colony.35 
The same resolution states that sovereignty over a colonised territory is not 
transferable by the colonial power to another power. All power must be 
returned by the colonialist to the native people of each territory. Here the 
transfer of power from the Netherlands to Indonesia made a mockery of the 
UN Charter and General Assembly resolutions against colonialism. 
Let us examine the provisions of the Agreement. In the first place, the 
Papuans were not allowed to express their views; their future was decided by 
three actors, the Dutch, Indonesia and the USA. The patronising attitudes of 
those actors reflected their views about the political culture of the Papuans, 
whom they saw as people still living in the "stone age". But under the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article: 6): "Everyone has the right 
to recognition everywhere as a person before the law" .36 Even if the Papuans 
were indeed so "primitive", this article gives the Papuans the right to 
participate in any agreement affecting their status. Articles 2, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13 
35 
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of the Agreement also denied those fundamental human rights by giving 
Indonesia control over West Papua37 and making it impossible for the 
Papuans to protest against the injustice. Articles 2 and 12 provided that 
power would be transferred from the Dutch to the United Nations 
Temporary Authority (UNTEA) and in turn to Indonesia at "any time". 
This was clearly contrary to UN Resolution No:1514-XV. Furthermore, 
Article 7 denied Papuan rights to political power and replaced the Papuans 
in the military and police forces with Indonesians. Most importantly, Article 
18 denied the international convention of a "one-person-one vote" 
plebiscite and allowed the use of Musyawarah (consultation)38 in the Act of 
Free Choice of 1969, on the basis that the Papuans were not ready to adopt 
international practice. Finally, Article 16 limited the role of the UN to 
advice, participation and assistance, denying it responsibility for organising 
the plebiscite, which was entrusted instead to the new colonial power, 
Indonesia. Again, this was in contravention of the UN's Charter XI, where 
Articles 73-74 of the Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories 
give the UN responsibility for and control over the administration of 
territories which had not yet attained a full measure of self government.39 
Consequently, the Papuans refer to the Musyawarah as the Act of No 
Choice. 
Thus, West Papua was sold out in the interests of regional stability, 
and in the eyes of the Papuans the UN lost its credibility. The UN was seen 
37 
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simply as a servant of powerful states and transnational companies. The 
situation became worse even before the Act of Free Choice occurred, 
particularly following the introduction of the Anti-Subversion Law No 11, 
1963.40 This law denied all Papuans' rights. Presidential Decree No 8, 1963 
banned the Papuan rights to freedom of expression, association, 
demonstration, publication and movement. This contravened Article 
XXII/l of the Agreement which said: 
The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, 
including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of 
assembly of inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the 
existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the 
transfer of administration to the UNTEA.41 
During the eight months of the UNTEA administration, the Papuans were 
haunted by fear, intimidation, torture, execution and uncertainty. When the 
Indonesian government took control over West Papua, the process of 
Indonesianization of all aspects of life immediately started. West Papua was 
immediately renamed "Irian Barat" and then "Irian Jaya"; the city of 
Hollandia, which Papuans called Port Numbay, was renamed Kota Baru 
(New Town), and then Sukarnopura, and finally Jayapura. The name of 
Papua was forbidden and only the use of the new name "Irian" was 
permitted. The mountain Nemang Kawi (the Papuan name), which 
previously was Carstensz Peak, was renamed Sukarno Peak. Human rights 
abuses were widespread in every corner of the country. Freedom of 
movement, freedom of association, and rights to demonstration were all 
restricted, and publications were censored. Freedom of movement was 
restricted by introducing the "Kartu Penduduk" (travel pass) system, like 
that used in South Africa during Apartheid. The Nieuw Guinea Raad was 
40 
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replaced by an appointed Regional Assembly. Student and military 
organisations were banned. The Papuans' national symbols, political parties, 
the Nieuw Guinea Raad, the Papuan Battalion and police forces, and the 
Dutch educational system, were all dissolved. The Papuan elite in the public 
service and the defence forces and also the UNTEA personnel were rapidly 
replaced by Indonesians. Properties left by the Dutch were appropriated and 
transferred to Indonesia. The functions of the "peace keeping force" (mostly 
from Pakistan) were systematically taken over by the Indonesian military 
and police. 
The fifty Papuan members of parliament were reduced to sixteen 
members.42 After dissolving the Nieuw Guinea Raad, Indonesia established 
nine "representative councils" whose members were appointed. The 
selection of consultative assembly representatives was regulated by 
government Decree number 31, 1969 which stated that 
Members of the consultative assemblies were to be chosen 
through musyawarah. The same decree said that members of the 
representative councils who were appointed and not elected 
would automatically become members of the consultative 
assemblies.43 
Three requests were submitted to the government of Indonesia. The first 
two were made by members of the Nieuw Guinea Council under the 
leadership of Nicolaus Tanggahma, member of Nieuw Guinea Raad, and 
Herman Wayoi of PARNA. Following a Congress decision of September 
1962, they urged that the UNTEA should respect the national flag and 
anthem of West Papua and that the plebiscite should be held in 1963 during 
the UNTEA's period of authority. The third request came from Ortiz-Sanz 
42 
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on 29 April 1969, urging a general amnesty for the opposition. All these 
proposals were rejected on the ground that an uprising in Paniai would 
influence a decision. Ortiz-Sanz also requested that the government allow 
the opposition to express its views; this too was ignored.44 
The primary objective of these attempts was to allow for a fair 
outcome of the plebiscite. However, Jakarta had a different agenda. For 
Jakarta, the purpose of the plebiscite was to create a good image; the real 
transfer of power had already been decided by the New York Agreement on 
15 August 1962. As Jakarta knew that a "yes" vote was assured, the plebiscite 
was not regarded seriously. The UN representative had no power over the 
consultative assembly, which was held from 10 July (in Merauke) to 2 
August 1969 (in Sukarnapura Uayapura]). As result of manipulation, 
intimidation, killing, and bribery, all of the 1,026 appointed "consultative 
representatives" confirmed the ties with Indonesia; all of them, without 
exception, publicly supported the decision made in the New York 
Agreement to bring West Papua into a new era of colonialism. When the 
decision was announced, many Papuans were disappointed and decided to 
leave the country. One of the victims was Otto Ondawame who witnessed 
the final stage of the Act on 2 August 1969. He spoke with freelance 
journalist Mark Worth in April 1997, expressing his painful experiences in 
the following words: 
44 
At the last day of the PEPERA that was held in Jayapura on 2 
August 1969, I stood among a crowd in the front of the Governor's 
Palace in Jayapura. Like the others, I was not allowed to stand 
nearby where the vote took place. Despite this restriction, I could 
see from far away how the vote process was conducted. The 
"representatives" put their hands up, indicating "yes" or "no" to 
the questions concerning the future of West Papua. None of them 
said 'No" to integration to Indonesia. There was not any secret 
Ibid.:13. 
ballot system that allowed voters to express their real feelings. 
Like the other witnesses, I became very sad and could not 
back my tears because it was the future of West Papua that has 
been decided in favour of Indonesia and the rights of Papuans 
denied. 45 
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The passing of the Act was a great political setback for the Papuans. Many 
people attempted to persuade the UN representative that it was not 
legitimate. More than 179 petitions expressed discontent over the conduct of 
the Act and complained of ill treatment. The petitions and letters contained 
criticisms, complaints, and requests to release political prisoners, and 
demanded participation in the Act by all Papuans. For the UN, this was a 
major political and diplomatic failure. Even though the credibility of the 
UN was at stake, the UN representative could do little but act as an observer, 
as Article 16 of the Act stipulated. 
In his report to the General Secretary of the UN, Dr U. Thant, 
Sanz expressed his concern about the outcome of the Act in the following 
words: 
I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the 
implementation of Article XXII of the Agreement, relating to 'the 
rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement 
and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area'. In spite of my 
constant efforts, this important prov1s10n was not fully 
implemented and the (Indonesian) Administration exercised at 
all times a tight political control over the population.46 
This manipulation of the Act of Free Choice to annex West Papua shocked 
the world community, particularly the newly independent countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, whose leaders such as President Kwame 
45 
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Nkrumah of Ghana, President Nasser of Egypt and President Patrice 
Lumumba of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) had agreed at the 
first Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Bandung not to use military 
interference against other countries. The thirteen French-speaking African 
countries of the Brazzaville Group, later joined by the Monrovia Group 
(Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Zambia) and Egypt, 
adopted the Brazzaville Resolution, which condemned the Indonesian 
occupation and called for bilateral negotiations and international support 
for the cause of the people in West Papua. In a challenging speech to the 
UN General Assembly, Ghanian Ambassador to the UN, Mr Akwei referred 
to the injustice of the Act of Free Choice: 
We in Africa have suffered politically at the hands of the 
colonialist in the past who were determined to apply similar 
methods to our political evolution ... These colonialist have used 
the same arguments that have been used about the people of 
West Irian ... On the basis of such arguments, the Ian Smith 
regime in Southern Rhodesia has claimed to be able to ascertain 
the will of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia by 
consulting the chiefs .... 47 
When general secretary of the UN, Dr U. Thant, presented the report 
of Dr Ortiz-Sanz, the UN special representative to the Act, a group led by 
Ghana and Togo expressed their dissatisfaction at the conduct, procedure 
and outcome of the Act and urged a new plebiscite under the international 
code of conduct and the direct responsibility of the UN. This had little effect 
on the Assembly; however, despite Indonesia's attempts to get the General 
Assembly to endorse the outcome of the Act, the General Assembly simply 
'Took Note' of the report, as Appendix No: 01, including the complaints and 
reservations made by the UN special mission. The UN has never endorsed 
47 Gavan Breen (1979). "West Papua: A Call for Help-the History from 1945 to 1962", 
Social Justice Group of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart Catholic Parish, Alice Springs, 
p.9. 
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the outcome of the Act nor recognised West Papua as an integral part 
Indonesia. A broader debate on the report was thus excluded. Czerapowicz, 
who made a comparative study of Leticia in Colombia and West Papua, 
concluded that the UN failed its obligation in the case of West Papua, from 
start to end.48 
For West Papuans, the United Nations completely lost its reliability 
in 1969 and is no longer a trusted body in the eyes of the Papuans. Only by 
reopening the case can the trust of the people be restored. Reopening the 
case in the UN is still possible, because "taking note" of the report of the UN 
special representative does not amount to ratification by the General 
Assembly. The UN knew that the whole procedure and outcome of the Act 
was wrong terms of its own principles. More important was the protest 
made ambassadors of the African countries. The issue West Papua 
still open, and needs to be reexamined. 
3.7. Conclusion 
Historically, the people of West Papua have inhabited the island of "New 
Guinea" for many thousands of years and have developed their own unique 
culture and tradition which have nothing culturally in common with the 
cultures of the Indonesian peoples. Since the first Asian and European 
explorers arrived in the country West Papua has systematically been subject 
to oppression, resource exploitation, and unwanted foreign cultural 
influences. One positive impact of Dutch colonial rule was the emergence of 
Papuan nationalism, which developed with the decolonisation and 
recolonisation processes that took place in the early 1960s. On the other 
48 John Vincent Czerapowicz (1972). International Territorial Authority: Leticia and 
West New Guinea, Phd Thesis, Indiana University, Indiana, pp. 226-229. 
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hand, the forcible imposition of Western and Indonesian cultural forms, in 
such areas as language, dress, school system and way of thinking, have 
posed a serious threat to Papuan cultures. 
The divide-and-rule policies deployed by both colonial powers 
impacted on the political convictions of the Papuans during the transition 
period of the 1950s and 1960s. Divisions between pro-Dutch and pro-
Indonesian groups within Papuan society reflected the empty promises of 
the Dutch and the Indonesians. The ultimate lack of commitment by the 
Dutch was evident in their reluctance to continue to support the West 
Papuan leaders in the Netherlands in their campaign for self-determination. 
The violation of the rights of the people of West Papua, including the 
rights to self-determination and independence, in the 1960s ran totally 
counter to international principles on human rights. The rights of the 
people were denied for the sake of maintaining regional and international 
stability. The case of West Papua demonstrates that democracy means little 
when the interests of the superpowers are endangered. The USA claims to 
be a champion of human rights and liberty, yet in the context of Cold War 
politics it forced the Dutch to transfer West Papua to Indonesia by the New 
York Agreement in 1962. Quite simply, the people of West Papua have, 
without their consent, paid a very high price for the interests of regional 
stability and security. 
The USA and its Western allies empowered the UNTEA 
administration and left it to implement the so-called Act of Free Choice in 
1969. As a result of this shameful Act, the rights of Papuans to self-
determination were denied. The United Nations and its member states 
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failed to address the West Papuan issue in the terms of international laws 
and conventions, and the resolutions of the UN General Assembly 
regarding the rights of peoples. Although the main external actors achieved 
their aims, the outcome was a severe setback for the future of the people of 
West Papua. The failure of the Dutch and American governments and the 
United Nations to consult the people of West Papua regarding the proposed 
transfer of political power was a serious dereliction of responsibility and 
marked the beginning of a new era of colonisation. 
While the chances of reopening an international debate about the 
future of West Papua may seem unlikely in the post-Cold War era, it might 
be possible, if the democratic process takes root in Indonesia, for Papuans to 
express their desire for independence. The use of international legal 
mechanisms, such as an appeal to the International Court of Justice in Den 
Haag, is an alternative, but West Papua is not internationally recognised as a 
nation-state with rights to sue other nation-states, and the sponsorship of 
another state would thus seem to be essential. 
The rule of the Indonesian government has been no better than that 
of the previous Dutch government. It has continued the pattern of colonial 
practices with a difference face. Despite the continued denial of their rights, 
the people of West Papua, coordinated by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM), have continued to pursue their claims to self-determination. 
However, the OPM has not yet been able to achieve its national goals. The 
reasons for this failure will be examined in the following chapter which 
analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM from an historical 
perspective. 

Chapter Four: The History of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM) 
4.1. Introduction 
Having considered the basis for the growth of national sentiment in West 
Papua, it is now necessary to examine the role of the OPM as the national 
organisation which transformed this national sentiment into action. 
A successful organisation must have such characteristics as: 
managerial ability, skill and knowledge; coherence; clear aims and 
objectives; vision; programs, strategies and action plans; and most 
importantly a clear structure and good leadership with well defined areas of 
accountability. 1 
Good leadership, according to Andrew Leigh, is demonstrated when 
"people with certain motives and purposes mobilise resources so as to 
arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers''.2 A leader should have 
a clear sense of direction; an ability to involve the whole organisation; a 
willingness to encourage, initiate, and take risks; tolerance; a management 
style, and should place emphasis on teamwork.3 Personal ability is 
important in influencing others through a persuasive magic, but it needs to 
be supplemented by good communication, and personal influence. 
Leaders gain their positions by various means, including birth, 
performance, influence and appointment; so, too, there are many types of 
leadership. According to Maxwell, four main types of leaders occur in the 
2 
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modern organisation: the leading leader, the learned leader, the latent 
leader and the limited leader.4 The first is characterised by natural 
leadership qualities from early in life; by becoming a leadership model 
throughout his or her life, by enhancing leadership skills through training, 
and by exercising self-discipline. The second type of leader displays the same 
characteristics as the first but, not being born with leadership qualities, he 
has to acquire them deliberately. In the third type of leadership, a person 
starts as a role model and then takes on leadership; the final type achieves 
leadership through personal ambition and drive. Modern leadership 
requires personal ability, self-discipline, good attitudes, a clear sense of 
direction, a charismatic and strong personality, and the ability to 
conceptualise goals and strategies. 
A successful organisation must have a well structured working 
system, in which all tasks and lines of responsibility are well defined and 
organised. Most modern organisational structures have both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions. In a vertical structure, the role of each subordinate 
sector is organised on a top-down and bottom-up basis, providing a two-way 
communication system. All decisions are made at the top and passed down 
to the next level and so on to the local level; it is expected that feedback will 
be returned from the bottom, through the various levels, to the top. In the 
OPM, for example, the Political Bureau of the National Executive Council 
(NEC) acts as an executive committee, providing directives, plans and 
coordination to regional executive councils which, in turn, direct the district 
executive councils and so on down to the village councils. The vertical 
system is in principle straightforward and highly bureaucratic; it has the 
advantage that it protects the secrecy of the organisation. On the other hand, 
4 Maxwell, op.cit. :ix. 
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this approach has potential disadvantages: it can become too bureaucratic, 
requiring excessive time to formulate and execute plans; it can also create 
gaps between one level and another; and it typically suffers from a lack of 
mass participation in the decision-making process. Additionally, the highly 
centralised authority means that regional units have very little influence in 
their own local affairs. Such weaknesses have been evident in the OPM 
structure. 
In a horizontal structure, by contrast, decisions at the top are arrived 
at by reference to appropriate committees or sectors lineally. One of the 
advantages of this structure is that it provides wider opportunities to engage 
in mass political discussion at various levels and to provide feedback based 
on collective opinion. Decisions become a collective responsibility. On the 
other hand, the system also has disadvantages, including delays in the 
decision process because of the time taken in consultation and opinion 
gathering. 
In the following, the OPM will be examined from an historical 
perspective and leadership and organisational factors will be assessed in 
relation to the changing political environment in which the OPM has 
operated. The primary objectives are to investigate the working relationship 
between the political and military councils and the regional commands; to 
show the link between the OPM's expansion in the past and the current 
guerrilla campaigns; to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM 
organisation; to trace the growth of nationalist sentiment; and to indicate 
the difficulties of achieving national unity and reconciliation. Finally, I 
attempt to show how the OPM might, by reflecting on its past experiences 
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and mistakes, engage in a constructive redevelopment of its organisation in 
a rapidly changing political and socio-economic context. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the history of the OPM can usefully 
be divided into four main periods: 
1. 1965-1970: the origins of the OPM. 
2. 1971-1975: declaration of independence and provisional government. 
3. 1976-1990: leadership split and its political and military implications. 
4. 1990-1999: the OPM in the "New Order". 
4.2. The Origins of the OPM (1965-1970) 
West Papuans have resisted foreign occupation as far back as the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, when slave traders were already operating in the 
region. 
During the Dutch colonial period, Papuan resistance against the 
colonial power can be traced back to the period before World War II, when 
anti-colonialism was often associated with millenarian tendencies 5 in 
many parts of West Papua. One example of this type of resistance was the 
"Koreri movement" on the island of Biak. This movement first arose to 
demand improvement of social conditions, but it became politically 
oriented. Proto-nationalist groups in Biak declared "independence" and 
raised a West New Guinea flag in 1942 during the Japanese occupation.6 The 
movement was immediately crushed and the leaders were arrested and 
imprisoned, but inspired other movements to action in years to come. 
6 
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Resistance against foreign occupation forces has intensified during the 
period of Indonesian colonisation since 1965, through the activities of the 
OPM. The recent widespread protests in urban centres such as Abepura, 
Jayapura, Timika and Jakarta, and the intensification of guerrilla campaigns 
in the 1990s, refute Jakarta's claim that the OPM has been crushed. 
4.2.1. The Birth of the OPM 
The exclusion of the Papuans from the New York Agreement in 1962, which 
led to the abandonment of the decolonisation process promised by the 
Dutch, severely upset the Papuan people. The consequent feelings of 
frustration, mounting discontent over ill-treatment, discrimination and 
political domination, and, most importantly, broader desires for self-
determination and independence in West Papua, culminated in the 
Manokwari military uprising of 1965. Soldiers who deserted from the 
Papuan Battalion (known as Battalion Kasuari), hundreds of employees of 
the departments of forestry and agriculture, and 14,000 militia, led by two 
brothers, Lodwick and Barren Mandatjan, attacked the Kebar military and 
police posts on 26 July 1965 during a flag-raising ceremony, and declared an 
independent Papuan State. 
This event became known as the Kebar Uprising. Two days later, on 
28 July 1965, 400 armed men led by Ferry Awom attacked the ABRI outpost 
of Infantry Battalion 641 in Arfak, Manokwari. Applying hit and run tactics, 
the attackers vanished, having laid homemade mines, and waged 
psychological warfare. They seized 1,000 arms as well as destroying the 
military and police posts. These events are regarded as the first significant 
activities of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), a name given by the 
occupation forces to any organisation in West Papua that had secessionist 
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ideas;7 later they were referred to as 'terrorist organisations' or 'wild terrorist 
gangs', Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK). 
Despite this, Djopari has claimed that the OPM was born of political 
perceptions created by Terianus Aronggear. Djopari presents a diagram of 
the organisational structure of the OPM, and an action plan.8 But this 
analysis has been strongly criticised by many observers. Rex Rumakiek, for 
example, states firmly that such a name and organisational structure did not 
exist at that time (except, perhaps, as an abstract concept).9 The truth is that 
the OPM was born out of the Papuans' national aspirations, not in the 
aftermath of Dutch colonial rule, as the Indonesian government claims. As 
discussed elsewhere, the Dutch had agreed to start the decolonisation 
process in the 1960s and had accepted new national symbols, such as an 
anthem, flag and parliamentary structure, as presented by the National 
Preparatory Council for Independence of West Papua. While the mcHivation 
for such initiatives is questionable, I would argue that they played a crucial 
role in encouraging the organisation of Papuan nationalism. 
The emergence of West Papuan nationalism, and the guerrilla attacks 
in the Manokwari district, threatened the position of the Indonesian 
occupation forces. Jakarta did not want the history of RMS in the Moluccas, 
PERMESTA in north Sulawesi, and PRRI in Acheh-Sumatra in the 1950s to 
be repeated in West Papua. Deploying the Operasi Kesadaran (Consciousness 
Operation) program and using a "persuasive approach", the ABRI launched 
its first counter-insurgency operation against the OPM at Manokwari in 
7 
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August 1965. Under the command of Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie, 
KODAM XVII Trikora of Irian Jaya (1965-69) attacked the area from air, land 
and sea. There were heavy civilian casualties and much damage to property. 
By the end of 1967, more than 3,000 village people had been killed. Quoting 
from Brian May, an AFP correspondent who covered the 1969 "Act of Free 
Choice", Carmel Budiardjo of Tapol says, "the Indonesians gradually wore 
them down, bombing them, cutting them into isolated groups and starving 
them from their hiding places" .10 The resistance leaders, including the 
Mandatjan brothers, were arrested; the Mandatjan brothers were given a 
Presidential amnesty, and were promoted to major and captain titulars 
respectively by the ABRI. Two weeks later, Ferry Awom with 800 of his 
followers surrendered. The fate of A worn is not clear to this day, but 
Papuans believe he was executed and his body thrown into the sea. One year 
later the corpses of the Mandatjan brothers were also found mysterious 
circumstances in Jayapura. 
The life of the early resistance movement was very short, and 
reasons for its demise have been sharply contested. Independent observers 
argue that both internal and external factors were crucial in its collapse. 
Internally, the movement was largely a spontaneous expression of anti-
Indonesian sentiment, and not well organised. The lack of an organisational 
structure, committed leadership and political program were serious 
weaknesses. Military leadership came mostly from the former Papuan 
Battalion, who had very little knowledge of politics or strategic issues. 
Equally, except for John Ariks, a former elementary school teacher and the 
only educated man in the Papuan leadership, the political leaders were 
limited in their capacity to play an influential role. Finally, the lack of a 
10 Budiardjo and Liang, (1988). West Papua: the Obliteration of a People, TAPOL, London, 
p.20. 
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political program was a crucial factor in the defeat of the movement. Even 
though Terianus Aronggear claimed that there was an established political 
structure, organisation was more illusion than actual structure. Certainly, 
when leaders were arrested or surrendered to the colonial authority, their 
replacement was a major concern. Local movements also operated 
independently, with minimum coordination among regions: for example, 
Merauke and Sorong regions did not coordinate with Manokwari and vice 
versa, mainly because of inefficient communication networks. F. Awom's 
troops in Kebar could not communicate with the Mandatjan guerrilla units 
in rural areas. Difficulties in the dissemination and exchange of information 
remained an unsolved problem. 
Although the resistance faced a serious setback in the early period, the 
spirit of the liberation struggle spread rapidly through the region, 
encouraging political propaganda work throughout the major urban cities 
and rural areas. The struggle enjoyed very broad mass support among 
students, peasants, public employees, villagers and workers. Resistance 
broke out in every corner of the country: in Ayamaru and Teminabuan in 
Sorong district, in Kokonao, Fakfak and Kaimana in Fakfak district, in 
Merauke and Biak and other places. In Merauke district, resistance against 
the occupation forces occurred along the border region. In 1969, Opni Yoku's 
guerrilla units attacked the ABRI post in Erambu and seized weapons 
including an AK 47, a Thompson machine gun and pistols; a week later the 
Jangganbu post was attacked and all the ABRI residents were killed. In 
retaliation, ABRI attacked villages and guerrilla posts in the region, forcing 
1,500 refugees to cross into Papua New Guinea, then still under Australian 
administration; they were resettled in Morehead in the Western Province of 
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Papua New Guinea.11 In Sorong in 1967, the OPM attacked and killed 
fourteen Indonesian soldiers. In February 1968, guerrilla units attacked two 
ABRI posts in Makbon and Sausapor of Sorong district; those districts were 
now fully controlled by the OPM. 
The activity of the movement was not limited to the coastal regions 
but spread to the interior. The most serious resistance of all, outside 
Manokwari, occurred in the highlands in Enarotali, Paniai district, the 
home of the Ekagi (Me) people. Revolutionary forces consisting of army, 
police, workers, public servants and peasants in Wagete, Maunemani and 
Enarotali were mobilised in support of a boycott of the Act of Free Choice in 
1969. The OPM used both traditional weapons (such as bows and arrows) 
and weapons left over from the Second World War against the sophisticated 
weapons of ABRI. In a secret plan, political and military leaders of the nine 
districts agreed to take part in a general strike during the Act proceedings. 
Seventy-five per cent of Ekagi, Moni and the other Papuans who worked as 
public officers and policemen participated in this strike. Military and police 
posts in Enarotali, Monemani, Epouto, Wagete and Mapia and also airstrips 
were attacked. Under the leadership of the indigenous Me people, Karel 
Gobai, the District Commissioner of the Paniai district, proclaimed a Free 
West Papua in February 1969. In Moanemani a large number of people took 
part in the resistance and attacked the Patrol Post of Komopa, resulting in 11 
soldiers being killed and dozens of others seriously wounded. The 
surviving troops were forced to retreat. The guerrillas also seized more than 
500 rifles and 100 boxes of ammunition. Another 800 people attacked 
Wagete on 1May1969, and Indonesian troops suffered heavy casualties. An 
11 Gerard Tom Ninanti (1987). Sejarah Perjuangan KODAM V, Ambotweng, MAKODAM 
V, Merauke, pp.6-8. (See also Budiardjo and Liang, op.cit.:21. 
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Indonesian officer who led the forces described his own experiences in the 
following words: 
Repeated attacks were launched against our troops every day from 
14 July 1969, the numbers involved grew, reaching many 
thousands of people. It was not until 18th July, when their food 
had ran out and they had suffered numerous casualties that the 
spirit to resist began to flag. People who had taken the side of the 
enemy abandoned their areas of concentration in Aporo valley 
and returned to their villages.12 
During the subsequent counter-insurgency measures, widespread and 
systematic human rights abuses were perpetuated by the ABRI. At the end of 
1969, the resistance centres were strafed by aircraft and land attacks were 
mounted by military reinforcements from Divisions of Pattimura (Ambon), 
Hassanuddin (Ujung-Pandang) and Diponegoro (Central Java). A 
considerable number of civilians was killed and their properties destroyed. 
As in the Manokwari experience, the resistance was crushed and its leaders, 
including Karel Gobai, were captured and sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment. 
Alongside this conventional warfare approach, ABRI also used what I 
call a "social approach", which is any form of unconventional military-
dominated approach aimed at genocide against the Papuans. This involves, 
among other things, poison, injections, intermarriage, immigration, and 
cultural domination. According to a UN definition, genocide means "any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethical, racial or religious group such as killing members of the 
group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, 
12 Budiardjo and Liong, op. cit.:22. 
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deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part".13 
In what some authors have described as a deliberate attempt to 
destroy the Me people, ABRI personnel from Bali introduced a number of 
pigs infected with tapeworm into the Paniai region. Culturally, as in other 
highlander communities, pigs have played a significant social role among 
the Me, not only for nutritional purposes but also in the economy, in trade 
and in marriage exchange. Fourteen years later it was reported that a 
considerable number of the Me people had died as a consequence of eating 
the infected pig flesh. 14 Following a consequent uprising, all local officers, in 
both public and private sectors, were replaced and a rapid militarisation of 
the region took place. Jakarta's political victory at the expense of the 
Papuans led many to question the people's commitment to the ideals of 
resistance and their capacity to mount a successful resistance campaign, and 
thus to question the credibility of the entire movement. 
The capability of the Paniai movement declined significantly with the 
arrest of its leaders. The most serious weakness of the OPM was the lack of 
coordination and cooperation between the seven regions of the country. The 
OPM activities in Biak Island and in Jayapura, for example, were not 
coordinated with those in Paniai. While the Me people were waging a 
liberation war in accordance with the general plan to oppose the Act of Free 
Choice, the other regions kept silent. In short, resistance actions were merely 
local expressions of resentment over injustices and in protest against the 
13 
14 
The United Nations (1988). "War Crime and War Crime Against Humanity, Including 
Genocide" in A Compilation of International Instruments, New York, p.143. 
See David Hyndman (1986) 'Transcultural tapeworm trafficking: the Indonesian 
introduction of biological warfare into West Papua', Fourth World Journal 1 (6). Also 
see Budiardjo and Liang, op. cit.:59. 
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transfer of political power from one colonial power (the Dutch) to another 
(Indonesia). Yet the resistance in the Paniai district was a significant starting 
point for a realisation of Papuan identity and the spread of Papuan 
nationalism among the highland peoples. 
4.2.2. Destroyed But Not Defeated 
Despite the crushing of these earliest liberation struggles, the OPM 
continued to grow, attracting support from students, army, police and 
politicians. During this period, Papuans established underground political 
networks and mobilised forces in each of the urban centres and in rural 
areas, and formulated a plan to take coordinated action in boycotting the Act 
of Free Choice in 1969. Police and military forces in Base G, Parliament 
House in Port Numbay (Jayapura) and the University of Cenderawasih in 
Abepura were the focus for underground activities, and the Front Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (FPKPB) was established to coordinate these 
activities. There was no longer any hope or trust in the official system; the 
Papuans now decided to take responsibility into their own hands. 
The Dutch government renounced its support for West Papua once 
its own program had been defeated by the New York Agreement in 1962. 
Papuan leaders in Holland such as N. Youwe and M. Kaisiepo were even 
discouraged from lobbying African countries such as the Brazzaville group, 
who were critical of the Indonesian occupation of West Papua in the 1960s. 
Unlike the support given by the government of Portugal to East Timor, at 
least from the late 1980s, the Dutch washed their hands of the situation and 
blamed the US government and the Papuan pro-Indonesian groups for 
selling out the country. Thereafter the Dutch were very reluctant to take 
further responsibility. The new policy commitment was supported 
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primarily by radical academic groups and Papuan politicians. Willem 
Zonggonau, a former member of the Nieuw Guinea Raad, who at the time 
was a member of the regional parliament, described the political change at 
the UN in the following words: 
On 26 November 1968, the People's Assembly of Irian Barat 
submitted a petition to the government of Indonesia and requested 
Sudjarwo-the Special Representative of Indonesia in Irian Barat -
to bring back Youwe and Kaisiepo from the Netherlands to West 
Papua to discuss how the implementation of the Act of Free Choice 
1969 should be done. But the Parliament's proposal was rejected. 
This was, therefore, why the parliament submitted a petition to 
Ortis-Sanz. Consequently, the regional parliament was abolished. 
A lot of questions were raised as to how the voice of the Papuans 
could be heard. The West Papuan politicians, parliamentarians, 
community and church leaders decided to send a delegate to the 
UN, bringing a petition of the West Papuans challenging Indonesia 
at the UN Assembly when Indonesia presented West Papua's case. 
The leaders endorsed me and Clemens Runawery, members of the 
regional parliament, to carry out the task. 15 
This strategy was unlikely to achieve its ultimate goal primarily 
because the political status of West Papua had already been decided by the 
New York Agreement in 1962. Despite having this pessimistic view in the 
back of their minds, Willem Zonggonau and Clemens Runawery, members 
of the regional parliament, were sent to the UN with a petition from the 
people of West Papua direct to the UN, and to give first hand evidence 
about how the violations of the rights of people of West Papua were carried 
out during the Act of Free Choice in 1969. When, on its way to New York, 
the delegation arrived in Papua New Guinea, full of enthusiasm, they 
received a mixed reception. The indigenous people and the business 
community of Papua New Guinea encouraged them, but not so the 
Australian administration. Canberra was very much concerned with its 
bilateral relationship with Indonesia and did not want to upset its nearest 
15 Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
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Southeast Asian neighbour. Canberra also knew that the future of West 
Papua had already been decided by the New York Agreement, and that West 
Papua was to be an integral part of Indonesia. For this reason, Australia 
considered the delegation a waste of time and money.16 From files that were 
made public on 26 August 1999, it is clear that the governments of Australia, 
the USA and the Netherlands, and the UN sold out the people of West 
Papua. Australian officials in Port Moresby prevented the transit of the 
Papuan leaders to New York because the presence of the Papuan mission 
there would embarrass the UN and those governments. 
Indonesia quickly took advantage of the power vacuum in West 
Papua. As outlined in Chapter One, the Sukarno regime immediately 
introduced Subversion Law No 11, 1963, prohibiting the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association. The law severely 
restricted the rights of Papuans: it stated, "it is prohibited for the time being 
to set up new political parties or party branches in West Papua"17 and it 
empowered the Indonesian authorities to intervene, arrest, detain and 
imprison any suspected Papuan political activists. Despite protests, all 
important positions in the regional government which had been occupied 
by Papuans were now systematically filled by Indonesians, on the excuse that 
the Papuans needed to be re-educated to destroy their Dutch mentality and 
sent to Java or the other islands. The real reason was that the Indonesian 
government planned to take over their positions. The Papuans in Battalion 
16 
17 
This international controversy was exposed by the Dateline program of SBS on 26 
August 1999. The program made strong allegations against the governments of 
Australia, the USA, the Netherlands and the UN for violating the rights of the 
people of West Papua for the sake of defending their own strategic, economic and 
political interests in West Papua and the South Pacific during the Cold War. (See also 
Sydney Morning Herald, 'How Canberra helped crush freedom quest', 26 August 1999, 
and Press Release of the OPM, 26August1999). 
Budiardjo and Liong, op.cit.:24. 
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Kasuari and the police forces, for example, were forced to resign; if they were 
later recruited to join the Indonesian armed forces, Papuans were not 
allowed to carry guns except when on duty. All property that had been left in 
offices and public places by the Dutch was taken away to Jakarta. 
In West Papua at this time there were more than twelve political 
parties, representative of various socio-political interest groups ranging 
from very conservative religious parties, to the extreme left.18 However, all 
these were now disbanded. The socio-political situation was dramatically 
changed from that under the Dutch administration. The escalation of 
human rights abuses and forced social and political "de-localization" 
provoked deep Papuan resentment, arousing sentiments that were 
translated into the political and military struggle at the end of the 1960s. 
4.2.3. Military Activities in the Border Region 
The National Liberation Army was fully aware that its situation in the cities 
was unsafe and that the possibility of peaceful political dialogue was 
minimal. When the government of Indonesia and UNTEA rejected the 
Regional Council's proposals for a one-person-one-vote system, the NLC 
decided to take radical action in the period leading up to the Act of Free 
Choice. For this purpose, the military organisation of the FPKPB, the 
National Liberation Army of West Papua, was established in the border 
region in 1968. All political and military campaigns and policies were 
coordinated from a new headquarters, Markas Victoria (Centre for 
Victorious Activities). The founders of the Markas Victoria were Leo S. 
Jamby (Jarisetouw), Henk Yoku, Marthen E. Tabu, Bob A. Kubia, Jacob H. 
Prai, Yuddy Yoku, Eddy Jarisetouw, John Pasik, Jan Meho and Obert 
18 Djopari, op.cit.:33. 
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Tabuni. 19 Prai, who comes from the Keroom region, played a particularly 
important role in its establishment. Markas Victoria was not, therefore, 
established by Seth Rumkorem, as Robin Osborne and other writers have 
stated.20 In fact, Seth Rumkorem at that time was serving in the Indonesian 
army in Java and only arrived in the Victoria headquarters two years later. 
The personal links made with the peoples of the border region in West and 
East Sepik provinces in Papua New Guinea, and the expertise of Prai and 
Kubia, both from the educated elite, made the organisation much more 
effective. 
Organisational discipline was generally good, despite some 
continuing weaknesses. (See Appendix 1.) Unlike the previous resistance 
activities, the military structure and political vision were well defined. The 
first organisational structure of the FPKPB was as follows: Yarisetouw was 
elected as chairman and Prai as general secretary, with appropriate sections. 
The headquarters took the military campaign program seriously. Integral 
parts of the new campaign strategy included political education and training 
for the Papuan youth, a mass political awareness program, and the 
establishing of new communication networks in urban areas and in Papua 
New Guinea. The National Liberation Council (NLC), a political wing in 
Holland which was led by Nicolaus Youwe, was authorised to undertake an 
international diplomatic campaign aimed in part at seeking further support. 
The centre became a place to mobilise the masses, attracting considerable 
numbers of Papuans (old and young, men and women, coastals and 
highlanders, urban and rural dwellers) to join the struggle, and was the 
19 
20 
Jacob H. Prai (29 April 1984). Document: "Tanggapan dan Penjelasan Saya Tentang 
Redaksi Bulletin Pro-Patria", Malmo. 
Robin Osborne (1985). Indonesia's Secret War: the Guerrilla Struggle in Irian f aya, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.52-53. 
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driving force in promoting a strong common sense of nationalism, national 
unity and cooperation. It engaged in both guerrilla activities, attacking 
important installations of the ABRI, and in psychological warfare, 
involving flag raising, distributing pamphlets, organising demonstrations, 
and, in extreme cases, attacking transmigration camps and logging 
companies. In this campaign the objectives were not only to boycott the Act 
of Free Choice in 1969, but also to protest to the world community that the 
New York Agreement in 1962 was unjust and to call for the UN to 
intervene directly in the plebiscite. 
While the guerrilla units were engaged in campaigns in rural areas, 
student organisations in Jayapura, in cooperation with public servants, 
police and army, established underground networks in towns and mobilised 
the masses to take part in peaceful protest actions. A demonstration which 
took place in Jayapura on 13 April 1969, two days before the last plebiscite, 
was one of these actions. After handing over some petitions, which had 
been signed by thousands of people from all levels of society, to the Special 
Representative of the UN, Dr F. Ortiz Sanz, at his residence at Dok V, 
Jayapura, more than 5,000 demonstrators marched through the city shouting 
"Merdeka" ("Freedom"). The petitions generally expressed discontent over 
continuing ill-treatment and human rights abuses, and called for direct UN 
intervention in the Act of Free Choice in 1969, to guarantee the 
international practice of "One Man One Vote" in the plebiscite, and, finally, 
to oversee the demilitarisation of the region. Herman Wayoi and Moses 
Weror, both from the former pro-Indonesian group, delivered speeches that 
generally condemned Indonesian brutalities and urged the UN and the 
government of Indonesia to respect the UN charter and conventions on 
human rights and ensure their application. 
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ABRI responded with an iron fist, firing on the massed crowd 
indiscriminately. A considerable number of participants were arrested, 
detained and imprisoned without any fair trial. Fifty per cent of West 
Papuan students from high schools and universities were failed in their 
examinations; many consequently sought political asylum in Papua New 
Guinea or joined the OPM. This escalation of human rights abuses and the 
unjust implementation of the Act in 1969 sparked strong protests among the 
people of Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian region and the world 
community generally. Papua New Guineans expressed their sympathy by 
giving the OPM free movement along the border region and permitting the 
guerrillas to obtain medical treatment in Papua New Guinea. Important 
Papua New Guinea leaders such as Maori Kiki and Michael Somare (later 
foreign minister and prime minister, respectively, in Papua New Guinea) 
also voiced concern about the presence of Indonesia in West Papua and 
called for a reduction of Indonesian troops in the country and a fair 
plebiscite. 
Yet the movement still had some fundamental problems. The OPM 
tended to become overly dependent on others, expecting too much from 
external support, particularly from the Western allies. A cult mentality was 
once again dominating their political orientation, blocking independent 
initiatives and placing too much reliance on the NLC's representatives 
abroad. According to one of the key players in 1969, the OPM believed that it 
would gain support from Western allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). In fact, the possibility of such support was very 
doubtful as the West did not want to risk creating a new Vietnam War in 
the middle of the South Pacific. The CIA had been involved in the 
liberation movements of the PRRI in Sumatra, PERMESTA in Sulawesi, 
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and the RMS in the Moluccas during the Cold War period of the early 1950s 
when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was still small. But in 1955-65, 
when the PKI was the second largest communist party in the world after 
China, the USA did not want to make the mistakes it made in Korea and 
Vietnam;21 it was unlikely that the expected support for Papuan rights 
would be forthcoming from the West. 
The outcome of the Act of Free Choice and the failure of external 
support dismayed members of the guerrilla groups. A considerable number 
of OPM members either surrendered to the Indonesian authorities or 
sought political asylum abroad, particularly in neighbouring PNG and in the 
Netherlands. Some key leaders from the Merauke region as well as in 
Markas Victoria, including Zacky Sawor, Menase Suwae, Rex Rumakiek and 
Bon Sapia, sought political asylum in PNG or Holland, leaving Jacob H. Prai 
to carry on with a handful of guerrillas including Marthen Tabu, Jeret 
Wayoi, Saul Hubby, Simon Amisim, Karel Kelanangame, Philemon 
Yarisetouw, U. Youweni and Fisor Jerrisetuow. Lack of personal 
commitment, and some health problems, contributed to the dissolution of 
the guerrilla forces. 
The departure of these guerrillas to other countries, however, 
strengthened the work of the NLC in the Netherlands and helped to 
develop further coordination work. Cooperation between the military and 
political bureaux intensified on the basis of an interdependent relationship. 
The Papuan leaders abroad, including members of the NLC such as Nicolaus 
Youwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, Philemon T.J. Jufuai and Herman Womsiwor, 
21 The CIA had been active in Indonesian politics for some time. See Brian May (1978) The 
Indonesian Tragedy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp.125-40, and Peter Dale Scott 
(1985) "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967", Pacific Affairs 
58 (Summer). 
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became a focal point for these activities. The NLC had authority to engage in 
international political campaigns and it strongly advised the FPKPB to 
continue the struggle, fearing that any loss of morale would discourage the 
movement as the whole. 
Working under the shadow of this moral dilemma and uncertainty, 
the OPM slowly regained its strength. But the consequences of the change in 
the colonial system in 1969 affected the lives of many Papuans negatively. 
The level of unemployment increased rapidly and human rights 
abuses-intimidation, arrests, torture and disappearances-were widespread 
in the country. Like many others from the pro-Indonesian group, Seth 
Rumkorem, Eliser Bonay (the first governor of Irian Jaya province), Darius 
Maury and Amos F. Indey were no longer trusted by the colonial power. 
These senior public officers were suspected to be members of the OPM, and 
were arrested and imprisoned. 
Seth Rumkorem, who is said by Jouwe22 to have been the chairman 
of Committee XVII of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) before 1965 
and attended the Military Academy student in Bandung, served with ABRI 
but was suspected of passing on military secrets to the OPM. He did not 
receive his expected promotion to captain and was subsequently arrested 
and imprisoned. At the end of 1970 he joined the guerillas at Markas 
Victoria and, because of his military expertise, was given a position in the 
leadership. 2 3 
22 Sejarah Perjuangan Dua Generasi Rumkorem Supaya Memasukkan Papua Barat Tanpa 
Syarat Kedalam Republik Indonesia PEMKA, Hollandia, 1981. 
23 Seth Rumkoren interviewed by the author, Port Vila, September 2000. 
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Escaping from state persecution and social chaos, and following their 
strong national sentiment, considerable numbers of students, public 
servants and soldiers left Port Numbay (Jayapura) and joined the guerrillas 
in the 1970s, reinforcing the national struggle. The NLC political bureau in 
Holland advised the FPKPB to establish a branch in Markas Victoria, which 
was formed with a new committee: Seth Rumkorem (Chairman), Philemon 
S. Jarisetouw (vice chairman), Jacob H. Prai (general secretary) and U.R. 
Youweny (vice general secretary). As the political wing, the NLC abroad 
sought political support from the governments of Japan, the Vatican, 
Senegal, Israel, Zambia, PNG and the USA. The responses varied: the 
Kaunda government of Zambia and the Golda Meir government of Israel (at 
least according to Jacob Prai), for example, promised that their governments 
would recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of the people as 
soon as a declaration of Independence was announced.24 While the 
genuineness of these promises was doubtful, they were taken at face value. 
When a CIA agent, using a false Nigerian passport, entered the Victoria 
headquarters and met the leaders, the OPM was further convinced that 
political recognition and support would arrive. In fact, once again, the OPM 
was being manipulated, repeating the story of the 1960s of unfulfilled 
promises. 
4.3. Declaration of Independence and Provisional Government (1971-1975) 
4.3.1. Declaration of Independence 
Following advice from the NLC political leadership abroad, the NLC 
leadership in Markas Victoria called an emergency meeting to discuss a plan 
for a Declaration of Independence of West Papua. At that meeting, held on 
24 Jacob H. Prai, (1995), interviewed by the author, Malmo. 
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June Markas chaired Seth it was 
~V~A~,~~ to set the date and venue to declare the Independence West 
Papua and the formation of a new provisional government of West Papua. 
The purposes of this action were, first, to coordinate activities between the 
NLC abroad and the Victoria headquarters concerning the promises of 
external political recognition; secondly, to demonstrate to the world 
community that the OPM was standing on its own feet and pressing for de 
jure recognition; and, thirdly, to formally reject the result of the Act of Free 
Choice in 1969. 
In executing the plan, 82 guerrillas, under the leadership of Jacob H. 
Prai and Seth Rumkorem, attacked the Waris military post on 30 June 1971; 
the next day the independence of West Papua was declared. The text of the 
Proclamation was as follows: 
25 
To all the Papuan people, from Numbay to Merauke, from Sorong 
to Baliem (Star Mountains) and from Biak to the island of Adi: 
With God's help and blessing, we take this opportunity today to 
announce to you all that, today, July 1st, 1971, the land and people 
of Papua have been declared to be free and independent (de facto 
and de jure). May God be with us, and let it be known to the world, 
that the sincere wish of the Papuan people to be free and 
independent in their own country is hereby fulfilled. 
Victoria, July 1st, 1971. 
In the name of the people and government of West Papua 
President 
Seth J. Rumkorem (Brigadier General)25 
Osborne, op.cit. :56. 
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Four days later, the announcement was officially ratified by the parliament 
of West Papua (established by the Provisional Constitution of West Papua 
[see Section 3]). 
International responses were very few. The Zambian and Israeli 
governments have never recognised the OPM nor has any support come 
from them. Their promises, if given, were empty. 
Notwithstanding their dependent behaviour, both organisations-the 
NLC and the FPKPB-became centres for expressing the profoundly held 
national desire for the independence of West Papua and played an 
important role in the national liberation struggle. Most importantly, the 
declaration symbolises the political desires of the Papuans and provides an 
important focus for building inner self-confidence. This symbolic 
declaration has become a powerful message to all Papuans who believe in 
themselves and their country and are prepared to struggle for it. 
4.3.2. Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPGWP) 
Despite difficulties with the new governmental system, and pessimism on 
the diplomatic front, the board members of the NLC in the Netherlands 
advised the NLC branch in Papua to establish a new government and draft a 
new provincial constitution. Such moves for political reform had both 
positive and negative outcomes: on the one hand it they gave the 
impression that the OPM could administer itself; the diplomatic situation, 
on the other hand, remained a problem. On 3-5 February 1973, FPKPB and 
the NLC surrendered their organisational power to the new government 
which was called the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West 
Papua (RPG). Seth Rumkorem was elected Head of State (Chief Executive) 
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of the RPG and Jacob H. Prai was elected head of the Legislative Council 
(Senate of the West Papuan Parliament26 ). The provisional government 
was inaugurated by the vice president of the NLC and the FPKPB was 
recognised as the military wing of the OPM, now renamed Tentara 
Pembebasan Nasional (TPN); at the same time the 39 articles of the 
Provisional Constitution of West Papua were endorsed. The NLC no longer 
functioned as a legislative body in accordance with Articles 124-127 of the 
supplementary provisions of the Constitution, it became an advisory body 
of government. 
This new organisation was much more effective than its predecessors. 
Political and military structures, programs, strategies, directives and 
leadership were well constructed. The overall policies, programs, duties and 
tasks of the appropriate councils, committees and sectors were elaborated in 
Chapter Two, sections 1-6 of the Provisional Constitution of West Papua. 
Another important development was the creation of an effective leadership. 
The government engaged also in education, military and health training 
programs. Most of the leaders were drawn from an elite background, having 
been senior public servants. The centre functioned as a means of unifying 
differences within the Papuan community. 
The establishment of the government seemed to be a political success 
and the OPM entered into a new era of diplomatic activity. The government 
enjoyed some international support, mostly from African and Pacific island 
countries. During the Senghor administration, for example, the 
government of Senegal permitted the OPM to establish an information 
26 The West Papuan Legislative Council was West Papua's authentic parliament, both 
upper and lower houses, in contrast to the provincial parliament of Irian Jaya, which 
has served the interests of the colonial government. 
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office in Dakar, and Ben Tanggahma, as foreign minister of the RPG, carried 
out international campaigns from the Dakar office for over fifteen years. 
However, after the death of President Senghor the office was closed because 
support had been based primarily on personal relationships and religious 
sentiment, and permission had not been officially enacted through 
Parliament. Senghor was a former Catholic priest and Tanggahma was also 
from a Catholic background; both men had good relations with the Vatican. 
The RPG enjoyed also some limited support from people and NGOs in 
Papua New Guinea, Australia, Japan, Holland, Sweden and the Pacific 
island countries, as well as from Black Americans in the USA. The National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) sent a 
resolution to the General Secretary of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, on 4 January 
1972 requesting "a full and free hearing on the status of the Papuans", but 
the general secretary replied thirteen days later that the UN was not in a 
position to raise the issue on its own as such formal consideration would be 
made "only if a member state can initiate such action."27 
In the region, the OPM requested Papua New Guinea's politicians 
such as Maori Kiki, John Guise and Michael Somare in 1974 to play a 
mediatory role in a meeting at Madang. This request was welcomed by the 
governments of both Papua New Guinea and Indonesia but talks between 
Indonesia and the OPM have never come about.28 Thus, while the RPG 
enjoyed some sympathy, political recognition and substantive support 
remained elusive. Political analysts have argued that the lack of an 
intensive political campaign, and sensitivity about the Papuan issue, have 
been reasons for the minimal external support the RPG attracted, but it is 
27 
28 
Kurt Waldheim (17 January 1972). Document No: Doc.CVN/eb. of General Secretary of 
the UN, replying NAACP's letter, Washington DC 
Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
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also true that countries with their own separatist movements were unlikely 
to support West Papuan independence. 
Internally, the government concentrated on human development 
and the growth of an urbanised and centralised power structure. Military 
campaigns were restricted to the border region and towns in the north, so 
that broad, country-wide, mass participation was minimal, if it existed at all. 
Unfortunately, the RPG was a highly centralised and authoritarian regime, 
committing human rights abuses against its opponents, encouraging 
regional rivalries, and threatening national unity and cooperation.29 In 
1971-72 a personal clash occurred between Seth Rumkorem, on one side, 
and U. Youweni, P. Yarisetouw, Luis Nusi, and Yeret Wayoi on the other, in 
which J.H. Prai became the mediator.30 Also, the people of the border areas 
complained about misconduct by OPM leaders, and some conflicts took place 
among guerrilla units. The chairman of the Senate once again played an 
important mediating role in those conflicts. But when a later episode 
threatened Prai's own life, conflict within the leadership deepened, leading 
to a leadership split in 1976. 
4.4. The Leadership Split and its Political and Military Implications (1976-
1990) 
4.4.1. The Leadership Split 
Like the conflict in East Timor between the UDT and Fretilin in 1975, the 
OPM leadership split between Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem, which 
occurred on 13 March 1976 in Markas Victoria, resulted in structural changes 
29 
30 
Jacob H. Prai (29 April 1984). Tanggapau dan Penjelason Saya Tentang Reala 
Gerard Tom Ninanti (14 May 1999), interviewed by the author, Den Haag. 
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have both positive and negative effects on the progress the 
movement. 
The real reason for the split is still unclear, and there is much 
speculation about it. Robin Osborne has argued that the main reason was 
disagreement between Prai and Rumkorem over where to obtain arms.31 
But Jim Elmslie, who has studied the subject of West Papuan nationalism 
intensively, has argued that the different characters and backgrounds of the 
two men were the primary reason for what was essentially a personality 
clash.32 Budiardjo argues that the fact that the two men came from different 
parts of West Papua played a role in the conflict, together with a contrast in 
personalities and sharp differences in their earlier political motivations.33 
Identifying the problem as an ideological conflict has never been a 
satisfactory explanation. Both men are devout Christians and their political 
convictions are moderate; so there is no significant W esterncommunist 
division between them. The political tradition in West Papua does not 
support ideological conflict: there has not been any conservative party 
representing the interests of a bourgeoisie or landlords, nor a communist 
party that ideologically represents the interests of a working class or 
peasantry. Both men accepted the Christian principle of "Brotherly Love" as 
one of the state principles contained in the preamble to the provisional 
constitution of 1971. Even though Seth Rumkorem had been a strong 
supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s and 
played an important role in the "integration" of West Papua into Indonesia, 
31 
32 
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Osborne, op.cit.:64. 
Jim Elmslie (1995). Irian faya in the 1990's: Economic Expansion and West Papuan 
Nationalism, University of Sydney, p.29. 
Budiardjo and Liong, op.cit.:65-66. 
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this does not mean that, because he became president of West Papua, the 
OPM became a communist movement. The two men held common 
political views: they both supported the general policy objectives of the 
OPM, the destruction of Indonesian colonialism and the creation of a free 
and democratic state of West Papua. Moreover, both men recognised and 
respected the state and the national symbols-the national anthem and flag. 
Yet their different regional origins remained important: "People do not 
forget that Prai comes from Keroom region. If Rumkorem treated his people 
badly, Prai as local leader has to stand up and defend them."34 
The split can probably be best understood in terms of regionalism and 
personal factors. Blaskett argues that "personal differences seem to have 
played a far greater role in dividing the two men"35 than anything else. 
Regional and tribal loyalties have always been major factors in the OPM; 
they have hindered cooperation, and ultimately undermined national unity 
and benefited the Indonesian government. The two leaders also made 
accusations against one another on the basis of their personal differences. In 
a statement, "13 points of accusation", Jacob Prai criticised Rumkorem for 
being authoritarian and pro-Indonesian, oppressing civilians and 
colleagues, raping local women, and inspiring a divide-and-rule policy 
within the OPM. On his side, Rumkorem accused Prai of failing to provide 
an accountability report about FPKPB/ A-'69 activities, being backward and of 
weak character, taking a Biak woman as his second wife, and similar 
accusations.36 Rumkorem believed that Prai, as general secretary of the 
FPKPB/ A-'69, had breached the military secrecy of the OPM by providing 
34 
35 
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Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
Beverley Blaskett (1993). "Resistance Movement as a Nationalist Force: A Brief 
History of the OPM" in Garry Tromp£ (ed.), Islands and Enclaves, Sterling Publishers 
Private Limited, New Delhi, p.321. 
Osborne, op.cit.:64. 
119 
information to Australian American intelligence Papua 
In 1971 a CIA agent, under cover a false Nigerian passport, 
allegedly had met with OPM leaders for secret talks about outside support 
(see p.23). However, no support ever arrived, and Rumkorem accused Prai 
of exposing the OPM's plans and working with unreliable agents in Papua 
New Guinea. According to Rex Rumakiek,37 Rumkorem, as a military man, 
was anxious to find out from Prai why the secret plans had been exposed, 
and he therefore ordered a section of the Corps Para Militer (CPM) to arrest 
and imprison Prai and his entire family. 38 This was the start of the 
leadership split. 
The arrest of Prai, who was chairman of the Senate, arguably 
contravened Article 92 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of 
West Papua, which explicitly guarantees the legal protection of members 
the parliament of West Papua: 
No member of the Senate can be arrested, taken into custody or 
proceeded against because of what he has said or done in 
discharging his responsibility in the Senate meetings. 39 
The president does not have constitutional power to dismiss or arrest 
a member of the Senate. In contrast, the Senate has the right to submit the 
president to an inquiry, a motion of no confidence, or dismissal. Djopari 
records that "Prai J.H. as President of the Senate in accordance with the 
Constitution dismissed Seth Rumkorem as President of the Republic of 
West Papua".40 Article 35/l of the Constitution provides that "The 
President and Vice President of West Papua are elected directly ... for a term 
37 
38 
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Rex Rumakiek (1997), interviewed by the author, Sydney. 
Jacob H. Prai (December 1992), interviewed by the author, Malmo. 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1 July 1971). Article 92 Provisional Constitution of 
the Republic of West Papua, Port Numbay, p.15. 
Djopari, op. cit.:117. 
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of office of 5 years",41 but empowers the Senate to call a new election, or to 
denounce the government leader and declare a coup d'etat. Instead, Prai 
chose to form a new organisation (see below). This action had considerable 
negative effects not only for national unity and reconciliation but for the 
struggle as a whole. 
Despite their personal differences and weaknesses, the two men must 
be recognised as significant leaders on the basis of what they contributed to 
the liberation struggle through their personal commitment and influence, 
two important leadership qualities. On a positive note, the split created 
some productive competition between the two main factions, which 
encouraged West Papuans to participate in the struggle, expanding the areas 
of struggle and creating new approaches (which are discussed below). On the 
other hand, the split started a power struggle, fracturing national unity, 
creating a negative image of the OPM, and giving rise to a tendency to 
constant leadership shifts. 
4.4.2. The Implications of the Leadership Split 
4.4.2.1. The Crushing of Student Organisations 
The student movement in West Papua has played a central role in the 
nationalist struggle. In the 1960s, the FPKPB had a strong base in the hearts 
and minds of the students. University students, who included Jacob H. Prai, 
Wim Zonggonau, Clemens Rumawery, Bob Kubia, A. Atabu, Otto 
Wospakret and others, held positions of responsibility and built working 
relationships on the basis of national unity and trust. Students with radical 
views wanted to take part in new activities even if they involved danger. 
41 OPM, op.cit.:5. 
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Given this spirit of unity and cooperation, the leadership split in the 
OPM initially had very little impact on the students. Equally, the people in 
the main towns were largely unaffected because the sense of national unity 
was stronger among urban Papuans than among those in the jungle and 
abroad. In a spirit of national unity university students established a new 
student underground movement, Persatuan Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Papua 
Barat (PMPPB), in 1975. This movement was initiated, in the Catholic 
Students Lodge in Abepura, by Felix Amokowame, Otto Ondawame, Frans 
Boga and Josep Gewab. Membership was not limited by religion and there 
were student representatives from all regions and all universities and 
colleges, including Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (APDN) in Yoka, 
Universitas Negeri Cenderawasih (UNCEN) and both Sekolah Tinggi 
Teologia Katolik (STTK) and Kristen (STTK) in Abe. High schools and 
colleges also had representatives, among whom were Dan Kafiar, Dan 
Kurni, Bob Suela, Eddy Mofu, Arnold Ap, Gabriel Go, Charles Bless, David 
Huby and Philipus Kum. 
The major objectives of this student movement were to establish 
underground networks and supply materials and information to the OPM 
in Markas Victoria; to mobilize the public for a total military uprising; and 
to increase the public's national awareness by engaging youth in cultural 
promotion through, among other things, songs, theatre, poems, and 
handicrafts. In the view of the students, the OPM should not be seen as a 
provocative movement but as a real political force, challenging the 
occupation forces continuously. They agreed that provocative actions such 
as flag raising on the hills and the distribution of pamphlets only created 
fear and uncertainty among civilians in the city. The committee decided to 
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send Felix Amokowame, a former student of the APDN in Yoka, to the 
OPM's headquarters, Victoria, to discuss these plans with the leaders of the 
OPM and coordinate activities. 
When Amokowame arrived at the headquarters, he found the picture 
somewhat different to his expectations. The leaders had already decisively 
split into two groups, led respectively by Seth Rumkorem and Jacob H. Prai; 
an effort to overcome their differences had failed. Instead, Amokowame was 
persuaded by the Prai group to become one of the founding members of 
Prai's new organisation, which was called Dewan Pembela Keadillan 
(PEMKA) or the Council for Restoration of Justice (CRJ). 
In the meantime, the urban students continued their operations, 
building effective information networks linking different levels of society, 
government officials and parliament, and suppling medicines, clothes and 
books to the OPM in the jungle. Otto Ondawame, who at that time was 
secretary II of Golongan Karya (Golkar) in Jayapura District, in 1975 became 
coordinator for agriculture and fisheries in the Abepura, Tobati, Engross and 
Yoka areas, under the chairmanship of Tontje Messet, district commissioner 
of Jayapura, and the first Secretary of Golkar, Taran Kalled, head of the 
district Agricultural Department. Together with Joel Kafiar and the other 
students, Ondawame coordinated supplies. 
However, the student organisation proved to be open to 
manipulation. In an incident at Abe Hill in 1975, Moses Wenda, one of the 
frontline troops of the OPM's operational units, was killed by ABRI in a 
morning attack. The question arose as to who had informed ABRI that a 
platoon of guerrillas, including Wenda, Dan Kafiar, Karel Kelanangame and 
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Gerard Tom Ninanti, was in the area. Subsequently houses were ransacked, 
suspects were arrested, including Otto Ondawame and Joel Kafiar, and 
documents and materials were confiscated by ABRI. Ondawame and his 
colleagues were brought to the headquarters of Komando Operasi Khusus 
(KOP ASSUS), the elite Red Berets, in Angkasa I, Jayapura. At this camp 
more than a hundred key political prisoners were held, including Bas 
Mekawa, who had been taken hostage in 1977, and T. Aronggear. The 
prisoners were tortured by burning their skin with cigarette butts and the 
use of electric shocks in order to force them to expose OPM secrets. In the 
camp, secret documents of the OPM confiscated by the ABRI could be seen, 
outlining the structure of the RPG and TPN with detailed maps and plans. 
How these documents had fallen into the hands of the enemy remains a 
mystery. 
Deploying both intimidation and persuasive approaches, prisoners in 
the camp were forced to cooperate with ABRI and reveal OPM secrets. 
Personal relationships were exploited by the ABRI, who knew that relatives 
of the prisoners were members of the OPM. In particular, Joel Kafiar and 
Bob Suela were under strong pressure to cooperate. These two men were 
sent to Markas Victoria (Marvic) by the ABRI, where they met Seth 
Rumkorem and Joel's brother Dan Kafiar, operations commander of the 
TPN, and tried to persuade them to surrender. Their attempt was 
unsuccessful. Following their return, the ABRI increased military attacks on 
Marvic. 
Ondawame, like the other political prisoners, refused to expose the 
secrets of the OPM. Because he resisted, the ABRI threatened to kill him on 
three occasions. In order to escape from these death threats, Ondawame 
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asked permission to visit his sick mother and organised a surat jalan (travel 
document) for his trip to Akimuga, Timika and Tembagapura. This travel 
pass is obligatory for all Papuans who want to travel to places outside their 
residential area, identifying them to each local military authority. It is 
similar to the travel pass used in South Africa during the Apartheid regime. 
When Ondawame arrived in his home subdistrict of Akimuga, his freedom 
of movement was still restricted; he was forced to report to the local 
authority on who, when and where he would visit: 
When I arrived in Akimuga, my home district, I have to report to 
the local military about how long I have stay, who I want to see, 
and when I wanted to leave my village.42 
During a short visit to Timika in 1975, Ondawame held a meeting 
with Victor Wamang, a guerrilla in Jayapura in 1969 who was now 
operations commander of the KODAM III Nemang Kawi, TEPENAL. The 
discussion focussed on two points: first, the decision to establish new 
guerrilla bases in East Mimika region; and secondly, the decision to attack 
Freeport Mine. Ondawame informed Wamang that Bonny Niwilingame 
and Kelly Kwalik were on their way to Akimuga and Tembagapura to 
pursue the second task. 
After returning to Jayapura, Ondawame and Emanuel Nagapruol 
joined the OPM. The life of important political prisoners in West Papua is 
uncertain; in most cases, such prisoners are killed after only a short 
imprisonment. The cases of the national martyrs F. Awom and the 
Mandatjan brothers in 1969, Marthen Tabu and Arnold Ap in 1984, and 
Mecky Salosa in 1991 are a few examples of this practice. When Ondawame 
42 Otto Ondawarne (1975). Personal Experience: paid a visit to Akimuga and 
Tembagapura. 
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was once again threatened with death, he decided to escape execution and 
join the OPM: 
I knew that my life was in danger. I did not want that the history 
of Mandatjan or F. Awon would repeat again to my destiny. I 
decided to join the OPM not only to escape from death but also to 
strengthen the OPM basis. It was therefore, I and Obert Nagapruot 
the former unskilled worker in Tembagapura, joined the OPM in 
the end of 1976 while the other colleagues were still suffering 
behind the iron bars. 4 3 
The mass mobilisation organised by the student movement had great 
potential; but lack of accurate information and the low morale of the 
members, especially those taken prisoner, meant the plan failed to achieve 
its primary goals. The failure affected the lives of many students and public 
servants, and encouraged even deeper anti-colonial sentiment. 
4.4.2.2. Dewan Pembela Keadilan (The Council for Restoration of Justice) 
Striving for social and political justice, democracy and peace, Dewan 
Pembela Keadilan (PEMKA) or the Council for Restoration of Justice (CRJ) 
was established on 26 December 1976 in Ubrud Sub-district in opposition to 
Markas Victoria. Its formation was a consequence of the leadership split 
described above. The words "restoration of justice" reflected a criticism of 
the constitutional abuses and injustices perpetrated by the RPG. When 
PEMKA was established, Markas Victoria was abandoned.44 Following the 
split with Rumkorem on 13 March 1976, Prai moved out with two thirds of 
the freedom fighters, and established a new organisational structure and 
propaganda machinery at Mamikli in the south. At the first meeting of 
PEMKA on 26 December 1976, two important actions were taken: the 
43 
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Otto Ondawame (1976). Personal Experience during the liberation wars in the jungle, 
PEMKA. 
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formation of an organisational structure with a clear political program and 
action plan; and the renaming of the organisation, PEMKA. The structure of 
the CRJ was as follows: 
Chairman: Jacob H. Prai 
General Secretary: [the late] Felix Amokowame (deceased 1976) 
Treasurer: Kentuy Paulus 
Chief of Staff: Marthen Tabu 
9 Administrative Sectors 
5 Regional Commanders of the TEPENAL (see Figure 2) 
Theoretically, nine regional commands were planned, but due to obstacles 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, five commands were established as in 
Figure 2. Organisation was structured both vertically and horizontally. Each 
regional command structure was (and still is) an independent entity. 
4.4.2.2.1. Political Program 
Six months later, a new council meeting endorsed a political program and 
action plan45 as follows: 
45 
1. The objectives and aims of the OPM are to destroy the Indonesian 
colonialist imperialism and then to establish a free, democratic and 
independent state of West Papua. 
2. The OPM will establish a people's government which will adopt a 
sovereign policy to protect the democratic rights and the interests 
of the people. 
RIOP, op.cit.:21. See also Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1992). "This is West 
Papua: General Presentation of the OPM", Malmo, p.6. 
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Figure 2: The Structure of Dewan Pembela Keadilan (PEMKA Council 
for Restoration of Justice) 
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3. The OPM believes in popular democracy. In this respect, the OPM 
rejects any form of bureaucratic system and strives for the broadest 
mass participation in the politics. The OPM serves and protects the 
fundamental freedoms including freedom of political participation 
of the masses. 
4. People's armed forces will be established to serve and protect the 
interests of the people. The masses must be armed and, together 
with the regular armed forces, fight the occupation forces and 
defend the country from all other external aggressions. 
5. The OPM strives for the equal distribution of the national wealth 
and resources for the well being of the people. It is the only 
legitimate guarantee for economic and social progress and political 
stability. 
6. The OPM rejects both the imperialistic and the centrally-planned 
economic systems, and strives for a mixed economic system, where 
every individual enjoys economic freedom but is collectively 
responsible for the well being of the citizens of the country. 
7. The OPM believes that all mankind have equal value and rights 
before law, therefore the rights of the people such as to freedom of 
expression, religion, demonstration, strike, and work must be 
protected and there will be no discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, social status and political conviction. 
8. The OPM believes that every individual has the right to develop 
his or her talent. The OPM will, therefore, provide adequate 
services such as schools, education and cultural institutions for the 
people's need and enjoyment. 
9. The OPM will provide adequate means of communication and 
protect resources and the ecology, and rehabilitate the land ravaged 
by the colonial and transnational companies. The OPM will also 
confiscate the land from imperialists and colonialists and give it to 
the people. 
10. The OPM strives for world peace and security, for mutual respect 
for and equal recognition of the rights of indigenous people 
elsewhere, and works for international solidarity with oppressed 
and colonised peoples. To achieve these goals, the OPM will 
establish an independent foreign policy which upholds the 
principles of friendship to all, malice to none in their internal 
affairs. The OPM will also work actively with progressive and 
democratic peoples and governments who work for world peace 
and security. 
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The council emphasised three principles of their action plan: 
decentralisation, mobilisation of the masses, and internationalisation. In the 
area of decentralisation, the following aspects would be targeted: 
localisation, flexibility, initiative, self-reliance, cooperation and hum an 
rights. In mobilisation, urban and rural areas, students, public servants, 
farmers, workers, army and churches were targeted. These points are briefly 
elaborated below. 
4.4.2.2.2. Decentralisation of Power 
Giving the masses an opportunity to take responsibility for their own local 
affairs has been a central tenet of the decentralisation policy. It was a direct 
reaction to the prior centralisation policy. The central command 
surrendered two thirds of its authority to regional commands of the 
TEPENAL, encouraging them to localise regional political and 
affairs, though overall policy, in terms of strategic planning foreign 
policy, was retained in the hands of the central organisation. The new 
command structure stressed that leadership of the regional command must 
be in the hands of the local people and demanded a high degree of flexibility 
in applying central policy according to the needs and conditions of the local 
people. The regional commanders' expertise and knowledge of local culture 
and traditions is valuable in convincing local people of the need for action, 
and involving them directly in the struggle. 
For the purpose of decentralisation, five autonomous regions and 
commanders were decided upon. The new regional commands decided 
upon were: 
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KODAM I-MAMTA, Jayapura: Matheus Tabu, assisted by Philipus Kernbu 
KODAM II-Tabuni, Jayawijaya: Alex Derey, assisted by Marthen Wenda 
KODAM III-Nernang Kawi, Fakfak: Bonifasius Niwilingarne, assisted by 
Kletus (Kelly) Kwalik. 
KODAM IV- Gobai, Paniai: Julius Go, assisted by Thadeus Jogi. 
KODAM V-Rusa, Merauke: Gerard Torn Ninanti, assisted by Bernard 
Ma wen. 
The major objectives were to increase the political participation of the 
masses, and to encourage self-esteem and accountability for regional affairs. 
The council also emphasised the need for the regional leaders to take more 
initiative in their regional development programs, adapting the overall 
policy of the central organisation in accordance with regional needs and 
conditions, especially considering the general ineffectiveness of the 
communications network and the undeveloped geographical nature of 
West Papua. Solidarity with the other regions or guerrilla units was another 
crucial principle. The number of guerrillas was not equally distributed 
through the regions, as some regions had greater strategic importance than 
others. Cooperation between units was seen as crucial in maintaining 
national unity and exchanging experiences. 
The decentralisation policy had many positive aspects, including 
expansion of the regions, greater mass participation, increased self-esteem 
and accountability. On the other hand, the policy ran the risk of breaking 
down the coherence of the struggle, which could lead to confusion, and 
there was a lack of central control, due to geographical distances, in any case. 
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4.4.2.2.3. Mass Mobilisation 
Political mobilisation and the creation of an effective underground network 
in towns was one of the important items on the political agenda of the 
PEMKA. Mobilising all revolutionary forces-trade unions, students, 
women, workers, intellectuals, police and army personnel, public servants, 
churches, political parties, and domestic bourgeoisie who supported the 
principles and programs of the OPM-was one of the key aims of the 
program. This was to be achieved through political education and training, 
and by establishing people's councils and committees in every district to 
monitor and implement a daily work routine and an effective propaganda 
network. 
In order to implement the mass mobilisation program, the council 
sent Felix Amokowame, already mentioned, an Amungme and the general 
secretary of the CRJ, to Jayapura at the end of 1976 in order to establish 
contact, mobilise masses, monitor the situation, and coordinate activities. At 
this time, Otto Ondawame had just arrived in Markas PEMKA. While 
Ondawame was busy with new tasks given to him by the chairman of the 
council, Amokowame organised a secret meeting in Jayapura in late 1976 
with the members of the PMPPB, politicians and public servants, including 
Bas Youwe, Otto Ovide, Josep Gewab and others in the house of Lambert 
Tsolme in Argapura, a Jayapura suburb. Important points of discussion were 
how to get clear information about the leadership split, how to reunify the 
leadership, and how to prevent the negative effects of the split in the cities. 
The meeting also discussed a plan for mass mobilisation and a military 
uprising in Jayapura. However, one of those present exposed this secret 
meeting to the ABRI; this resulted in the arrest of the participants, who were 
then sentenced to imprisonment in Jayapura and outside West Papua. 
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These events in Argapura seriously affected the structure of the 
council. Ondawame, who had just arrived in PEMKA headquarters, was 
elected to the post of general secretary of the council, replacing 
Amokowame, while the other posts did not change. During this process of 
political change and reorganisation, ABRI strafed Markas PEMKA on 6 May 
1977, using two OVlO-Broncos, and also bombed the new PEMKA 
headquarters 300 km south-west of Jayapura. "All properties, gardens and 
houses of the local people and the office of the OPM, including my own 
documents were destroyed".46 Who actually revealed the location of the 
camp to the ABRI is still not known, but the disclosure was probably 
connected in some way with the earlier arrest of those in Argapura. 
4.4.2.2.4. An Attempt at National Unity 
Papuan national unity involves a fight against any form of tribalism, 
factionalism or regionalism, and the formation of a national united front 
through the establishment of collective leadership, politicisation of the 
masses and the army, reorganisation of the army and the people's councils, 
and the use of appropriate tactics to expose the enemy's propaganda. 
Inspired by these ideas, Prai requested Papuan leaders such as Nicolaus 
Youwe and Suwai to form a new national government, a suggestion which 
aroused a positive response but with the reservation that the government 
should be called a de facto government. On another front, the chairman sent 
a call to Bernard Tanggahma, foreign minister of the RPG in Senegal, urging 
him to join the Youwe group. However this call was rejected and 
Tanggahma advised Prai to return to the RPG. Thereafter there was no real 
46 Otto Ondawame (1977). My own eyewitness account of the first year of guerrilla 
experiences in the newly established Markas PEMKA. 
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attempt by either side to conciliate, and mutual suspicions continued into 
the 1980s. 
The establishment of a social organisation in the headquarters was 
another way of encouraging national unity and cooperation, and of 
strengthening brotherhood and solidarity among the KODAMs. A social 
organisation, JAPAMEFAK (which stood for "Jayapura, Paniai, Merauke, 
and Fakfak"), was established in Markas PEMKA in March 1978, initiated by 
Ondawame. It was a Melanesian way to strengthen relationships when 
traditional organisational approaches had failed to achieve national unity. 
The organisation was extended into JAPAMEFAKSOM (including Sorong 
and Manokwari) at the end of 1978; later, during the OPM National Unity 
(see below), Biak and Jawa were also included. This social organisation has 
played a significant role in carrying forward the banner of the PEMKA and 
in efforts at national unity. The significance of this type of association is still 
recognised; after nineteen years, former guerrillas are again calling for a 
reorganisation of the association, once again stressing the importance of 
national unity. 
4.4.2.2.5. Internationalisation 
Internationalisation of the West Papua issue was another key objective. 
This was to be done through establishing support groups, improving 
internal organisational network systems, an international diplomatic 
offensive, solidarity with similar interest groups, publicising the facts about 
human rights violations in West Papua, and identifying the West Papua 
issue with the broader issues of refugees, minorities, indigenous peoples 
and hostages. Regionalisation of the issue, through lobbying Melanesian 
Spearhead groups and members of South Pacific Forum countries and by 
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increasing public awareness and working closely with progressive and 
liberation movements in Indonesia and the South Pacific region, has 
become an integral part of the international campaign. 
4.4.2.3. The Establishment of a National De Facto Government (NDFG) 
Despite the reformation that took place in PEMKA, the organisational 
system still followed the governmental model-even though PEMKA was 
aware of the negative implications of that model. Failing to learn from past 
experience during the RPG period, the new order regime continued to make 
mistakes. 
To satisfy the demands of the NLC groups in Holland and to 
implement the action plans formulated by the RCJ, the National De Facto 
Government of West Papua (NDFG) was established on 10 April 1978 in 
Markas PEMKA. The full title not only reflected an intention to correct the 
constitutional abuses perpetrated by the RPG but also made clear the de facto 
grounds on which the government stood firm and sought de jure 
recognition. The name was intended to contradict external misperceptions 
even though, since there was no official political recognition of the Papuan 
struggle (as noted earlier), diplomatic lobbying would continue to encounter 
difficulties. External forces often saw the OPM as merely a terrorist group, 
without any power structure and territorial control, and accused the OPM of 
using Papua New Guinea territory for its operational base. Internally, this 
structural change was designed to denounce the RPG in accordance with 
Article 35 of the Provisional Constitution of West Papua, indicating that the 
RPG was no longer representative of the people. Further, the NDFG 
attempted to provide a national unified structure and to abolish any form of 
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leadership dualism within the OPM. The composition of the first cabinet of 
the National De Facto Government reflected such national unity: 
President: Jacob H.Prai 
Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe 
Defence Minister: Otto Ondawame 
Finance Minister: Henk Inggamer 
Economy Minister: Zacky Sawor 
Health Minister: Adolf Sawery 
Social Minister: Wim Zonggonau 
Communication Minister: Marthen Kambu 
Chief Staff of TEPENAL: Colonel Marthen Tabu 
Chief Staff of Papuan Intelligence Service (PIS): Colonel Yeret Wayoi 
Chairman of the Senate: Fisor M. Yarisetouw 
Vice Chairman of the Senate: Anton Numbun 
Unlike in the RPG, representatives of all districts and social classes 
were given an opportunity through the NDGFG to exercise power in both 
legislative and executive areas. This was a primary reason for the popularity 
the government enjoyed soon after its establishment. The government 
represented a range of political and social backgrounds and controlled 60 per 
cent of the territory and people. The leadership roles of Prai and Youwe 
were also important. Most significantly, the new order regime had a 
humanistic approach, giving each group responsibility for its own home 
affairs. 
Despite its initial success, the new structural changes were not free 
from problems. As with any nationalist struggle, the PEMKA group had 
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some weaknesses. First, the failure to denounce the RPG immediately by 
declaring a coup d'etat meant that much time was wasted haggling over 
internal matters. Secondly, the guerrilla campaign was so widespread that 
there was a lack of control, caused primarily by ineffective communication 
networks. And, finally, a negative impression was given to the world of the 
OPM having two governments within one liberation movement, which 
was clearly irrational. 
The political program of the National De Facto Government was not 
significantly different from that of the CRJ. The first cabinet meeting, which 
took place on September 1977 in PEMKA's headquarters, adopted the ten 
point program of the CRJ, as set out earlier in this chapter, with some minor 
modifications. The principles of self-reliance and respect for human rights 
were inserted, and additional regional commands were established, namely: 
KODAM VI-Kasuari, Sorong; KODAM VII-Mandatjan, Manokwari; 
KODAM VIII-Awom, Biak, and KODAM IX-Japen-Waropen. 
A new commitment was that all political and military campaigns 
must take place on Papuan soil. The Supreme Commander of the OPM and 
president of the government had to be domiciled in West Papua, showing to 
the world community that the OPM had genuine control over its de facto 
territory. Self-reliance was seen as a crucial part of the OPM's new principles. 
Unlike the previous cult mentality, the new OPM took self-reliance 
seriously. Marthen Tabu, the chief of staff of TEPENAL, often summed up 
this principle in relation to material weaponry in a short sentence: "Enemy 
weapons are ours". The OPM believes that all material needs are available 
in the hands of the enemy, although the question still arises as to how the 
OPM can gain access to those materials. The lack of external support has 
137 
been a long-term concern, but it was now recognised that an isolated 
movement like the OPM is unlikely to attract significant external support. It 
must, therefore, rely on its own resources. 
4.4.2.3.1. New OPM tactics 
Different tactics have been deployed in fulfilling the OPM's aims, including 
the taking of hostages and an intensification of aggressive political and 
military campaigns during the 1970s and 1980s in each region. Using a 
limited amount of external support in terms of money and 
communications equipment, and other items including weapons 
confiscated from the ABRI, a range of military campaigns took place in all 
five regions in 1976-1978. 
The history of resistance in other regions will be described separately 
in this chapter but I will first describe in some detail the events that took 
place in the Mamberamo-Tanah Merah (MAMTA) region, as indicative of 
the new strategies. In the MAMTA region, the military campaign was 
intensified under the leadership of Marthen Tabu. One of the key campaigns 
involved taking hostages in Aurina, Kampung Tua on 16 May 1978. Nine 
Indonesian officers and officials were captured as war hostages, including 
Colonel Ismail (Commander of KOREM Abepura), Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. 
Admiral (Intelligence Assistant of the KODAM XVII Trikora Cenderawasih), 
Father Ombos, (Military Catholic Priest), Maloali (the Chairman of the 
regional Parliament), Otto Subruanggo, brother-in-law of Jacob Prai, and Bas 
Mekawa, a relative of Jacob Prai.47 The objective was not only to gain 
material equipment but also to draw international attention to the issue of 
West Papua, to force the parties to the peace negotiation table, and, finally, to 
47 Gatra (20January1996). "Pembebasan Tempo Dulu" in Teror-Teror OPM, p.25. 
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press for the withdrawal of the ABRI from the border region. Despite 
aggression and threats by the ABRI, the OPM maintained its commitment to 
the principles of a humanitarian approach. The hostages were treated well, 
in accordance with the Geneva convention regarding the fate of war 
hostages, and were provided with basic humanitarian needs. The way the 
OPM treated the hostages was later described by Father Ombos in the 
following words: 
My former appendix operation was giving me pain, so I reported 
this to Otto Ondawame. He ordered me to stop carrying heavy 
stocks of wood. After a few minutes, I was threatened by one 
member of the OPM but he was brought into line by Otto 
Ondawame. 48 
Many humanitarian organisations argue that the taking of hostages is 
inhumane; however, in isolated situations like that of the OPM such an 
action has many advantages. It not only exposes the tactics of the enemy but 
can also gain positive publicity and attract international attention and 
intervention. The case of Aurina provided a clear indication of this. 
Through interrogation, the OPM were able to obtain the secret plans and 
locations of the ABRI. The reliability of this information was later 
confirmed when a document setting out five key points of a secret ABRI 
plan, dated 12 July 1981, was captured by the OPM. One of the points dealt 
with the Operation for Restoration of Security and Stability in Irian Jaya. 
The primary objective of this plan was to restrict the movement of the OPM 
and destroy its external support. Involving what ABRI calls a hearts and 
minds approach, it stated that the development of strategic regions along the 
border must be taken seriously. Resettling the landowners and immigrants 
from Indonesia into these strategic areas has always been an important 
48 Samsuddin (1995). Pergolakan di Perbatasan: Pembebasan Sandra Tanpa Pertumpahan 
Darah, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, pp.318-319. 
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territorial approach of the ABRI and in this case it was planned as follows: 
"resettlement in the following areas: Arso in Yamas, Waris in Ampas, 
Senggi in Molov, Ubrub, Lereh and Unurum Guay in Guay in Jayapura 
district. Waropko, Mindiptanah, Muting, Tanah Merah and Agast in 
Merauke district, Akimuga and Kokonao in Fakfak district, Oksibil, Kiwirok, 
Tiom, Magi and Asologaima in Jayawijaya district; Biak Barat in Teluk 
Cenderawasih district and Warmare, Oramsbari in Manokwari districts were 
seen as vital" .49 The realisation of such a plan become clear ten year later 
when new settlement camps had been built in Kerom region by the 
Indonesian government. 
The taking of hostages was a tactic that continued to be used by the 
OPM. Eighteen years after the Aurina event, another hostage situation 
occurred in Mapenduma district in the southern highlands, this time 
involving international, Indonesian and Papuan civilians. In this event, 26 
people, including nine scientists, were taken as war hostages on 8 January 
1996, with the same objectives of attracting international attention to the 
plight of West Papua.50 Here again, the OPM exercised good will in 
promising that the hostages would be released without harm and 
demonstrated their respect for international conventions in the initial 
Geselama release ceremony on 8 May 1996. However when the 
International Red Cross, which played a mediating role, became politically 
involved, the OPM leadership changed its release plans and the whole 
episode ended amid international controversy. The violation of ICRC's 
humanitarian symbols and the deployment of foreign mercenaries in the 
49 
50 
Indonesian Armed Forces/ ABRI (12 July 1981). /1 Secret Document: Perencanaan 
Pengoperasian ABRI kepada Irian Jaya", Jayapura. 
The story of the kidnap incident has been told from the viewpoint of one of those 
kidnapped, in D. Start (1997) The Open Cage: Murder and Survival in the Jungle of 
Irian Jaya, Harper Collins, London. 
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release operation resulted in serious damage to the reputations of the ICRC 
and the government of the United Kingdom.51 
In another incident later in the same year, Sony Giyono and 
Panidjanto (Ryanto), employees of PT Hexapilar Nusantara, were taken 
hostage on 8 November 1996 by Arnold Tumutu's troops of the KODAM V, 
Rusa in Upkin village, Waropko sub-district, Merauke, during a survey for 
the construction of the Trans-Irian Highway links in Waropko subdistrict. 
According to a spokesman for Trikora Military Command in Irian Jaya, Lt. 
Col. Maulud Hidayat, a fifteen-man special operation team, comprising 
military and police personnel led by soldiers from the Tribuana of Army 
Special Forces (KOP ASSUS) was engaged in the rescue operation. The team 
confirmed that "despite being held captive since November 1996, Ryanto 
appeared healthy. But Ryanto, a father of two, said during his captivity he 
was treated well by the GPK".52 Thus, in engaging in hostage-taking, the 
OPM was following humanitarian guidelines in their treatment of the 
hostages, while successfully attracting world attention to their cause. 
During this period ABRI began to extend their activities along the 
border with Papua New Guinea. The OPM's camps along the border became 
the main targets of the Indonesian operation, not only to release the 
hostages but also to implement their plan of eliminating the OPM. ABRI 
used a divide-and-rule policy towards the local people and distributed 
pamphlets calling for surrender. Seeking hostages and military advantage, 
ABRI repeatedly violated Papua New Guinea's territorial sovereignty. US-
51 
52 
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supplied OVlO-Bronco aircraft strafed the headquarters of the PEMKA and 
Victoria in 1978 and burned villages along both sides of the border, killing a 
considerable number of people and destroying houses and gardens. Many 
civilians retired into the jungle for protection, where many of them later 
died from hunger, disease and lack of medicines; others fled to sanctuary in 
West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. Belatedly, there were 
expressions of Australian and US concern at Indonesia's tactics here.53 Land 
attacks were also intensified. On 12 April 1981, for example, the ABRI under 
the command of Major Gafar Arifuddin, Chief of Operational Section of the 
KOREM, violated the border in an attempt to release Ling Tay Hock, a 
Malaysian who had been taken hostage together with 21 others during a 
TEPENAL raid at a Malaysian timber camp at Holtekang, under the 
leadership of Alex Derey and Marthen Wenda.54 On the diplomatic level, 
Jakarta pressured Port Moresby to engage in territorial military cooperation 
to disrupt the OPM's activities along the border; Papua New Guinea 
declined to take part in joint operations, but stepped up patrols along the 
border. 
The OPM is not, and never has been, a terrorist organisation; it is a 
national liberation front. The movement has always taken its humanitarian 
approach seriously, in accordance with international principles. What the 
OPM has striven for consistently is to fight against the colonial system 
perpetuated by the government of Indonesia and its state institutions 
including the military, not against the Indonesian people. In the spirit of 
Brotherly Love and humanitarian values, all OPM hostages have been well 
treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention; they have been 
provided basic needs and protection from the more radical elements of the 
53 
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movement. The OPM has explored ways to release them through third party 
mediation. The goodwill of the OPM was witnessed by Father Ombos: 
A day later, the Defence Minister of the OPM visited us. He 
brought blankets, t-shirts, shorts, and soap and gave these to each 
of us. Maloali got a blanket, Admiral got a shirt and I received a t-
shirt, shorts and underpants.ss 
The OPM, however, continually failed to gain support for its activities 
from the Papua New Guinea government. In the process of handing over 
the Aurina hostages in 1978, Otto Ondawame had on a few occasions visited 
Papua New Guinea to deal with local churches and the PNG Defence Force 
about how the hostages would be released. The Somare government, 
however, maintained its hardline foreign policy towards the OPM, and Port 
Moresby used the situation to try to destroy the organisation. The target 
group was the OPM's leaders, Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame of PEMKA 
and Seth Rumkorem and Yariseouw of Victoria, who were the prominent 
leaders in the 1970s. 
The Somare government was not willing to use direct force against 
the OPM, and despite pressure from Jakarta, was reluctant to engage in direct 
military cooperation against the OPM. Instead, Port Moresby agreed to hold 
peace talks, and the leaders of the OPM were invited to Vanimo (the capital 
of Sandaun [West Sepik] Province) for talks on 26-27 September 1978 to 
negotiate the fate of the hostages and discuss the border crisis. However, 
when the OPM leaders arrived in Vanimo, instead of having a serious 
discussion, Jacob Prai and Otto Ondawame, together with two couriers, Nick 
Meset (a West Papuan pilot) and Fred Eiserman (a PNC-naturalised 
Australian), were arrested on 27 September by Papua New Guinea police. 
55 Samsuddin, op.cit.:326-327. 
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They were charged with being illegal immigrants and transferred to Bomana 
Jail in Port Moresby. The so-called peace talks were simply a trap to capture 
the OPM leaders; the Melanesian brothers betrayed their own fellow 
Melanesians who were seeking justice, peace and democracy. 
These arrests and the court procedure which followed were openly 
criticised as immoral and illegal by the Papua New Guinea general public. 
Expressing their solidarity with the peoples' struggle, Papua New Guinea 
students burned the Indonesian flag in front of the Indonesian Embassy in 
Port Moresby. A handful of politicians, including Iambakey Okuk, MP and 
the leader of the opposition, criticised the government. Okuk said: "the 
government should immediately end the prolonged detention of Jacob Prai 
and Otto Ondawame".56 In cooperation with solidarity groups in Australia, 
Papua New Guinea and Holland, the cabinet ministers of the National De 
Facto government who lived in Papua New Guinea and the Netherlands 
appealed against the charges by hiring prestigious lawyers-Queen's 
Counsels from Australia-to defend Prai and Ondawame in the Papua New 
Guinea National Court.57 Despite the lack of clear evidence against the two 
defendants, and the public outcry and criticism, the court rejected the appeal 
and the leaders were imprisoned for two months in Bomana Corrective 
Institution, Port Moresby. Six months later, the Papua New Guinea 
government decided to deport the two men to Indonesia, under an 
extradition treaty signed in 1978. However, this was prevented by the direct 
intervention of Prof. Saparkummar, the Special Representative for the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for the Asia and 
Pacific region, based in Kuala Lumpur. This enabled the two men to escape 
56 
57 
Post Courier 31 January 1979. 
Adolf Sawery, letter 11 November 1978 addressed to Chairman of Stichting Hulp 
Papuas in Nood in Ede-Wageningen. 
144 
execution. Responding to a formal request from the UNHCR, the Ola 
Ulstein government of Sweden welcomed the two men and three others -
Amos F. Indey, Darius Maury and Nicolaus Messet-and granted them 
asylum as political refugees. This marked a new starting point in 
international concern about the armed conflict in West Papua. 
The arrest of the OPM leaders and the border crisis created an 
emergency not only for Markas PEMKA but also for the border policy of 
Papua New Guinea. First, for the OPM the arrests meant a total loss of their 
leaders. TEPENAL claimed that their leaders should be returned, a claim 
which was unacceptable to Port Moresby for security reasons. TEPENAL 
consequently attacked outposts along the border with PNG, including Jako 
refugee camp on 2 April 1979, aiming to recruit new leaders. Their target 
preferences were Felix Amokowame and Otto Ofide, who had just arrived 
back after escaping from prison in Abepura, but both men rejected the 
request.58 
The crisis also impacted on Port Moresby's border policy. The 
escalation of border incidents has always been a major concern in Port 
Moresby.59 The hostage crisis on the border in 1978 provided an important 
motive for the government of Papua New Guinea to review its border 
policy in ways that disadvantaged the OPM in the years that followed. The 
governments of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea signed a Border 
Agreement on 17 December 1979 in Jakarta, which was reinforced in 1980. 
Article 8/1 concerning security 60 allowed both parties to use force in 
58 
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districts along the border in their respective territories in order to destroy 
the OPM and its sympathisers. Subsequently, the movement of the OPM in 
the border region was severely restricted. 
4.4.2.4. Ekspedisi Komando Kemerdekaan Papua (ESKOPME) 
Let me now move back to 1976 and describe the OPM's decentralised 
military campaign from 1976 to 1980 as an example of the positive effects of 
the new structure. The military campaign which took place in five regions, 
KODAM I, II, Ill, IV and V, (see Map 2) will be described briefly, focusing on 
the reasons for the campaign, the actual activities, the failure to maintain 
the campaign, and its general significance. * 
As we have seen, the leadership split opened a new chapter in the 
OPM's history. The change opened new fronts, increased mass participation 
and national consciousness, and broke the previous isolation. The notion of 
Papuans as a primitive people always embroiled in tribal wars slowly began 
to die. Now, Papuans in every region had a moral duty to make their own 
contribution to the struggle. The decentralisation of power brought about 
radical change in the minds and hearts of the Papuans in interior regions. 
Radicalisation of national sentiment became widespread in the interior in a 
relatively short period. 
The term "war" has negative connotations for many people, but for 
the highlanders in West Papua, war is a part of their culture and way of life, 
educating boys into manhood. To this end, small children, especially boys, 
are encouraged to take part in physical activities. 
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Guerrilla warfare against Jakarta has now become a natural part of 
highland traditions. The peoples of tribes such as the Dani, Amungme, 
Moni, Ekage, Yali, Ayamaru, Muyu, and Nduga have continued the 
struggle, defending their lives and communities. War against the foreign 
occupation forces is seen by Papuans as an obligation, for their very 
survival. The wars that erupted in the highlands in the 1970s were not 
accidental occurrences or "civil wars", as Jakarta claimed; they were 
deliberately organised by the OPM. This is illustrated by the ESKOPME long 
march, which lasted from 7 April 1976 to 1980, in KODAM II, III and V of the 
TEPENAL. 
4.4.2.4.1. Liberation Wars in KODAM 11-Tabuni in Jayawijaya Region 
True public political awareness and localisation of power began when a 
group of Dani people, under the leadership of Hans Bomai, arrived in 
Markas PEMKA and made a formal request to the Council for Restoration of 
Justice for reinforcements. At that time, the Dani people had already opened 
a new guerrilla base in the Baliem valley. The Council decided to send 
reinforcements. In Surat Perintah Jalan No:004/P /p/76, dated 13 December 
1976, the chairman ordered Bonny Niwilingame to lead fifteen guerrillas in 
a new expedition into the heart of West Papua and then to his own 
homeland, Amungsa in the southern highlands. These sixteen people were 
designated as follows: seven to the Baliem valley, three to the Mimika 
(Fakfak) region, two to Paniai and four to the Merauke region.61 Mathius 
Tabu, a brother of Marthen Tabu, was among the seven sent to the Baliem 
valley and was appointed the regional commander. (He was replaced in 1977 
by Major Alex Derey.) This guerrilla expedition was called Expedisi 
Komando Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (ESKOPME), a name given to it by 
61 Bonifasius Niwilingame (Tune 1980). Laporan Aktivitas TEPENAL thn 1977/80. 
No:OOl/ A- l/Mil/KODAM III/1/1980, PEMKA. 
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members of the KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, Fakfak. The major tasks of the 
mission were to establish a base, to implement political and military 
training programs, to engage mass participation and mobilisation, and to 
carry out a mass political awareness program. In an operational order dated 
29 August 1977, given by the chairman of the Council to the regional 
commander of the Tabuni Command, Major Alex Derey (who replaced 
Mathius Tabu) it was stated clearly: 
Educate national awareness to our people in order to prevent any 
negative influences ... This political education will not only be 
limited to Wamena region alone but it must expand into the 
whole region, for example, to Agimuga, Paniai, Enarotali, 
Tembagapura (Fakfak), Oksibil, Merauke, etc.62 
This statement was strengthened by Bonifasius Niwilingame, who said: 
"the primary objective of the expedition into the regions was not to declare a 
war but to initiate an increasing political awareness program".63 With this 
in mind, the team left PEMKA on 14 January 1976, arriving in the Baliem 
valley on 21 February; there, it launched a public awareness campaign at 
Ilaga, Pyramid, Sinak, Bokondini. Mulia, Mapenduma, Munak, Eraguiyam 
and Kelila; established a new base; took security measures; and made contact 
with officials in Wamena. For these purposes, on 7 February 1977 
Niwilingame divided the Baliem Valley into two operational regions: 
Eastern and Western commands. The Eastern Command was headed by K. 
Komba, assisted by secretary A. Tabuni, and security was in the hands of 
Mathias Wenda, who is now Supreme Commander of the OPM. On 15 
February 1977, Western Command was established with Elias Yikwa, a 
member of the West Papuan parliament, as chairman, assisted by Simon 
62 
63 
Alex Derey (1977). Document OPM, 29.8.1977: Operational Order from the Chairman of 
Council, PEMKA. 
Bonifasius Niwilingame (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Maprik. 
149 
Tagawak, A. Yikwa, Weli Togoli and Simon Karoba. (Yikwa died at Markas 
PEMKA ten years later.) And on 21March1977, the headquarters of KODAM 
II Tabuni, Magambilis was inaugurated by Bonifasius Niwilingame; later, on 
4 April 1977, a new base was also established in Tiom. 
While Bonifasius Niwilingame and the others were engaged in the 
public awareness program, an operational order of the Chief of Staff, 
Marthen Tabu, arrived on 2 March 1977, carried by Anis Weyab. The major 
points of the order were that the guerrillas should be strengthened and 
should maintain readiness, waiting the commands of their superior. The 
message was very clear, but it was misunderstood by Major Mathius Tabu, 
the operational commander, who attacked a mission station, Kampung 
Pagai, near Mamberamo River on 7 April 1977 and continued the attack into 
the other sub-districts such as Pireme near Makki. Under the leadership of 
Boas Wanimbo, further attacks took place in Kobakma, Kelila, Makki, Tiom, 
Angguruk, Wamena, Pyramid, Wasilima, Kimbin, Wurik, Karubaga and 
Usilimo in Kurulu subdistrict, and in Bokondini, Abusa, Ampena, Lima, 
Simona, Wolo and Angguruk in Kurima subdistrict. All of these events 
occurred between 7 April 1977 and 17 April 1978 in Jayawijaya district. They 
destroyed many essential assets of the Indonesian Armed Forces, including 
airstrips, food stocks, and weapon stocks; some planes were also destroyed or 
shot down. A helicopter which carried five passengers (four Australians and 
one Indonesian), reportedly engaged in military map-making in West 
Papua, was shot down. The passengers,· who were seriously injured, were 
sent to Australia for medical care. This encounter was denied by ABRI who 
claimed that the crash occurred because of bad weather.64 
64 Cenderawasih Badan Pelaksana Intelijen, "Daftar Kejadian tahun 1997 Khusus 
Daerah Kabupaten Jayawijaya". [See also Budiardjo and Liong (1984) West Papua: the 
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In response, the Indonesian Armed Forces intensified their counter-
attacks against the OPM. American-made OV-10 Bronco bombers strafed 
and bombed regions suspected of guerrilla activity. There were varying 
reports of the number of war victims. The Jakarta daily newspaper Kompas, 
for example, reported that there had been a very large number of victims 
and that the Baliem River was full of corpses, affecting fish in the river. The 
Times of London reported that the Indonesian Armed Forces had "stepped 
up bombing raids along the border, using American-built aircraft", and 
reported that these aircraft were being used to clean out a small nest of 
guerrillas.65 At the end of August 1977, another air strike took place in 
Akimuga district, reportedly killing a considerable number of civilians and 
destroying their property.66 During these operations a considerable number 
of people, mostly civilians, were killed and their properties (houses, 
gardens, pigs) were destroyed. On 29 July 1977 in Kurelu ABRI burned down 
houses and destroyed property indiscriminately, forcing a considerable 
number of civilians to surrender. On the other hand, ABRI also suffered 
heavy casualties. A detailed account of such casualties was reported by the 
local military commander.67 
In order to clarify the situation, the Council sent Alex Derey, the head 
of diplomacy, to the Baliem valley to assist Mathius Tabu and the others. In 
an operational order dated 29 August 1977, the significance of public 
awareness programs and the need for expansion into the other regions were 
clearly stated. In a joint statement, Bonifasius Niwilingame and Alex Derey 
criticised Mathius Tabu for his emotional act. This positive criticism 
65 
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developed into a deep personal clash between Derey and Mathius Tabu later 
in 1978, ultimately causing Mathius Tabu to cooperate with Indonesia. 
4.4.2.4.2. Campaigns in KODAM 111-Nemang Kawi in Fakfak Region and 
KODAM IV-Gobai in Paniai Region 
In line with the major campaign objectives, the guerrilla campaigns also 
extended into KODAM III, IV and V. While KODAM I and II were engaging 
in their campaigns, the expansion of new fronts was carried out in the 
Fakfak region in the south, in Paniai in the west, and in Merauke in the 
southeast. Bonifasius Niwilingame and Kletus (Kelly) Kwalik were 
appointed as regional commander and assistant respectively of the KODAM 
III-Nemang Kawi, Fakfak. 
In the spirit of localisation, the commander of the Nemang Kawi 
ordered K walik and Daniel Kogoya to prepare to establish a new base in 
Fakfak region. Consequently, on 22 January 1977 the assistant commander of 
KODAM III of the TEPENAL, Kwalik, with Daniel Kogoya, Anis Weyap and 
Karel Uropkut left the headquarters in the south, in the direction of 
Akimuga district. Bonifasius Niwilingame and Kletus Kwalik, both 
Amungme and former students of the Catholic Teachers College of Taruna 
Bhakti, Waena, in Abepura, had also both attended a military officers 
training course conducted by the Rumkorem government after they arrived 
in the headquarters in 1974. 
The team left the Baliem Valley on 22 February 1977. It started new 
awareness programs and mass-mobilisation; arranged secret meetings with a 
Papuan in the Indonesian army (Victus Wamang from Tembagapura) to 
distribute documents as part of the awareness program; and built up 
networks in Akimuga, Enarotali, Timika, Tembagapura, Wahgete, Nabire, 
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Kokonao. The result the was reported on March 
Kwiyawagi, Niwilingame ordered Daniel Kogoya to 
Mapenduma. Kogoya was advised not to engage in any guerrilla activities, 
but this order was later undermined by Hermanus Kogoya, who attacked 
Mapenduma on 2 May 1977, and the leadership was forced to suspend all 
activities in the subdistrict. Because the situation in the Baliem valley was 
so tense, Niwilingme returned there and established a new base in Eragai on 
5 April 1977. After evaluating the campaign, the crucial decision was taken 
that Niwilingame would be fully responsible for KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, 
leaving Tabu and Derey to take responsibility for the Baliem Valley affairs. 
The presence of OPM commanders in the Fakfak and Paniai regions 
attracted the masses, leading to the establishment of a new training base 
the MAKODAM III, Nemang Kawi where basic military training was 
conducted. More 5,000 Amungme, Nduga, Damal, Moni, Ekagi, 
Sempan, Nakai and Asmat people participated this program.68 
Propaganda offices were established in these two districts and the guerrilla 
campaign intensified. In 1976/77, police and military posts in Haga, Jila, 
Akimuga and Tembagapura were systematically attacked. The local people 
dug trenches, two metres deep, as a defence system. Three sections of 
guerrillas, under the leadership of Kletus K walik, Anis Weyap and Daniel 
Kogoya, attacked police and military posts as well as the government office 
in Akimuga on 18 June 1977. The OPM killed 44 Indonesian soldiers, took 
hostages including the head of the subdistrict, and seized many arms. In this 
campaign, women participated alongside men, providing food and 
intelligence networks. 
68 Bonifasius Niwilingame, Simon Aim and Soter Pogolamun (January 1997), interviewed 
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Akimuga soon became a ghost town. In a fourth counter-insurgency 
attack, two boats, supported by two Bronco OV-lOs, attacked Akimuga69 and 
regained control of it. Subsequently, a considerable number of civilians died 
not only from bullets and bombardment but also from hunger and illness. 
The mission station, health centres, schools, air strips, and communication 
networks were closed down. Father Frankenmolen OFM, the local priest of 
Aramsolki, was badly beaten by Indonesian soldiers. Women were raped 
systematically. Kwalik consequently ordered the civilians to flee into the 
jungle to escape from the indiscriminate slaughter and repression. 
On 7 May 1977 Regional Commander Niwilingame called for 
reinforcements. At the same time, he sent an expedition to the Merauke 
region in an attempt to establish a new network in the southeast region. A 
section of guerrillas was first sent under the command of Karel Urapkulin, 
but the expedition experienced a lot of problems, including resistance from 
isolated local tribes in the south, and health and food supply problems. In a 
second attempt, a team led by David Kogoya and Anis Weyab left KODAM 
III on 12 May 1978 together with a few guerrillas of KODAM III, including 
Anton Tsungomol and Bernard Pogolamun (who died in East Awin in 
1992). Simon Aim and Daniel Deikme were ordered to set up a new 
communications network between the Merauke region and the Central 
Headquarters of PEMKA. Despite much hardship on the way, caused by 
hunger, illness and the hostility of the isolated local people,7° the ESKOPME 
team arrived in Merauke region on 23 August 1977 and then proceeded to 
the border region one week later.71 
69 
70 
71 
Osborne, op.cit.:69. 
Including such ethnic groups as the Momuna, Una, Iwur, Somahai, Citak, Ngalum, 
Yali, Kawai, Kombai, Yair and Ok. 
Ninanti, op.cit.:Appendix. 
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The presence of the OPM in the Mimika (Fakfak) region was heartily 
welcomed by the Amungme people. In accord with the view of the 
Amungme people, the CRJ believed that the presence of the Freeport mine 
in Amungsa (the land of Amungme) had not brought about any 
fundamental improvements in the wellbeing of the local people. On the 
contrary, the destruction of the socio-ecological system had brought serious 
threats to the very survival of (highland) Amungme and (lowland) Kamoro 
cultures, traditions, and ways of life. The January 1974 agreement between 
the Amungme, Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia had 
little positive effect on the local people. The Amungme and Kamoro had 
long been concerned about the lack of respect for and recognition of their 
rights. The OPM also regarded Freeport as a puppet of the Suharto capitalist 
regime. Indonesia's economy was becoming heavily dependent on Freeport 
tax payments in the form of royalties, dividends and income tax (see 
Chapter 7). However the living conditions o'f the landowners are still no 
better now than they were fifty years earlier. The Council leadership sent an 
operational order to the Regional Command, received on 16 November 
1977, to start negotiations with Freeport over compensation for loss of land, 
and the withdrawal of the military presence;72 the OPM ordered that, if 
these demands were not met, it was to bring the mining operation to a stop. 
The attempt to negotiate with Freeport on the basis of this document failed. 
While the expedition team moved northwards, a plan for attacking 
Freeport became one of the primary items on the military agenda of the 
KODAM III in early June 1978. After leaving Kwalik and Silas Wandik-
Kogoya in Akimuga, Niwilingame led guerrillas to Tembagapura where 
72 Document No:l08/XVII-PR/SUP /l/1977. 
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preparation work took place over three weeks. During period, 
Niwilingame sent four guerrilla teams to the Paniai region, led by Donatus 
Waine, Ignatius Mamukang, Mathias Gobay and Yarrus Kibak respectively, 
and ordered them to open new bases and pursue an increased public 
awareness program. 
The Freeport mmmg area was attacked on 22 June 1977 as an 
expression of the discontent of the Amungme. Trucks, bridges, factories and 
the airport were destroyed and pipelines, which transferred tons of partly 
processed minerals 109 km from the Ertsberg mine to Amamapare on the 
coast, were dynamited. The Amungme, Moni, Ekagi, Nduga and Dani 
peoples who worked for Freeport joined the guerrillas and blockaded 
important installations. The primary reason for this attack was not just the 
provocation of the Amungme in Akimuga, as Doyle suggested73 , but also 
the lack of recognition of and respect for Amungme rights, 
right to compensation for loss of land and resources. According to Soter 
Pogolamun, a former Freeport employee who disagreed with Doyle's 
analysis: 
73 
74 
We believed that when Freeport entered our traditional land, our 
condition would be improved, our children would get good 
education, our health service would improve and we would get 
good house and food. But nothing happened. The Amungme 
have very little opportunity to get a position in the company. 
Many of our people were killed since Bechtel [the original 
construction contractors] came into the region. Amungme have 
never been paid any compensation for the loss of our traditional 
land and human rights abuses. We were very angry. When we 
heard that the OPM had arrived in our region, we were very 
happy. Many of us joined the OPM and took part actively in 
planning to attack Freeport.74 
Osborne, op.cit. :69. 
Soter Pogolamun (December 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
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This attack was the outcome of coordination between the OPM and 
landowners. The company was estimated to have lost at least $US11 million 
per week during the attack.7 5 
Indonesian military reinforcements were sent in to Freeport to regain 
control of the situation. Combining their military and persuasive 
approaches, the ABRI launched an intensive military action against the 
OPM. As usual, the guerrillas escaped from these massive attacks and the 
civilians became the main target of Indonesia's military repression. A 
considerable number of the landowners were intimidated or murdered. 
According to the report of the regional commander of the Nemang Kawi, 
460 civilians were tortured, summarily executed, or disappeared. Military 
reprisals were widespread in the sub-districts of Akimuga, Ilaga, Jila, 
Tembagapura, Tiom, Mapenduma, Oksibil, Senggi, Abmisibil, Kiwirok, and 
Sawerma. Much livestock, including 158 pigs and chickens, 188 gardens and 
176 houses in those sub-districts were destroyed by the Civil Defence 
(Hansip) and ABRI soldiers of the 753 Battalion of the Kommando Resimen 
Militer (KOREM) for the Paniai, Serui and Biak regions during the 1977-1979 
period.76 Two examples demonstrate the manner in which ABRI acted. First 
is the case of Constan Hanggaibak, the former District Commissioner of 
Timika in 1974. He was merely suspected of cooperating with the OPM 
because he is Amungme, and was arrested and imprisoned in 1977.77 A 
more extreme case was the treatment of Kibak Nagalolan in Jila village in 
1978. Nagalolan was hung up and his head cut off; his blood was collected in 
75 
76 
77 
Osborne, op.cit.:69. 
Niwilingame, op.cit. :Report. 
Machael Manufandu (12-18 September 1995). Mutiara 777, Jakarta, p.5 
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a bucket and the massed crowd were ordered to drink it. This incident has 
been reported by R. Osborne78 and by eyewitnesses.79 
In an extension of the counter-insurgency measures, 752 Battalion of 
the Indonesian army, based in Nabire, attacked the OPM bases in those areas, 
particularly in Jila sub-district. Houses, gardens and other property of the 
people were destroyed, and the Amungme people of Jila and surrounding 
areas were harassed when ABRI could not find members of the OPM. These 
human rights abuses increased when the OPM took Lieutenant Colonel 
Sodemo hostage and destroyed his aircraft at Jila airport.80 A further report 
on human rights abuses was made by TEPENAL Kelly Kwalik, who claimed 
that 42,660 people had been killed by ABRI in Akimuga, Jila, Timika, 
Tembagapura, Tsinga, Ilaga, Dillam, Kwiyawagi, Benangga, Mapenduma 
and Sepan.81 On the basis of a report by Sydney-based freelance journalist 
Ben Bohane, John Wright from the Brisbane Courier Mail also reported on 
23 December 1995, that 43,000 civilians had been killed in the region. 
A new OPM campaign program started immediately. Expansion into 
the other regions, particularly into KODAM IV and V, opened new posts 
and communications networks and new post commanders were appointed. 
A new basic training program was started, running from January to March 
1978, and a second program was held from November 1978 to February 1979. 
The guerrillas engaged in campaigns in Fakfak, Paniai and Merauke regions; 
78 
79 
80 
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Osborne, op.cit.:71. 
Bonifasius Niwilingame (24 Juli 1985). Report: Bersama Ini Kami Laporkan Beberapa 
Perisitiwa -Peristiwa Penting Antara Lain Pembunuhan Masal atas Rakyat Papua 
Barat Didaerah Pegunungan Tengah Dibagian Barat Dari Papua Barat Oleh 
Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Markas Besar Nasional OPM. 
Simon Dekme (9January1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
Kelly Kwalik (May 1996). Report: "Fakta 2 Pengorbanan jiwa bangsa Melanesia Barat 
Sejak Tahun 1962-1996 Dalam Wilayah KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, Fakfak, Puncak 
Abadi Jaya, MAKODAM III, TEPENAL. 
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six groups were sent to bases at Jila, Mapenduma, Agandugume, Kwiyawagi, 
Hitadipa, and Mapia respectively. On 17 April 1979, the guerrillas destroyed 
a Boeing aircraft, owned by Bali Air Lines, and Lieutenant Colonel Sadewo 
Suwondo was captured. They also confiscated a radio in Jila (1978), and three 
Mausers, four grenades, and four automatic weapons in Ilaga and Akimuga 
(1979). As ransom for the hostages, the guerrillas made three demands: the 
return of Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame from Port Moresby to PEMKA; 
the stopping of mineral exploitation in the whole of West Papua; and 
compensation of Rp 5 million rupiah and 5,000 military backpacks. This 
ransom demand was never paid. The hostages were released two months 
later. 
4.4.2.4.3. Expansion into KODAM V-Rusa in the Merauke Region 
Despite these guerrilla successes, the military campaign in general faced 
severe problems through lack of communication with central command, 
the inaccessible terrain, the self-isolation of the Nemang Kawi Command, 
and the non-arrival of reinforcements. Communications with central 
headquarters were cut off as a result of the events in the Baliem valley in 
1977; this made it extremely difficult to report on the human rights abuses. 
The guerrilla forces in Jila demanded reinforcements, in order to avenge the 
death of Kibak Naogolan and the others. The OPM leadership consequently 
decided to send guerrillas to the Markas PEMKA in the north looking for 
further support both in manpower and material. The first stage of the 
expedition took a triangular route: Jayapura-Tembagapura-Paniai, 
Merauke-Jayapura (see again Map 2). 
Members of the second expeditionary team continued their journey to 
the headquarters of PEMKA, to fulfil this mission and also to open new 
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military bases in Merauke region. On the way, having gone into the Ok Tedi 
mine area looking for food, they were arrested by the PNG army and 
sentenced to imprisonment in Wewak. However, the guerrillas were able to 
escape and return to their headquarters. The security of the Ok Tedi copper 
mining operation in Papua New Guinea, and the increase of OPM activities 
in the Baliem Valley and Merauke region engaged the PNGDF and the 
ABRI, so that movement of the OPM in those areas was severely restricted. 
On the other hand, Anton Tsungomol and his colleagues returned home in 
March 1979 to the headquarters of MAKODAM III Nemang Kawi, in the 
southern highlands of West Papua, and reported on the success of their 
expedition in opening communications between KODAMs in the north, 
east, south, central and west. 
Acknowledging the people's demands for logistic support and 
material, and for contact with central command, a new, bigger expeditionary 
team was moved to the Central Headquarters, PEMKA, in the north. Under 
the leadership of Niwilingame, Commander of KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, 
112 guerrillas started a long march from Jila, Fakfak region on 13 January 
1980 to Jayapura via Merauke. Kwalik later replaced Niwilingame as the 
new regional commander. After spending three months on the way, in a 
journey of much hardship, the 109 remaining guerrillas arrived in the 
Merauke region on 22 March 1980. 
The OPM needed to expand into new areas and the Merauke region, 
being highly militarised and a major destination for transmigration, was an 
important target. After having a discussion with East Timor Liberation 
Front leader, Ramos Horta, and Dr Hassan Tengku Di Tiro of the Aceh 
National Liberation Front in Stockholm in January 1980, the OPM political 
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bureau abroad ordered Marthen Tabu to raise the matter of establishing new 
military bases in the Merauke region in a cabinet meeting. On 2 January 
1980, following a presidential decision, Gerard Tom Ninanti was ordered to 
establish a new base there, in order to expand the OPM's influence and 
oppose further transmigration and militarisation (see p.149 (fn)). 
While Niwilingame's team was on their way north, another 
expedition to the south was planned when Anis Weyab and Daniel Kogoya 
arrived in PEMKA, after escaping from Wewak prison. The new 
expeditionary team, led by Gerardus Tomy, the Regional Commander for 
KODAM V- Rusa, Merauke, consisted of seven men, namely Thadeus Yogi, 
Karel Kelanangame, Emanuel Nagapruol, Anis Weyap, Nico Wenda, Jacob 
Hubi and Daniel Kogoya. The team arrived in MAKODAM V, Merauke on 8 
March and two weeks later it met up with Niwilingame and his troops, who 
had arrived in the region on 22 March. A month later, an exchange of troops 
took place. Tadeus Yogi, Daniel Kogoya and the other troops left for the 
Paniai and East Mimika (Fakfak) regions respectively, while Niwilingame, 
with a number of guerrillas, decided to continue the journey to the Central 
Headquarters of the OPM in the north. On 19 April 1980, three days before 
their departure, news of the arrest of President Tabu came over the radio.82 
After climbing many hills and mountains, and crossing many deep valleys 
and rivers, they finally arrived at headquarters on 10 June 1980. 
The journey of this ESKOPME expedition took almost five months, 
and the whole decentralisation process took almost four years, from 14 
December 1976 to 10 June 1980. As a result of the expedition, five regional 
82 Marthen Tabu was President of the National De Facto government 1978-1980. He was 
persuaded by the Indonesian military to surrender, arrested in Port Numbay and 
sentenced to Cipinang prison in Jakarta. He died in prison in 1984. 
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commands had been established, each with its own command structure. 
Together with the decentralisation of power, cooperation and new 
communication networks between KODAMs were also established. 
However, local resistance and lack of logistic support remained problems. 
More than 30 guerrillas were killed or died on the expedition. Ten of them 
were killed and eaten by cannibalistic groups in the Oksibil region; the rest 
died through hunger and illness.83 
The New Order was established primarily to expand the OPM's 
regional political and military influence, to open new communication 
networks, to implement effective political and military education and 
training, and to expand the political awareness program. Besides 
decentralisation and increased local participation, the forces were mobilized 
in strategic areas such as Jayapura and industrial towns such as 
Tembagapura, Timika and Sorong. A very important contribution of the 
OPM in the highlands was introducing new influences in isolated areas. The 
OPM became a catalyst in forcing the Indonesian administration to review 
its rural development policies, leading to new administrative regencies in 
the highland regions, such as Timika, Mulia and Paniai. 
83 Those who died during the expedition were: Wim Wandikbo and Karibat Kogoya 
(killed by isolated people in the head of Baliem river); Matius Wenda (died of hunger 
in the headwaters of the Brazza and Mapi rivers; Lukas Amokowame and Ben Murip 
(died in Pos Mangga of hunger); Keis Kasamol, Amos and Bemad (died in Bewani post 
from hunger and illness); Marius Magai, Joseph Magai, Jacky Magai, Komelis Magai, 
Pasamal Alom, Philipus Kobogau, Alpius Kogoya, Legi Kogoya and a child (these ten 
were killed and eaten in Oksibil, being falsely suspected by the local OPM (and forces) 
of working with the enemy). David Dekme, a member of the ESKOPME team, 
interviewed by the author, Port Moresby, 1996. 
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4.4.2.5. Frequent Leadership Shifts and their Consequences 
Peter Savage noted in 1984 that "Since the arrest of J.H. Prai and 0. 
Ondawame, guerrilla activity had declined along the border" .84 Repeating 
an earlier pattern in the RPG, the arrest of Prai and Ondawame produced a 
leadership shift. Recurring power struggles within the National De Facto 
group indicated that PEMKA lacked strong leadership. However, contrary to 
Osborne's claim,85 the PEMKA group did not split into small factions, but 
maintained cohesion as a group despite power struggles. 
In an official handover in 1978, Marthen Tabu, the former chief of 
staff of the TEPENAL, replaced Jacob H. Prai as the new president of the 
National De Facto Government. To fill the leadership vacuum while he was 
in Bomana Gaol (Port Moresby), on 30 September 1978 Prai authorised 
Marthen Tabu to take over power. On 23 December 1979, during an 
emergency congress held in Markas PEMKA, the parliament of West Papua 
inaugurated him officially as President of the National De Facto 
Government of West Papua. This leadership change was endorsed by senior 
cabinet members abroad at a ministerial meeting held in Malmo, Sweden, 
on 12 January 1980. The new governmental structure was as follows: 
President: Marthen Tabu 
Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe 
State Minister/General Coordinator: Jacob H. Prai. 
State Minister, Special Affairs: Otto Ondawame 
State Minister, General Advice: [the late] Menase Suwae 
Chairman of the Senate: M. Fisor Yarisetouw 
84 
85 
Peter Savage (1984). Irian Jaya Reluctant Colony in Politics in the Pacific Islands, 
University of South Pacific, Suva, p.24. 
Osborne, op.cit.:79. 
Chief of Staff of the TEPENAL: Paulus Kuntuy 
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The other posts did not change, and the policy of this new government was 
to continue the old policies and principles with only minor modifications. 
The government continued to engage in small scale guerrilla campaigns 
along the border, during which Camat (District Head) Yamlean and his staff 
of Waris sub-district were taken hostage. However the term of this 
government was very short, from 30 September 1978 to 19 April 1980. 
Keroom region is the heart and central nerve of the national 
liberation struggle. For a long time, the people of Keroom and Keroom-born 
leaders such as Jacob H. Prai and Marthen Tabu, played a leading role in 
maintaining order and security in the region. The arrest of Prai was a setback 
in morale for Tabu and his people, and particularly for the guerrillas. The 
president faced extreme pressures from different directions. Brigadier-
General Santosa of KODAM Trikora VIII used a persuasive approach, 
enticing the Keroom people to surrender to Indonesia with promises of 
development in the region. As a result of this "smiling policy", two thirds of 
the Keroom people surrendered to Indonesia, and resettled in Koya Baru, 
near Yamas. 
Secret negotiations between Mathius Tabu, the younger brother of 
Marthen Tabu, and Alex Derey with Colonel Samsuddin, Field Commander 
of KOREM, Abepura, then took place, and Mathius Tabu persuaded his 
brother to surrender to Indonesia. In the process of negotiation, Derey 
visited military officials in Jayapura. Marthen Tabu surrendered to 
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Indonesia on 19 April 1980 but when he arrived in Jayapura he was arrested 
and sent to prison in Kalisosok, Jakarta, where he died in 1986. 
Low-level conflict within PEMKA (principally between the Alex 
Derey and Mathius Tabu factions over who should be commander in 
KODAM II Tabuni, Jayawijaya) was the major reason why the Tabu regime 
ended in such a relatively short time. When Indonesia increased its military 
attacks on the OPM in Wamena, Hans Bomai and Marthen Wenda, together 
with considerable numbers of guerrilla troops, moved to the north and 
joined with Tabu's forces. This reinforcement had mixed consequences. The 
loss of control over parts of the central highlands and Keroom due to 
increased Indonesian military activity, and constant personal conflict 
between the Tabu brothers and Derey and Wenda, created major problems. 
The Tabu brothers wanted to release their hostages in exchange for ransom, 
but Derey and Wenda resisted this move, contributing to the difficult 
relationship. The loss of Prai and Ondawame in 1978 and then also of 
Marthen Tabu three years later, upset many people, particularly the peoples 
of Keroom. It was this loss, and distrust of new leaders, together with the 
persuasive strategy of Indonesia, which led small groups to surrender to 
Indonesia or cross the border into Papua New Guinea. 
In contrast, the surrender of Tabu and his people did not greatly 
demoralise the guerrilla units86 ; instead, PEMKA became even stronger. 
The group could readily recruit new leaders, because there was an ongoing 
cadre education program. Ecky Berney, from the Genyem subdistrict of 
Jayapura, replaced Tabu as president of the National De Facto Government 
86 Tabu was believed to have had contact with the Indonesian military during his 
leadership, and was regarded as being behind the surrender of many Keroom people in 
the 1980s. 
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and he held this office from May 1980 to 1982. The government of Berney 
maintained the policies, programs and organisational structure of its 
predecessors, but it placed more emphasis on military offensive, national 
unity and rural participation as the key objectives of the guerrilla 
campaigns, as well as encouraging local mass participation. As part of the 
latter, six Ormu women, Florida Yakadewa, Persila Yakadewa, Regina 
Yakadewa, Barbalina Ikari, Dominggas Firsrewa and Maryones Y arona 
undertook a peaceful demonstration in front of the Governor's office on 6 
August 1980, raising the Morning Star flag and singing the national anthem. 
They were arrested and imprisoned and then raped systematically, with the 
result that one of them became pregnant.87 
Another action was initiated by students from the Fakfak region. In 
1982, students of Cenderawasih University in Abepura, including Simon 
Tuturop, Herman Heremba, Abraham Hegemur, David Hegemur and 
Geradus Timang, raised the West Papuan flag in front of the provincial 
parliament and read out a statement calling for a Free West Papua. They 
also were immediately arrested and imprisoned.88 
A more successful event was the attack on a Malaysian-registered 
logging company, PT Hanurata, in Holtekang on 9 October 1981. This attack 
took fifty-eight workers hostage, including Ling Tay Hock. The guerrillas 
demanded a ransom of US$2 million and 100 machine guns,89 demands 
which were never met. The destruction of forests by this company was later 
criticised by international environmental groups. A World Rainforest 
Conference, held in Penang, Malaysia on 12-15 February 1992, also 
87 
88 
89 
Budiardjo and Liang, op.cit.:81-83. 
Ibid. :81-83. 
Osborne, op.cit.:89. 
166 
condemned the exploitation of forests by PT Intimapura, which operated in 
the Moi land of Sorong district, and urged the company to recognise and 
respect the right to self-determination of all indigenous peoples in West 
Papua.90 
This action also had international repercussions. While attempting to 
release the hostages in 1982, in cooperation with influential Keroom leaders 
(such as Bernard Wally, Bas Mekawa, Petrus Sewi and Titus Tikus), Captain 
Gafar Arifuddin, ABRI Commander of Operational Section of the KOREM, 
Arso, violated Papua New Guinea territory in the Imonda subdistrict.91 
Another Indonesian troop incursion into Papua New Guinea occurred in 
June the same year, in which houses were burnt, and one man was killed 
and one injured. But Port Moresby chose not to criticise the ABRI; instead, it 
prepared to attack the OPM in cooperation with Indonesia. 92 
Another important action during Bemey's government was the 
attack, in October 1982, on the gaol at Abepura manned by Komando Operasi 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban (KOPKAMTIB/Operational Command for 
Security and Stability) aimed at recruiting students into PEMKA. A large 
guerrilla force, under the command of Bonifasius Niwilingame and 
Marthen Wenda, attacked the gaol and burned a motor cycle, destroyed a 
truck, raised the Morning Star, and sang the West Papuan national anthem. 
Though the Abepura raid did not succeed in its immediate goals, it marked 
the awakening of Indonesian media interest in OPM claims.93 
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Regional cooperation declined significantly as a consequence of the 
cutting off of communication networks, and this forced the regional 
commanders to develop their own plans. While the Jayapura and Merauke 
regions engaged in guerrilla activities, Paniai region underwent a structural 
change. When Julius Go, the Regional Commander of Gobai, was killed, 
Thadeus Yogi took over, arriving there in June 1980. New political 
awareness and basic military training programs were immediately started, 
involving thousands of men and women of the Me people. These activities 
attracted international attention and were reported by a TV team from the 
Dutch KRO network.94 
However Bemey's administration did not last long. He was poisoned 
by Indonesian military agents in his village in December 1981. The death of 
Berney upset many, particularly within the PEMKA group; his capacity to 
organise military campaigns and his strong commitment to the National De 
Facto Government were greatly missed. New hope, however, emerged with 
the new recruits to both OPM groups. 
As a result of the Abepura raid, many Papuans deserted the 
Indonesian army and, together with public servants and university 
students, joined the PEMKA and Victoria groups. James Nyaro, Elieser 
Bonay, A. Atabu, Menase Lokombre, and Ignasius Mujijau joined Victoria, 
while Doga Lasarious, Paul Zonggonau, Leo Wakerkwa, Henk Tsenawatme, 
Willem Kiriyar, David Jebled and Jesaya Magai joined PEMKA. Unlike older 
members, these new arrivals called loudly for national unity and 
reconciliation. During this period, the Victoria headquarters came under 
pressure from the PEMKA group and in June 1982, James Nyaro and his 
94 Ibid.:87. 
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colleagues were coerced into joining the PEMKA-Markas Pusat OPM, in the 
interests of national unity. A year later, on 1st July 1983, James Nyaro was 
elected President of the National De Facto Government of West Papua by 
the Senate. The structure of the new government was as follows: 
President: Nyaro James 
Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe 
State Minister/Coordinator: Jacob H. Prai 
State Minister /Special: Otto Ondawame 
Defence and Communication Minister: Alex Derey 
Chief of Staff : Simon Amisim 
Chairman of Senate: Fisor M. Yarisetouw. 
The OPM leaders abroad released a statement supporting this 
initiative. Despite some small modifications, including a new name and 
structure, the general policies of the new government were consistent with 
those of the previous governments of the PEMKA group. But a special 
initiative of the new government was an attempt to reunify PEMKA and 
Victoria, and peace talks between the two factions culminated in the signing 
of a new peace accord by the chairman of the Senate, Fisor M. Yarisetouw, 
and Marthin Prawar of the Victoria group. In other policy areas, two major 
concerns were the social and ecological impacts of the transmigration 
program, and the need to regionalise the issue of West Papua in Sou th 
Pacific politics. The government also continued to engage in small-scale 
guerrilla activities. In March 1984, for example, the TEPENAL, led by Nyaro 
and Alex Derey, ambushed a small Cessna 185 aircraft in Yuruf, a border 
village, taking hostage a 29 year old Swiss pilot, Werner Wyder.95 
95 See Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War, pp.103-106. 
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On the home front, a power struggle between Lazarus Doga, originally 
from Wamena, and Alex Derey, from Paniai, continued to create an 
unhealthy atmosphere, despite attempts by Bonifasius Niwilingame to 
resolve the conflict. This counter-productive personal conflict led to the 
killing of Doga. The circumstances surrounding the death of Doga are still 
unclear, but his close colleagues believe that political and personal 
jealousies were motives for his killing. As a consequence of this power 
struggle, President Nyaro, his Defence Minister Derey and Fisor Yarisetouw 
sought political asylum in Papua New Guinea. Before Nyaro and Derey left 
the headquarters of the OPM, they persuaded the legislative and executive 
members to sign a document which empowered the two men to carry out a 
diplomatic mission abroad (similarly to Seth Rumkorem and John W akum 
in 1982). It is not clear what their role as representatives abroad was expected 
to be, or whether they merely manipulated their colleagues with empty 
promises; in practice, their presence abroad brought no significant 
advantages to the movement. 
Power struggles and regional loyalties have always been sources of 
destructive conflict within the OPM. Just as during the RPG period, a 
tendency to anarchy was created in PEMKA as military units did not trust 
their superiors and vice versa. It was becoming clear that the government 
had not succeeded in bringing about any significant progress, nor had it 
strengthened national unity. Instead, it had actually fostered disunity, by 
encouraging regional loyalties and power struggles, resulting in instability 
and a lack of socio-economic progress. 
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Responding to this unhealthy situation, the leaders of the OPM 
abroad, particularly Prai and Ondawame in Sweden, denounced the 
governmental system in 1982 and urged the OPM leadership in Markas 
PEMKA to reform its policy and return to a stronger organisational system, 
arguing that the leadership system required particularly high levels of self-
discipline, since the OPM was not yet recognised by any international 
governments and a strong organisational base would create more flexibility 
for the OPM's international mission. Nicolaus Youwe, however, rejected 
the reform policy, arguing that the existing government system was the best 
precondition for international respect and recognition. 
In 1988, in a document signed by the leaders of the OPM 
abroad-Jacob H. Prai, Otto Ondawame and Max Ireeuw in Malmo-it was 
suggested once again that the governmental system must be reformed and 
the OPM clearly recognised as the legitimate national liberation movement 
of West Papua, having its headquarters in Markas Pusat OPM (MPOPM). 
This time, the recommendation was accepted, and a new reform program 
was introduced in the PEMKA. Power within the National Executive was 
divided between political and military bureaux, with the political bureau 
operating abroad and the military bureau operating within the country. This 
meant there was no longer a PEMKA or a National De Facto Government. 
The major objective of this crucial policy change was to unify the different 
factions into one national front. A new organisational structure was 
established with David Jebled as chairman, Bonifasius Niwilingame as 
political and military adviser, and Marthen Wenda as commander in chief 
of the TEPENAL, assisted by Hans Bomai. In a document dated 23 September 
1988, the council members were named as David Jebled, B. Niwilingame, 
S.K. Amisim and S. Povay; Jacob H. Prai, Otto Ondawame and Max Ireeuw 
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were authorised as their official representatives abroad, with responsibility 
international diplomatic campaigns. 
In retrospect, it can be seen that the leadership split in 1976 had many 
positive consequences, bringing about significant political and military 
progress. The immediate advantages included an expansion of areas of 
influence, the opening up new bases, increasing mass participation and 
political awareness, intensifying the diplomatic campaign abroad, and, in 
the later years, internationalising the West Papuan issue. The 
decentralisation and the mass participation policies of the PEMKA groups 
were a significant catalyst in forcing the colonial power, Indonesia, to review 
its policy on West Papua. In turn, Jakarta's policies of raising the political 
status of remote regions such as Mimika, Paniai and Puncak Jaya, with new 
district administrative centres in Timika, Enarotali and Mulia, constructing 
new communication networks, most notably Trans-Irian Highway, 
finally, emphasising the significance of economic development the 
'Go East Policy', all had consequences for the OPM. 
The split and the subsequent expansion policies of OPM were also 
significant developments. The De Facto groups mounted successful 
campaigns in the 1970s and the 1990s, though there was a sharp decline in 
the 1980s. On the other hand, the lack of strong leadership, leadership 
changes and power struggles, and the problems of national unity resulted in 
instability and decline, which in turn created a bad image nationally and 
internationally and prevented progress. The processes of militarisation and 
Indonesianization in rural areas, particularly in strategic areas such as along 
the border, were also intensified, restricting the movement of the OPM. It 
thus remained to be seen if the PEMKA and its De facto governments could 
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achieve the OPM's key political goals. Before discussing this issue, let me 
turn to the situation of the RPG after the split. 
4.4.2.6. The Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPG) 
As discussed above, the RPG was the first provisional government of West 
Papua, and Seth Rumkorem was its elected president. The power structure 
and political program were clearly presented and it operated effectively at 
both national and international levels. But many observers described the 
political power structure as nothing more or less than Indonesian-style 
democratic centralism, that is, guided democracy. 
Following the split, the future of the Rumkorem government was in 
doubt for many reasons. For one, the number of supporters declined 
sharply, primarily because they joined with the majority 
group-PEMKA-or sought political asylum abroad. Osborne estimated the 
strength of the Victoria group at only 500 guerillas while the PEMKA group 
claimed over 30,000.96 Moreover, the RPG government was criticised for its 
unlawful actions against the Chairman of the Senate and for its human 
rights abuses against civilians, as indicated in Prai's report. 
As in 1971-1976, the Victoria group continued its old policy with only 
minor modifications. In contrast to the De Facto Government and the OPM, 
the RPG emphasised centralisation, urbanisation and an aggressive 
international campaign. On 15 July 1977, the group presented its action 
plan.97 In the short term, it emphasised national consciousness, mass 
mobilisation, international solidarity, a strengthened front line, and 
national unity. In the long term, the group aimed to destroy colonialism 
96 
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and paternalism, to establish an independent state, and to create a greater 
by establishing a federal state with Papua New Guinea. International 
solidarity with progressive and revolutionary movements was another 
important part of the program. 
On the international front, the RPG maintained its information office 
in Dakar. How successful this office was in generating support and sympathy 
is questionable, but the presence of the office in Black Africa was 
psychologically important. The chances of gaining international support in 
Africa were much more promising than in Europe. Yet over all these years, 
the issue of West Papua remains little known on the African continent, as I 
discovered when I toured West Africa in 1988-89. 
Regionalisation of the issue in the South Pacific was another foreign 
policy objective. Benard Tanggahma, the former foreign minister 
RPG, who sought political support in South Pacific island countries, told the 
Pacific governments in June 1983 that: 
The Free Papua Movement was not communist. Neither was it 
concerned with democratic [sic]. Its aim was to fight to free the 
indigenous West Papuans from colonial power. And it did not 
receive arms from communist countries. The few arms it had 
were captured from Indonesian soldiers. 98 
As with the National De Facto Government, ideological debate was not a 
priority of the RPG. This sense of an ideological vacuum has been criticised 
by some who argue that without a strong ideology, international support is 
unlikely to be forthcoming. This may be partly true. But it must also be 
realised that, geo-politically, West Papua was located between two power 
98 West Papuan Observer 7(3) (May-June 1983), p.10. 
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blocs during the cold war; a wrong choice of ideology might have meant 
political suicide, and no regime of the OPM wanted to be a political victim 
for the second time. Ideological debate was thus not a priority in the OPM; in 
the post cold war period ideological debate has become, arguably, irrelevant. 
Some radical changes took place in the RPG power structure. In May 
1982, Rumkorem was forced to seek political exile abroad, leaving behind 
500 guerrillas.99 New appointments were made of Marthin Prawar as leader, 
Uri Youweni as defence minister, Philemon Yarisetouw as chief of staff of 
Tentara Pembebasan National (TPN), and Simon Imbiri as operational 
commander. The remaining guerrillas operated in the coastal areas in the 
north, from Wutung in Papua New Guinea in the east, to Sarmi in West 
Papua, and they engaged in an aggressive military campaign. 
The different factions of the OPM did not always agree on the choice 
of military strategy and tactics. As described above, the PEMKA group used 
hostage-taking as a way of attracting public attention to the cause, but this 
strategy was generally not welcomed by the Victoria group. Instead of 
supporting the PEMKA, like the government of Indonesia the RPG 
condemned the hostage taking at Aurina in May 1978 as a terrorist act, even 
publicising a critical statement in the South Pacific News Service.100 
However, the RPG group later engaged in actions which included hostage-
taking. They took hostages at the Phillips oil site in Sarmi, northwest of 
Jayapura, at the end of May 1983, killing a guard and seizing Australian-
made automatic and semi-automatic rifles.101 In another action in the 
Sarmi subdistrict, three Shell employees were taken hostage on 12 March 
99 
100 
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1985 by a group under the command of Youweni and a ransom of US$8,000 
cash, plus food, medical supplies and blankets was demanded. The hostages 
were released one day later, after these demands were met.102 The group 
also ambushed a platoon of the Indonesian Army in Koya Timor, near 
Jayapura, on 20 June the same year, and Captain Bambang Suedi and 1st 
Class Sergeant Syati Purnamo were killed. On the diplomatic front, 
however, the RPG maintained its old pattern. 
The RPG also attempted to engage in guerilla campaigns in the 
northern region, with the aim of gaining political support among the 
Papuan community. It staged a military uprising on 13 February 1984 in 
Jayapura, in which Rumkorem played an important organising role from 
the beginning, although he has denied direct involvement. In fact, 
Rumkorem spent four days in Jayapura in 1982 to discuss secret plans, 
including the planned military uprising, before he left the country.103 At a 
second meeting held at Kilometer 37 on 11 February 1983, it was agreed that 
13 February 1984 would be the date to take military action. Rumkorem then 
left Pasir Enam Jayapura, together with Luis Nussy and Athen Atabu, after a 
meeting with Marthin Prawar, Hendrik Anari, Costan Ruhukail and Tom 
Ireeuw. Rumkorem gave these men a mandate to "make a move" and 
subsequently appointed Ireeuw and Ruhukail as ministers in his new 
cabinet, which comprised:104 
Minister for Home Affairs: Arnold Ap 
Minister for Education: Tom Ireeuw 
102 
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Minister for Information: Costan Ruhukail 
Chairman of the Senate: Jemmy Wawar 
Most of these men were members of the Mambesak Group, a folk song and 
cultural group directed by Arnold Ap, who assisted the RPG by providing 
financial and material support. For the purpose of the military uprising, 
Rumkorem ordered the establishment of the Staff Pelaksanaan Operasi 
Pembebasan Papua Barat (General Operational Staff for the Liberation of 
West Papua (SPOPPB)) with the following composition: 
General Coordinator: Marthin Prawar 
Deputy Coordinator: John Jambuani 
Secretary: Aulena Rumbewas and Eddy Mofu 
Assistant Operation: A. Weyai 
Assistant Intelligence: Hendrik Anari 
Assistant Personnel: Fred Sibuny 
Assistant Logistics: Arnold Wakum 
This new structure, in which students, public servants and army were 
represented, constituted a strong working team. It worked closely with 
Border Liaison and the National Intelligence Organisation in Papua New 
Guinea, exposing the position of PEMKA105 and reporting on Indonesian 
activities. Rumkorem also instructed his ministers to expand into the Biak, 
Nabire, Seru, Manokwari and Sorong regions and influence potential 
leaders from those areas in an attempt to gain their support. 
105 
"Ali Charli asked once more about the plan to bring Rumkorem to Port Moresby and Tufi 
interviewed him with the aid of the PEMKA Papers" in NIO-Rumkorem Relationship, 
Border Liaison Report (19 December 1978). 
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The plan for the military upnsmg m Jayapura was a coordinated 
action between Markas Pusat OPM and Victoria. Hendrik Anari1 who played 
a significant role as mediator between Victoria and PEMKA groups1 first 
visited PEMKA and met President Nyaro to discuss the plan. On 13 February 
19841 President Nyaro instructed Gerard Tom Ninanti to encourage the 
people of the Baliem Valley and the Merauke region to take refuge in PNG1 
in anticipation of an uprising. These two events make it clear that the plan 
was coordinated between PEMKA and Victoria. 
As the agreed deadline drew near1 a Papuan corporal serving in ABRI 
was shot dead on 13 February 1984 in front of the provincial parliament 
house during a flag raising and the singing of the West Papuan national 
anthem. The plan for the uprising had been leaked. Major Joe Awom, 
together with 100 Papuan soldiers1 immediately seized their arms 
deserted. There was much speculation about the source of leak1 
independent observers concluded that it was clearly an inside job. According 
to Papua New Guinea Border Liaison, who interviewed the key players in 
Blackwater camp, the plan was leaked by Anari, but Anari has denied this 
and claimed that Burdam, a soldier in ABRI, was responsible for the leak. 
The experiences in 1969, 1978 and 1984 show clearly that members of the 
OPM were not well disciplined in maintaining the secrecy of the 
movement. This weakness was observed by one of the hostages of Auringa 
in 1977, Father Ombos, who stated that he talked with members of the OPM 
who frequently exposed their secret plans.106 
The upnsmg of February 1984 had dramatic implications. As ABRI 
moved against suspected OPM supporters, more than 12,000 refugees from 
106 Samsuddin, op.cit. :325. 
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Jayapura, Keroom, Baliem, Merauke, including 
sought political asylum m Papua New Guinea, leaving behind their 
jobs and relatives to face an uncertain future in refugee camps. Moreover, 
the loss of life was substantial. The director of Mambesak, Arnold Ap, and 
his colleague, Eddy Mofu, who had been arrested on 30 November 1983, 
were killed by Indonesian soldiers in February 1984. Many of the Serui 
fishing community, who had served as couriers for the OPM, and of 
students at the University of Cenderawasih, were also killed. 
The committee of the SPOPPB subsequently decided to send a 
delegation overseas, consisting of Tom Ireeuw, Constant Ruhukail, Jemmy 
Wawar and John Wakum, in the hope that they could conduct a more 
successful campaign than Rex Rumakiek and Andy Ayamiseba had done. 
The mass movement of refugees attracted world interest in the root causes 
of this upheaval. The United Nations High Commission Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the governments in the region, notably Papua New Guinea 
and Australia, were asked to intervene. Australia became an important 
source of funds for the refugees; since 1984-85, Australia has been the major 
donor to the UNHCR program, providing a total of AU$7.7 million 
dollars. 107 Yet international involvement did not result in political 
liberation but merely in the development of new concentration camps. The 
border crossers were denied travel documents and freedom of movement, 
and could not seek employment; PNG was not prepared to encourage a 
bigger problem of refugees. 108 
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As in case of the PEMKA, a leadership shift occurred also 
Victoria group. When Youweni Jarisetouew was killed Sarmi by the 
Indonesian Army in 1989, Marthin Prawar, the army deserter, was elected 
the new leader of the Victoria group; but he too was killed four years later. 
With the death of Prawar, the influence of the RPG declined significantly, 
mainly because the Keroom people in the border area (who were loyal to 
J.H. Prai) did not welcome Rumkorem's leadership style. However, the 
banner of the RPG remained a significant symbol for a small number of 
Papuans, particularly among refugees in Papua New Guinea and abroad. 
I now return to discussion of the RPG's secret mission. The real 
reasons why Rumkorem and his colleagues Athen Atabu and Luis Nussy 
left Markas Victoria are still unclear. According to the West Papuan 
Observer, Rumkorem was forced out by the PEMKA group when the two 
factions failed to reconcile their differences: "the withdrawal of 
should have to do with an endeavour of reconciliation between the pro-Prai 
and the pro-Rumkorem troops within the OPM".109 But Rumkorem 
himself has denied this and claimed he merely went on the overseas 
mission to seek support, as had been planned in 1980, and intended to 
return. Rumkorem even claimed he was very pleased with this move 
because his departure meant the fulfilment of the first part of his 
mission. I I 0 On their way by boat to Vanuatu, Rumkorem and his colleagues 
stopped in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, where they were arrested as illegal 
immigrants, and subsequently deported to Greece. 
Why did Vanuatu become the first target of this mission? 
Recognition of the OPM by the Vanua-Aku Party might have opened new 
109 
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possibilities for the RPG that could have improved its image and enabled it 
to regain mass support. But, in reality, this was only a dream, as became 
clear when Rumkorem's application to visit Vanuatu was rejected. The 
group had failed to analyse adequately the position of the Vanuatu 
government which was heavily dependent on foreign aid, notably from 
France and Australia, and was therefore unwilling to offend either country. 
Like the other Melanesian governments, the Lini government wanted the 
conflicting parties in the OPM to unite before any further step for support 
was taken. 
4.4.2.7. Similarities and Differences of the Two Regimes 
The De Facto Government and RPG had many important aspects in 
common, but also some significant differences. Both factions strove, first, to 
destroy the colonial power, and then to establish the democratic, just and 
peaceful country of West Papua. Both accepted the same national 
symbols-flag, anthem and constitution-and the same general principles, 
such as collectivism, Christian Brotherhood and the idea of Pan Melanesia. 
The general manifestos in their two political programs also indicated a 
general uniformity of direction and action plans, with only small variations 
in areas such as immigration policy, rural advancement, self-reliance and 
internationalisation. The leadership split had the positive effect of opening 
up alternatives in approach, and increased areas of control and mass 
participation. 
Gaining international recognition and support was a continuing 
problem for both factions. Although the events of 1977 in Tembagapura and 
1984 in Jayapura qualified as successful campaigns in attracting international 
attention, neither faction was recognised by governments elsewhere in the 
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world, apart from limited support from Vanuatu and Senegal. Both factions 
enjoyed some small measure of support from solidarity groups and NGOs 
in Australia, Holland, Sweden, the USA and the United Kingdom, and 
Melanesian Solidarity Groups and the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific 
organisation. Among political parties, the Australian Labor Party, Green 
Party, Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party and People's Party, and 
individual politicians of the South Pacific Forum countries, have to a 
limited degree expressed their sympathy through parliamentary motions, 
resolutions and statements. The ALP Federal Conference in 1986 and 1995, 
for example, passed resolutions expressing concern about human rights, 
border problems, PNC-Indonesian accountability, and Australian assistance 
to the refugees. Similarly, the Swedish Social Democratic, Green and Centre 
parties submitted a number of resolutions in 1991 and 1992 which called, 
among other things, for recognition of the OPM as the legitimate 
representative of the people's struggle in West Papua and urged that it be 
given official support. A more detailed analysis of this growing 
international sympathy is contained in Chapter Six. 
The groups were different, however, in their choice of strategies and 
tactics. The PEMKA group emphasised decentralisation, flexibility, 
localisation, ruralisation, participation and self-reliance; the RPG 
emphasised centralisation, urbanisation strategy and elite-oriented and 
centralised democracy. In comparison with the PEMKA, the RPG had more 
limited areas of control and manpower. 
International support for both factions was always liable to decline 
primarily because of the problems of national unity, the ineffectiveness of 
both parties, and the rise and fall of leaders and factions, which continued to 
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confuse the world community. Small-scale military successes within West 
Papua had very little impact on the international community, while the 
split provided an opening for further Indonesian military aggression and 
more intensive pursuit of the Indonesianisation policy. 
4.4.2.8. The Emergence of Small Factions 
The most important negative effect of the split was the emergence of small 
factions within the OPM. From the jungle of West Papua to Papua New 
Guinea, Europe and the Pacific, new groupings have emerged, sometimes as 
major obstacles to national unity and reconciliation. 
First was the creation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 
OPM (RMCOPM), led by Moses Werror and based in Madang, Papua New 
Guinea. The size of its membership is uncertain; indeed, it seems to be a 
one-man party. Although RMCOPM supports the policy and program of 
Markas Pusat OPM, and recognises the Wenda leadership, it does not 
recognise the OPM representation abroad. 
The Grass Root Movement is another grouping. It is led by Marthen 
Kambu, the former Communications minister of the De Facto Government. 
Its membership comes from members of both PEMKA and Victoria groups 
who deserted. This movement has similar objectives to the RMCOPM. Both 
have attempted to expand their influence into the western and northern 
parts of West Papua, and they support the policies and programs of OPM-
National Unity based in Markas Pusat OPM. They both recognise 1 July 1971, 
the national flag, anthem, and other symbols of the OPM. 
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A third splinter movement is the National Liberation Front 
(NLFWP), led by John Koknak and Ignasius Mujijau. This group is a radical, 
socialist-oriented youth movement, inspired by leftist movements outside 
West Papua and emphasising the importance of Melanesian socialism. Ex-
members of both the PEMKA and Victoria groups make up the Front. The 
movement calls for national unity on the basis of certain conditions, 
including abolition of the dual leadership and rejection of old styles of 
leadership. The group has drawn up a 15-point political program which is 
similar to the 10-point program of the OPM and FPM.111 The NLFWP is 
more militant than the RMCOPM and Grass Root Movement. It shares its 
area of control with OPM-National Unity, which is an elaboration of the 
PEMKA and Victoria groups. Unlike the two other splinter groups, the 
NLFWP recognises the OPM international office in Sweden, with Jacob H. 
Prai and Otto Ondawame as official representatives abroad, and accepts the 
central power structure; a fundamental difference, however, is that the 
movement is very reluctant to recognise 1July1971 as official independence 
day and the Morning Star as the national flag, instead attempting to design 
its own new flag. 
Another group which rejected the existing establishment was the 
Declaration of the Independence of the Western Melanesian State, led by Dr 
Tom Wanggai, who led a demonstration in the Mandala Sports Stadium, 
Jayapura, on 14 December 1988. Like the OPM, its major objective was to 
achieve an independent West Papua, which the group called Western 
Melanesia - an ambiguous term, because Wes tern Melanesia could include 
all the western Melanesian islands of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and Kanaky [New Caledonia]. This movement was not well 
111 Elmslie, op.cit.:39-40. 
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planned and it was not coordinated with the OPM. Even though Dr 
Wanggai was a well respected academic and public servant with 
international experience, his movement had elements of a cult. The 
Declaration wished to start a totally new chapter of the history of resistance 
in West Papua, ignoring the existing struggle and its mechanisms. This was 
clear when the movement opted for a new name for the state, a new flag 
and a new anthem, arguing that all existing national symbols were relics of 
Dutch influence. Yet the fact is that these national symbols were not created 
genuinely or encouraged by the Dutch, as Jakarta believes, but were the 
independent product of the Papuan leaders. It was the members of the 
Nieuw Guinea Raad such as Nicolaus Youwe, Markus Kaisiepo, Wim 
Zonggonau and Elias Bonay who created those symbols. Wanggai' s 
Declaration was criticised by many simply because such actions raise new 
confusion among the Papuans, Indonesia and the world community about 
the nature of the national liberation movement. 
In 1988 Wanggai and 76 other followers were arrested and imprisoned 
at Kalisosok, Cipinang, and Tanggerang in Java.112 He died there early in 
1996. However, evidence that the movement did inspire many Papuans was 
provided by the mass reaction when Wanggai's corpse was returned to 
Jayapura. Mass protests in Sentani, Abepura and Jayapura on 12 March 1996 
indicated how important the Declaration was for many Papuans. 
A Holland-based humanitarian organisation, the Folk Front, 
established among Papuan youth in 1983, was yet another faction. The 
primary objective of this association was involvement in humanitarian 
issues, particularly refugees, environmental issues and human rights, but in 
112 Ondawame, op.cit.:30-32. 
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latter years the movement has also become involved issues. Like 
the Wanggai group, this organisation does not recognise 1 July 1971 as the 
National Declaration Day of West Papua. However, the Front has played a 
significant role in bringing the issues of West Papuan human rights, 
environment and refugees into such international forums as the 
Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations in Geneva. 
The West Papuan Action Committee was established in 1995 in Port 
Moresby, led by the Papuan community and supported by NGOs in PNG, in 
an attempt to unify differences between factions within the OPM and to 
create a central administrative structure. In its political charter, the 
Committee called for national unity and reconciliation. However, with its 
lack of organisational experience, expertise, political program and mass 
support, the activity of this group declined. 
Lastly, a new youth humanitarian foundation, PAVO (Papuan Volk), 
was established in Utrecht, Holland in the 1990s. The foundation works for 
meeting basic humanitarian needs, for women and for the environment. 
This organisation has been active in campaigning on socio-economic and 
political issues in West Papua in recent years. Most members are educated 
women born in Holland, and have little contact with the people in West 
Papua. However, they are a committed group and have attempted to build 
networks into the South Pacific region. 
Most of the action-oriented groups have in common the weakness 
that they do not have any clear political program, leadership, military units, 
or areas of control. Each of the faction leaders claims to be the official 
representative of the OPM abroad. Unfortunately the existence of these 
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small factions contributes to confusion about the giving the 
impression that the OPM is a fragmented organisation. 
Jakarta exploits this lack of internal unity in its counter-insurgency 
campaign; for example, in order to improve the image of the OPM and to 
make progress, national unity and reconciliation have now become the top 
priority on the political agenda of the OPM. 
4.5. The Problem of Achieving Unity and Attempts to Solve it 
One of the central questions in this account is why the West Papuan 
government and the OPM have failed to gain international support. 
According to Franz Fanon, "national unity is first the unity of a group" 113 
and he defines unity as the liquidation of regionalism and tribalism. Yet in 
the case of West Papua, liquidation of these two factors is not easy. As 
discussed elsewhere, tribal loyalty is so strong that it cannot be liquidated in 
a short period. a new society like West Papua, the problem of national 
unity will probably remain a contentious issue for a long time to come. 
national unity is undoubtedly one of the crucial factors for progress and for 
gaining support. Much international opinion continues to regard West 
Papua as a dead issue and the OPM as a terrorist organisation which is 
destabilising regional peace and security and dividing Papuans on the basis 
of different political convictions, regional loyalties, religious beliefs, and 
social status. The position of the OPM has been often weakened because it 
has been preoccupied with criticisms and internal conflicts, even armed 
conflicts. 
Political awakening to the central importance of national unity came 
only late in the 1980s. The newly exiled political leaders slowly recognised 
113 Franz Fanon (1968). "The Classic of Third World politics" in P. Sartre (ed.), The 
Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York p.105. 
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their past mistakes and began to call for national unity and reconciliation. 
Jacob H. Prai, for example, called for national unity in 1990, urging: 
national unity and cooperation of the people of West Papua is a 
key issue. This is needed to achieve the primary objective of the 
national liberation struggle; however, it must be just, honest, and 
principled.114 
The leaders of the PEMKA and Victoria groups were now fully aware that 
disunity within the OPM benefited only the occupation forces. The 
movements did not want to repeat African experiences in West Papua. This 
view was expressed by a member of the Victoria group: 
Please, do not prolong this disunity which would bring a great 
disadvantage to our revolution, We must unite (PEMKA and 
Victoria) to challenge our enemy Indonesia and its allies. If we 
would not unite, the enemies will continuously divide and rule 
us. Please, see the example of civil war in Biafra, Africa. My self 
(Kakak) should not see West Papua as a second Biafra in the 
Pacific.115 
Though the PEMKA group controlled two thirds of the territory of West 
Papua and a major proportion of its manpower, there are no dominant 
ethnic groups to play a leading role in the struggle; to achieve its objectives, 
the OPM needs national unity, cooperation and external intervention. 
A number of attempts have been made to achieve national 
reconciliation and unity since 1976, inspired by both internal and external 
forces. Early in the struggle, the Dutch government made an attempt to 
reunite Nicolaus Youwe and Markus Kaisiepo, when these Papuan leaders, 
who had been loyal to Western liberal politics, split in 1967. The 
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government of the Netherlands called for reconciliation between the two in 
order to present one voice at the UN General Assembly when the issue of 
West Papua was to be discussed in 1969. However, personal differences led 
to the conflict deepening even further: Kaisiepo wanted to be president of 
what was called the Pan Melanesian Raya (Great Melanesia), while Youwe 
wanted to be the president of the National Liberation Council (NLC). Y ouwe 
is from the well-educated Papuan elite, and has a capacity for diplomatic 
work, while Kaisiepo, a former public servant with very little formal 
education, has special leadership qualities and a strong commitment to 
Papuan nationalism and Melanesianism. These different personal 
backgrounds have influenced the two men's views on politics and the role 
of the masses in West Papua. How far their different approaches have 
influenced different ethnic groups needs further investigation, but, clearly, 
the differences, compounded by regional loyalties, have had negative 
consequences for the OPM. 
Another attempt at national reconciliation took place in refugee 
camps in Flen, Sweden on 11May1979. Benard Tanggahma and Tan Tse Tai 
from the Netherlands came to visit the OPM leaders and discussed national 
unity. Seven months later, on 24 December 1979, another meeting was held 
at the residence of Benard Tanggahma in Den Haag, where the 
representatives of both governments (RPG and De Facto) met to discuss 
their differences, and seek reconciliation. Otto Ondawame was the only 
representative of the National De Facto group who attended the meeting, 
while Benard Tanggahma, Tan Tse Tai, Indey Amos, Max Ireeuw and 
Darius Maury Victoria represented the RPG. One of three proposals under 
discussion was that "cooperation between Prai and Rumkorem must 
immediately be restored for the sake of continuation of the liberation 
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struggle for country and people of West Papua".116 The RPG interpreted this 
statement as a call for the "return" of the National De Facto group to 
Victoria. This interpretation was sharply criticised by the National De Facto 
representative, who argued that genuine national unity and cooperation 
could occur only if there was a strong commitment on both sides to work 
towards consistent implementation. This view was later endorsed by 
Ignasius Muyijau, the former military adviser of Rumkorem, who said: 
"common understanding, honesty and national unity are primary factors 
that are needed to end the Indonesian colonisation" .117 Lack of further 
consultation between the two factions became a major hindrance to mutual 
understanding. 
Three years later another attempt at reconciliation took place in 
Oegstgeest, the Netherlands, when a so-called National Congress was held 
on 29 April 1982. Except for Prai and Ondawame, the Papuan community in 
Holland and Sweden and a few representatives from Papua New Guinea 
participated. The meeting formed a presidium or standing committee with 
responsibility for preparing drafts of policies and programs for the next 
congress. However, the meeting failed to discuss the principal issues 
concerning strategy, policy and political programs. Because of the 
spontaneous nature of the arrangements, and some undemocratic 
procedures, the participants antagonised each other and the meeting ended 
without a successful outcome. One potentially positive recommendation, 
however, was the proposed abolition of the NLC and the Melanesian 
Federation, and also of the RPG-National De Facto governmental system, in 
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order to establish a new structure. However, the recommendation was not 
taken seriously and both parties continued in their old ways. 
A new initiative then came from the National De Facto Government 
abroad. A ministerial meeting held in Malmo, Sweden on 10 May 1982 
called for, amongst other things, national unity and cooperation between 
PEMKA and Victoria, emphasising understanding, justice and honesty as 
the crucial factors needed to establish genuine national unity. A statement 
on national unity was signed between Fisor Yarisetouw of PEMKA and 
Marthin Prawar on 8 November 1984. Subsequently, Bernard Mawen, 
Regional Commander of the KODAM V, Rusa, in a letter of 18 April 1991 
addressed to Gerard Tom Ninanti in Holland, called for national unity and 
reconciliation among the OPM's leaders abroad, arguing that without 
national unity the OPM would not achieve its goal. Later, the secretary 
general of the OPM National Unity, Nicolaus Ipo Hau, called for national 
unity in July 1991.118 Again on 1 August 1991 a memorandum of 
understanding and cooperation was signed between Marthen Wenda of 
PEMKA and Marthin Prawar of Victoria, developing a plan for national 
unity.119 
In the southern command a new agreement was reached, ending one 
year of internal conflict, when, on 25 February 1995, Bernard Mawen and 
John Koknak signed a statement of cooperation which was witnessed by 
representatives of organisations from at home and abroad. More recently an 
initiative came from the West Papuan Students Organisation inside the 
country. In a statement of 9 February 1996, the students called for total 
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abolition of any form or ethnicity and regionalism, and for the 
establishment of a national united front. Finally, Kletus Kwalik, in a 
statement dated 16 June 1996, has called for national unity and 
reconciliation. All these initiatives indicate that national unity and 
cooperation are paramount concerns - but are also elusive. 
4.6. External Intervention in the National Reconciliation Process 
Despite all these efforts, the OPM factions have failed to achieve unity. This 
has led to a series of external interventions by the governments of 
Melanesian countries. First was the intervention of the Somare 
government in 1978. The representatives of the PEMKA and Victoria-Jacob 
H. Prai and Otto Ondawame and Seth Rumkorem and Dan Kafiar 
respectively-were brought to Papua New Guinea to participate in peace 
talks which were held on 14-15 April 1978 in Port Moresby. Papua New 
Guinea government officials requested the removal of the OPM 
headquarters, which they believed to be in PNG territory, and called for 
national unity and reconciliation; but these calls were never considered 
seriously by either side. 
Another move was initiated by the Lini government of Vanuatu. 
This initiative came as a result of longstanding political contacts between 
the leaders of the National De Facto Government in Port Moresby and the 
government of Vanuatu. In 1983, when Rex Rumakiek was living in Port 
Moresby he was ordered to surrender his travel documents and there was an 
attempt to deport him to Indonesia.120 The National De Facto Groups in 
Port Moresby (who were actually the opponents of the RPG), stepped in to 
help him, and requested the government of Vanuatu to grant Rumakiek 
120 Osborne, op.cit.:81. 
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political asylum. 121 The Lini government agreed and gave him a new home 
in Port Vila, where he served in the new South Pacific Resources Centre and 
on behalf of the Victoria Group. This initiative in itself was a positive action 
towards national reconciliation. Following joint requests by a group 
comprising Rex Rumakiek, Max Ireeuw, Fred Korwa, and Zacky Sawor, 
there was also a positive response to proposals for the establishment of an 
OPM base in Vanuatu and for the sponsorship of the OPM as the legitimate 
representative of West Papuan interests, but only on the condition that 
national unity should first be achieved. This precondition seriously upset 
the RPG, which had thought that these initiatives would further its political 
and military ambitions. Like the other Melanesian governments, however, 
the government of Vanuatu would support only a United Front of the 
OPM, not the PEMKA or the Victoria group separately. 
This reaction inspired Rumakiek to establish the United Front of the 
OPM in Vanuatu 1985. In order to convince the Vanuatu government and 
the world community of the seriousness of their intentions, the leaders of 
the two main factions-Prai for PEMKA and Rumkorem for Victoria-were 
pressured to sign the four point Port Vila Declaration of 11 July 1985, under 
the supervision of the Lini government. National unification, cooperation 
and specification of responsibility were emphasised in the Declaration. Even 
though their assent to the document was not wholehearted, the two men 
were each given specific responsibilities: Prai was to be responsible for 
political campaigns and Rumkorem for military campaigns. How far the 
Declaration was actually implemented is questionable, but it did have 
considerable positive political effect. It provided hope and it generated 
immediate public interest and support. The Lini government provided the 
121 Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby. 
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United Front with a venue and diplomatic opportunity. The Vanua-Aku 
Party of Vanuatu recognised the legitimacy of the OPM and promised to take 
up the West Papuan cause at a forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of 
Governments Regional Meeting and at the South Pacific Forum;122 it also 
brought the West Papuan cause before Committee 24 of the UN in 1984. 
Despite these positive initiatives, however, the newly established base 
in Vanuatu was closed down after only a short period. There has been much 
speculation about the reasons for this failure. According to Prai, the 
initiative failed primarily because of a lack of honesty and an excess of 
manipulation; Prai argued that the Declaration was conceptualised secretly 
by Seth Rumkorem, Rex Rumakiek and Andy Ayamiseba, without 
consulting him or the other members of the respective factions - Prai even 
claimed that he was forced to sign the document. 123 The Declaration was, 
indeed, sharply criticised by members of both parties for the lack of 
consultation in its drafting. In a statement dated 31 July 1986, former 
ministers of the RPG in Holland and Sweden, including Amos Indey, Tan 
Seng Thai, Marcus Kaisiepo, Bernard Tanggahma and Daniel Wikom, 
sought to dismiss Rumkorem as president of the RPG, arguing that he had 
not first consulted them about the Vanuatu declaration. Like Bernard 
Tanggahma and his colleagues, Nicolaus Youwe and other members of the 
PEMKA factions (excepting Otto Ondawame and Nicolaus Messet), criticised 
Jacob Prai for the same reason. Mixed reactions were also evident among 
Papuan support groups. There was a general concern that the main actors 
did not take the position of the government seriously but instead became 
interventionist and manipulative. The support that had been promised by 
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the Vanuatu government was, accordingly, never given. The offer to 
resettle Prai and Ondawame in Vanuatu also lapsed. Lack of commitment 
and consultation, together with the personal ambition of the participants, 
were the major causes of the failure of this move for unity. 
Internal conflict among local political leaders also affected the 
interests of the OPM in Vanuatu. Rivalry between Vanuatu's leaders Barak 
Sope and Walter Lini in 1990 impacted on OPM concerns. The Black 
Brothers, a Papuan folk song group, was accused of interference in 
Vanuatu's internal affairs by arousing national sentiment among local 
people and politicians. Independent observers believed that such disunity 
was promoted by foreign powers, thus undermining the support given by 
the government and people of Vanuatu to the OPM. Responding to these 
accusations, the OPM leaders, Prai, Ondawame and Ireeuw released a public 
statement criticising the Black Brothers and Rex Rumakiek for their 
intervention in the internal affairs of Vanuatu which had resulted in the 
closing of the OPM base. 
On another front, the influence of Libya in the South Pacific 
continually alarmed Canberra, Washington and Jakarta. Formal diplomatic 
links between Vanuatu and Libya were established in 1986 and several 
youths from Vanuatu, together with Rumakiek and Kafiar, visited Libya for 
training in Tripoli. New questions of the future of the OPM were raised 
when Rumkorem confirmed the link and claimed that "Libya had offered 
the OPM financial assistance". 124 The fear of destabilisation in the South 
Pacific region was widespread among governments in the region. Because 
124 Ibid.:172. 
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Libya has supported 'terrorist' organisations, its presence in the Pacific was 
seen as provocative by the Western interests in the region. 
The most influential factor, however, was the effect of Indonesian 
penetration into Pacific Islands politics and development, which also 
alarmed most Melanesian countries and Australia, because of its 
implications for regional stability and security. The involvement of the 
government of Vanuatu in West Papuan affairs transformed the foreign 
policy of Indonesia in the South Pacific. Fearing a spread of such actions, 
Indonesia established military and economic cooperation with countries in 
the region in order to undermine support for the OPM. Indonesia made 
attempts to gain international support by influencing politicians in Papua 
New Guinea, bribing them with money and women. In November 1987, for 
example, General Ted Diro was accused in the PNG Parliament of receiving 
almost US$132,000 in election campaign funds from General Benny 
Murdany.125 Indonesian military and economic cooperation with the 
Rabuka regime in Fiji and its penetration in Papua New Guinea alarmed 
the Vanuatu government and caused it to revise its policy. 
Among the positive side effects of the Declaration were the impetus 
to establish new support groups, notably the Australia West Papua 
Association (A WP A), and the Foreningen For ett Fritt Vast Papua (FFP) 
(West Papua Association) in Sweden. A tour of Australia by the leaders of 
the OPM in Sweden-Jacob Prai, Otto Ondawame and Nicolaus 
Messet-was another outcome. Bev Hall, a member of state parliament 
from Adelaide, in cooperation with the A WP A and various other 
organisations, organised this tour which started on 3 November 1986 and 
125 David Robie (1989). "The Forgotten Wars" in David Robie (ed.), Blood on Their Banner 
Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific, Pluto Press Australia, Leichhardt, p.62. 
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continued to 18 January 1987; its aim was to increase government and 
community awareness in Australia of the situation in West Papua. The 
OPM leaders talked about the problems of refugees, military cooperation 
between Australia and Indonesia, humanitarian support, land problems and 
the need for a re-examination of the West Papuan issue in the UN 
Decolonisation Commission. They addressed meetings in Adelaide, 
Canberra, Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong, Melbourne and Hobart, and met 
with politicians, political parties, NGOs, trade unions, support groups, 
solidarity groups, universities, and the mass media. They gained 
considerable moral support126 and helped raise awareness of the West 
Papua issue throughout Australia. 
The Port Vila Declaration had an important impact in the ending of 
factional armed clashes, in strengthening national unity, in highlighting the 
need for stronger leadership, and in encouraging the movement to be more 
respectful and tolerant.127 But it could not be made legally binding, and 
given the coercive nature of the agreement and the lack of prior 
consultation among the conflicting parties, its credibility and legitimacy 
were weak. 
The spirit of the Port Vila Declaration lived on, and several further 
national unification attempts took place abroad and at the headquarters of 
the OPM. In 1986, the leaders of the two factions met in Nijmegen and 
formed a preparation committee to plan a national congress. The meeting 
entrusted Fred Korwa (Chairman), Max Ireeuw (Secretary), Fred Atabu 
(Treasurer), and J.H. Prai and Seth Rumkorem as advisers, to plan another 
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congress. Three years later a meeting was held in Utrecht, which was 
attended by various groups, including the Volk Front; but again there was 
little progress. 
These various initiatives indicate a serious concern about national 
unity and reconciliation among all parties. Unlike the situation in Africa 
and elsewhere, the internal conflict in the West Papuan movement is more 
personal and regional than ideological. A solution is possible, with personal 
commitment, and the choice of the right approach. The Port Vila 
Declaration has provided an important foundation. 
4.7. The OPM New Order 
The OPM New Order (OPMNO) was established as a response to the failure of the 
Vanuatu Declaration, seeking new bases for both political and military 
campaigns. The OPMNO is structurally divided into a political bureau and a 
military council, one of which operates abroad while the other is in-country. The 
primary objectives are not only to expand political and military campaigns but 
also to unite the different factions into one national united front. Membership is 
open to all Papuans who support the objectives and aims of the OPM National 
United Front, particularly the former members of the two major factions. The 
organisation structure is illustrated in Figure 3. 
It is a loose organisational model. Theoretically, the OPMNO adopts a top-
down approach, but in practice such arrangements are ineffective. Regional 
political and military commands, for example, still act independently and the 
OPM political bureau can only intervene in regional affairs on questions of 
general policy. Let me now examine both of the OPMNO councils. 
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4.7.1. Political Bureau of the OPM 
The International OPM Office was established on 1February1992 in Malmo, 
Sweden, by Jacob H. Prai, the political coordinator of the OPM, in order to 
promote the urgent needs of structural change, national reunification and 
reconciliation. Reflecting on the mistakes of the past, the new political 
agenda sought the abolition of the previous governmental system. The 
single name "OPM" is now widely used as a legitimate term to identify the 
Papuan national liberation struggle. The OPM Political Bureau was 
structured as follows: 
President: J.H. Prai (formerly PEMKA) 
Vice President/Treasurer: Indey Amos (formerly RPG) 
International Spokesman: Otto Ondawame (formerly PEMKA) 
Youth : Joseph Prai (formerly PEMKA) 
Social Affairs: Marius Maury (formerly RPG) 
Members: Waney and D. Kafiar (formerly RPG) 
Supreme Commander: Marthen Wenda, with overall responsibility for 
nine Regional Commanders in West Papua. 
Propaganda machinery has been set up as a vehicle for an international 
campaign. The centre also has a clearly defined political program and action 
plan. There is strong personal commitment to engaging in various forms of 
political campaign, and increasing political awareness among the 
governments and peoples in Scandinavia, Europe, the South Pacific, 
Australia and elsewhere, all actions which strengthen the position of the 
centre. OPM Central Command, under the leadership of David Jebled, in 
their decision No. 40/XI-K/SM/PP /MPOPM/1988, authorised Jacob Prai, 
Otto Ondawame and Mark Ireeuw as their official representatives abroad. 
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The centre has legal status, only because it is a registered 
organisation in Sweden but also because it is recognised by most military 
units and the Papuan communities at home and abroad. John Koknak, the 
Operational Commander of the KODAM V, Merauke, who had titled 
himself "Supreme Command" in his decision No. 
03/C/PITOPM/SKPM/MPOPM/V /1993, dated 6 May 1993, recognised the 
office as the centre for political activities abroad and authorised Prai as the 
official representative. Recognition also came from Marthen Wenda and, 
finally, from Kelly Kwalik, KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, who, in his decision 
No. 001/P.G.OPM/SM/1997, dated 25 July 1997, authorised Prai and 
Ondawame as official representatives abroad to approach the International 
Red Cross with a view to building mutual understanding and cooperation, 
and to lobby governments of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific as well as 
NGOs, the UN Human Rights Commissions, the Secretary General 
UN and the European Parliament.128 The latter were asked to seek the 
immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from West Papua; to send in a 
UN fact-finding mission to West Papua to monitor human rights abuses in 
Hoea and Timika; and to make diplomatic approaches to the government of 
Indonesia to start peace talks. 
The political program and action plan of the centre combine the 
former RCJ and RPG platforms, with some small modifications. However, 
the primary tasks of the centre are to work towards the creation of national 
unity and reconciliation, to engage in public awareness programs and 
international lobbying, and to reopen the issue of West Papua in the UN 
and also put it on the agenda of the South Pacific Forum countries. 
128 Kelly Kwalik (25 July 1997). Surat Mandat Resmi, Doc. No:OOl/P.G.OPM/SM/1997. 
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4.7.2. Diplomatic Offensive 
Since its establishment the centre has achieved much success in its 
diplomatic efforts. Maintaining regular contact with military units at home, 
the centre has successfully lobbied the Swedish parliament and political 
parties. A number of motions in the Swedish parliament129 provide 
evidence of this success: these motions have called for recognition of the 
OPM as a legitimate liberation movement; provision of financial aid to 
refugees; the banning of weapons exports to Indonesia; the reopening of 
debate in the UN about the future of West Papua; and action on human 
rights abuses. Pierre Schori, a Social Democrat Party MP, urged the Swedish 
government to recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of West 
Papua and to reopen West Papuan questions in the UN.130 
In Australia, in 1996 the ALP conference expressed its concern about 
the situation in West Papua and the plight of the refugees, and called on the 
Australian government to intervene on the basis of a 13-point resolution 
which had been submitted by Ondawame to the ALP Branch in Victoria 
through Jean McLean MP on 19 February 1992. The Irish Parliament also 
passed a resolution on West Papua, dated 31 January 1996, which 
condemned alleged abuses of human rights and called, amongst other 
things, for the issue of West Papua to be reopened with the UN Committee 
on Decolonisation. Finally, the European Parliament passed a resolution on 
March 14, 1996 echoing these calls but adding support for demilitarisation 
and the sending of an international fact-finding mission to the region. 
129 
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Apart from diplomatic approach, the centre uses other means to 
internationalise the Papuan issue, including guerrilla activities in West 
Papua. Events such as the human rights abuses in Hoea and Tembagapura, 
the hostage dramas in Mapenduma, Arso and Waropko, and the attack on 
the Indonesian consulate in Vanimo in 1996, were acts which were used to 
attract international attention. The very existence of the centre, and the 
growth of support groups, provides indirect encouragement and strengthens 
morale. 
The direct involvement of the UN Human Rights Commission, and 
a recent response of the Secretary General of the UN on the fate of hostages 
taken by Kelly Kwalik and his colleagues in 1996, indicate how the new 
process of internationalisation has began to succeed. The Australian 
ambassador to Indonesia visited Timika 1996 and confirmed the hum an 
rights allegations, and Gareth Evans, the former ALP foreign minister, 
raised the issue of human rights with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali 
Alatas. 131 During the hostage crisis in Mapenduma, the International Red 
Cross played a crucial role not only in negotiating the release of the hostages 
but also in bringing West Papua to international attention, forcing the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and permanent members of the UN and the 
European Parliament to invite representatives of the OPM to discuss the 
whole issue. Most importantly, the Secretary General of the UN at the time, 
Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in calling for the release of the hostages on 
humanitarian grounds, made the first direct reference in the UN to the 
current West Papua issue and so engaged international attention. Finally, 
the visit of foreign diplomats from New Zealand and Canada in 1995, when 
131 Courier Mail 23 December 1995 ("OPM-Figure Interviewed" by John Wright). 
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publicity was being given to human rights abuses in West Papua, and from 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Holland during the hostage crisis in 
Mapenduma in 1996, as well as a recent visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister, 
are all positive outcomes of the OPM's international campaign. The case of 
West Papua is no longer so obscure. 
The centre has also promoted regional networks and public political 
awareness programs. By establishing support groups in different 
international centres, such as the Australia West Papua Association 
(AWPA) in Sydney, the West Papua Relief Association (WPRA) in Sydney, 
the West Papua Action in Ireland, and the Foreningen For ett Pritt Vast 
Papua (FFP) in Sweden, and by linking with other liberation and progressive 
movements (including environmental groups) in Indonesia, the Asia 
Pacific region, Europe, and the USA, the centre has successfully established 
international trust and confidence. 
On the home front, the centre has attempted to reconcile all parties, 
particularly the two main factions; the new organisational structure is a 
reflection of this desire. A musical group in Holland, called "Sampari", was 
invited to open the office, and all faction leaders, including Rumkorem, 
were invited to start a new peace dialogue. This call has never received a 
positive response, but the centre has hopes to organise a national congress 
which will be a stepping stone to solving the organisational problem. 
Despite such progress, lack of administrative experience, education, 
effective networks and finance suggest that hopes of substantial success are 
still remote. Recognising this, the centre emphasises the education of cadets 
and the improvement of networks. Realising the importance of improving 
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both the quality and the quantity of its activities, the centre sends students 
abroad to gain special skills and to participate in different activities and 
conferences. 
In short, the centre now plays an important role in inspiring the 
guerrillas to take more initiatives and be more flexible in their actions. With 
genuine coordination between the political bureau and military units, total 
internationalisation of the West Papua issue is no longer a mirage. The 
presence of the centre has opened new opportunities for international 
involvement and has begun to break down the isolation of the West 
Papuan struggle. 
4.7.3. Military Council 
The military council is the highest organ of the TEPENAL structure. Its 
functions are to advise the regional military units, KODAMs, and to provide 
general directions and guidelines for military activities. As described 
elsewhere in this chapter, there are, theoretically, nine military regions 
which take independent responsibility for their own regional affairs. The 
strengths and the areas of control of these command structures vary from 
one military region to another, reflecting material and geographical 
constraints. 
When David Jebled surrendered to Indonesian authorities in 1990 for 
tactical reasons, the OPM Political Bureau in Sweden appointed Marthen 
Wenda, the Commander of MAMTA I, to serve as acting supreme 
commander of the OPM. This move upset the self-styled Supreme 
Commander John Koknak of the KODAM V Merauke, who circulated a 
false account that he had been elected as the new supreme commander. 
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According to Koknak, his position as supreme commander was the result of 
an election, conducted after a meeting on 10 July 1992 at which eight 
commanders signed a "declaration of the unification and coordination 
body" and agreed to give him full mandate to organise the official 
committee of the OPM. He claimed that 52,000 ballot papers had been 
distributed between 25 August and 15 October 1992, and that he was elected 
over three other candidates: Marthen Wenda, Bernard Ma wen, and Peter 
Tabuni.132 According to Koknak the result was announced on 28 November 
1992; he received 65 per cent of the vote, with Mawen as deputy 
commander-in-chief of TEPENAL receiving 20 per cent, Wenda as 
commander-in-chief of TEPENAL gaining 10 per cent and Tabuni, the 
deputy chairman receiving 5 per cent. In fact, no such election took place; 
Koknak used this story to promote his leadership claims. While an 
Australian journalist, James Matthew, who visited Koknak's camp, 
described him as a natural leader and as having unquestioned respect from 
everyone in the movement,133 a group of people who visited the camp in 
1994 discredited his leadership and accused him of abuse of power.134 In a 
new command restructuring program of the KODAM V, Rusa of Southern 
region, Bernard Maw en was reappointed as commmander in chief. 
The relationship between the political and military sectors is 
governed by the terms of a general agreement on the policy and program of 
the OPM; TEPENAL carries out tasks under the general guidance of the 
political program and the military units are recognised by the OPM 
International Office in Sweden, as explained above. Clearly, the OPM abroad 
can campaign more effectively if the military units are actively engaged in 
132 
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military campaigns, but the military units are largely independent and 
decisions about what actions they should take depend heavily on local 
situations and capacity. Actions such as the hostage-taking in Mapenduma 
and in the border regions (north and south) in 1996, and the attacks on 
transmigration camps in Arso in 1983 were instances of independent 
military actions. 
By way of example, the policy and program of the KODAM V, 
Merauke reflects the blend of unity and differences. The 13-point action plan 
of the KODAM V is encompassed by the general policy and program of the 
OPM that was set out in the original 10-point program presented by the RCJ 
in 1976. The main points of the plan are economic and financial self-
reliance, effectiveness of communication networks, solidarity work, and the 
organisation of a national congress. The key points of all such programs are 
the same, all urging the overthrow of Indonesian colonialism and 
imperialism, and the establishment of a democratic state of West Papua 
which will guarantee fundamental human rights, provide free education, 
health and social services, maintain solidarity with oppressed peoples, and 
work for world peace and regional stability. 
4.7.4. Intensive Guerrilla Campaigns 1995-1998 and the Political Responses 
Since 1995, guerrilla campaigns have been intensified. Each guerrilla unit 
has undertaken aggressive military campaigns against Indonesian 
repression, and these have attracted national and international public 
attention. 
A peaceful demonstration organised by Kwalik on Christmas Day 
1994, to which officials from both Freeport and the government were 
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invited, led to harsh reprisals and the subsequent death of over 100 civilians 
in Timika, Hoea and Tsinga. According to reports by ACFOA and by Bishop 
Jan Munninghoff OFM, 37 people, including 11 children and women, were 
killed in the 1995 Hoea massacre alone. Following this, on 8 January 1996, 26 
people, including six Europeans, were taken hostage in Mapenduma by a 
group led by Danial Kogoya. Hostage taking also took place in 1996 in 
KODAM V, Merauke, KODAM II, Mamta, Jayapura and KODAM IV, Paniai. 
These incidents attracted much international attention. 
Elsewhere, in Waropko, thirty people from a survey team of Conoco, 
a US-based oil company, were taken hostage on 22 November 1995 in Ikcan 
Baru Village, and one hostage was killed. This operation was led by Arnold 
Dumutu of B-company, Battalion 2 of the TEPENAL. In reprisal, more than 
200 civilians were forced to evacuate their homes and seek political asylum 
in PNG.135 Another major guerrilla activity took place in KODAM I, 
MAMTA, where 40 guerrillas under Marthen Wenda marched into 
Vanimo on 26 October 1995, attacked the Indonesian consulate, held two 
Indonesians captive, raised the West Papuan flag, and destroyed consulate 
property.136 The OPM accused the consulate of involvement in espionage 
activities, particularly against the OPM. The Wenda troops also captured two 
Indonesian students, Marwiyah Abubakar and Basyir Kadir, in Arso Kota, 
who were later released after a ransom was negotiated. In the same region, 
sporadic fighting also occurred in Base G, Jayapura, 30 km to the north. 
Finally, in KODAM IV, Thadeus Yogi, guerrilla units were also active. As in 
Mapenduma, Waropko and Arso, in KODAM IV Karel Gobai of Paniai took 
two hostages - Frenchman Frederick Benti and Gabrial Go (Ekagi), in 
135 
136 
Australia West Papua Association, Sydney (12 December 1995), "Report m Recent 
Incident at Waropko". 
John MacDougall, "Attack m Indonesian Consulate in Vanimo", Kompas, 28 October 
1995. 
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Okaitadi on 20 February 1996.137 In the same year, groups also attacked PT 
Kamund Raja of the Djajanti Group, a logging company in Timika owned 
by a son of President Suharto, and took seventeen hostages. Expressing their 
discontent over the injustice and corruption promoted by the local 
government, more than 6000 Ekagi, Moni, Dani and Nguda peoples 
marched on Nabire and destroyed government property; this was also in 
1996. 
All these events attracted considerable public attention and concern. 
The National Human Rights Commission in Indonesia, churches and 
NGOs in Indonesia and West Papua, and foreign diplomats in Jakarta, for 
the first time began to make public their concerns over human rights abuses 
and to call for international intervention. As detailed above, the call was 
taken up by the European parliament, the Irish government, the UK 
parliament, the Dutch government, the Australian Labor government, 
universities in USA, and various NGOs and solidarity groups. In West 
Papua, the events encouraged people in urban centres to engage in mass 
protest actions. The protests that erupted in Jayapura and 
Timika/Tembagapura in March 1996 and in Nabire a few days later 
indicated clearly that the Papuans' national awareness had significantly 
increased. Most importantly, the events also ignited a new debate about 
Indonesian claims of sovereignty over West Papua, in both national and 
international arenas. 
137 Kompas 22 February 1996, "ABRI Free Two Hostages in Panai". 
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4.8. Conclusion 
Papuan nationalism has grown, inevitably, in response to high levels of 
oppression and exploitation. In terms of the concepts of nationalism and 
colonialism presented in Chapter Two, it is clear that the Papuan liberation 
movement has developed as a direct response to Indonesian colonisation. 
Papuan resistance against foreign occupation of their land can be 
traced back at least to the early twelfth century. It continued into the Dutch 
colonial period. The Dutch began a process of decolonisation in the 1960s, 
but lacked serious commitment to political change. The Papuan community 
itself became divided between pro- and anti-Indonesian forces. 
The resistance intensified significantly during Indonesian occupation. 
Yet although the restrictions on freedom of movement and increasing state 
terrorism, exploitation, repression and discrimination against the Papuans 
have served to encourage stronger nationalist sentiments, these factors 
alone do not explain the level of political unrest that is currently 
enveloping the country. The notion that all people have equal rights to be 
free and independent, as stipulated in international laws and conventions 
of the United Nations, has become the basis for Papuans claims. The 
independence of other Melanesian peoples has also inspired West Papuan 
nationalism. 
The OPM has engaged in a military and political struggle to establish a 
free and democratic state of West Papua. However, it has generally been 
perceived as a weak and ineffective organisation. From 1965 to 1968 it 
suffered from a loose organisational structure, weak leadership and a vague 
political program. The OPM was, in this period, more an expression of 
. . . :~ 
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Papuan feelings and dissatisfaction than a real political force. Such an 
assessment was often used to discredit the movement. But while resistance 
activities in the 1960s were quickly crushed the movement succeeded in 
fuelling Papuan nationalism and arousing Papuan political consciousness. 
The image of the OPM slowly improved from the end of 1968 into the 
1970s. Increasing repression forced the Papuans to follow new paths. A new 
political vision and military structure gradually emerged, involving the 
people in public awareness programs, education and training, and mass 
mobilisation in capital cities and along the border. New bases were formed 
and thousands of Papuans joined the resistance. 
Despite some serious organisational problems, and the denial politics 
described in the previous chapter, the OPM has managed to stand alone and 
fight against one of the largest and most powerful states in Southeast Asia. It 
has been able to expand its areas of control and spread nationalist sentiment 
throughout the entire region. A leadership split in the 1970s resulted in a 
factionalised movement, divided by regional loyalties and personal 
differences. The expansion of new areas of influence and the creation of a 
competitive environment, however, were positive effects of the split, partly 
compensating for the disunity and consequent lack of international support. 
Though the two factions have taken different approaches, it is hard to see 
fundamental differences in objectives and ideology, which suggests that 
reconciliation of internal differences may be easier in the OPM than in more 
ideological conflicts elsewhere in the world. External intervention to 
promote reconciliation has not been pursued seriously. National unity 
agreements have regularly inspired the Papuans since the Port Vila 
Declaration, but real achievement still seems far away . 
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The OPM has repeatedly called for peace talks with the Indonesian 
government over the last ten years, but such calls have fallen on deaf ears. 
The guerrilla campaigns of the last two years reflect frustration at Jakarta's 
lack of political will. However, the OPM is aware that a military approach 
can only be complementary to a diplomatic approach. 
The OPM New Order has brought about some positive change by 
internationalising the West Papuan issue and strengthening the military 
council. The growing self-confidence of Papuans has been important in 
forcing the OPM to unite to work in positive directions. 
However, returning to the criteria for successful leadership and 
organisation discussed at the start of this chapter, it is clear that most 
leadership styles within the OPM fall within Maxwell's fourth type, the 
limited leader. The issue of leadership remains a major problem for the 
OPM. Moreover, the OPM is still loosely structured, and lacks a clear line of 
accountability, a clear direction, effective coordination, and effective 
networking. Although, on paper, the political and military wings are 
unified in their major political objectives, in practice lack of coordination 
between the two bureaux remains a serious weakness. The military wing, 
for example, has taken political decisions without reference to the political 
wing abroad, and vice versa. The resulting confusion has often had 
devastating effects. The highly fragmented organisation of the OPM makes it 
difficult to establish accountability. While the OPM tends to adopt a vertical 
structure, a drift towards a horizontal structure - although sometimes 
successful at the local level-leaves dangerous gaps in the working 
mechanism. 

Chapter Five: International Support for the OPM 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that West Papua cannot achieve 
its independence through military actions alone; it also requires 
international recognition and support in this struggle. Gaining such support 
is difficult because of the divergent attitudes towards West Papua within the 
international community. The main debate concerns the question whether 
West Papua is to be considered as an integral part, or a colony, of Indonesia. 
The opposing arguments have created widening social and political gaps 
both within West Papua and between it and Indonesia. 
The first part of this chapter will examine the perspectives of the three 
major groups involved: the Indonesian view, the West Papuan view, and 
international opinion. The second part will analyse international support 
for the OPM, the national liberation movement, describing connections 
with Black Africa, Europe, Pacific/ Australia, and the USA. The chapter will 
conclude with an analysis of an internationalisation strategy for the OPM. 
5.2. Differing Viewpoints on the Status of West Papua 
The absence of a constructive debate about the political status of West Papua 
in the period of the third wave of colonisation has become obvious. Both 
Jakarta and its close allies, and those opposing Jakarta rule have been 
reluctant to arouse public opinion through open debate. Indonesia's general 
stance has always been defensive and one of avoidance. In contrast, the 
OPM believes that constructive debate would be beneficial for both sides. 
The international reaction reflects not only these different viewpoints but 
also the quite different interests of the countries and international 
organisations interested in the West Papuan situation. 
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the general view of the political status West is 
unchanging: West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia as a consequence of 
the political decision taken through the Act of Free Choice in 1969. 
However, there is also an alternative view, which holds that the annexation 
of West Papua was an illegitimate act and violated fundamental human 
rights. Among Indonesians, the group supporting West Papuan 
independence forms a very small proportion of the population, but one 
which is politically important for the West Papuans. This group believes 
that the Papuans have the right to be a free and independent state on the 
basis that the Papuans are Melanesian by race and have a different ethnicity, 
culture and tradition, and colonial historical experience from the rest of 
Indonesia. Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of Indonesia, was one 
who recognised Papuan rights when West Papuan issue became an issue 
after Second World War. Disagreeing with the colleagues 
Sukarno and Mohammad Yamin for the occupation of West Papua, Hatta 
warned them that such a plan could be regarded as /1 expansionist" 
"imperialistic", arguing that "If we take West Papua, we must also include 
the Solomon Islands in the middle of the South Pacific. The West Papuans 
are Melanesian. I recognise that the Papuans have the right to be an 
independent nation" .1 
After the death of Mohammad Hatta, self-determination for West 
Papua was for many years regarded as a non-issue, but more recently, in the 
post Suharto era, debate about its political status has resurfaced. A few of 
the newly emerging radical and democratic groups in Indonesia have 
acknowledged the past mistakes of Indonesian politics in the 1960s and the 
Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soie Liang (1984). West Papua: The Obliteration of a 
People, TAPOL, London, p.16. 
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rights of indigenous people West Some al terna ti ve 
approaches to a resolution of the Papuan conflict have begun to attract 
discussion, including the options of autonomy and of a federal system (see 
Chapter Seven). A handful of Indonesian intellectuals, including George 
Aditjondro (who lectures at the University of Newcastle in Australia), Arif 
Budiman (who now lectures in Melbourne University in Australia), and 
Amien Rais (the chairman of Partai Nasional (PAN) and a former academic 
at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta), and some other democratic 
forces believe that a federal system is the best solution for preventing 
further escalation of social and political unrest that could lead to the 
disintegration of the Indonesian state. This view is based on recognition of 
past mistakes and of the need to correct them. A different call has been 
made by Marine Brigadier General Freddy Numberi, the governor of Irian 
Jaya province until 2000; like others he recognises the need for a resolution 
of past injustice, but unlike other Indonesian intellectuals, he does not 
support the creation of an independent West Papua, 
autonomy.2 
advocates 
Social-economic and political disparities also influence ways of 
thinking among peoples from the outer islands of Indonesia. Many of these 
peoples feel that they "are colonised by our own countrymen because we 
cannot express our desires and opinions" .3 These people are also resisting 
central domination because their natural resources are being exploited on a 
huge scale, making a few Javanese and Chinese rich while the local 
inhabitants of resource rich regions like Sumatra, Kalimantan, Riau and 
Irian Jaya remain poor. People ask: if tiny resource-poor Singapore can 
2 Post Courier (Port Moresby) 17 December 1998. 
Indonesian Daily News, 18 August 1997. "Siapa Bilang Kita Sudah Merdeka". 
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become a wealthy country, why cannot similar progress take place in 
Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Aceh? 
In contrast, the general view in Indonesia has always been in favour 
of unifying West Papua as an integral part of Indonesia. Any demand for 
the independence of West Papua is dismissed as a utopian dream. It is 
argued that West Papua has always been historically a part of Indonesia: in 
the eleventh century West Papua was a part of the Modjopahit Empire, a 
Buddhist Kingdom that ruled out of Central Java and extended its power as 
far as Ternate and Tidore in the Moluccas. This claim is historically dubious; 
but even it were true, it is not relevant to the status of West Papua at the 
end of the twentieth century, any more than an argument that the Vikings 
of Sweden could legitimately claim sovereignty over Russia, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Greenland, America, Germany and Poland 
because they invaded those countries eleven centuries or more ago. Jakarta 
has also used the 'sanctity' of the Dutch colonial boundaries to justify its 
claims. 
The Indonesian ambition to incorporate West Papua into Indonesia 
led to a diplomatic approach in the 1940s. At the Round Table Conference 
between the Dutch and Indonesian governments in Den Haag in 1949, the 
two parties reached an agreement that within one year West Papua would 
be resolved as an issue; but in practice Amsterdam delayed negotiation, as 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Jakarta regarded this delay as a 
humiliation. Yet in reality Den Haag had already surrendered West Papua 
to Indonesia by accepting Indonesian demands instead of defending the 
status quo. Sukarno therefore increased diplomatic pressure on the Dutch 
and later developed military campaigns to annex West Papua. Jakarta 
preferred the term "return to the Motherland [Ibu Pertiwi]". During the 
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military campaigns a considerable number of Indonesians were said to have 
sacrificed their lives (Naval Captain Jos Sudarso and all his crew members 
were killed in the Arafura Sea, southwest of West Papua in 1962). 
The catchcry "return to the motherland" is a loaded term, politically 
motivated and of questionable validity. The occupation of East Timor, a 
former Portuguese colony, in 1975 and the confrontation with Malaysia in 
1963-1965 clearly indicate that Jakarta could engage in territorial expansion 
for its own social, economic, political and strategic interests. The evidence of 
such motivation is clear, even in the use of new names to replace the old 
Dutch names. To honour those who made the supreme sacrifice fighting 
the Dutch, the name of West Papua was changed by the Indonesian 
government to "Irian Jaya", and the use of the phrase "the gate of Victory" 
indicates that the take-over of Irian Jaya symbolised the ascendancy of the 
Republic over the colonial masters.4 The creation of "Irian Jaya" was thus 
important for the dream of creating a greater Indonesia. Before, during and 
after what was called the Act of Free Choice in 1969, Jakarta expounded this 
historical myth to convince the world community of the justification of its 
claim. 
Since the international community readily recognised the 
annexation, Indonesian views soon shifted. The Papuans were now to be 
regarded as Indonesian citizens with rights and duties that such citizenship 
entails. The Papuans were to comply with state rules and regulations like 
other ethnic groups; any complaints, criticisms and ideas of secession were 
seen as counter-productive. But there were inherent contradictions in this 
view. The Papuans were supposed to be the same as other Indonesians, yet 
4 Jim Elmslie (1995). Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan 
Nationalism, University of Sydney, p.14. 
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they were in fact considered a special group, both "underdeveloped and 
backward" and racially different with a black skin.5 As citizens the Papuans 
have a duty to defend the state and the state ideology, Pancasila and the 
Constitution of 1945. Any opposition to this state ideology is seen as a threat 
to the state's stability and security, and must be destroyed. The Irianese 
cannot be permitted to challenge the interests of the state either by trying to 
claim for themselves resources that belong to all Indonesians, or by creating 
political instability by calling for the independence of West Papua.6 
Further, Jakarta argues that because Indonesia is composed of many 
divergent cultures, traditions, ways of life, and races, spread across a vast 
area, any claim for independence or special treatment of West Papua 
encourages similar claims elsewhere, and poses a serious threat to the 
stability and unity of the state. Thus anyone who promotes the idea of West 
Papuan nationalism, and hence threatens national stability, must be 
crushed.7 
As far back as the seventh century, and particularly during the Hindu, 
Buddhist and later Muslim empires that ruled Indonesia in the eight to 
twelfth centuries, West Papua was a place for capturing slaves, hunting 
birds of paradise, and collecting other valuable trade items.8 Most 
Indonesians still stereotype Papuans as a primitive, backward and inferior 
race living in the stone age, that must be educated even though it will take 
them generations to reach the level of the Javanese.9 It is believed that the 
6 
7 
9 
Ibid.:14. 
Ibid.:15. 
Ibid.:16. 
Wim Zonggonau (1998). Statement at meeting of the International Physicians for 
Prevention of Nuclear War, Melbourne, 7 December, pp.3-4. 
Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples/RIOP (1985). The Tragedy of the Papuans and 
the International Political Order, RIOP Report No:l. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, 
pp. 12-17. 
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Papuans cannot develop themselves because they are lazy, undisciplined, 
and fractious. If they were allowed to leave Indonesia, they would not have 
the knowledge and skills to develop the country and become economically 
viable. Jakarta thus repeats the derogatory remarks that were often made by 
its former colonial master about Indonesian freedom fighters during the 
Indonesian independence campaign in the 1930s and 1940s. 
More recently, the Papuan nationalists have been regarded as traitors, 
terrorists or wild gangsters who must be destroyed. Jakarta believes that the 
problems that exist in West Papua will disappear over time as the Papuans 
accept the political reality and become assimilated as Indonesians. Working 
within Indonesian society, Papuans will then be able to take their part in the 
national development program and improve their living standards.10 
However, there are many hidden motives underlying these arguments. In 
order to develop and resettle its population, Jakarta needs more land and 
resources, both of which are available in West Papua. 
One of the possible consequences of coercive political integration can be 
disintegration. Marthin van den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama (1992), in their 
study of the politicat economic and social crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 
concluded that disintegration was inevitable mainly because the nation-state 
of Yugoslavia was created by force, perpetuated by the Tito communist 
regime. The federal government of Yugoslavia believed that by unifying the 
divergent ethnic groups, differences of religion and culture, regionalism and 
ethnic sentiments would be eradicated. Tito saw this as fundamental to the 
achievement of national and regional stability. However, the Balkan conflict 
following the death of Tito provides clear evidence that a majority of people 
of "Yugoslavia" rejected this artificial and enforced unity. The Catholic 
10 Ibid.:16. 
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communities in Croatia and Slovenia, the Muslim community in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the Albanians in Kosovo all felt that they had become the 
subject of colonisation by the Serbs who dominated the central power 
structure. The Serbs imposed their own culture and traditions on the other 
ethnic groups and regarded these ethnic groups as inferior races. 
Consequently, the emergence of new political opposition within the 
establishment inspired further ethnic nationalism. After the death of Tito, 
the federal state of Yugoslavia fell apart and demands for broader political 
participation and separation dominated the conflicts in the 1990s. Ethnic 
nationalism emerged once again. Most recently, the Kosovo liberation 
movement mobilised the ethnic Albanians to struggle for freedom. For 
them, the question is not one of social improvement but of the 
independence of Kosovo. Improvement in economic conditions will not 
end ethnic nationalism. The disintegration of Yugoslavia will continue, 
regardless of economic change and the assistance of foreign powers.11 The 
emergence of newly independent states such as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia provide clear evidence of inevitable political 
transformation in the Balkans. 
Balkanisation of Indonesia could well be a political outcome. 
Yugoslavia and Indonesia share many common characteristics. Like 
Yugoslavia, Indonesia constitutes many ethnic groups, religions, races and 
cultures. More than 3,000 distinct ethnic communities inhabit Indonesia. 
The state is also based on artificial colonial boundaries created by the Dutch, 
ignoring ethnic boundaries. In the case of West Papua, the Papuans are 
ethnically Melanesians and, logically, should be part of Papua New Guinea, 
not forcibly integrated with the Malay Indonesians. Like Tito, Sukarno 
II Marthin van den Heuvel and John G. Siccama (1992). "The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia", Yearbook of European Studies, Rodopi, Amsterdam, p.206. 
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abolished a federal system and united divergent ethnic groups into an 
artificial mega-state. 
5.2.2. The Papuan Perspectives 
Papuan views are also divided for and against independence. The contra-
independence movement argues that an independent West Papua is 
unlawful and historically unjustifiable. The supporters of this view 
comprise only a small proportion of Papuans, in terms of numbers, but 
have a strong influence in the central power structure. Most of them are of 
the elite, who fear the loss of their current positions in such organisations as 
Gerakan Merah Putih of '45, Pemuda Pancasila (the Pancasila Youth), and 
Batallion Kasuari. As military agents, members of Battalion Kasuari have 
the task of spying on OPM supporters in the villages; they often live in the 
villages as ordinary citizens and may not be suspected as agents working for 
the Indonesian military.12 They are not only contra-revolutionaries but also 
opportunists, and do harm to the movement. In line with Jakarta, these 
people accept the present political status quo. Most often they are self-
interested operators rather than loyal supporters of Indonesia. Their Ii ves 
are constantly in danger because both sides suspect them of disloyalty. 
During the social and political unrest in major cities in 1996 and 1998, such 
groups actively participated in counter insurgency activities against pro-
independence activists, with the Indonesian military using them in their 
espionage activities. They are often more dangerous than the real enemy 
because they can infiltrate local society and orchestrate protests and rallies. 
In the highlands of West Papua, for example, well trained agents wore 
12 KODAM VIII/TRIKORA (December 1990). Sejarah KODAM VIII/TRIKORA Period 
1982-1990, Jayapura, p.118. 
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traditional clothes and lived among the local people while searching for 
sympathisers and members of the OPM.13 
The second group is the nationalist or pro-independence movement. 
It is not only large in number, comprising comprising the vast majority of 
the population, but it controls access to the future of the nation. In its view, 
West Papua is not an integral part of Indonesia, but a colony in disguise. 
This group argues that the common characteristics of the early conventional 
colonial systems (territorial occupation, exploitation of natural resources, 
genocide of indigenous peoples, and militarisation), prevail in West Papua 
and, in some instances, are even worsening,14 and that what happened in 
the Act of Free Choice in 1969 was merely a transfer of power from one 
colonial master to another, without the consent of the Papuans. Although 
some observers believe that the current political tensions in West Papua are 
caused primarily by social dissatisfaction, to the Papuans it is absurd to see 
such an interpretation as a basis for deciding whether or not West Papua 
should be part of Indonesia. 
Racism and social barriers have also played an important role in 
determining the Papuans' views. The Papuans strongly believe that the 
colour of their skin marks a line of racial separation. The Papuans are black 
with fuzzy hair, while the Indonesians are Malays with brown skin and 
straight hair. The Papuans regards Indonesians as "orang seberang" or 
foreigners. 15 These differences are compounded by religious divisions. A 
13 
14 
15 
Ibid.:118. Also confirmed by Aldolfina Zonggonau Ondawame, September 1998, 
interviewed by the author, Canberra. 
Otto Ondawame (1997). "The Impacts of Freeport Mining's Activities m the Amungme 
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majority of Indonesians are Muslim, whereas Papuans are 
predominantly Christian. ways of life, tradition and culture are also 
quite distinctive. The Papuan food culture, for example, is typical of the 
cultures of the people of South Pacific with taro, yam, sago, sweet potato and 
pig as their staple foods; the Indonesians are a rice-eating culture. The social 
structure of the Papuans is a communal one, in which the big-man plays a 
significant leadership role, while Indonesian society, notably in Java, is 
semi-feudalistic. These differences have created deep social and political 
divisions between the Indonesians and the Papuans. According to the 
Papuans, secession is the only practical way to diminish the cultural conflict 
between the two societies. 
Reference to legal argument raises other factors. The Papuans have 
rights to self-determination and independence like other peoples in the 
world. As noted above, these have been dearly stipulated the UN's 
Declaration on Human Rights and its related conventions and resolutions. 
However, in West Papua these rights were denied the transfer of land 
and people from the old colonial power, the Dutch, to the new colonial 
power, without the Papuans' prior consent. The Papuans argue that a just, 
democratic and lawful plebiscite was not implemented in West Papua 
during the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969, and they criticise the United 
Nations for its failure to honour its responsibility in this matter. 
The bitter experiences of the current colonial occupation have 
impacted on the hearts and minds of Papuans. 16 The state administration is 
concentrated in Java, and the relationship of the centre to the periphery has 
been harsh. Militarisation has intensified and West Papua, which is 
16 John R.Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Oraginasi Papua Merdeka, Grasindo, Jakarta, 
p.160. 
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regarded as a "trouble zone", has been declared a Military Operational Zone 
(DOM). Widespread human rights abuses have occurred and there has been 
a massive influx of immigrants. In 1994 political observers regarded the 
173,430 immigrants with increasing alarm;1 7 by 1999 the number had risen 
to around one million. The Papuans lost control of their land and economy 
and became a target for cultural genocide. More than 163,000 hectares of 
forest were destroyed between 1982-1990 as a result of large-scale logging.18 
Economic inequality, unlawful selling and purchasing systems, outside 
exploitation of local economic resources, land conflicts, business-motivated 
marriages, criminal activity, and competition for jobs are just a few of the 
consequences of the tidal wave of immigration. There is a real fear that the 
Papuans will become a marginalised society in their own land in the years 
to come. 
The independence of most Melanesians and of many small island 
countries in the South Pacific, which in terms of geographical and 
population size and capacity are much smaller than West Papua, have 
encouraged the aspirations of Papuan nationalism. The Papuans ask, if their 
Melanesian brothers in the east can enjoy freedom and independence, why 
cannot the Papuans in the West of Melanesia enjoy the same freedom? The 
feeling of Melanesian Brotherhood is expressed in the OPM's national 
motto for the state of West Papua: "One People One Soul". 
Although public opinion in West Papua is somewhat divided, the 
general view is clear: as West Papuan students in Jakarta have argued, 
independence is the only realistic solution to the current conflict.19 
17 
18 
19 
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Arrangements based on force will not survive long, and will often end 
unhappily; the experiences of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet 
Union demonstrate this. Papuans refuse to accept the assumption that 
merely by improving the economic conditions of the West Papuans, ethnic 
nationalism will die out. Indeed improvement of internal conditions is 
seen as a way of strengthening the Papuan national sentiment. The 
experiences of newly independent states in Eastern Europe, and ongoing 
political resistance within democratic countries, such as the Scots and 
Northern Ireland in the UK and the Basques in Spain, show that economic 
improvements do not necessarily reduce separatist national sentiments. 
5.2.3. International Attitudes towards West Papua 
From the viewpoint of international opinion, West Papuan nationalism is 
often dismissed as unrealistic, but more generally it is regarded as a non-
issue. There are three main international perspectives. First, there are 
groupings associated with Jakarta. They include multinational companies 
and individual countries such as Papua New Guinea, Australia and USA, 
which have both bilateral and multilateral ties with Indonesia. Like the 
colonial power, this group readily accepts that West Papua is an integral part 
of Indonesia since the international community recognised the outcome of 
the Act of Free Choice in 1969. For this group, the issue of an independent 
West Papua is already dead; they consider the OPM to be a gangster or 
terrorist organisation, probably associated with communist movements, 
and consisting of only a handful of men equipped with outdated weapons. 
According to this view, West Papua would be better off within the current 
system than seeking separation. Its exponents argue that West Papua has a 
small population which is still "backward and primitive", that continual 
fighting between its many ethnic groups could lead to civil war in the 
future, and that it lacks qualified manpower, while in contrast Indonesia is 
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already a major power in the region.20 The Papuans themselves cannot 
defeat Indonesia and any move to the independence of West Papua will 
merely destabilise the region. Supporters of the view prefer to strengthen 
their bilateral and multilateral relationships with Indonesia. Papua New 
Guinea and Australia, for example, as part of their preventive diplomacy, 
pursue a friendly policy with Jakarta and have signed mutually beneficial 
military and border agreements. The military approach to overcoming West 
Papuan resistance is accepted. According to Peter King, in the interests of 
realpolitik, commercial advantages, and short-run tranquillity, Australia 
has turned a blind eye to problems in West Papua and East Timor,21 and has 
actively discouraged its own ex-colony PNG from showing Melanesian 
solidarity with the West Papuans. 
The more moderate international groups believe that the desire for 
separation exists because of unequal distribution of wealth, power and 
resources. These views come mostly from human rights groups, 
parliamentarians, environmentalists, academics, government sponsored 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and investors in West Papua and 
Indonesia. Like the first group, they defend the status quo of the unitary 
state of Indonesia. On the other hand, they are concerned about the survival 
of Papuan culture, tradition and ways of life, human rights abuses, and land 
destruction. They believe that by sharing of powers and a more equitable 
distribution of the national resources, political unrest will gradually 
disappear. According to them, autonomy, self-determination or a federal 
system offer the best prospect for resolving conflict, as such solutions would 
avoid an escalation of disintegration and would safeguard Papuan culture, 
20 
21 
Ian P. Siagian (21November1999) interviewed by the author, Sydney. 
Peter King (1993). "Breaking Deadlocks-Peace-making Opportunities for Australia in 
East Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea" in Kevin Clements (ed.), Peace and 
Security in the Asia Pacific Region, UNU Press, Tokyo, p.84. 
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dignity, land ethnicity. These groups suggest the OPM the 
focus of attention from contentious to non-contentious issues,2 2 that 
from the issue of independence to matters such as human rights, 
immigration and land issues and so engineer a new break in the current 
deadlock. While this view is unlikely to be acceptable among the 
nationalists, it makes sense in tactical terms, in that it envisages a basis for 
developing consensus in any subsequent peace talks. 
The third international perspective is that of groups of the far left, 
who argue that neither a unitary state, nor autonomy, nor federation will 
improve the basic condition of the people in West Papua. This group is 
relatively small in number, consisting of grassroot movements, radical 
NGOs, left organisations, progressive churches, academics and politicians, 
the peoples of Melanesia, and Black people elsewhere in the world. It 
includes the PNG Council of Churches, the Melanesian Solidarity 
movement and many solidarity groups other parts the world. 
group supports the major objectives of the OPM,23 and distrusts Jakarta. 
The contra-independence view is driven by political realism, while 
the pro-independence view derives from an idealist viewpoint. In part this 
reflects a division between state interests and people's interests. However, 
the general consensus on the likely success of any attempt to gain 
independence is pessimistic. 
22 
23 
P.Wallenstein and G.Lindgren (1998). Towards Conflict Resolution in the Third World, 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, p.129. 
Post-Courier 27 November 1997. 
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5.3. Potential Sources of International Support 
By comparison with the case of East Timor, international support for the 
OPM has been insignificant, for the reasons outlined above. The world 
community accepts the realpolitik of the supremacy of the state of Indonesia 
as legitimating the current status quo. It is important, however, to 
understand the shifting concerns of the international community, over 
time and space. The potential sources of support are four-fold: European, 
African, South Pacific, and American. 
May24 and Djopari25 , who have both made studies of external sources 
of support, conclude there is no real international support for the OPM, but 
that there is some low level of sympathy emerging, mainly on the basis of 
racial solidarity from the South Pacific and from Black countries, which to a 
considerable extent has encouraged West Papuan nationalism; any 
fundamental political change in the near future is unlikely. Let me examine 
this conclusion more closely. 
5.3.1. European Connections 
The public in West Papua, essentially the oldest generation, believe that 
support will come from Europe, particularly from the former colonial 
master, the Dutch; but that expectation is unlikely to be fulfilled even 
though the Dutch have a moral obligation to the Papuan people and have a 
tradition of democratic and international solidarity. 
The Dutch have in the past felt some moral duty to defend the rights 
of the Papuans. Their decolonisation process was started in 1960, first, to 
24 
25 
RonJ.May (1991). "Sources of External Support for the West Papua Movement" in K.M. 
de Silva and Ron J.May (eds.), Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict, International 
Centre for Ethnic Studies, Pinter Publishers Limited, London, pp.158-180. 
Djopari, op. cit.:134-146. 
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improve the poor international image created by their role as colonial 
masters, and secondly, because the granting of self-determination to the 
Papuans would open up a new opportunity for the Dutch to restore its 
colonial ties through the provision of conditional aid. In other words, the 
Dutch wanted to continue their domination. However, the support given by 
the Dutch was never serious and, as argued in Chapter Three, no real 
political support was given even to the West Papuan exiles in the 
Netherlands. The presence of West Papuan leaders such as Nicholas Youwe, 
Philemon T.J. Jufuway, Herman Womsiwor and Markus Kaisiepo in the 
Netherlands was virtually ignored in 1962. In the multilateral talks which 
preceded the New York Agreement in August 1962 the Dutch undermined 
the Papuan leaders, who were excluded from the negotiations. Since the 
transfer of power to Indonesia, the Dutch government has been very 
reluctant to support the OPM, arguing that it will only embarrass the home 
government, and it has never offered moral or financial support similar to 
that given by Portugal to East Timorese leaders. Some small local support 
has been given by Dutch grassroot organisations, NGOs and churches but 
their policy also goes hand in hand with that of the government. In the 
1980s and 1990s, Stichting Werkgroep Nieuw Guinea (HAPIN), based in 
Nijmegen, for example, provided small-scale financial support for social 
and educational projects inside West Papua. 
A significant development, more recently, has been the political 
support given by the European Union parliament. It passed Resolution 
No.B4-0332/96, of 15 March 1996, which called for demilitarisation and the 
presence of an international monitoring group in West Papua. 
Similar sympathy has come from Ireland. On 31 January 1996, the 
Irish Parliament passed a resolution stating its deep concerns over "the 
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allegation of human rights abuses and the inadequacy of the Act of Free 
Choice in 1969", and then called on the government "to request the United 
Nations to investigate and act on the allegations of human rights abuses 
and on the question of the validity of the 1969 'Act of "Free" Choice"' .26 
West Papuan Action, a local solidarity group based in Dublin, has kept the 
Irish government and people informed about political developments in 
West Papua on a regular basis. 
Unlike the Netherlands, Sweden has been an important source of 
support. The government of Sweden provided a new home for leaders of 
the OPM such as J.H. Prai and Otto Ondawame, Amos Indey and Darius 
Maury, and a small but significant measure of sympathy has emerged in the 
country. During the RPG period, leftist intellectuals, in collaboration with 
members of the OPM, were allowed to open an information office in 
Stockholm, but the venture failed. Fourteen years later, Nicolaus Messet, a 
West Papuan exiled in Sweden, confirmed that the increase of public 
awareness in Sweden was a result of energetic lobbying efforts by Prai and 
Ondawame.27 Six motions were submitted to the Swedish parliament 
during the 1990/91 and 1991/92 parliamentary sittings, drawing attention to 
allegations of human rights abuses and weapons exports to Indonesia and 
calling for recognition of the OPM, and the reopening of the case of West 
Papua in the UN. In the early 1990s the Swedish parliament called for a 
change in the position of the government on the issue of West Papua: it 
called on the government to take the issue to the United Nations and 
reopen the case; to play an active role in working for the implementation of 
a plebiscite to determine the future of the people of West Papua; and to 
submit a resolution on West Papua in the UN as it had done on East Timor 
26 
27 
Irish Parliament (31January1996). "Resolution on West Papua". 
Nick Messet 6 February 1992, Document: "A letter addressed to Andy Ayamseba in 
Canberra". 
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in the European Parliament.28 In Motion 1991/92:U609, of 27 January 1992, 
Pierre Schori and other members of the Social Democratic Party urged 
Prime Minister Karl Bill and the Liberal government to recognise the OPM 
as the legitimate representative of the people of West Papua, to provide 
humanitarian aid to the West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea, to 
take up the issue of West Papua at the UN, and to urge that the UN pass a 
resolution concerning West Papua similar to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
European Parliament's resolution on East Timor. This continuing activity 
reflected the work of the Swedish-based support group, Foreningen foer 
Pritt Vast Papua (FFP), established in January 1988 in Malmo, and of the 
International Office of the OPM, set up by the head of Political Bureau of the 
OPM, J.H.Prai, in Malmo on 1February1992. Expressing concrete sympathy, 
the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (SSU), Skaone branch, and 
the local government provided a venue for OPM operations. More recently 
in 1998 a new support group, known as West Papuan Information, was 
established in Copenhagen. 
In Germany, a church-based organisation has been one of the largest 
support groups in Europe to have played a role in keeping the West Papuan 
issue alive. The London-based TAPOL (which is the oldest human rights 
organisation in Europe focusing on Indonesia), Amnesty International, 
Survival International, and other NGOs have also monitored the situation 
in West Papua closely and raised the issue on a regular basis in different 
forums. In Greece, a group of West Papuans including Seth Rumkorem was 
28 See motions of Swedish Parliament No: 1991/92:U624, point 5 of Folk Party (People's 
Party) and Centre Party and 1992/93:U604, point 3 of Folk Party submitted motion. In 
motion 1991/92:U609, Pierre Schori, points 5 and 7 of the Social Democrat Party, clearly 
stated the need for human rights and a political solution. Also, see motion 1992/93:UU3 
in the Parliament archive or in the Merdeka Nyhetsbulletin of Foereningen Ett Fritt 
Papua, Nr17 /93, Malmo, pp.15-25. See also earlier motions: 1990/9l:U602 Eva Goes et 
al. (Green Party) and motion 1990/9l:U647, Ingela Maortoson (Folk Party) on the 
colonisation of West Papua. 
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given political asylum. The Vatican has offered relatively little support, but 
some moral support was given when the late Bernard Tanggahma was 
running the information office in Dakar. The position of the Vatican is 
broadly similar to that of other governments in the world. My own 
impression from a visit in 1989 to hold discussions with officials in the 
Vatican, was that if the population of West Papua had been predominantly 
Catholic, political support would have been likely, in the same way that the 
Vatican voiced concern over East Timor, where 95 per cent of East Timorese 
are Catholics. 
5.3.2. African Connections 
Support given by the Black African continent was significant in the 1970s;29 
even today Black African countries are actively concerned about the future 
of the West Papuans and of other colonised black peoples around the world, 
unlike the official positions of the governments in the South Pacific. The 
governments of both Black Africa and the Caribbean demonstrate high 
levels of support and sympathy. The effects of racism, the painfulness of 
colonial experiences, and strong feelings of the unity of black people are 
important motivating factors. As mentioned in Chapter One, in 1969, 
responding to the result of the Act of Free Choice, the Brazzaville group 
expressed their sympathy and called for a new and just plebiscite. The late 
President Senghor of Senegal, who was Chairman of the Brazzaville group, 
recognised the right of the Papuans to independence and provided a venue, 
with diplomatic immunity and office facilities, in his capital city from 
which to pursue an international campaign throughout Africa. During the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua, the late Bernard 
Tanggahma, a Catholic, was appointed as the head of this bureau. Senghor's 
own background as a former Catholic priest enabled him to play an 
29 Djopari, op. cit.:136-137 (see also May, op. cit.:163). 
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important role in creating links for Tanggahma with the Vatican. However, 
the office in Dakar was later closed down, primarily because of political 
change in Senegal (where a leadership shift replaced Senghor by a Muslim 
president) but also because of leadership clashes within the OPM in 1976, as 
outlined earlier. The closure of the bureau has not brought a decline in the 
Black people's interest in West Papua, however; much general sympathy 
still exists in Africa,30 but geographical distances and Africa's own serious 
social and political crises mean that this important potential source of 
support cannot be mobilised at this stage to become West Papuan sponsors. 
An embarrassing question raised by government officials from 
mainly West African countries (including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and 
Liberia) during my own discussions with their diplomatic representatives in 
Ghana in September 1989 was, what has your own region (referring to 
South Pacific Forum countries) done to help in your struggle? I had to 
admit, sadly, the OPM had not received any consistent support from its 
neighbours. 
5.3.3. Pacific and Australian Connections 
It is a matter for regret and shame that members of the South Pacific Forum 
have done nothing at all collectively to help to bring the West Papuan 
conflict to an end. In diplomatic rhetoric one often hears of "the Melanesian 
Way" and "Melanesian Brotherhood", but in reality such terms are empty 
as far as the people of West Papua are concerned. The governments of the 
South Pacific Forum (SPF) should play a more active role in seeking to 
resolve this conflict; however, the OPM enjoys only a very low level of 
sympathy in the region. 
30 Otto Ondawame (1998). The Joys and Challenges of a Freedom Fighter, Canberra, 
(unpublished), pp.128- 130. 
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As a close neighbour and also the first point of refuge, Papua New 
Guinea has frequently been affected by the West Papuan conflict, and any 
future political development in West Papua will also have an immediate 
effect on PNG. Repeated incursions by Indonesian troops along the border, 
and the flight of West Papuan refugees into PNG, have already created 
confusion for PNG, and PNG's attempts to take preventive diplomatic 
actions have failed. The official position of Port Moresby is clear: West 
Papua is an integral part of Indonesia and any support for the OPM risks 
encouragement of regional conflict and the influx of more refugees. There is 
some sympathy among politicians, government officials and people,31 but, 
like the Somare government in 1984, the Skate government in 1998 
continued to deny the rights of the people of West Papua. 
Despite this disappointing official stance, Port Moresby has made 
some positive contributions, as for example in providing a new home for 
more than 20,000 West Papuan refugees, despite pressures coming from 
Jakarta and Canberra. Port Moresby also ratified the international 
convention on refugees in 1986, during the Paias Wingti administration. In 
1998, 1,000 of the refugees were permitted to stay in PNG. Over the years a 
few politicians have individually expressed their sympathy. In 1962, for 
example, members of the Papua New Guinea legislative council voiced 
concern about the future of West Papua New Guinea (referring to West 
Papua), and supported an immediate referendum on self-determination.32 
John Guise wrote to the United Nations expressing Papua New Guinean 
dissatisfaction with the UN's actions in 1969. In 1974, a year before PNG's 
independence, Foreign Minister Albert Maori Kiki, called a secret meeting 
with the leaders of the OPM in Madang, and said that PNG was ready to 
31 
32 
Otto Ondawame (1992). West Papua: A New Perspective and Hope, Report: OPM-
International Affairs, Uppsala, p.11. 
May, op. cit.:165. 
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mediate in peace talks with Indonesia.33 However, these talks never took 
place, due to the fragmentation within the OPM in 1976. Individual 
politicians such the later opposition leaders Iambakey Okuk, John Momis 
and Bernard Narokobi are among those who have raised the West Papuan 
issue in the PNG parliament from time to time. In the final communique of 
a NGO parallel conference before the Forum meeting in Madang in 
September 1995, the conference called on the Forum to put the issue of West 
Papua onto the agenda of its next meeting, and then collectively bring the 
issue to the UN Decolonisation Commission. One year later, former Prime 
Minister Julius Chan made an important point to Jakarta, when 
Indonesians criticized him for allowing West Papuan political activities in 
PNG; West Papuans, he said, had full rights under PNG's laws to exercise 
their democratic rights.34 In the same year, John Tekwie, an MP from 
Sandaun province and chairman of the Indigenous People's Party, together 
with highlands MPs Robert Lak, and Peti Lafamana, both members of 
Melanesian Solidarity (MELSOL), East Sepik MP Bernard Narokobi (then 
opposition leader), and Western Province MP Micah Wes, criticised the 
Skate government's policy towards West Papua and said: 
The request is for the PNG government to take up the issue of 
West Papua self-determination and independence with 
Indonesian as well as take the matter to the United Nations. 35 
In 1998, leaders of the Melanesian Solidarity Group, the Secretary 
General of the PNG Council of Churches Pat Kila, and other community 
leaders led a protest march to the Indonesian Embassy to call on the new 
Indonesian government to recognise West Papua as an independent 
33 
34 
35 
Wim Zonggonau, interviewed by the author (January 1997), Port Moresby. 
Post-Courier 26 April 1998. 
Post Courier 22 June 1998, "Papua New Guinea Parliamentarian Pushing West Papua 
Independence". 
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country.36 The Papua New Guinea churches, Melanesian Solidarity groups, 
PNG Legal Aid, the Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum 
(ICRAF), and the Rural Training Centre are among the organisations that 
have supported independence for West Papua. In November 1998 the PNG 
Council of Churches allowed the OPM to open an information office in Port 
Moresby, but the government refused to accept such an arrangement and 
ordered it to close down, an action which was sharply criticised by the PNG 
Ombudsman, ICRAF, Melanesian Solidarity and the PNG Council of 
Churches. 
Unlike PNG, the Walter Lini government of Vanuatu recognised the 
OPM in 1985 as a legitimate organisation and provided a base for the OPM's 
activities in the region.37 The government also raised the issue in the 
United Nations and played an important role in bringing together the 
leaders of the Pemka and RPG factions to sign the Vanuatu Declaration in 
September 1985 (see Chapter Four). The Vanuatu government later agreed 
to support the exiled leaders of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in seeking 
independence for Indonesian's Irian Jaya province.38 [Since this was 
written, Prime Minister Barak Sope of Vanuatu supported calls for West 
36 
37 
38 
"West Irianese are Melanesians; they are not Asians. They cannot remain internally 
repressed under the tyranny of an Asian leadership. They are half of Papua New 
Guinea-literally in flesh and blood. They are Papua New Guineans who unfortunately 
were cut off from the rest of us by the borders of the colonial powers. They share our 
cultural values, societal norms and virtues; the aboriginal patterns of their lives do not 
resemble their Asian counterparts in any way. They are culturally different from the 
rest of Indonesia", Samson Komati, Gune 1998) "Indonesia must Free West Irian", 
California Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, California USA. 
"The Republic of Vanuatu, through its development co-operation program, will assist 
diplomatically and the Vanua-aku Party in particular will take an active part in the 
negotiations which may lead to the international recognition of the West Papuan 
People's Rights for Self-Determination and Independence. The Government and the 
People of Vanuatu are determined to support it in the future", in "The Vanuatu Proposal 
to the West Papuan National Liberation Front", The Lini government of Vanuatu 
(1985), Port Vila. 
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Papuan independence at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Kiribati in 
October 2000, as did the government of Nauru.] 
The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement (NFIP), based 
in Suva, has also given concrete support and kept alive the issue of 
independence of West Papua throughout the years. The foreign policy of the 
Fiji Labour Party government under the late Dr Timoci Bavandra made 
clear its support for the OPM. The Pacific Islands Association of NGOs 
(PIANGO) at a conference held in Suva in June 1998 also called for the end 
of colonialism in the region and classified West Papua as one of the Non-
Self Governing Territories in the South Pacific, together with Te Ao Maohi 
(French Polynesia) and Ka Pae'Aina (Hawai'i). 
Since the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia, the official 
position of Australia has remained unchanged: Canberra does not want to 
destabilise the region and endanger its own relations with Indonesia. In the 
Guidelines of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the 
OPM was listed under South Pacific region, and DF AT officials were 
reminded that the Australian government neither recognises nor condones 
the activities of the OPM.39 Bill Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1986 
refused to meet the leaders of the OPM during an official tour in Australia. 
He justified this action as follows: 
39 
40 
I would not agree to a formal meeting because of tension 
between Australia and Indonesia and the likelihood that 
Indonesia would be disturbed by official recognition of the 
OPM.40 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1995). "Guidelines on Official Australian 
Contacts with Representatives of Foreign States, Political Entities or Organisations 
where Special Considerations are Involved", Canberra, p.10-11. 
The Canberra Times 21 November 1986. 
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However, following a series of significant events, including the mass 
influx of refugees into PNC in 1984, human rights abuses in 1995/96, the 
Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996, the release of human rights reports by 
ACFOA and Bishop Herman Jan Munninghoff OFM in Jayapura, the 
hostage crisis and drought in 1996, and political protests in 1998, the official 
position in Canberra has slowly shifted. Australia was a major donor of 
humanitarian aid to refugees in 1985 and in the relief operation in West 
Papua in 1997 /98, and has also provided financial support to the Indonesian 
Human Rights Commission in Jakarta to carry out its monitoring work. In 
1995, the then foreign minister, Gareth Evans, raised for the first time 
concern about human rights abuses in West Papua and requested the 
Australian diplomatic mission in Jakarta, headed by Allan Taylor, to visit 
the Timika region to monitor the situation.41 Two years later, under the 
new Coalition government, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned 
the Indonesian military not to use security forces in dealing with separatist 
movements or popular protests, as this would damage Indonesian's 
international reputation and economic recovery.42 The Australian 
government also released over AUS$4 million for relief operations in West 
Papua in 1997 /98. 
In the corridors of Federal Parliament, concern is mostly focused on 
human rights and environmental issues. The Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade made clear its position on human rights in a 
recommendation calling on the Australian government to actively support 
a new UN initiative for consultations with all the parties to the conflicts in 
East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh with a view to negotiating a settlement, and 
to draw to the attention of the Indonesian Government the gross injustice 
41 
42 
The Australian Financial Review 7 April 1995, p.12. 
The Weekend Australian 11-12 July 1998, "Downer Warns Rogue Troops" p. 12. (See also 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 1998, p.11). 
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of the application of the Anti-Subversion Law to those involved in peaceful 
protests.43 Minority parties, in particular the Democrats and the Green 
Party, raised questions on West Papua in parliament. For example, in July 
1998, Senator Bob Brown, MP for the Green Party of Tasmania, gave notice 
of a motion in the Senate which called on the government to "reinvigorate 
Australia's approach to the West Papuan freedom movement by moving to 
ensure a fully enfranchised vote on self-determination in West Papua"44 
and called for a reopening of the case of the Act of Free Choice of 1969, 
arguing that this was the only way to solve the political conflict in West 
Papua. At the party level, the Australian Labor Party has on different 
occasions discussed the issue of West Papua. The Victorian Branch of the 
ALP in November 1978 called among other things for: "the recognition of 
the OPM as a political voice of the people of Irian Jaya, granting refugee 
status to West Papuans, and sending a fact-finding mission to West Papua to 
monitor human rights abuses, and urging Canberra to take up the issue 
with its counter-partners in Jakarta".45 Similar resolutions were passed by 
the Victorian Branch in 1986 and in February 1992, and at the national ALP 
Conference held in Hobart in 1994. 
While the Australian government has officially adopted a hands-off 
stance, a growing level of sympathy is emerging among the Australian 
people. In November /December 1986, grassroot organisations in Australia 
organised an official OPM tour around the country. During the tour (from 
11 November to 10 December 1986), public meetings and talks were held 
43 
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The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australian Parliament) 
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with aid groups, churches, universities, foreign affairs officials, 
parliamentarians, and solidarity groups. Three key concerns were submitted 
in the form of a resolution to the Federal Parliament, concerning human 
rights abuses, refugees, and the need for a re-examination of the Act of Free 
Choice of 1969 through the Decolonisation Commission of the UN. On the 
final day of the tour, the leader of the delegation, Otto Ondawame, answered 
journalists' questions in the following words: 
the tour found a lot of positive moral support among the 
politicians and the other people we have met in Australia ... in 
the long term, the West Papuan leaders would like to see a 
federated Melanesia incorporating West Papua, Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and 
F ... 46 lJl. 
In 1985 the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) was 
established in Melbourne, and twelve years later additional branches were 
opened in Sydney and Hobart. In 1996 the West Papua Relief Association 
(WPRA) was set up by Ondawame. The Australia Council for Overseas Aid 
(ACFOA) has also played a key role in the area of human development and 
human rights. These organisations have been important in fund-raising, 
publicity, and information campaigns which have had very positive effects. 
The AWP A has produced newsletters and information kits for worldwide 
distribution. The associations have organised meetings, seminars, 
exhibitions, and fund-raising events, and have paid travel expenses for 
OPM representatives. As a result, they have succeeded in breaking down the 
isolation of the West Papuans by increasing public awareness of their 
struggle. By organising visits of media personnel to remote areas in West 
Papua, it has been possible to expose the brutality and manipulation of the 
Indonesian regime. The mass media, including radio and TV programs, in 
46 P. Heyward, "Exiles Push West Papuan Cause: Independence from Indonesia Revived 
As Prime Objective", The Mercury, 4 December 1986. 
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Australia have been instrumental in transmitting the message throughout 
the country. The personal involvement of OPM leaders, and the 
commitment of members of the OPM and support groups, have been key 
factors in the success of this campaign. 
5.3.4. USA Connections 
The official position of the Washington government is the same as that of 
the Australian and most European governments, that bilateral and 
multilateral relations with Indonesia must be preserved at all costs. This 
general position has remained unchanged despite a growing concern about 
human rights issues. Over the last three years, human rights abuses in West 
Papua have been sharply criticised by Washington. In 1998 State Department 
Spokesman James Rubin urged the government of Indonesia to exercise 
maximum restraint, to permit peaceful demonstrations to proceed, to foster 
a climate of dialogue, and to order the immediate release of political 
prisoners in West Papua.47 In the same year the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor of the US Department of State released a 1996 
report on human rights abuses in West Papua which recommended that the 
Clinton government review its aid policy to Indonesia. However the 
prospect of direct pressure by Washington on Jakarta to prevent escalation 
of human rights abuses-as the USA has done in the cases of Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina-is still remote. At best, the State Department 
promised in 1995: "we will continue to actively pursue the advancement of 
human rights in Indonesia".48 
47 
48 
The Australian 9 July 1998. 
Marshall Carter, Director-African, Asian, and American Affairs Bureau of 
Democracy, letter to S. Udall, Executive Director of International River Networks in 
New York, 1May1995. 
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The US Congress has recently shown its concern not only about 
human rights issues but also about the issue of self-determination and 
independence of West Papua. On 22 May 1998, fifteen congressmen from 
across the parties called on President Habibie to "initiate direct, good faith 
dialogue with the peoples of East Timor and Irian Jaya on human rights 
protection and a just solution to their political status" .49 This call inspired 
the people of West Papua to demonstrate on the streets of the main urban 
centres such as Jayapura, Wamena, Biak, Manokwari and Sorong on 1 July 
1998 to celebrate the 27th anniversary of the struggle; but these actions only 
brought about severe reprisals. On 11 September 1998, Congressman Eni 
Faleomavaega, from American Samoa, expressed his own concern and then 
called the attention of his colleagues to the on-going liberation struggle in 
West Papua.50 
Among the American public, support for West Papua crosses social 
class, race and religious divisions. The emerging support is mainly coming 
from churches, grassroot organisations, environmentalists, intellectuals and 
students. In 1962, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People (NAACP), an important interest group of Blacks in the US, 
endorsed the Papuan independence struggle.51 Since Freeport McMoRan 
started its mineral operations in West Papua in 1967, the issue of human 
rights abuses and environmental destruction has become more apparent 
internationally and the attention of the USA has increased, particularly 
among environmentalists and academics of the University of Texas in 
Austin and other universities, and among human rights organisations. 
49 
50 
51 
The Congress of the United States, letter addressed to President Habibie, Washington 
D.C, 22 May 1998. 
Pacific Islands Report 11 September 1998. See also "Congressional Testimony: 
Indonesia's Human Rights Violations Against the People of West Papua", US House of 
Representatives, Washington. DC 
J.M. van der Kroef (1977). Conflict Studies; Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia, 
No.79, London, p.14. 
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They claim that Freeport is one of the most irresponsible international 
mining companies, and has shown little respect for human rights, the 
environment or indigenous people. Expressing their sympathy, students 
have demonstrated in front of Freeport main offices in New Orleans and 
established huge data bases on West Papua and Freeport activities. Prof. 
Steven Feld, from the Anthropology Department at the University of Texas, 
Austin, resigned his academic position as a protest against the involvement 
of the university chancellor on the Freeport Board. A Kennedy Foundation 
Award for human rights activities was given to Bambang Wiyanto, who is 
now leader of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta, for his concern over 
land issues in West Papua. Tom Beanat the leader of the LEMASA, also 
received the Jane Bagley Lehman Award by the Tides Foundation in 
September 1997 for his public advocacy. 
There is still little significant support from the USA, but sympathy 
has increased slowly over the past decade. More information about West 
Papua, together with the recent move towards democratisation in 
Indonesia, may encourage a greater public awareness. 
5.4. Strategies for Further Internationalisation of OPM Support 
Potential international support for the OPM is still very limited. Unlike the 
struggle for independence in Kanaky and East Timor, the OPM has not yet 
gained any significant political support from governments in the Asian and 
South Pacific regions. 
Since regional support is so important, the OPM needs to increase its 
efforts in this area. On the home front, the OPM must unify its forces; 
present a new vision, program, strategy and leadership structure; make 
more effective use of mass media outlets; and improve its information 
244 
network. At the regional/international level, the OPM must engage in 
more active diplomatic campaigns, using diplomatic channels in Australia, 
New Zealand and the Melanesian countries, and the existing networks of 
the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement. It must lobby the 
South Pacific Forum to put the issue of West Papua on the agenda of the 
UN's Non-Self Governing Territories committee, as was done in the case of 
the overseas territory of French Polynesia, and to reopen the West Papuan 
case with the UN. Cooperation with the Hawaiian liberation movement is 
an important avenue of entry to US political circles. The OPM must lobby 
NGOs, parliamentarians and government bodies, environmentalists, 
churches in the region, and member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, particularly donor countries to Indonesia, to 
stop all further financial, military and economic aid to Indonesia. It should 
specify international target groups, which may include the USA, Japan, 
Australia, the European Union, ASEAN, the IMF, the UN, the 
Unrepresented People's Organisation (UNPO), the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), and the Black Caribbean countries, in order to have the plight 
of the people of West Papua put back on the international agenda. It should 
again lobby those African countries which rejected the result of the Act of 
Free Choice 1969 in the United Nations, particularly the government of 
Senegal, urging them to sponsor the West Papuan cause in different 
international forums. 
Finally, as regionalisation is so important in international relations, 
West Papuan representatives should be allowed to attend the South Pacific 
Forum as observers and be admitted as members of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group.52 
52 Liem Soei Liang (1992). "Indonesian Colonialism in the Pacific" in David Robie (ed.), 
Tu Galala; Social Change in the Pacific, Bridget Williams Book Limited/Pluto Press, 
Sydney, p.113. 
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The issue of whether West Papua is to be or not to be a Indonesia has 
always been controversial and there is still debate about its future political 
status. One view derives from realpolitik, while the other comes from a 
sense of idealism. It is dear that public opinion within Indonesia itself has 
slowly changed; even if it is still has a long way to go, a positive shift is now 
occurring. 
Potential national and international support for the OPM is still far 
from realisation. However, there is evidence that sympathy is spreading 
geographically and slowly increasing. The specific issues of refugees, hum an 
rights abuses, and hostage crises, and, most importantly, the 
democratisation of Indonesia, have influenced this shift in public opinion. 
The level of support is still minimal. Three major factors 
account for this. First, the Pacific countries lack experience national 
liberation struggles, their current political status being largely a product of 
the negotiated withdrawal of colonial powers rather than a bitter liberation 
struggle. Secondly, the small size of most small island countries in the 
region means they are relatively powerless; the political interests of 
Australia and New Zealand still largely determine the domestic policies of 
these island countries, which remain heavily dependent, both economically 
and militarily, on the two larger countries. Finally, there is the deep political 
sensitivity which shapes Australia and PNC relationships with Indonesia. 
These two governments, as close neighbours of Indonesia, do not want to 
invite new conflict in the region. But regionalisation of the West Papua 
issue is vitally important and must be the primary focus of the OPM's 
efforts. 
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5.6 Postscript 
With the raised profile of the OPM and the Papuan National Council inside 
West Papua from June 2000, regional concern and support have steadily 
increased. The governments of Vanuatu and Nauru have openly declared 
their support for an independent West Papua. In their addresses to the UN's 
Global Summit in September 2000, they declared their support and called on 
the UN to revisit the so-called Act of Free Choice of 1969. other members of 
the Pacific Islands Forum have expressed their concern over human rights 
abuses in the country. The government of New Zealand has openly stated 
that it would like to play a mediatory role if the government of Indonesia 
and the OPM request it, a condition which seems unlikely to be met. 
International public opinion on West Papua has also shifted in the 
last two years, with expressions of support from US Congressman, with the 
establishment of parliamentary groups on West Papua in both Australia and 
New Zealand, and growing support within Europe. 
In Indonesia, a small number of radical groups are also calling for an 
independent West Papua. But the most important support has come from 
President Wahid himself. In a new policy, President Wahid approved a 
change of name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua, allowed the raising 
of the Papuan national flag, and provided $A350,000 for the Papuan 
National Congress in May 2000. 
All these demonstrate that West Papua is no longer an isolated issue. 
After East Timor, it will become an international issue. Australia and Papua 
New Guinea may not be able to continue to ignore the political reality in 
West Papua. But there are still many obstacles to overcome. One question is 
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how the OPM can attract more international attention and support? The 
answer to this depends on the formulation of a new OPM strategy. 

Chapter Six: Ethnic nationalism and Local Resistance: a case study 
6.1. Introduction 
To illustrate how Papuan nationalism has taken root among Papuan 
communities, a study of Amungme ethnic nationalism and its responses to 
the mining company Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia 
is presented here as a case study. 
Despite the claims of the government and Freeport that there has been 
some improvement in local conditions, social and political unrest at the 
Freeport mine, which is located in the southern part of West Papua, has 
been so bad in the last 32 years that the region is regarded as a serious trouble 
spot. The relationship between the main actors-Amungme and Kamoro 
landowners on one side, and on the other side the government and its 
military forces and Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans-based company-has 
actually deteriorated seriously over time. 
Political analysts such as Djopari 1 argue that public turmoil has 
occurred mainly because of dissatisfaction over the consequences of 
development, and suggest that the use of a "social prosperity approach", 
with a more equal distribution of social services and job opportunities and 
participation in the decision making process, will restore stability and 
security. While such improvements may bring some advantages in the 
short term, in the long term the issue of nationalism remains unsolved not 
only because of its complexity but also because it is so deeply rooted in the 
hearts and minds of all Papuans.2 The social prosperity 'solution' has been 
2 
John R. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Grasindo, Jakarta, 
pp.161-165. 
Ibid.:150. See also M. Kaisiepo (1994) "Ke-Irian-an dan Ke-Indonesia-an Mengkaji 
Nationalisme dalam Kontext Lokal", in K.H. Timotious et al. (eds), Irian faya di 
Persimpangan falan, No.45 Tahun 12, Bina Darma, Salatiga, pp.50-51. 
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opposed by the OPM and its supporters on the basis that such change will 
not address their fundamental demands. 
This case study will look at the relationships among the main actors 
and analyse the reasons for the continuing social and political unrest. It will 
argue that, even at the local level, the bases of the conflict are much deeper 
than a mere misallocation of benefits. Finally, it will suggest some possible 
avenues for conflict resolution. 
6.2. The Main Actors and Their Conflicting Interests 
There are six major political actors in the Freeport mine area, all of whom 
are in conflict with each other over their roles in the mining operation, and 
their share of any benefits. These are: the landowners (the 
Amungme/Damal and Kamoro) and the Amungme Consultation Council 
(LEMASA); Freeport McMoRan, the multinational mining company; the 
central, regional and local governments and the armed forces of Indonesia; 
the other highlanders in the region (Moni, Dani, Ekagi and Nduga); the 
Indonesian and Papuan workers; and the OPM. Each of these groups claims 
that it has rights to benefit from the mining operation; but on what basis can 
each group justify such claims, and which claims should be given 
precedence? I will examine each group of actors in turn, but will focus on 
the main three-the landowners, Freeport Indonesia (FI), and the 
Indonesian government. 
Map 3: Amungsa (the Land of Amungme) 
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6.2.1. 
and Kamoro are the local landowners. They been 
severely affected the Freeport mining operation for more 32 years3 . 
The Amungme, who belong to the Papuan language phylum, total 
14,000 people who speak Amungkal4 . The Amungme have been described 
as peace-loving5 . According to Junus Pribadi, the chairman of the regional 
government in Fakfak in the 1970s, the Amungme are intelligent and 
capable.6 A more recent account by Flannery notes that the Amungme are a 
physically small but tough people who have able to manage their lives in an 
extremely difficult environment.7 Generally, the Amungme value 
kindness, honesty, calmness, and integrity, and strongly believe in 
collective, consultative approaches to social and political conflicts. 
The Amungme live in Amungsa (the of Amungme) which 
located between the Jigi-Mugi valley in the east and Delamagama 
West, sharing borders with the Nduga-Dani the east, Moni/Ekagi in 
the west, and the Kamoro in the south. Timika city is located on current 
border between the Amungme and the Kamoro.8 The Amungme live in 
4 
7 
A general description of the Amungme people is contained in Otto Ondawame (1998) 
'The Joys and Challenges of A Freedom Fighter: A Personal Reflection of My Past 
Experiences -A Short Autobiography', Department of Political and Social Change, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, pp3-4 (unpublished). 
Warta Freeport Vol.No.XXV (3rd Quarter 1997). The Community and Community 
Report: Working Together Towards Sustainable Development, Jakarta, p.20. 
A Dumatuban (1993). Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedesaan: Studi Tentang Peranserta 
Orang Amungme Dalam Pembangunan di Desa Kwamki Lama, Kecamatan Mimika 
Timur, Kabupaten Fakfak, Irian Jaya, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, p49. 
Junus Pribadi (1996). "Orang Amungme Memang Cerdik and Piawai", Tifa Irian, 
Minggu Ketiga, Jayapura, p. 10. 
Tim Flannery (1998). Throwim Way Leg: An Adventure, Griffin Press, Melbourne, 
p.101. 
"These workers and their families had established themselves just north of the 
airport. This area represents the southernmost edge of Amungme territory", in George 
A. Mealey (1996) Grasberg: Mining in the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper 
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seventeen regions: Duma, Wa, Araowoanop, Tsinga, Hoea, Belakmakama, 
Umpiliga, Malimepsingama, Dola, Noema, Bela, Ilaga, Alama, Beoga, 
Aronowa, Akimuga and Timika; and from 1962 and 1967, the lowland areas 
of Akimuga, Jita and Timika were also inhabited by Amungme (see Map 3 
below). The Amungme and Kamoro people have settled on the most 
cultivatable land in the southern part of the mountainous range where both 
the Lorentz Conservation Area and the Freeport mining operations are 
located. The Lorentz national park, managed by The World Wide Fund for 
Nature, is one the biggest of its kind in the world, covering 1.5 million ha. 
Many unique species of flora and fauna have been protected within the park. 
The area is not only home to many types of flora and fauna, but also to more 
than 80,000 indigenous Amungme, Kamoro and Nduga peoples.9 In the 
same region, Freeport McMoRan has been granted a concession area of 
almost 2.6 million ha, covering the area from the current operation site to 
the Star Mountains near the border with PNG. 
Amungme settlement can be presumed to have begun by 
approximately 7,000 BC, when new agricultural techniques were developed 
in the highlands of New Guinea. The Amungme practice a shifting 
agricultural system supplemented by domestication of animals, and hunting 
and gathering. They also barter with their neighbours, particularly with the 
Kamoro in the south, and in this way developed alliances, and established 
land boundaries. 
9 
and Gold in the World in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia, Freeport McMoRan 
Copper & Gold Inc., New Orleans, p.322. 
Ronald G. Petocz (1987). Konservasi Alam dan Pembangunan di Irian Jaya: Strategi 
Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Alam Secara Rasional, The World Wildlife Fund, 
Grafitipers, Jakarta, pp. 42-74. 
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Amungme society is divided into two major moieties, Mom and 
Magai, which determine eligibility for marriage; each moiety consists of nine 
subgroups or clans.1 0 
Amungme society is egalitarian. Like the Dani, the Amungme 
traditionally accord all people equal rights. 11 Men and women have equal 
opportunity to gain social status. Usually, the eldest women can gain respect 
and position in Amungme society. According to many authorities,1 2 a 
leader (me nagawan), either male or female but usually male, is elected on 
the basis of wealth, high social status, good attitude, oratorical skills, 
charisma, ability in making war and peace, and generosity in dispensing 
resources. Tom Beanal, the leader of LEMASA, particularly emphasises the 
following criteria for a leader: he should be a well respected figure, wise, 
firm, trustworthy and honest, while cowardliness and dishonesty are 
strongly condemned.13 The primary advantage of this social system is that it 
provides the opportunity for everyone to express their views and to 
participate in collective decision-making; consequently opportunities for 
dominant leadership are minimised in Amungme society. Within the 
system of delegation of power, me nagawan are divided into three 
categories: village me nagawan, regional me nagawan, and tribal me 
nagawan, with each responsible for their own internal affairs.14 These 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
Tom Beanal (1997). Amungme: Magaboarat Negal fombei Peibei, Wahana Lingkungan 
Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), Jakarta. pp.94-96. [See also N. Manembu (1991). The 
Sempan, Nduga, Nakai and Amungme Peoples of the Lorentz Area. WWF Project 4521, 
Jayapura, p.77.] 
Dumatubun, op.cit.:40. 
D.K.Carlsson (1987). Fraon Koen till Genus: Kvinnligt och Manligt i Ett Kulturellt 
Perspective, Minervaboeckema, Boraos, p.83. See also Manembu, op.cit.:79; 
Dumatubun, op.cit.:42; John D.Ellenberger (1994) On Economic Development Amongst 
the Damals (Uhunduni) North of the Carstensz Mountain Range, Bureau of Native 
Affairs, Hollandia, pp.7-8; and C.D.T. Cook (1995) Amungme Way: the Subsistence 
Strategies, the Knowledge and the Dilemma of the Tsinga Valley People in Irian 
f aya, Indonesia, UMI, Ann Arbor, pp.91-94. 
Beanal, op.cit.:116. 
Ibid.: 114-119. 
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leadership 
successful discussed 
The Kamoro people live in the coastal areas between the Asmat the 
east Etna Bay. Like the Amungme, they belong to the Papuan linguistic 
phylum. Physically, they are tall and well built. They are nomadic people, 
whose daily economic activities are dominated by hunting, gathering and 
small-scale gardening. They are classified as a semi-nomadic society. Unlike 
the Amungme, their main staple food is sago, derived from the palm which 
grows in swamp areas and along river banks. Rivers and the sea are very 
important to the Kamoro both as an economic resource and as a 
communication network. The current Freeport concession areas to the 
south of the mine are designated as supporting areas, which means that no 
actual mining takes place there; but a large area of Kamoro land has been 
seriously affected by toxic tailings wastes, and land also 
over for roads, airfields and a harbour, and for dumping mine waste. 
6.2.1.1. The Amungme Land Tenure System 
In Amungme traditional law an individual is not allowed to own land. As 
in many parts of Melanesia, land is not owned by individuals but belongs to 
the community. An individual has rights to use land according to accepted 
community arrangements. For these purposes, the traditional land tenure 
system of the Amungme and Kamoro is classified both by natural qualities 
and use. 15 Like the Ekagi people, the Amungme classify terrain into 
fourteen categories "according to its economic and physical attributes 
(garden, fallow, virgin forest, fallow bush, fallow grass, paths, swamps, 
rivers) which [are] based on seven contrasting components: nature of the 
15 R. Crocombe and R. Hide (1987). "New Guinea: Unity in Diversity" in Crocombe R. 
(ed.), Land Tenure in the Pacific, University of the South Pacific, Third Edition, Suva, 
p.325. 
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surface, cultivation, significance, degree of vegetation disturbances, type of 
vegetation, size, and, in the case of water, whether moving or still".16 
At the level of the clan, parish, or community, the Amungme have 
common rights to hunting territories and common defence obligations, but 
not necessarily rights to commonly held land. Group land rights, for 
example, are focused at the level of sub-clans and lineages or of hamlets and 
villages, where decisions on the allocation of land other than through 
inheritance are most frequently made.17 The Amungme classification of 
land recognises intermediate (nuclear) family land, sub-clan land, 
community land, regional land, and the Amungme land. 
Within this system, the Amungme classify the areas around the mine 
operation into two main categories, according to functions. There is the 
classification by topography, from savanna through deep forest to hillsides 
and high mountains; and by the social and religious significance of each of 
these land forms. On the hillsides of Ridge Camp or Mile 74 at the mine, for 
example, the Amungme traditionally plant pandanus trees, which are the 
only trees suitable for this environment. All this land is held in collective 
ownership and an individual has only use rights. 
Land is basic to much of the conflict of values between the Amungme 
and Freeport; for the Amungme, land has two key functions: the 
mythological aspects of origin and survival, and the spiritual values of the 
land tenure system. 
16 
17 
Ibid.:325. 
Ibid.:330. See also Erari (1997) in "Tanah Kita, Hidup Kita: Pendekatan Budaya 
Melanesia dalam Rangka Krisis Ekologi Global", Prisma, 6 June. 
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6.2.1.2. The Meaning of Land 
Traditionally the Amungme regard land as their "Mother", their source of 
life, inspiration and survival. The system of land tenure is rooted in 
mythology and history of origin, genealogy, and warfare, a heritage passed 
down for generations. Generally, the division of land is made in accordance 
with the religious ecology of the people, emphasising harmony as the 
primary feature of their interaction with their natural and social 
environment. In this respect, mountains, rivers and valleys are regarded as 
the "Body of our Mother" by the Amungme.18 The mountains are called 
ningok ("the head of our Mother"). This is the secret place where the spirits 
of the ancestors live, often in the mountains of Nemang Kawi or Y else gel 
(Puncak Jaya) or Ongopsegel (Ertsberg) or Awulkeweng in the Noema valley. 
The lower mountain slopes and foothills are the places where the 
Amungme live. All social activities such as war and peace, hunting, 
gardening and governing, take place on the land. Land is also a source of 
origin, as A. Kelanangame, an Amungme academic, has explained: 
18 
19 
Land signifies their identity. It shows where a person comes 
from, for example Tsingame means a man from the Tsinga 
area. Land is the place where the Amungme live, where the 
Amungme can get food, where their bodies are buried and 
where their ancestral spirits live. Land is their mother; a 
mother gives birth, gives food, takes care of them, and educates 
them. Land is their mother's womb. Mountains are their 
mother's breasts which give the Amungme milk to drink. 
Rivers are their mother's urine. The flow of the water in the 
big rivers means that mother is healthy and can give the 
Amungme fertility. Valleys are their mother's chest where the 
Amungme live. Land, mountain: "body of our Mother" for the 
Amungme.19 
N. Manembu, op.cit.:83. See also K.P. Erari, op.cit.: 73. "They [Amungme] believe that 
the land represents their mother in three distinct sections: the head, where the 
Amungme think, the body, where the Amungrne live (planting food and raising 
children), and the legs, which is a taboo area," said Peter Yan Magal, ACFOA (24 
April 1996) Freeport Indonesia: Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights, 
Report, Canberra, p9. 
Manembu, op.cit.:83. 
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this way Amungme explain meaning land set social norms 
protect land from mass destruction. The Sempan-Kamoro people also, 
for example, believe that they come from the Big Swamp around Jita and 
Pece, in the south of Akimuga sub-district.20 Sempan people call themselves 
Manesari, which can be translated as 'Centre of People'. Like the Amungme 
claims to the Mulkia region, the Sempan-Kamoro also claim land 
ownership on the basis of river systems. They divide land according to 
individual, family, village/ group and se (clan) ownership. Both river and 
land areas are divided between a village's se and families. Inawka river, for 
example, is claimed by Inawkans;21 the Inafita people claim Inafita river as 
their land, and the Waonoripi people claim the Minajerwi river as their 
land boundary. Similarly, the Amungme regard Bela Mepingama as the 
Amungme place of birth. The Amungme and Kamoro revere the land both 
as source of origin and as their own mother who bore them. 
Land also represents religious values. The Amungme, for example, 
differentiate between aba dingkop, which is a garden place, and seboanayi, 
which is a sacred forest or mountain. In the seboanayi forest of Ulalokbugin 
in the eastern part of Aramsolki, Akimuga subdistrict in Mulkia (Grasberg) 
and in Awulkeweng, Noemba, for example, people are not allowed to cut 
trees, not even a leaf.22 Ertsberg and Grasberg and Awulkeweng-ningok are 
among the secret places where ritual ceremonies are held asking for success, 
protection, strength and health. According to Hai, the Amungme religion 
which has overtones of reincarnation, these are places of the first passing of 
the dead spirit on its journey to heaven (Haijogon) to meet Jomun nerek-
temun nerek (God). Each year, the Amungme traditionally celebrated a Holy 
20 
21 
22 
Ibid.:14. 
Ibid.:23. 
Ibid.:81. 
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Day when all members of the community were obligated to participate in 
the Nord Nomun ceremony. Similar rituals to the holy communion that is 
practised in Catholic churches today were also performed in the Hai religion. 
When Christianisation spread to Amungsa in the middle of the 1950s, this 
religious practice was prohibited. 
The people's religious relationship with the land may be expressed 
through many different ceremonies. Like other religions of indigenous 
peoples in the world, the Amungme often offer goods and sacrifices to the 
supernatural powers. In Javanese culture, such beliefs are still practised: on 
the island of Java alone there are more than a hundred holy places where 
spiritual forces are believed to be concentrated like magnetic poles. There is, 
for example, Sendang Semanggi, a spring near Yogya; Gua Serandil, a sea 
cave near Cilacap, and the misty uplands of the Dieng Plateau, all sacred sites 
which the former president Suharto often visited to seek spiritual 
strength.23 If the government of Indonesia denies the validity of the 
Amungme belief system and the secret places in the Mukia area, this is the 
same as denying the right of their former president and many Javanese to 
visit the Dieng Plateau to meditate and practise self-denial in order to gain 
new strength and insight. 
However, Amungme values have been systematically destroyed since 
the first geological expedition to Ertsberg in the Mulia valley (Tembagapura) 
in 1936, led by Colijn and Jean Jacques Dozy, and later by Freeport McMoRan, 
whose contract of work was signed in 1967. The mother of the Amungme 
has been systematically killed: the head has been cut off and destroyed, and 
the remains have been thrown into the rivers. Other parts have been taken 
away to Japan, USA, South Korea and other faraway countries. Today, the 
23 H. McDonald (1980). Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana/Collins, Blackburn, p.3. 
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Amungme are m a destroyed environment. They want to 
their identity, which is under serious 
Recent changes in the land tenure system in Papua are the result of 
increasing economic pressures. Land that was traditionally valued in 
spiritual terms is now valued in purely monetary terms.25 The selling of 
land for transmigration camps in Timika is a dear example of this trend. 
Additionally, traditional subsistence groups have turned to the market 
economy, with demands for faster transport and higher quality of produce. 
In order to obtain effective control, increase production, and make way 
for colonists (immigrants), the Indonesian government has introduced new 
laws to overturn the traditional land tenure system. Such injustice 
reinforces the hatred of the colonial powers and encourages separatist 
sentiments among the Papuans. 
6.2.1.3. Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme 
Comparable to the OPM nationally, at the local level the Lembaga 
Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA) or Traditional Consultation 
Council of the Amungme was established in 1991 to represent the interests 
of the Amungme and Kamoro. Even though it has some fundamental 
weaknesses in terms of administrative management, organisational 
structure, policy, program, and financial viability, the organisation feels 
strong because it is supported by the local people, the churches, the 
landowners, NGOs and Papuans at regional, national and international 
levels. 
24 
25 
Mealey, George A. (1996). Grasberg: Mining in the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of 
Copper and Gold in the World, in the Mountains of Irian faya, Indonesia, Freeport 
McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc, New Orleans. p.76-77. 
Crocombe, op.cit.:4. 
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A major priority of the organisation is recognition of and respect for 
Amungme rights to land. It has set out a list of 33 demands (see below). 
Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia both regard the 
organisation as a disruptive element working against their interests in the 
region and creating bad relations. In order to undermine LEMASA, a new 
alternative organisation, AMUNGKAL, was established in 1996 with 
financial assistance from the government. Even though Amungkal is not 
supported by the majority of the people, its existence has created confusion 
and division within the Amungme community. 
As a representative of the local people, LEMASA fights against such 
injustices as compulsory land acquisition, dispossession of the local people, 
environmental destruction, and the continuing lack of employment, social 
services, compensation and participation for the Amungme. LEMASA has 
organised meetings, demonstrations, and talks with the company and the 
government, and has even taken Freeport McMoRan to district and federal 
courts in the USA. In this way the organisation has become the mouthpiece 
of the people in gaining public sympathy and support. 
As LEMASA is officially regarded as a political movement, it is subject 
to the restrictions on fundamental freedoms imposed by the Indonesian 
government. Suspected of having links with the OPM, LEMASA has 
become a target of suppression and intimidation; Tom Beanal, the leader of 
the organisation, has personally been accused of having a connection with 
the OPM.26 
26 The Head of Police for Eastern Timika Sector (14 January 1998) accused Tom Beanal of 
having a connection with the OPM, Document No:Pol.SP /02/1998/SERSE, Timika. 
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LEMASA's relationship Freeport 
generally due to public pressures over 1990s a more sensitive 
relationship is developing. Policy change could give LEMASA a new role as 
a full player in the decision-making process. 
6.2.2. Freeport McMoRan and Rio-Tinto/CRA 
There are many economic and practical reasons why multinational 
companies such as Freeport McMoRan, Rio-Tinto and CRA invest abroad. 
They include the availability of raw materials and cheap manpower, tax 
holidays and market dominance. Often they ignore social and 
environmental responsibilities in the Third World country. 
When political change took place in Indonesia in 1965, the shift from a 
guided economy to a free market economy opened up new possibilities 
foreign investment. The economic policy of the Suharto regime emphasised 
rapid economic development, aiming to catch up with new economic 
tigers in Southeast and East Asia. One priority area was direct foreign 
investment in Indonesia, mainly in the mining, oil, forestry and fishery 
sectors. 
In line with this objective, a thirty-year Contract of Work (COW) to 
undertake mining exploration and operations in the Mulkia area was signed 
between representatives of Freeport McMoRan and the government of 
Indonesia, through Saleh Bratanta as Minister for Mines, in Jakarta on 7 
April 1967. There was no consultation of any kind with the Amungme and 
Kamoro landowners, or with the provincial and regional governments of 
Irian Jaya. This contract allowed the company to exploit mineral resources 
on approximately 100,000 ha of the traditional Amungme land in the 
Ertsberg and Mulkia valleys (see Map 4 below). 
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The initial discovery of mineral deposits in this area was made by 
geologist Jean Jacques Dozy during the first Coljin expedition in Ertsberg in 
1936, and a second reconnaissance expedition was sent by Freeport in 1960 to 
determine whether the Ertsberg was an economically viable prospect. Rock 
samples indicated that the region was rich in mineral resources.27 The 
Amungme people became angry because the team had entered the region 
without first asking permission, and they felt humiliated at being treated 
like slaves; they expressed their discontent through low-level disturbances. 
The mining operation was delayed for some years by the unfriendly attitude 
of the Amungme and also the political changes that took place when the 
Dutch were finally forced to leave. 
With capital of US$100 million, a gigantic mining operation began in 
1967 with a large number of national and expatriate workers. In 1973 the 
1,031-strong workforce consisted of 68 expatriates and 963 nationals, both 
Indonesians and Papuans. Fourteen years later, the workforce had increased 
to 17,000. 
Freeport Indonesia (FI) is the biggest producer of gold in the world and 
the third largest producer of copper. It has forty associated and contracting 
companies engaged in some way in the mining operation. UK and 
Australian based multinationals Rio Tinto and CRA signed a joint venture 
agreement with Freeport McMoRan in 1995, under which Rio Tinto 
acquired a 12 per cent interest in Freeport and a 40 per cent participation in 
any incremental production. The new partners will finance up to US$750 
million for mine development, together with US$100 million for 
27 Chris Ballard (1996). "A Freeport Timeline: 1910-April 1996" in Chris Ballard (ed.), 
Freeport in Indonesia; Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights, Report, 
ACFOA. p.26. 
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areas 
elsewhere in West Papua.28 
Production capacity has increased significantly in recent years following 
the discovery of more concentrated ore in the Grasberg region. A US$81 
million project is located three kilometres east from Ertsberg, and 
production has risen from 7,500 tons per day in 1978 to 32,000 tons per day in 
1992.29 Gross revenues increased from $74 million in 1975 to $400 million in 
1988,3° with total output of 15 billion pounds of copper, 22 million ounces of 
gold, and 37.4 million ounces of silver. Freeport has the largest known gold 
reserve of any operating mine in the world.31 In December 1991, FI signed a 
new contract with the central government, following the discovery of more 
concentrated ore in Grasberg, three kilometres from Ertsberg. The new 
concession covers an additional 2.6 million hectares. 
Freeport pays the Indonesian state very significant royalties, 
and taxes, US dollars. 1990 Freeport paid US$271 million taxes, 
much the biggest corporate tax received by the government3 2 . 
To protect its mining operation, the company has supported the 
deployment of military, police and security forces in the region, supplying 
them with accommodation, finance, job opportunities, social privileges, and 
permission to use Freeport's infrastructure of airfields, helicopters and 
barracks. This creates a strong triangular interdependency between the 
company, the government, and the military: the government and the 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Rio-Tinto (1998). "Tainted Titan or Responsible Company", The Facts, Melbourne, p.12. 
Mealey, op.cit.:121. 
Ibid.:129. 
Jim Elmslie (1995). Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan 
Nationalism, University of Sydney, p.78. 
Ibid.:78. 
266 
military provide security protection, and FI contributes royalties, dividends 
and taxes, and improves infrastructure and rural development programs. 
Yet despite its influence over the mass media, and good international 
communication networks, Freeport Indonesia has for a long time been 
under media scrutiny for its poor human rights record, its destruction of the 
environment, and, most importantly, for its lack of respect for the rights of 
the landowners in the region. The behaviour of the company towards the 
landowners and the dependence of landowners on the company have 
become sources of social and political conflict, resulting in a steadily 
deteriorating relationship between these two parties over recent years. 
6.2.3. The Government of Indonesia 
The term "government" here covers all three levels of 
government-central, provincial and regional-which influence the 
decision-making process in relation to Freeport Indonesia and the region of 
West Papua. As indicated above, Indonesia faced a serious economic crisis in 
the 1960s, partly as a result of the political crisis during this period. One 
contributing problem was the proportion of the state budget spent on 
purchasing weapons from Western and communist countries in order to 
occupy West Papua in 1962 and in preparation for the later annexation of 
East Timor in 1975. Demands for political and economic change resulted in 
the military coup d'etat in 1965 which brought General Suharto to power. 
In order to restore confidence in the government, promote economic 
development, and repay its soaring foreign debts of almost US$1.8 billion, 
the New Order regime introduced a new economic policy which emphasised 
free capital movement and encouraged foreign investment. In accordance 
with this new economic policy, the government allowed Freeport to invest 
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in mineral exploitation in West Papua. Subsequently Indonesia entered a 
new era of economic success, with one of the fastest rates of economic 
growth in the region. The general living standard of the Indonesian people 
improved significantly, with Freeport being a major contributor through its 
royalties, dividends and taxes. 
In 1998-1999, however, Indonesia faced another serious economic crisis: 
the financial and banking systems collapsed; the value of the rupiah 
fluctuated wildly and dropped severely; the basic needs of the people could 
not be met; and the Indonesian people lost confidence in the government. 
These problems were either created or compounded by the corruption, 
collusion and nepotism practiced by the Suharto government and its 
cronies, including military officers and business allies. 
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 has created a new political 
reality. Popular demand for economic and political reforms had led to 
widespread social and political unrest, and to internal conflict within the 
ruling elite. The successor Habibie regime, however, retained control of 
most of the state's institutions, including the military, business, mass media 
and communications, financial institutions, and international networks. 
Under Article 33 of the Pancasila Constitution of 1945, the land, sea and 
air and its abundant resources all belong to the Indonesian state. Also, under 
a new agrarian law, land ownership can only apply to cultivated land, which 
means the Amungme rights to hunting and secret grounds around the 
Mulkia region have been totally ignored. Its centralised power system allows 
the national government to continue to exercise control over mining 
operations and to enjoy privileges given by the company. Even though the 
national government promised to give autonomy to the province of Irian 
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Jaya in 1963, it has only paid lip service to this agreement; in practice, the 
powers of the regional and local governments are limited and they function 
only as guard dogs for the interests of the central government, and enjoy few 
privileges. The regional and local governments have expressed their strong 
resentment of this discriminatory arrangement. In 1995 they argued that 
"Freeport has contributed US$1001.90 million in the form of US$19.31 
million in royalties and US$81.59 million in taxes, but these funds have 
never been heard of even at the office of the regency".33 They have very 
limited influence in dealing with joint or individual rural development 
programs. During the negotiations of new agreements in 1974, the 
Amungme representatives were allowed to participate in the primary talks 
that occurred between the Amungme and FI, but not on the issue of the 
rural development program. 
6.2.4. The Interests of Other Groups 
The category of "other groups" refers here to those peoples and 
organisations that believe they are, or should be, eligible to benefit from the 
mining operations, in terms of influencing the decision-making process, 
controlling job opportunities, or sharing in the profits. These groups include 
the military, four other neighbouring groups of highlanders some of whom 
now live within Amungsa (Dani, Moni, Ekagi and Nudga), and other West 
Papuan and Indonesian workers. 
6.2.4.1. The Indonesian Armed Forces 
To protect the interests of the company, a considerable number of 
Indonesian military, consisting of land, air and sea troops, together with 
Freeport security personnel, are now stationed in the region. 
33 Kompas 11September1995. 
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From the start, the company has been responsible for the actual 
deployment of these forces and provides necessary support, creating a 
mutual dependency in which Freeport Indonesia allows the use of its 
property and the ABRI and security forces provide security protection. Yet 
despite this apparently mutually satisfactory relationship, troops can face a 
moral dilemma because they are required to adopt a coercive approach 
towards the opponents of the company. 
6.2.4.2. Central Highlanders 
The Dani, Moni, Ekagi and Nduga peoples share borders with the 
Amungme in the east, north and west of Amungsa. The five groups have 
much in common in terms of culture, traditions and ways of life. However, 
the mining operations are located in areas that by tradition and by 
established boundaries are recognised as belonging to the Amungme. It is 
argued by the Amungme, therefore, that the other highlanders are not 
entitled to compensation for loss of land or to equal treatment with the 
Amungme in any compensation package. Despite this these highlander 
groups feel they have a right to benefit from the mining operation. First, 
they consider that they have a right to pass through the mountain ranges 
which they used traditionally in barter trade stretching back several 
thousand years. Secondly, there are strong blood relationships between the 
Amungme and the other highlanders through intermarriage, particularly 
between the Amungme and the Nduga and Moni. 
Even though these claims do not provide sufficient evidence for equal 
compensation, the government and Freeport Indonesia put the other 
highlander groups into the same category as the Amungme and Kamoro, 
thus entitling them to share in royalties amounting to US$17 million 
annually (paid into a trust fund). Such manipulation of loyalties has been 
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orchestrated by the company and the government to undermine national 
unity and cooperation among the highlanders and among Papuans as 
whole. However, this arrangement was stopped after tribal wars erupted in 
1996 and 1997 in Timika, Banti and Utekini between the Amungme and 
Dani/Nduga. The divide-and-rule policy of the government and Freeport 
was ultimately unproductive. These highland peoples come seeking job 
opportunities; but as traditional peop~e they are not able to compete with 
outsiders. Most of them become "spectators". Freeport Indonesia and the 
government view them as parasites, and the government has taken strong 
measures to either return them to their home areas or resettle them in the 
coastal area at Timika. To the Amungme, these people destroy traditional 
land and create environmental damage when they cut down trees for 
firewood and for making gardens. Hence their relationship both with 
Freeport Indonesia and with the Amungme is generally very poor. 
6.2.4.3. Freeport Workers (Indonesian Nationals) 
This category includes both the Indonesians and the West Papuans who 
work as employees of the company. Today, there are 17,000 workers 
employed by Freeport or by companies contracted to Freeport, of whom only 
2 per cent are local people. Of the 5,838 workers employed directly by direct 
contract to Freeport, 81 per cent are Indonesians and expatriates (see Table 1). 
Unlike the Amungme and the other highlanders, these outsider groups are 
semi- and highly-skilled workers and have strong loyalty to Freeport 
Indonesia. Many of them work in executive positions both 1n 
administration and in operations in the field. Most of these outsiders feel 
they have a comfortable and secure future in the company and therefore 
regard any opposition to the company as an attack on their own interests. 
Consequently, along with Freeport Indonesia and the government, they 
support tough measures against any disturbances by the Amungme. 
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is the the the wants a 
share of the action and benefits, but for political reasons. The regional 
command of the OPM, Nemang Kawi Command, sees the Freeport mining 
company as an agent of the colonial government of Indonesia, benefitting at 
the expense of low-paid local workers, enjoying a tax holiday, and causing 
serious social and environmental damage through its lack of social 
responsibility. 
The establishment of the OPM in the region dates back to 1977 when 
the new ESKOPME expedition began (see Chapter Four). This was followed 
by low-level guerrilla raids on the main rural centres, from the central 
mountain ranges in the northeast to Akimuga in the south, and ended with 
the attacks on Freeport facilities in Timika and Tembagapura on 
1977. 
The military capability of the OPM in the area has been limited the 
lack of logistical and political support and any clear vision and program; 
however, the OPM has been sustained by personal commitment and strong 
local leadership. The current regional commander, Kelly Kwalik, has 
appeared in many media interviews in relation to guerrilla activities in 
1994, 1995 and 1996, assisted by Daniel Kogoya and Titus Murip. Local 
support has also been vital, even though there have been allegations of 
crimes against the local community. The local OPM, moreover, are waging a 
war on their home ground; they feel they have nothing to lose and will be 
regarded as national heroes if they die in battle. The inaccessible terrain and 
the support of the local people gives the guerrilla units great mobility, and 
the inability of the army to defeat them boosts their influence. 
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6.3. Colonisation and the Implications of Mining Activities 
The term "colonisation" here is justified, first, by the nature and scope of the 
exploitation of local resources and, secondly, by the way the major actors 
deal with the landowners and the environment. 
Jakarta's colonial policy in Amungsa has had both positive and 
negative consequences. On the positive side, the Papuans, notably the 
Amungme and Kamoro peoples, have benefited in some small degree 
through the breaking down of social isolation, the improvement of 
infrastructure, the promotion of the region's political status, the creation of 
employment opportunities, and the increase in regional productive capacity. 
At the state level, FI is the highest tax payer in Indonesia, and a vital asset 
for the central government. 
In contrast, to the Amungme and other local communities, the 
presence of the Freeport mine is a colonial imposition and its presence has 
brought about discrimination, Indonesianisation, militarisation, an 
escalation of human rights abuses, and the destruction of traditional social 
structures and the environment. 
6.3.1. Immigration Policy 
Rapid population growth in the region through government-sponsored 
immigration (transmigrasi) is an integral part of the colonial process of 
territorial control, with the ultimate objective of Papuan genocide and 
ethnic uniformity in the entire Malay archipelago. What has happened in 
West Papua since the 1960s is analogous with European colonisation over 
the last four hundred years, when European peoples resettled in America, 
Australia and Africa, wiping out the indigenous peoples and taking over 
their land and resources. 
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new was started 
were the Amungme together with an airstrip and 
station. Two more houses were built on the riverside belonging to Paulus 
Beanal, the village head, and one by a family from Kei. Nine years later, the 
population increase in this area has broken all records in the province. 
Timika and Tembagapura are now two of the most densely populated towns 
in West Papua: "Today, not even 25 years later, these urban cities have 
already reached a total population of 50,000-60,000 people, making the area 
one of the most populous parts of the province".34 
There have been official immigrants from Java and Bali, 'spontaneous' 
immigrants from Maluku and Sulawesi, and local job seekers (referred to as 
internal immigrants) from within West Papua. West Papua has become 
major target of the government's transmigration program, 
88.4 per cent higher than any other province. During PELITA 
(1984/85-1988/89), for example, West Papua was used to solve the 
overpopulation problem of Sumatra, which was the major destination 
transmigrants in this period. By 1988/89, 137,800 families, or 685,000 people, 
were resettled in West Papua,3 5 of whom 9,000 families, or 7 per cent of the 
total immigrants, were settled in Timika36 in seven Unit Resettlements (SP). 
These developed into established villages including Kamoro Jaya, Timika 
Jaya and Karang Senang. Seven years later, during PELITA VI, the number 
of immigrants, mostly from the overpopulated islands of Java and Bali, 
increased to 11,000 (2,300 families).37 Apart from these official immigrants, 
"spontaneous" migrants from outside Amungsa have resettled in Kwamki 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Mealey, op.cit.:290. 
Prayan Purba, Anna M. Massie et al. (1987). Irian faya: The Land of Challenges and 
Promises, PT Alpha Zenith, p.39. 
Ibid.:37. 
Mealey, op.cit.:326. 
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Lama, Kwamki Baru, and SP II, III, VIII, looking for better lives and job 
opportunities.38 
Many fear that the population of the area will double by the year 2000, 
threatening the future of the Amungme and Kamoro, who number only 
22,000 people. The Amungme and Kamoro have already become 
marginalised societies in their own land. 
6.3.2. The Confiscation of Land and Dispossession of Landowners 
In order to extract the mineral wealth and to build roads, airfields, bridges 
and military posts, the lands of Amungme and Kamoro have been 
confiscated without any payment of compensation. A considerable number 
of the landowners have been and are being forcibly dispossessed and 
relocated into resettlement camps in Timika and surrounding areas. In 1998, 
for example, the local government made public a plan to relocate 
considerable numbers of Amungme and other groups from Wa, Banti and 
Utekini villages in the highlands39 and dozens of villagers from 
Koperapoka in the south, thus creating a buffer zone for mining expansion 
and the dumping of the mine wastes. The regime uses various justifications 
to dispossess the landowners, including the claim that a village is the centre 
of the OPM. The most common practice is to claim the land on the basis that 
it is no-man's-land and therefore the government and FI have the right to 
claim it as state land. 
38 
39 
Mus Pigai (1996), interviewed by the author, Timika. 
"Thousands, probably up to 40,000, of indigenous folk including Amungme tribespeople, 
were dislocated when Freeport McMoRan built the mining town of Tembagapura for its 
workers. Since the company started operation in 1967, unrest and riots have been 
reported in protest of mining operations. Amungme leader Tuwarek Karkime 
[Natkime] once said: 'I am always angry at God and why He had to place these 
beautiful mountains here, because the Amungme people have received nothing from 
Freeport except problems' ", Andreas Burdani, in article:"Environment-Indonesia: As 
Big Mines Settle in, Indigenous Folk Crowded Out", Inter Press Service World News, 
December 11, 1998, Jakarta. 
275 
The growth of new cities and towns provides new employment 
opportunities and improvements in infrastructure. However, there have 
been severe social consequences too: the destruction of social structures and 
belief systems; the loss of traditional land; significant changes in traditional 
life styles; and the spread of coastal diseases such as malaria, cholera and 
dysentery. 
6.3.3. Social Injustices 
Social discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion and sex is an 
integral part of colonial policies. In the mining area, discrimination in access 
to health services and in wages are examples of this. In order to understand 
the overall situation, let us examine in more detail the health situation, 
discrimination in job opportunities, wages and education opportunities, and 
environmental destruction. 
6.3.3.1. Health Problems 
The massive changes in the Amungme area have also brought about severe 
health problems for many local people. In 1980, it is claimed that 216 
Amungme in Kwamki Lama died of an epidemic.40 In the highlands, the 
people commonly suffer from poor nutrition, yaws or treponemal infection 
and also from respiratory ailments, skin infections and eye infections.41 
Many people die from diseases spreading inland from the coast, such as 
malaria, cholera, TB, tape-worm, diarrhoea, dysentery and tetanus. Malaria 
is now endemic in the area. According to Freeport Indonesia, malaria 
positive rates in Kwamki Lama in 1992 were as high as 68 per cent.42 Despite 
the well-documented existence of these health problems, and 
40 
41 
42 
Ballard, op.cit.:8. 
Cook, op.cit.:345-348. 
Warta Freeport Vol.XIV (Ist quarter of 1995) Indonesian Government, The Community 
and Freeport: Working Together Towards Sustainable Development in Irian Jaya, 
Jakarta, p.12. 
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notwithstanding local demands for medical assistance, the state and Freeport 
Indonesia initially did very little to improve the health conditions of the 
local people. 
Eventually, in response to local demands and protests (particularly the 
social unrest that erupted in 1996), FI built health centres in Banti, Aroanop, 
K wamki Lama and Mapuruajaya, and provided substantial assistance and 
consultation. However these centres can only provide primary medical 
services, and seeking treatment at the general hospital in Tembagapura is 
generally discouraged; only wealthy patients can afford the high medical fees 
there. In Banti, 130 patients visit the health centre every day but there are 
only three nurses on staff, plus some volunteers from the Tembagapura 
Hospital. In Kwamki Lama, Aroanop and Pomako, medical centres built by 
FI were transferred to the local government which does not supply adequate 
service. Okoseray, a Papuan medical doctor who is head of the Community 
Health Centre in Timika, reported in 1995: "Mimika-Akimuga Districts still 
lack medical personnel, particularly doctors and nurses".43 The rural village 
medical centres, such as those at Kwamki Lama, Banti and Wa, have an 
average of six beds and a staff of three nurses assisted by visiting doctors. In 
contrast, Tembagapura has a modern hospital which has 67 beds, 12 doctors 
and 60 nurses to serve the more than 200-300 people who visit it each day. 
There have been some recent attempts to improve the health of local 
people. Some years ago, efforts to control malaria were undertaken jointly by 
Freeport, the Department of Health, the University of Indonesia, Medical 
Research units of the US Navy, and regional and community services.44 
43 
44 
Tifa Irian (Minggu Ke IV January 1992). 
Freeport Indonesia (1995). Warta Freeport, Vol XIV, 4th Quarter of 1995, p.11. 
277 
These included spraying, drainage of stagnant water, and distribution of 
mosquito nets, as well as the provision of medication and consultation. 
The current spread of deadly diseases such as HIV I AIDS in Timika has 
also alarmed the authorities.45 When I visited Timika in 1975 there were no 
brothels, but the economic boom has since attracted many sex workers, with 
centres of prostitution located in Kilo 10, Pisa and a few bars in the city. 
Mostly, the prostitutes are Javanese and Menadonese (from North 
Sulawasi), from broken families, orphans, or driven by poverty. The sex 
industry is one of the faster growing developments in the area. In 1995, it 
was reported that there were six suspected HIV cases in the Timika area, but 
this number had jumped to 40 in 1997. In Kwamki Lama alone, four people 
were reportedly affected by AIDS. In a society where the use of condoms is 
tabu, a rapid spread of the virus is likely. 
6.3.3.2. Discrimination in Job Opportunities and Wages 
Looking for new lives, traditional dwellers have moved into the cities and 
towns expecting to make their fortunes. However, few achieve their goals. 
Wage and job discrimination is a problem faced by many. Most small- and 
medium-sized business activities are in the hands of newcomers, primarily 
the Buginese, Makassans and Javanese. As the former governor of Irian Jaya, 
Mr Pattipi, said: "Both Javanese settlers and 'spontaneous' migrants coming 
from Sulawesi have taken many jobs and secured a stranglehold on the 
urban economy."46 For example, FI brought in Javanese and Buginese taxi 
drivers, ignoring the many Irianese with the skills to drive cars and trucks.47 
Today, there are 17,308 workers employed directly or indirectly by Freeport, 
45 
46 
47 
"Sex workers in Timika and Nabire are those in a high risk group,"Cenderawasih Post 
5 June 1993, p.3. 
Pacific Islands Business April 1994, p.34. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 
March 1994, p.50. 
Forum Keadilan No.11, Thn IV, 11 September 1995. 
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of which only a small number are local unskilled workers, as shown in 
Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Distribution of Employment at Freeport Indonesia, by origin, 1997 
Nationalities Staff Non-Staff Total 
Expatriates 173 77 250 
Indonesians 923 3,684 4,607 
West Papuans 71 910 981 
Total 1,161 4,671 5,838 
Source: Community Affairs Department, FI, June 30, 1997 
These figures show an increase of 46 per cent from the previous total of 670 
West Papuan workers in 31 March, 1997, caused mainly by the FI's 
commitment to increase the West Papuan workforce in response to riots 
that occurred on 10-12 March 1996 and also to LEMASA demands. 
Table la: Distribution of Job Opportunities 
Among Different Nationalities 
West Papuans 
17% 
Expatriates 
4% 
However there is still a problem as two thirds of the Amungme and 
Kamoro employees are unskilled workers. 
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Origin Numbers Employees % 
Amungme/Damal 580 20 
Biak 557 19 
Ekagi/Me 307 11 
Dani/Lani 215 8 
J apen/Waropen 206 7 
Jayapura 178 6 
Kamoro 165 6 
Ayamaru/Sorong 81 3 
Others 583 20 
Total 2,872 100 
Source: Community Affairs Department, FI, June 30, 1997. 
According to Table 2, which includes FI employees and employees of 
companies contracted by FI, the Amungme workers do seem to enjoy 
employment rates West Papuan groups. This is 
Amungme, as the group in the immediate area and most 
by FI, have been forced to adapt more rapidly. Even so, most of them are 
employed as unskilled workers with low wages while immigrants dominate 
the semi-skilled and skilled jobs. This bias in the allocation of jobs has 
become one of the main factors fuelling the widespread social resentment in 
the region. 
Marked differences in wages are a further problem. An unskilled 
Papuan worker in Tembagapura, for example, can earn Rp 464 per hour, 
while an Indonesian manager earns 220 times this. This situation is 
illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Wage Relationships in Thousands Rupiahs per month 1997 
Type Quality Grade Basic Wage 
Non -Staff Unskilled Gl 
Elem.School G3 
Sen.High School E2 
Sen.High School Dl 
University Cl 
Staff New Empl. 
Superexp. 
Su perin tenden t 
Manager 
Executive 
Expatriates Supervisor 
(White) Superintendent 
Manager 
VIP Executive 
Source: Community Affairs Department, FI, 30June1997. 
(Exchange rate: Rp.4000= US$1 ). 
150 
180 
215 
246 
303 
4,000 
12,000 
16,000 
32,000 
40,000 
32,000 
36,000 
48,000 
60,000 
Total 
150 
207 
224 
256 
330 
4,000 
14,000 
18,000 
34,000 
50,000 
48,000 
52,000 
56,000 
76,000 
Most Papuans, particularly the highlanders who are often unskilled 
workers, earn a very low wage. Unskilled Indonesians and expatriates are 
paid very much higher wages than Papuans at the same level; however, 
coastal Papuans still enjoy much higher levels of earnings than the locals 
(see Table 4). 
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Thousands Rupiah 
Employees Average Wage % of total 
wages paid 
Highlander (Papuans) 750 24 
Coastal (Papuans) 950 31 
Indonesians 1,400 45 
Total 3,100 100 
Source: Community Affairs Department. FI, 30 June 1997. 
FI and the government argue that this imbalance exists because of the 
lack of appropriate skills among the locals and the Papuans. But this defence 
merely raises the question of how many Amungme and Kamoro are given 
educational opportunities that reduce disadvantage. 
6.3.3.3. Unequal Access to Education 
Discrimination against the Amungme has created deep social divisions. 
Stereotypes of the West Papuans, notably the highlanders, as backward and 
primitive, OPM supporters, alcoholic, and resistant to progress make it very 
difficult for the Amungme to participate in the development process and 
gain access to education. 
This attitude is clearly reflected in the way education and social services 
are distributed. Even though FI has been in the area for more than three 
decades, equal access to education and training for the local people has been 
ignored. Following the signing of the January 1974 Agreement, only one 
elementary school was established, with classes UPT I-IV. By contrast, an 
Elementary School INPRES was built for 300 students, with eight teachers 
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employed, to serve children of Freeport employees. Training and education 
centres established in Tembagapura in the 1970s served only children of 
expatriates and Indonesians; the children of the Amungme were excluded. 
More recently, again in response to LEMASA demands and local protests, 
Freeport has begun to realise the need to provide education and training for 
the Amungme and Kamoro. New elementary schools were established in 
Wa, Banti and Timika in the 1990s and a dormitory for Amungme students 
was built in Kwamki Lama. New senior high schools were built in Timika 
and an international secondary high school was established in 
Tembagapura. FI has also opened vocational training centres in both 
Tembagapura and Jayapura, and is now engaging in preschool education, 
literacy campaigns, and other educational and skills-based activities. A 
human resources program and a training centre (Balai Latihan Kerja or 
BLK) is now located in Jayapura, and a primary school and dormitory have 
been established in Timika.48 
In 1996, FI introduced an Integrated Development Program in Timika, 
targeting seventeen villages, of which eleven are in the coastal areas, three 
in the central area, and three in the highland region. The program aims to 
improve the quality of human resources, address basic needs in education, 
training, social services, health care, religious services and economic 
activities, and improve the environment. FI argues that the local low level 
of human resources has been caused by the limited infrastructure, poor 
quality of settlements, inadequate nutrition, and extremely limited levels of 
education; and that strong social-cultural bonds make adaptation to different 
ways of thinking difficult. 
48 Freeport Indonesia Incorporated (1992). Program Yayasan Freeport Cenderawasih, 
Jakarta, pp. 27-32. [See also Mealey, op.cit.:312-345.] 
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If this ambitious plan had been realised, it would have served the 
interests of a population of 22,405, or 3,937 families, of those 
villages-representing 50 per cent of the total Papuan population in the 
region. The program has, however, been criticised as a failure. Social 
disparities and crime remain major problems in the emerging towns and 
villages. Considerable numbers of students drop out of schools, and there 
has been an increase in social crimes and alcoholic problems among the 
local youth. This unhealthy situation has been exploited by local compradors 
who are very ready to import cheap alcohol, pornography, prostitution and 
engage in other forms of criminal activity. In Timika, for example, boats 
from Java and Makassar bring in cheap whisky, locally made sagoer (a 
fermented palm juice), and pornography and sell these products to their 
willing customers at high prices.49 
6.3.4. Destruction of the Environment 
Lack of environmental accountability on the part of FI has been a 
contentious issue for some time. Environmental destruction has intensified 
over the last twenty years, with serious social, religious and economic 
implications. When I visited Timika and Tembagapura in 1976, the 
environmental destruction was largely limited to the actual areas of mining 
operations. The Aijkwa river was already becoming polluted; even then I 
could not drink from the river or swim in it. At that stage only a small 
handful of hamlets had been built in Kwamki Lama and a very rough 
airstrip and a police patrol post had been established in Timika. 
Over the last seventeen years, the environmental impact of mining has 
been catastrophic. Following the discovery of concentrated ore in Gunung 
Bijih Timur (GBT) in 1975, a mega construction program was introduced, 
49 Far Eastern Economic Review 26 December 1996-2 January 1997, p.105. 
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and more than 20 private companies were invited to join Freeport 
McMoRan. In the process, 350 Amungme houses in Wa, Banh and U tekini 
villages were destroyed, and both landowners and transmigrants were 
forcibly resettled in Kwamki Lama under the BANPRES program.so More 
recently, another 300 families have been forced to resettle in Timika.s 1 
During the years 1982 to 1985, Amungme and Kamoro people were forced to 
sign a Statement of Land Release covering more than 1,000 sq km of land, 
from Pomako in the coastal area to Mile 50 in the highlands. The Amungme 
and Kamoro people have lost not only their land but also their houses, 
animals and other property. 
For the purpose of the mining operation, initially (1973) more than 
100,000 hectares of land in the Ertsberg and Grasberg areas was destroyed, 
with irreparable damage to its ecosystem; estimates now place the area of 
degraded land at 2.6 million hectares. A total of 1,000 ha has been cleared for 
harbours, bridges, roads, tunnels, towns, camps, airfields, and military 
barracks, as well as for mineral exploration. In the Mulkia Valley (Mile 74), 
FI cut down 240 ha of trees and excavated a great hole in the heart of the 
mountain. 
The rural Amungme now have to travel long distances to make 
gardens, to go hunting, and even to find clear drinking water. Peaceful 
places have been turned into industrial cities where the noise of tractors, 
buses, helicopters, and all the machinery of heavy industry have driven 
away valuable fauna, and plant species which traditionally had social and 
economic value for the local people, such as pandanus and various 
rainforest plants used traditionally as medicines, have disappeared. 
50 
51 
Chris Ballard (1997), op.cit.:7. 
Jakarta Post, 13 May 1998. 
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The destruction of also serious erosion 
much reduced fertility of land used for producing basic food crops such as 
taro, yam and tapioca.52 Erosion has caused major flooding, which has 
destroyed the gardens and houses of the lowland Kamoro people. Organisms 
in rivers and the sea, and in the forests along the river banks, are causing 
contamination. Currently 120,000 metric tons of tailings (including toxic 
chemicals) are discharged into the Aijkwa river system every day, killing 
fish, plankton, sago palms and mangrove trees.s 3 Jakarta has recently 
approved an increase in production to 300,000 tons of ore per day; this 
means that another 88 square miles of land will be smothered under the 
grey, sand-like tailings. 
Clean drinking water is a continuing problem: "The main concern of 
Amungme and Kamoro is their water supply".54 
along the Aijkwa, Minajerwi and Kopi rivers cannot now water 
because the water, originating in the Ertsberg and Grasberg mining areas, 
heavily polluted by toxic wastes. Despite the very obvious problems, 
Freeport Indonesia and the government of Indonesia have denied the facts 
and accuse environmental and human rights organisations of publicising 
OPM propaganda. However, a Jayapura-based official has recently broken the 
silence.ss Recently Freeport and the local government have built a few water 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Podzolic and latozolic soil structures are found in southern mountain ranges and 
lowlands respectively. Both are characterised by softness and lack of keasaman and 
are particularly vulnerable to erosion (Petocz, op.cit.:28). 
An independent environmental audit concluded that Freeport mining operations have 
significant impacts upon the environment, and called for an immediate improvement 
(Ros Kelly, Paul Whincup & Soeharto Wongsosentono 1996), PTFI Environmental 
Audit Report, Dames and Moore, p.2. 
Cook, op.cit.:424. 
"Residents along the Aijkwa River which flows from the outskirts of Tembagapura 
city to Timika the capital of East Mimika regency, have been warned against drinking 
the polluted water" (Jakarta Post 27 March 1997). 
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tanks in Banti, Koperapoka, Kwamki Lama and Aroanop, but the water 
supply is still far from adequate. 
Problems during pregnancy have been related to environmental 
degradation and, according to a Catholic Mission report, the rate of natural 
increase in 1936 was 1.9 but had dropped to 0.9 in 1989.56 
Large areas of land have been used as a dumping ground for mining 
wastes, and Kamoro landowners have been forcibly removed from their 
traditional land. Recently, the Regency of Mimika told dozens of villages in 
the Koperapoka to move to Timika from their traditional land to enable FI 
to take care of its massive mine waste disposal problem. Bertha Urumami, a 
mother from Nawaripi village, protested against the move, saying: 
If the military come they will have to kill me here. It is my 
land. We are only different by the skin and hair but Freeport 
can not treat us like animals. 57 
6.3.5. Militarisation and Human Rights Abuses 
6.3.5.1. Increased Militarisation 
Along with the provincial city of Jayapura in the north, the relatively small 
urban centres of Timika and Tembagapura in the district of the East Mimika 
Regency are among the most highly militarised zones in the southern 
hemisphere. The region has been seen as a "red zone", where conflict 
between the Papuans, notably the OPM and the Indonesian Armed Forces 
56 
57 
Forum Studi dan Pengembangan Mimika-Akimuga di Jayapura, (22 Mei 1993). 
"Laporan Keadaan Lingkungan dan Social Penduduk Koperapoka, Tipuka dan I w aka 
Dalam Kaitannya dengan Aktivitas Freeport Indonesia Inc", Report, Jayapura, p.17. 
Shanna Langdon (1997). "Kamoro Landowner may be forcibly ejected for Freeport's 
mining wastes" Project Underground Newsletter, Drillbits & Tailing, Vol 2, No. 5, p.1. 
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(ABRI) has occurred frequently over the last twenty-two years.58 Jakarta 
argues that it has a duty to "protect the state's vital asset", the Freeport mine. 
In 1976 there were no military posts in either the coastal or the interior 
mining areas, and only a couple of police posts to be found in Tembagapura 
and at Timika airport. However in reaction to the long running local 
protests that have occurred over the last twenty-two years, military capacity 
has been substantially increased and the military has become increasingly 
interventionist in civil as well as military affairs. A number of events have 
contributed to this increased militarisation. In November 1976, two years 
after the January Agreement was signed, riots and roadblocks occurred 
between Tembagapura and Ertsberg. Subsequently, a huge military 
deployment took place in June 1977 after the OPM attacked the Freeport 
installation, severely affecting Freeport's operations. Peaceful 
demonstrations were later organised by the OPM in 1994/95, hostage crises 
occurred in Mapenduma and Timika in January 1996, and mass protests 
occurred in March 1996 in Kuala Kencana, Timika and Tembagapura. All 
these events provoked further militarisation. 
From the port of Amamapare on the coast to the inland mining region 
at Grasberg, the deployment of police, military and security forces is now 
seen as essential. In each village, each transmigration site, mining 
operational centres, and even in remote villages such as Banh, military and 
police now play a security role. In main centres at Koperapoka in Timika 
(Mile 26), Kuala Kencana (Mile 34), Tembagapura (Mile 68), and Banh (Mile 
66), there is tight security control and intimidation of opponents; these 
58 
"In a year when Irian Jaya proved to be even more a problem than Indonesia's 
perennial trouble spot of East Timar, security forces also had their hands full on the 
northern side of the Central Highland" in Asia 1997 Year Book 1996, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Hong Kong, p.136. 
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centres have also been used as places for detention, torture and execution 
(see Map 5 for locations). 
In Timika the number of ABRI personnel increased significantly after 
the riots of April 1996 when many suspects were taken away at checkpoints 
at Mile 38 by Battalion 733 and Brimob. The Amungme were suspected of 
being members of the OPM and were forced to surrender their traditional 
weapons such as bows and arrows on the basis that they created a security 
breach under the Emergency Law Nol2/DRT /1995 regarding sharp weapons. 
LEMASA later claimed (22 August 1997), that this state law was in violation 
of traditional customary law. Special troops (KOPASSUS) have been 
attached to all security posts and at other secret locations. Since OPM 
activities escalated in the 1990s, considerable numbers of the Indonesian 
troops (including members of the elite KOPASSUS) have been located in 
Mimika regency. Many observers have concluded that the army's objective 
is to wipe out the OPM and its sympathisers. 
There are very close links between FI and the ABRI. FI has actively 
supported the militarisation process, and ABRI provides essential protection 
for the mining operation. All visitors intending to visit Tembagapura and 
Timika first have to be checked at Mile 37, which is a checkpoint run by the 
security forces. Moreover, both parties cooperate in the Integrated Rural 
Development Program for East Mimika District. Most importantly, FI allows 
ABRI to use its communication infrastructure networks, accommodation, 
port facilities, and helicopters, and also provides subsidies, direct funds and 
medicines. During the peace demonstration in 1994/95, the hostage drama 
in 1996, and the recent civil war in Banh and Timika, for example, FI 
allowed ABRI to use their trucks, containers, helicopters and air fields and 
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even funded salaries. This close relationship has been described in the 
following words: 
Any one visiting the area can see the close links between FIC 
security guards and local ABRI units. The main road to the 
mining site can only be entered with permission, through 
military check points ... It is well known that company bosses in 
Indonesia pay the local military to protect them from hazards, 
like strikes. 59 
Josepha Alomang, a former detainee, has confirmed this relationship, 
describing ABRI as flies seeking honey but at times acting like a hungry tiger 
ready to crush the other flies. 60 
Increased militarisation has also impacted negatively on the local 
people, restricting their movement and creating fear among the people. 
There have been psychological effects too, on the ABRI troops, affecting their 
discipline and capacity to control rural areas. This was evident at Timika 
airport on 15 April 1996 when an Indonesian soldier shot 28 people and 
killed 19, many of them fellow soldiers.61 
ABRI has used the classical policy of divide-and-rule, practised earlier 
by the former colonial master, the Dutch. It has sought to create divisions 
among the people on the basis of ethnicity, religion and region, in order to 
undermine national unity. When fighting erupted in Banti and Timika 
between the Amungme and Dani and Nduga migrants at the end of 1998, 
ABRI did not intervene on the grounds that they had not come to protect 
the local people. But independent observers confirmed that ABRI and 
59 
60 
61 
Carmel Budiardjo (1995). "The Great is the Name of the Game", T APOL Bulletin, 
No.31, April 1995, London. 
Josepha Alomang (1998), interviewed by Mark Enger, German TV journalist, Timika. 
Ballard, op.cit.:14. 
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Freeport Indonesia actively encouraged the migrants so as to aggravate 
ethnic tension. 
FI and ABRI also succeeded in creating divisions within Amungme 
society over the issue of a Trust Fund, which Freeport offered the local 
people in response to their mass protests in 1996. When the Traditional 
Amungme Council (LEMASA) in Kwamki Lama, Timika, rejected this offer, 
FI formed an alternative council, which it called AMUNGKAL. It also 
accused LEMASA of having connections with the OPM, thereby restricting 
the freedom of movement of LEMASA members, and leaving the 
chairman, Tom Beanal, under constant threat. 
Internationally, the use of the military to protect a private company 
such as FI is unusual. But in Indonesia, the direct involvement of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is considered appropriate, even though 
this practice has resulted in an intensification of human rights abuses. 
6.3.5.2. Human Rights Abuses 
For a long time in West Papua democratic freedom has been regularly 
violated and the people have been subjected to oppression and exploitation. 
In reaction to the growing public pressures for political change, violations of 
fundamental human rights have steadily increased. The occupation forces 
maintain their tight grip on the opposition partly through the new Criminal 
Code. Amnesty International, which has been observing the situation 
closely, has concluded: 
Opposition to Indonesian rule of West Papua, both armed and 
unarmed, has continued since authority over the province was 
transferred to the Indonesian Government in 1963. Protests, 
flag-raising and peaceful demonstrations have been responded 
to by the occupation forces with severe widespread human 
rights violations including arbitrary arrests, "disappearances", 
extrajudicial executions, torture and the imprisonment of 
prisoners of conscience.62 
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Similarly, John Wing comments: 
West Papua is a place where freedom of expression and 
assembly have been violated, and the rights of self 
determination and independence of the Papuans completely 
denied. The indigenous Papuans are in effect a colonised 
people who have no control over the course of even 
determining the country's development.63 
These human rights abuses have intensified since the Presidential Decree 
No 8, 1963 concerning prohibition of the exercise of political rights, which 
was later reinforced by Presidential Decree No 11, 1963 formulating the Anti-
Subversion Law that legitimated the role of the Indonesian armed forces in 
eliminating political opposition.64 
The government has continued to impose severe limitations on 
freedom of assembly, association, demonstration and criticism, in 
combination with a wave of arrests, torture, intimidation and expanded 
surveillance aimed at reining in the activities of the OPM. Prison conditions 
are extremely harsh, and security forces regularly violate citizens' right to 
privacy. The following examines two aspects of human rights abuses: 
violations of political freedom and of civil liberties in the Timika and 
Tembagapura areas. 
62 
63 
64 
Amnesty International (1997). "Urgent Action Request about Recent Events near the 
Freeport Mine". All Index: ASA.21/61/97, p. 2. [See also: 
http:/ /www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/amnesty-970829.html]. 
John Wing (1995). "An Overview of the Impact of Indonesian Development and the 
Critical Social-Environmental Situation in West Papua (Irian Jaya)", Masters Thesis, 
University of Sydney, p. 2. 
C. Budiardjo and Soe Liong Liem (1984). West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 
TAPOL, London. pp.24-52. 
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6.3.5.2.1. Lack of Political Freedom 
Respect for political freedom is essential in a democracy; however, since the 
introduction of the Anti-Subversion Law in 1963, those rights have 
routinely been violated in West Papua.65 Political killings have been 
intensified in many parts of the region-particularly in the areas where 
OPM is most active, notably in the highlands towns and villages along the 
border region. 
The occupation forces place restrictions on public meetings of five or 
more persons, including academic or other seminars, and all marches and 
demonstrations require permits from the police and several government 
agencies. Lectures and class discussion materials in schools, colleges and 
universities that might provoke government displeasure can lead to 
academic sanctions, if not expulsion or arrest. Any publications that contain 
the word "Papuan" were banned until late 1999. Old scholarly publications 
that deal with Papuan songs, literature, poetry, politics and culture are 
similarly barred from circulation on the basis that such items are relics of 
Dutch colonial rule and could encourage Papuan nationalism. The military 
is allowed to intervene on campuses and in schools to arrest and detain 
students who may have taken part in any form of "subversive" activity. The 
arrest and detention of members of the Papuan Youth Organisation in 1968, 
1975, 1996 and 1998, both in Timika and Jayapura, are classic examples of 
such military intervention. Such undemocratic actions inhibit academic 
institutions and scholars in their roles of promoting freedom of expression 
and providing informed public criticism. 
65 The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US Department of State 
(1997). Indonesia: Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p.1. 
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Timika areas become 
rights abuses over recent years; has significantly 
the poor relationship between the and the local the area. 
Accusing the Amungme of supporting the OPM, the military argues that 
"the OPM itself depends on the people, and as bullets have no eyes the death 
of ordinary people is unavoidable".66 Papuan human rights, environmental 
and social organisations, churches and unions have all been subjected to 
systematic government crackdown and have become regular targets of 
intimidation. NGOs have faced government harassment through police 
raids on their offices, surveillance by police or military intelligence, and 
cancellation of private meetings; in some cases high-level government 
officials have been threatened with legal action because they are considered 
to be trouble-makers. Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA) 
chairman, Tom Beanal, for example, was accused of involvement a 
demonstration in 1994/95 and in the hostage crisis and 
threatened with death.67 In 1994-1995 more than one 
was 
Amungme, including 37 people in one village (among whom were two 
children and a priest), were killed, disappeared, or detained.68 Other human 
rights violations occurred in Bela, Alama, Jila, and Mapenduma in 1996-
1997,69 where more than 138 civilians died as a consequence of military 
reprisals; 166 buildings were burned down, including 29 men's houses, one 
traditional men's house, 13 church buildings, and two medical care centres. 
While some of these events have been widely reported, there are many 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Inside Indonesia December 1995, p.20. 
Head of Police, East Mimika Sector (14 January 1998). Document 
No.Pol.SP /02/1998/SERSE, Timika. 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), April, 1995. Trouble at Freeport: 
Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport-McMoRan Mine in 
Irian faya, Indonesia and Indonesian military repression: June 1994-February 1995, 
Melbourne. 
Isak Onawame, Nata Gabay and A.B.M. Hutapea (1998). Human Rights Violations & 
Disaster in Bela, Alama, Jila & Mapnduma, Irian Jaya, Indonesian Evangelical 
Church, Mimika, Catholic Church, Three Kings Parish , Timika, Christian 
Evangelical Church of Mimika, ACFOA Human Rights Office, Melbourne, pp.2-34. 
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more systematic human rights abuses that are never reported in the world's 
mass media. 
The government considers all outside investigations or foreign-based 
criticisms of alleged human rights violations to be interference in its 
internal affairs. It consistently obstructed NGO and church efforts to 
investigate human rights abuses committed by the military in the 
Mapenduma area after the hostage drama. According to critics of the 
government, this event resulted in the subsequent deaths of considerable 
numbers of Nduga and Amungme civilians. Even the International Red 
Cross (ICRC), a non-political organisation with UN observer status, has 
periodically encountered difficulty in implementing its humanitarian 
programs in the famine-affected areas in the West Papuan highlands. ABRI 
claims that it can only permit limited access to the area by non residents, for 
security reasons; it argues that such areas are very remote and there is a lack 
of materials and transport. But in 1997 the OPM International office in 
Sweden strongly criticised the relief policy of the government and stated that 
the relief program was intentionally protracted, leaving the Papuans to die 
slowly; the delay in the relief program was, it argued, an integral part of its 
policy of genocide. 70 
The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 sets out the principle of equal 
rights and obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalised. Chapter 4 
of the 1993 Guidelines of State Policy also states that all Indonesians have 
the same rights, obligations, and opportunities. Notwithstanding this, the 
Papuans have consistently been discriminated against on the basis of their 
race and religion and excluded from high official posts because they are seen 
as an inferior race of lazy and unreliable people. The Papuan public officials 
70 J.H. Prai Press Release (14 October 1997) OPM-Intemational Office, Malmo. 
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who held government offices in the 1960s were replaced by Indonesians 
because Jakarta considered the locals to be incapable of positions of 
responsibility over the occupation forces. In Timika, for example, the 
Indonesians consistently look down on Papuans in general, and the local 
peoples in particular, as an inferior and "primitive" race; local people are 
not allowed to shop at the supermarket in Tembagapura and the company 
has built a wire fence around the city area to prevent local people from 
entering. 
The disappearances of many Papuans have also been reported. 
According to Zonggonau et al./ 1 K. Kwalik/ 2 and B. Niwilingame/ 3 a 
considerable number of Papuans have disappeared without trace. Following 
the Tembagapura incident, both the Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
(ACFOA) and Bishop Jan Herman Munninghoff OFM of Jayapura74 
reported five relatives of Kelly Kwalik missing. Josepha Alomang, who was 
one of the detainees, confirmed that "Kwalik's relatives were taken away 
that night but never returned again" .7 5 A report made available by Amnesty 
International76 records that people are missing; independent observers 
believe that most of those missing are dead, including the five relatives of 
Kwalik. 
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Torture and degrading treatment have been common practices in the 
detention centres and prisons. The Indonesian Criminal Code makes such 
practices a crime punishable by up to four years in prison and gives suspects 
or their families the right to challenge the legality of an arrest or detention. 
However, such legal protection is in practice both inadequate and widely 
ignored. Security forces continue to use torture and other forms of 
mistreatment on suspects, forcing them to make confessions. For example, 
Josepha Alomang and four men were detained and held in containers 
owned by Freeport Indonesia on suspicion of being collaborators with the 
OPM. 
We were arrested by Indonesian soldiers and Freeport security 
in the night and then brought to the police station for 
interrogation. Despite we had not had any link with Kelly 
K walik, the leader of the OPM, they accused us and detained us 
in the containers which are owned by Freeport Indonesia for 
almost two weeks. Then they removed us to police cells, which 
was actually a toilet. The condition in the cells was so very bad, 
affecting our health seriously. We were treated as animals. 77 
It is also known that considerable numbers of the participants at the protest 
of 10-12 March 1996 in Timika and Tembagapura were arrested and detained 
without warrant. 
6.3.5.2.2. Lack of Civil Liberties 
The second category of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian 
government is the lack of respect for civil liberties, including freedom of 
speech, of the press, of peaceful assembly and association, and of movement 
within the country and overseas. 
Although the 1945 Constitution and the 1982 Press Law provide for 
freedom of the press, the government has consistently restricted public 
77 J. Alomang (April 1999), interviewed by the author, New Orleans. 
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discussion. Critics of the president, senior officials and influential local 
interest groups, for example, are at risk of harassment, arrest or torture. In 
West Papua, news magazines and daily newspapers have been banned, and 
the authorities provide guidance to local journalists and editors on what 
they should write and print. The Catholic daily newspaper, Tifa Irian, in 
Jayapura, for example, has been frequently warned for publishing critical 
articles concerning social injustice and rural development. Suara dari 
Kampung (Voice of the Village), a university-based quarterly bulletin, was 
banned in the 1980s because it criticised the government for the failure of its 
rural development policy including problems arising from the FI enterprise. 
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are rarely accessible; little is 
available other than Javanese programs on Indonesian TV. Special 
permission is required for foreign journalists to travel to West Papua. For 
example, the environmentalist, Danny Kennedy, who attempted to monitor 
environmental degradation on the Aijkwa river in Timika, was deported at 
the beginning of 1997 for fear he would expose the full extent of the 
environmental damage. A permit for the importation of foreign 
publications and video tapes, which must be reviewed by government 
censors, is also required. 
Freedom of movement is restricted and special permits are required to 
visit certain parts of West Papua, particularly sensitive areas such as 
Tembagapura/Timika and surrounding areas. Even to visit their own 
relatives, Papuans are required to have an identity card, Kartu Penduduk, 
and a travel document, Surat Keterangan Jalan, a system little different to 
that under the apartheid regime in South Africa. As mentioned earlier, in 
1975 my own freedom of movement was restricted even in my home area 
and I was required daily to declare my movements in detail, including my 
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objectives, the places and people I would visit, and the times of my 
meetings; I had to report to the local police and military afterwards. I was 
treated virtually as a foreigner in my own village. 
West Papua is, therefore, a place where freedom of expression and 
assembly have been violated, and legal access to prisoners, to information 
sources, to public criticism, and to democratic freedom denied. A major 
objective of these abuses in the Timika area is to create confusion and fear 
among the landowners, particularly in the concession region, so that the 
company and the state can exploit the mineral resources without opposition. 
6.3.6. The Political Administrative Approach 
Responding to the failure of the purely military approach, the Indonesian 
government has introduced a new political approach in its attempt to 
destroy the influence of the OPM; this may be termed an "administrative 
approach". The government plans to focus on particular strategic regions, 
creating new provinces or regencies in order to counteract the influence of 
the OPM and facilitate Indonesianisation. The first step in this plan is to 
divide the province of "Irian Jaya" into three provinces:78 a northern 
province, with Jayapura as its capital; a western province, with Sorong as the 
capital; and a southern province, with Timika as capital. Each of these 
provinces will be under the authority of an assistant governor. Jakarta 
argues that such reorganisation is crucial to the provision of development 
and services, and to improve infrastructure and create more job 
opportunities. But Papuans see the plan as a strategy for increasing political 
and military control. According to state law, a region can only be upgraded to 
a "province" if it fulfils certain criteria; one of these is that there must be a 
78 Yusril Ihza Mahendra,"Irian Jaya Agar Dijadikan Tiga Provinsi", Republika, 25 June 
1998, Jombang. 
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population of at least one million. The Papuans fear that if the plan were to 
be implemented, an even greater influx of migrants from Indonesia would 
be needed to increase the population in each of the newly created provinces 
and so the 1.5 million Papuans would very quickly become marginalised. 
Following the social unrest that occurred in the central and southern 
parts of the country in 1996, another administrative reform was put in place: 
three new regencies were created in East Mimika (with Timika as capital), 
Puncak Jaya (with Mulia as capital), and Paniai (with Enarotali as capital). 
Again, the Papuans believe that such administrative rearrangements were 
part of a politically and militarily motivated strategic plan. In order to 
restrict the movement of the OPM in the border areas, the military has built 
new outposts even in the most remote locations. In Akimuga district, for 
example, three times a week military aircraft drop troops to Jila, Haga, Beoga, 
Hoea, Alama, and Bela from the military's new base in Aramsolki. Each 
small village now has its own military post, with the main KODIM in the 
region supplying manpower, food, and medicines. 
During the drought of 1998, the military also used the social catastrophe 
as a means to hasten the extermination of the Papuans. Apart from delays in 
supplying food to victims in remote areas such as Sinak, Mulia and 
Geselama, the military set fire to the terrain; landowners in Hoea were 
unable to save their crops, animals, houses and land from the bushfire. 
According to an ICRC report (1998), the district of East Mimika was one of 
the areas worst hit by drought, with more than 250 people dying of hunger 
and drought-related diseases such diarrhoea, malaria, and cholera. 
Jakarta is now attempting to reduce the boundaries of the Lorentz 
National Park in order to allow a contractor (Nabire Bhakti) to explore the 
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viability of a gold mine in Jila valley, approximately 50 kilometres north-
east of Tembagapura. This means new environmental destruction will take 
place in the eastern area of Amungsa, affecting Dologong and Noemogong, 
the headwaters of the Cemara river system, and the adjacent lowlands. 
Jakarta is proud of its current administrative policy; but Papuans 
remain extremely critical, believing that the real objectives are to restrict the 
movement of the OPM and cut off its information network and local 
support. The military has used the administrative reorganisation to 
legitimate further forcible removal of landowners and increased 
militarisation in the regions. Moreover, if the government continues to 
claim land in accordance with Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution 
1945, concerning the state's right to ownership of all "no-man's-land", the 
Amungme will not have any right to claim compensation. In such 
circumstances, conflict between the Amungme and FI (and Nabire Bhakti) 
will drag on well into the future. 
6.4. Local Resistance 
Despite the claims of FI and the government of Indonesia that the presence 
of the company in the region has significantly improved social and 
economic conditions and local infrastructure, and has broken down the 
isolation of the people, the Amungme and Kamoro people are still highly 
critical of it. As Professor Steven Feld argues: 
Like all indigenous West Papuans in Irian Jaya, Amungme 
have suffered from the brutal oppression of their Indonesian 
colonizers. They had no say in the takeover of their homelands 
for mining nor in the resettlement programs that removed 
them for the benefit of Freeport Indonesia. Their lands have 
been annexed, their wealth has been absorbed. They receive no 
land rent and no royalties, and have virtually no legal, 
political, or economic recourse to this forced dispossession. 
When some Amungme rebelled in frustration in 1977 and 
blew up part of a pipeline, Indonesian military retaliations 
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resulted. Gardens houses were 
Indonesia claimed 
the estimate at 
even more important than these abuses is the lack of respect for the 
fundamental human rights of the local people, including land rights, and 
the destruction of their environment. The specific abuses of the 1960s and 
early 1970s are briefly summarised below: 
79 
80 
• The lack of consultation and agreement with landowners; confiscation 
of their land, and exploitation of their natural resources, the 
destruction of their secret places; and environmental degradation. 
® The treatment of the Amungme as slaves in their own land. The 
Amungme have complained that secret places were destroyed 
and that Forbes Wilson's Freeport minerals 
1960 refused to pay the Amungme porters any 
this expedition. 
their role in 
• The disregard of local landowners by first contractor Bechtel Pomeroy 
(BP) in 1967. Without asking permission or making any attempt at 
consultation, BP started to build its camps in Peyukate where the 
villages of Jelsegel and Onogopsegel are located. In response, the people 
of Wa, under the leadership of Tuarek Natkirne, organised a protest 
and planted stakes to mark their land, saying "Natkirne is determined 
to resist change at all costs".80 
Steven Feld (1995). "Let's Call It Amungme Hall", University of Austin, Texas. 
"For much of his life, Tuarek Natkime, chief of the Amungme tribe, dressed in an 
orange penis gourd, feathers and a layer of pig fat. These days, he adopts Western-
style clothing. But when it comes to a consortium mining his clan lands in Indonesia's 
remote Irian Jaya province, Natkime is determined to resist change at all costs. The 
leathery wrinkles in his dark skin clench in a dramatic frieze as he vows: 'As sure as if 
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• The treatment of the Amungme as inferior workers. In 1971, a fight 
broke out in Mile 74 between the Amungme and FI workers, which 
led to four workers being killed. Two years later, an FI geological team 
once again entered the secret places of the Amungme in 
Nosalonogoma in the Tsinga valley without asking permission. The 
Amungme, under the leadership of Pitarogome Beanal, protested, and 
the camp was burned down. In 1973, a protest broke out in 
Tembagapura against further deforestation and confiscation of land 
without compensation. The Amungme planted many crosses around 
the Mulkidini as a sign of prohibition of entry. 
The government, responding to Amungme demands, required the 
company to provide basic social facilities in remote villages such as Banti, 
Kwamki Lama and Aroanop, but, in practice, FI has ignored its obligations, 
continuing its expansion into prohibited areas outside the Tembagapura 
region not covered by the agreement.81 An Amungme delegation, 
consisting of Tom Beanal, Constan Hanggaibak and selected Amungme 
chiefs, was excluded from the final decision-making process or in the 
formulation of the document, their views being represented by the 
government of Indonesia.82 The January 1974 Agreement was thus not the 
product of a democratic and just negotiation. 
This pattern was repeated when FI and the government signed a new 
Contract of Work on 31 December 1991, to approve another 30 years of 
81 
82 
I were holding a rock in my hand, I'll never let go'", in Michael Shari (1996) "My Land 
is Your Mine", p.7. 
Lembaga Masyarakat Amungme/LEMASA (1995). Tuntutan and Tanggapan 
Amungnesorei Atas Masalah Pelanggaran Hak-hak Asasi Manusia Terhadap 
Penduduk Asli di Wilayah Pt. Freeport Indonesia dan Hasil Temuan KOMNASHAM, 
Timika, (unpublished), p.7. 
Ibid.:7. 
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mining. Once again, the Amungme were not consulted. Moreover, in order 
to build towns for workers and immigrants, there has been further land 
acquisition. Sixteen chiefs of the Amungme and Kamoro were forced to 
release their land on 16 March 1985, covering an area between Timika, Mile 
50 in the north, West Sempan in the south, Kauga river in the West and 
Aijkwa river in the east.83 
In expressing their discontent over these injustices, the landowners 
have taken both non-violent and violent approaches. 
Non-Violent Approaches 
Non-violent actions have included the following: 
• The use of blockades and silent strikes (when FI failed to consult the 
Amungme and undermined the sale of local products, the Amungme 
planted prohibited entry marks in Mulkidini (Tembagapura), and 
women held a silent strike in Timika market); 
• The channelling of the aspirations of the Amungme through the 
Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA); as the only legitimate body 
of the Amungme and Kamoro peoples LEMASA addresses issues of land 
rights, human right abuses, environmental destruction, and 
improvement of education, health and social services; 
• cooperation with national and international solidarity groups, NGOs and 
environmental groups (campaigns have influenced decision making in 
some host countries; on 13 October 1995, for example, the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) cancelled export insurance cover 
to Freeport McMoRan). International solidarity is also expressed through 
83 Ibid.:8. 
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protests, press releases, seminars and conferences. In one instance, a 
highly respected academic, Professor Steven Feld of the University of 
Texas in Austin, resigned from his professorship arguing that the 
University of Texas and Freeport, which have links, failed to address 
human rights and environmental issues. In a letter to the University 
chancellor he wrote: 
The attempts I made to follow them [my previous letters] up 
and speak with you about Freeport's human rights record 
was met with silence. I even offered to provide you with an 
executive summary and copies of hundreds of pages of 
accounts of Freeport's role in Indonesian military detentions 
and murders of Melanesian civilians. But you have been 
unwilling to even acknowledge these overtures, much less 
acknowledge or participate in any campus forum on 
Freeport. Your lack of accountability presents the entire 
University community with a clear picture of arrogant 
disregard for democratic discussion. I can no longer be proud 
of my association with the University, and certainly no 
longer wish to bring prestige to it. This feeling was surely 
intensified when I read last month's report (copy enclosed) 
by the Catholic Church of Jayapura on violations of human 
rights around Freeport's West Irian mine site. Among other 
things, the report provides eyewitness accounts of 
Indonesian military use of Freeport containers as detention 
and torture cells.84 
The Indonesian Environmental Group (WALHI), the Catholic Church, 
and national and regional groups such as the Foundation for Rural 
Development Program in Jayapura, Student Solidarity with the 
Amungme People, Christian-based organisations, and indigenous 
advocacy forums have been instrumental in defending human rights 
and environmental values in the area. 
• Legal challenge is another form of non-violent campaigning; LEMASA 
brought actions against FI before both district and federal courts in the 
84 Steven Feld, letter to the Chancellor of the University of Austin, Texas, 11 September 
1995, announcing his decision to resign from his professorship. 
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USA for its crimes against humanity and environmental destruction. 
Charges of human rights abuses against FI were provisionally upheld in 
the Louisiana Supreme Court in July 1998, but LEMASA's case was 
eventually lost. 
Violent Approaches 
In general, the Amungme are not an aggressive people. However, some 
individuals, frustrated when their peaceful demands have not been 
heeded, have resorted to occasional violence. In November 1976, the 
Amungme blocked roads between Tembagapura and Ertsberg to express 
their discontent at the destruction of their forests and land in Mulkindi. 
On 23 July 1977 a joint operation between the OPM, Freeport workers and 
the Amungme burned down oil tanks at Mile 50 and cut off the pipeline 
that transferred copper ore to the port in Ammapare, involving losses to 
Freeport of between US$6 and US$11 million.85 Many protests and 
demonstrations have been organised over the years; the biggest erupted 
on 10-12 March 1996 when 6,000 Papuans in Tembagapura and Timika 
went onto the streets and destroyed company offices, airport facilities, 
cars, and laboratories, valued at US$1 million. 
In the view of the OPM, the support given by FI to the state of 
Indonesia prolongs the colonisation of West Papua. This perception has 
strengthened Amungme sentiment against FI over the years. 
The leader of the Nemang Kawi Command of the OPM, Kelly Kwalik, 
himself an Amungme, has taken a number of actions in an attempt to force 
85 Ballard, op.cit.:32. See also Robin Osborne (1985). Indonesia's Secret War: The 
Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. p.69. 
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FI and the government to the negotiating table. The demands of the 
LEMASA and Kelly Kwalik are set out in Appendix, 2.86 
The 23 points of this declaration have been demanded for many years 
without any result. However it is possible that the currently increasing 
internal and external pressures may change the social and development 
policies of Freeport McMoRan and of the post-Habibie government. Let me 
consider this future possibility in the light of conflict resolution strategies. 
6.5. Prospects for Ending the Conflict 
6.5.1. General Overview 
The painful experiences of the past, which I have described above, are 
unlikely to be reversed in the future because all the actors feel that they are 
in the right. In the view of the government, the mineral resources belong to 
the state and must be exploited for the benefit of all Indonesian citizens, in 
accordance with Article 33 of the State Constitution of 1945. FI is seen as a 
vital asset of the state because Jakarta benefits from the mining operations in 
the form of dividends, royalties and taxes. Demands for social justice and 
democracy are regarded as criminal acts against the interests of the state. The 
government also has major strengths. The powerful military protects the 
interests of the state and of Fl. The government also controls the apparatus 
of the state such as finance, international relations, and the powers of local, 
regional and national administrative bodies, and it exercises substantial 
control over the media. The government is, therefore, willing and able to 
suppress opposition. 
86 LEMASA (1995). op.cit.:12-14. 
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Parallel to the state's interests, Freeport McMoRan and its associated 
companies will continue to support government policy because the 
company does not want to lose the opportunity to make profits in West 
Papua. A change of regime in Indonesia is unlikely to affect the company's 
presence or operations significantly. In the short term, there may be minor 
difficulties but in the long run the government of Indonesia, no matter how 
it is constituted, needs FI to operate in the region. Freeport McMoRan's 
strengths lie in its capacity to contribute to the state's finances, and in the 
knowledge that it enjoys the protection of the state and military; it also has 
effective international networks and influence over the local mass media. 
In contrast, from the perspective of the Amungme and Kamoro, the 
presence of this transnational company has brought very few advantages. As 
landowners whose fundamental rights have been ignored, they feel that 
they have nothing to lose, and they will therefore continue to fight for their 
land and their rights. Their major strengths are the popular support they 
enjoy, the fact that they are defending their own land, the important role the 
leadership of the LEMASA has played in their struggle, and the increasing 
regional, national and international support for their cause. However, the 
landowners lack financial support, managerial skills, control over the mass 
media, and access to national and international networks, and the 
government's divide-and-rule policy has seriously affected the unity of the 
Amungme and the other peoples. 
6.5.2. Possible Scenarios for a Resolution 
Each set of actors has placed itself in a defensive position, distancing itself 
from dialogue. From this apparent stalemate, there are several ways of 
breaking the deadlock. 
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The current move towards the democratisation of Indonesian politics 
will impact on the region. A soundly based civil society is still far away; 
however, political democratisation and the abolition of ABRI's dual 
function (dwifungsi) may open up new possibilities for dialogue. Restoring a 
constitutional regime and empowering civil society are primary tasks in the 
reform program, but the government must also redefine the meaning of 
landownership, recognise indigenous peoples, human rights, and political 
rights and obligations, and introduce an accountable regional rural 
development program. 
Democratisation in Indonesia will also affect the political situation in 
West Papua. Alternative forces will emerge within the political system. 
Freeport Indonesia may be forced to redefine its policy concerning the 
indigenous people if it is to continue its operations in the region (or it could 
decide to sell out to another company). A total withdrawal of the military 
would be one way to create a neutral zone in which to start dialogue 
between the conflicting parties, but this is still a remote possibility. 
Increasing internal and external public pressures will also impact on 
the attitudes of the main actors; however, it seems unlikely that either the 
government or FI will be willing to fully recognise the rights of the 
Amungme and Kamoro in the near future. In the longer term, with the 
creation of a civil society, the deadlock may be broken, primarily because all 
the actors would like to share in the profits. Ongoing talks between the 
conflicting parties indicate some positive steps towards this eventuality. 
But there is also the likelihood that the Amungme will get nothing 
except further destruction and misfortune. If FI decides to sell out its 
operation any compensation for loss of land or environmental destruction 
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Amungme 
If FI and were to recognise LEMASA as 
legitimate representative of the Amungme, and party to negotiations, 
this would be a great step forward, though at present it seems unlikely. 
Another possibility is a replication of the Bougainville conflict. This is 
generally seen as unlikely "because the government of Indonesia, a 
stakeholder, sees Grasberg as one of the country's most important resources 
projects and will use its army to protect it"87 ; however if the current 
negotiations fail, then local organisations may consider they have no 
alternatives to violence. The situation has been analysed by Elmslie, who 
concludes that the national consciousness of the Papuans shows "no sign of 
dying out"; rather, local sentiment will grow and will promote social 
unrest.88 I share his view. 
The problem of West Papua is not only social; it is also Any 
solution to the problem must, therefore, be sought not only within social 
and economic contexts, as suggested by Djopari and other social and 
economic experts, but within cultural and political contexts as well. 
Addressing the basic issues of human rights, land rights, indigenous rights 
and environmental issues is vital. However, minor improvements in these 
key areas will not guarantee security and stability in the region. First, the 
coercive approach that is currently employed by the Indonesian government 
and the military will not break local sentiment; instead, it will encourage 
more violence. A more effective option for achieving a productive dialogue 
would be to withdraw troops from the region and replace them with police 
security forces. Secondly, the application of a purely social approach will not 
87 
88 
Sydney Morning Herald 14 March 1996. 
Elmslie, op.cit.: 103. 
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reduce the strength of local sentiment either, primarily because the local 
demands are for something much more fundamental: namely respect for 
basic human rights, including land rights and political rights. 
Land means everything to the Amungme and Kamoro. It has social, 
economic, religious and cultural values; spiritual connections to land 
cannot be ignored. Therefore, any peaceful solution must be culturally 
grounded and involve popular participation.89 
The demand for recognition of, and respect for human rights has been 
a continuing issue. Freeport Indonesia and the government of Indonesia 
must recognise the importance of land and resources to the Amungme and 
Kamoro as the indigenous people of the area. The suggestions made by 
LEMASA (set out above) should be seriously studied in order to create a 
foundation for trust and stability in the region. 
Local ethnonationalism has contributed to the development of a 
broader West Papuan national sentiment. LEMASA has played an 
important role, especially in initiating the Forum for Reconciliation of the 
People of West Papua (FORERI) and taking part in a peace dialogue with the 
government of Indonesia under the coordination of Team 100. LEMASA, 
and its leader, Tom Beanal, who has consistently fought for human rights 
and environmental issues in the Amungsa and Kamoro land, are now 
major actors at the national, as well as the local, level. Beanal's commitment 
and experience at the local level gave him the credibility to play a national 
role. Further, LEMASA's fight against the USA-based Freeport McMoRan 
had a serious impact nationally. Environmentalists and human rights 
89 LEMASA (1995). Amungme people's response to National Commission of Human Rights 
findings, 22September1995, TAPOL, London. 
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organisations who support the struggle of the Amungme, also support the 
West Papuan national struggle. A resolution passed by the LEMASA in 
Timika in 1998 called for an independent West Papua, arguing that only in 
an independent West Papua could the problems of human rights, 
environmental degradation, and social education be solved. The raising of 
the Morning Star flag in Timika on 10 November 1999 indicated the 
continuing serious local commitment to West Papua's national cause. 

Chapter Seven: Future Prospects for West Papua 
7.1. Introduction 
The future of West Papua remains controversial even after 35 years of 
struggle, for the issues at stake are extremely complex and sensitive. 
Furthermore, there is still a lack of political commitment from the two 
conflicting parties, the government of Indonesia and the OPM, to engage in 
a healthy and constructive dialogue. For these reasons, and because of the 
divergent views that were discussed in Chapter Five, negotiation on the 
future of West Papua was impossible in the New Order period. However, 
since the collapse of the Suharto regime, new possibilities may at last 
emerge as the spirit of democracy strengthens. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first will provide a general 
review of the collapse of the Suharto regime and its effects on the social and 
political problems in West Papua. The second will focus on future 
scenarios, in particular the issue of the survival of the nation-state of 
Indonesia. The final part will discuss three alternative political approaches 
to resolving the conflict-autonomy, federation, and independence. 
Papuans are currently debating the advantages and disadvantages of these 
potential solutions. 
7.2. The Failure of the New Order Regime 
The Suharto government was one of the most highly centralised and 
authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. Because the country was ruled 
through a militarised power structure, the position of the Suharto regime 
was for long unchallengeable. The state built a system of centralised control 
over economic resources in which Suharto's family and close friends played 
a predominant role. Major strategic industries such as oil, gas, 
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communications and plantations were run by state companies controlled by 
Suharto loyalists and selected private companies. 
As in South Korea, the authoritarian regime brought rapid economic 
growth to the country, and living standards and infrastructure improved 
significantly. According to Huntington, economic growth tends either to 
democratise or to destabilise authoritarian regimes. 1 In the case of 
Indonesia, behind the success there was extensive corruption, collusion and 
nepotism. In West Papua, for example, the corruption of the family of 
former President Suharto was evident in the logging industry. According to 
Sitorus, chairman of the Provincial Parliament of Irian Jaya (DPR D-I), 
Suharto's grandson Arisigit was closely involved in logging contracts that 
jeopardised the local economy and environment, and the parliament has 
called for further investigation into logging in West Papua.2 Suharto and 
Bob Hassan were also involved in a scandal relating to Freeport Indonesia 
(FI); Hassan purchased shares from Bakrie Indocopper Invertama 
Cooperation, one of the contractors at the Freeport mine, and then sold 
them at a 9.3 per cent profit to Freeport Indonesia.3 
To protect this situation of privilege, the Suharto regime gave no 
mercy to its political opponents. There was no respect for human rights. 
Considerable numbers of Indonesian citizens and colonised peoples were 
brutally murdered, imprisoned, detained, or executed, and many 
disappeared without trace. Land confiscation and resource exploitation 
became endemic. In the absence of the rule of law, corruption, collusion and 
"In a few countries extremely rapid economic growth destabilised authoritarian 
regimes, forcing them either to liberate or intensify repression. Economic development, 
in short, provided the basis for democracy; crises produced by either rapid growth or 
economic recession weakened authoritarianism", Samuel P. Huntington (1991) The 
Third Wave, Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma 
Press, London, p.59. 
Cenderawasih Post 31 May 1998. 
Suara Independence No.10, 3 August 1997. 
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nepotism became a way of life. Consequently even a country as rich as 
Indonesia was brought to the point of economic collapse. After 1997 the 
financial and banking systems no longer functioned and Indonesia was 
unable to pay its soaring foreign debt, which even by late 1996 was recorded 
as US$55.5 billion, or 25 per cent of GDP.4 Economic infrastructure was run 
down and the level of unemployment rose to a record high. The value of 
the Indonesian rupiah fluctuated further and a high rate of inflation forced 
changes in the consumption index in the middle of May 1998. As the rupiah 
lost its purchasing power, hunger, frustration, and high unemployment 
became prevalent. 
In reaction to social dissatisfaction and economic crisis, the demand for 
change of the Suharto regime quickly became widespread in early 1998. The 
unequal distribution of economic growth among the regions created 
increased resentment, leading to social unrest in many parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago.5 The Suharto family and its associates were sharply 
criticised for their role in conglomerate business, and faced a new test of 
credibility as the people demanded an end to one of the longest-lasting 
authoritarian regimes in the world. Student organisations, intellectuals, 
workers, human rights activists and environmentalists in the main cities 
on Java and the other islands demanded Suharto's resignation and called 
for immediate economic and political reforms. As the reformist movement 
steadily gained momentum, President Suharto was forced to stand aside 
and the combination of economic deterioration and political protest 
triggered the downfall of his regime. Rousseau's observation that "stronger 
is never strong enough to be always the master"6 was confirmed by the 
4 
6 
M. Purcell (1998). "Sinking Asia: Capital Flows and the Collapse of the Asian 
Miracle", ACFOA Development Issues 4, Canberra, pp.14-18. 
Ibid.:69. 
Huntington, op.cit.:46. 
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collapse of the Suharto regime; the government was forced to resign and on 
21May1998 President Suharto himself was removed from power.7 
This change of regime, and the associated process of political 
democratisation in Indonesia, has seriously affected social and political 
conditions in West Papua. 
7.3. The Effects of Democratisation in Indonesia 
The demand for greater democratisation and political participation in 
Indonesia received wide national and international publicity when student 
organisations in the main cities demonstrated in the streets and demanded 
change. Even though these mass movements were loosely organised and 
lacked coordination and leadership, they had considerable impact on the 
country's political future. 
This political action led to an increase of national sentiment and 
political turmoil in many parts of West Papua. On 1 July 1998, raisings of 
the West Papuan flag, the Morning Star, took place in Jayapura, Biak, 
Sorong, W amena and Manokwari and were accompanied by demands for 
the independence of West Papua. Similar actions by West Papuan students 
took place in Jakarta and Yogyakarta; they also went to the UN 
representative's office, demanding independence for West Papua and 
expressing their deep anger and frustration over the injustices, repression 
and exploitation suffered by West Papuans under the Indonesian colonial 
system. July 1st was chosen for these demonstrations as this is the date on 
which, each year, the OPM celebrates its National Independence Declaration 
Day, commemorating the day in 1971 that Seth Rumkorem, the president of 
the RPG, first publicly declared the independence of West Papua. The 
G. Forrester (1998). "Introduction"in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds),The Fall of 
Suharto, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, pp.16-17. 
317 
to these 
participants were or disappeared. 
Serious incidents occurred Biak, where it was reported that a considerable 
number of civilians were killed or wounded, or disappeared.8 
Unlike in previous years, West Papuan national sentiment in 1998 was 
channelled through more effective organisational systems. Democratisation 
opened up new opportunities to publicly express political desires and to 
organise mass protests and rallies. The Forum Untuk Rekonsiliasi Bagi 
Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya 
FORERI), the Komite untuk Papua Barat (KIPB), and other organisations 
inside and outside West Papua were established. The general aims of these 
organisations were the same-the independence of West Papua-but the 
organisational models and means of achieving the ultimate goal were 
For example, FORERI, which was established on 
been consistent in its demand for discussion of three possible 
West Papua: autonomy, federation and independence.9 At a seminar on 1 
August 1998, the forum suggested that national dialogue should be followed 
up by an international dialogue involving the United Nations. In a 
communique released in Jayapura on 29 July 1998, FORERI called for the 
independence of West Papua, arguing that the integration of West Papua 
within Indonesia was historically unacceptable even to many Indonesians 
(referring to Mohammad Hatta and others), and that West Papuans were 
never given an opportunity to express their desires either in the New York 
Team Investigation of Human Rights Institute and Advocacy, July 1998, "Laporan 
Pelanggaran HAM di Biak", Jayapura, pp.26-31. 
"FORERI is a broad based organisation which consists of churches, students, youth, 
women and traditional leaders and affiliated members organisation established on 24 
July 1998. One of the tasks of the forum is to inspire the national aspiration of the 
people of West Papua and find an appropriate mechanism to end the political conflict. 
As a new political agenda, the forum stresses the necessity of developing an open, just 
and peaceful national dialogue with the government of Indonesia."Forum Untuk 
Rekonsiliasi Bagi Rakyat Irian Jaya/FORERI (30 July 1998). "Resume Hasil Pertemuan 
FORERI Dengan TPF-DPR-RI", Jayapura. pp.1-2. 
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Agreement or the Act of Free Choice in 1969. The Forum rejected the 
unrepresentative decision-making of 1969, and the orchestration and 
manipulation of opinion by the state. It called for national dialogue, 
withdrawal of the military, release of all political prisoners, the court-
martialling of soldiers guilty of human rights abuses in Wamena (1977), 
Timika (1995), Bela, Alama, Jila and Mapenduma (1996), and Biak, 
Manokwari, Sorong and Jayapura (1998), and the opening up of the region 
to international fact-finding missions. 
This call received a positive response from the Habibie government 
which "agreed to open a national dialogue. Habibie's willingness indicates 
openness of the government to hear the aspirations of the people".10 
However, no agreed agenda has yet been set up for discussion. In contrast to 
the broader Papuan demands, the government wishes to restrict the agenda 
of national dialogue to the issues of development and autonomy only. Yet 
even though there are still obstacles, the new commitment and 
understanding on both sides has been a positive step towards engaging in 
future discussions. 
Another positive sign has been the call, from the government side, for 
the demilitarisation of West Papua. President Habibie made initial efforts to 
recognise and apologise for the human rights abuses in West Papua and, as 
a token of his willingness to acknowledge past mistakes, he promised to 
initiate a limited withdrawal of Indonesian troops. In acknowledgment of 
the mounting evidence of past army atrocities and the recent ceasefire 
agreement, the Indonesian armed forces are reported to have now halted 
their special operations or Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) in West Papua. 
There are many reasons behind this change in strategy, but the most 
10 Suajay Izack, the Vice President of the Traditional Consultation Council of Irian Jaya 
(LMMA), Indonesian Daily News, 5 October 1998. 
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which 
rights abuses in East 
Aceh and West Papua. In October 1998, General Sembiring Amir 
announced a withdrawal from most military operational areas and a 
limited withdrawal of the Indonesian armed forces from certain sensitive 
regions, such as Timika regency. 11 Two months later, Indonesia cancelled 
the military operations zones set up to safeguard vulnerable areas in 
Timika regency in 1995/96 and in other regions. The military has already 
lost public trust and there are continuing demands for the withdrawal of its 
troops and for soldiers who have been involved in atrocities to be 
courtmartialled. In Timika, for example, two companies of Satuan Tugas 
(SATGAS) Infantry of Garuda I/98, namely Yonif Linud 330 of Ujung 
Pandang I KOSTRAD and Brid.Inf 9 KOSTRAD, have been pulled out. 12 The 
military is now shifting from a security approach to a approach.13 
According to General Sembiring, any withdrawal troops 
Papua will need time because the conditions are difficult and the territory is 
so vast. 14 In practice, however, these changes do not mean anything, 
because the DOM is merely transferred to territorial units and a joint 
operation is always possible between different units. For example, during 
the hostages crisis in Timika, Mapenduma and Waropko, Yonif. 32 Ujung 
Pandang and Yonif. 412 Purworejo in Central Java were transferred to West 
Papua and stationed in those towns from October 1995. When critics argued 
against their presence, Jakarta replied that these reinforcement troops came 
under the territorial arrangement. Thus the current change in policy will 
only affect the elite troops, while other troops will remain to "guarantee 
II 
12 
13 
14 
Suara Pembaharuan 17 October 1998. 
Tifa Irian August Minggu III, 1998, p.13. 
Antara News 9 October 1998."KODAM VIII TRIKORA Changed Operational Function 
To Territorial Development". 
Reuters 3 October 1998. 
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security ", in Jakarta's words. The whole process is window-dressing, 
intended to repair the damaged reputation of the military in the eyes of the 
world. In practice, human rights abuses continue in West Papua. 
Occurrences of arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and killing of suspected 
OPM and participants in the independence activities in July 1998, indicate 
that "withdrawal" is a fa<;;ade. There is growing fear that, as in East Timor, 
the military will come back in a different, and less easily identifiable, 
uniform. 
Democratisation has also affected the policy of the OPM, with renewed 
debate about the overall policy and structure of the organisation being a 
primary item on the political agenda. The Political Bureau of the OPM and 
the Papuan community abroad have both welcomed the current national 
political initiatives and are ready to work towards a realisation of the 
national dialogue. The fragmented factions of the OPM are now being 
forced to unite and to forget their differences. The establishment of the 
OPM-PNG Chapter in September 1998 is a clear example of this shift. The 
call for a ceasefire made by the OPM faction in the north of the country, 
under the leadership of Marthin Wenda, on 29 September 1998 is another 
example. The OPM commander requested that a peace dialogue be set up 
and asked for a guarantee of the safety of every member of the OPM visiting 
the country.15 
But the changes which have taken place in Indonesia have also had 
negative effects. First, the region has faced a serious economic crisis. As a 
result of corruption, collusion and nepotism, the economic recession, and 
the collapse of the financial and banking systems, the socio-political 
situation has been seriously affected. Industrial production has virtually 
15 Reuters 30 September 1998. "Irian Rebels, Indonesian Army Agree Ceasefire". 
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mining operation West 5,000 workers went 
on demanding increased wages improvement working 
conditions;16 subsequently, a considerable number of Papuan employees lost 
their jobs. Secondly, the price of basic commodities has increased more 
sharply in West Papua than in the other provinces. In Jayapura, for 
example, the price of low quality rice in DOLOG (Rice Distribution 
Company) increased from Rp2,400 per kg in 1996 to Rp2,500 per kg in 1998; 
sugar increased from Rp3,000 per kg to Rp4,000 per kg, and cooking oil from 
Rp5,000 to Rp7,000 per kg. over the same period. 17 Thirdly, the economic 
crisis has brought growing social problems, such as prostitution and the 
mass influx of immigrants seeking a new life and economic success in West 
Papua. According to Tom Beanal, the situation is out of control: 
16 
17 
18 
I cannot believe that the number of prostitutes, both local and 
immigrants, in main urban cities such as Timika, 
and even in Wamena has increased so much in a relatively short 
period. One of the reasons is there are no jobs available their 
husbands, so that they are forced into these activities. Another 
alarming issue is that the influx of immigrants into West Papua is 
increasing since the collapse of the Indonesian economy because 
many Indonesian believe that West Papua is still paradise for 
them. In Jayapura, Nabire and Manokwari where alluvial gold 
was discovered, many Indonesians moved in seeking for fortune 
and competing with the Papuans which often led to social 
tensions, and resulted in an unhealthy outcome. In the Nabire 
case, for example, five people were killed in a social clash in 1998. 
In the coastal areas of the island of Biak and in Timika 
considerable numbers of Indonesian immigrants have occupied 
the traditional land of the local people and forced landowners into 
the jungle. As coastal dwellers, there is no easy way for them to 
adapt to a new life. This also creates serious social tension. These 
are a few effects of the Indonesian economic crisis affecting our 
people. 18 
Australian Broadcasting Cooperation/ ABC News, 12 August 1998. "Five Thousand 
Workers Strike at the Giant Freeport Mine". 
Antara News 9 November 1998. 
Tom Beanal (September 1998), interviewed by the author, Canberra. 
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There has also been a decline of the regional government's acceptance 
of social responsibility. During the El Nino disasters leading to widespread 
drought in the highlands in 1997, it was very difficult to deliver basic 
humanitarian needs to the affected people there. Consequently, about 180 
out of a total of 900 civilians in Nongme and Wosak villages in the 
Jayawijaya regency died as a result of drought and related diseases such as 
staphylococcus bacteria caused by dead pigs. According to Slamaet 
Harjosuwarno in Jayapura, apart from an isolated case reported by 
Hyndman sixteen years earlier in the Paniai region, this Jayawijaya 
epidemic is unique. Despite the thousands of tons of humanitarian food aid 
stocked in Wamena, and the teams of medical doctors available, officials 
could not deliver an immediate relief operation. The government claimed 
that poor communications and the isolated nature of the region meant the 
goods and emergency services could not be delivered. However there are 
strong suspicions that extensive corruption was involved and that many 
officials regarded the emergency as an opportunity to increase their own 
fortunes. 
It is also known that the military actually encouraged many of the 
recent widespread and well-orchestrated mass protests, rallies and 
demonstrations. According to Tom Beanal and John Rumbiak, the mass 
demonstrations and flag-raising ceremonies that occurred in centres such as 
Jayapura, Biak, Wamena, Sarong and Manokwari on 1 July 1998, as 
mentioned above, were not a true expression of the Papuan desire for 
independence but were actually masterminded by the Indonesian military, 
aiming at destroying national unity and infiltrating the underground 
networks of OPM supporters inside West Papua.19 There were similar 
concerns in the case of the Timika and Tembagapura riots in 1996, when the 
19 Tom Beanal (September 1998) and John Rumbiak (February 1999), interviewed by the 
author, Canberra and New York respectively. 
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accused on 
"campaigns create 
contra independence movements which leads in turn to social 
tensions. 
The change in Indonesia has also impacted on the bilateral 
relationship between the government of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. 
In November 1998, both governments signed new Standing Operations 
Procedures in Surabaya, and agreed on the return of West Papuan refugees 
now in Papua New Guinea.20 However, the PNG government declined to 
agree to joint operations between the two countries; instead it reviewed its 
own refugee policy, allowing 1,000 refugees to remain and integrate into 
PNG society. This initiative of the PNG government has mixed 
implications for the OPM: while the refugees get a new opportunity to 
exercise democratic freedoms, it is something of a setback the as it 
means organisation has lost one means gaining 
attention; it also diminishes national sentiment. 
In short, the democratisation of Indonesia has significant social, 
political, economic and military consequences for West Papua. Along with 
opportunities for an intensification of political agitation, for increased self-
reliance and the opening of new possibilities for independence, an increase 
of unemployment, the difficulty of making an economic recovery, and 
military and governmental provocation have clear implications for the 
need for political change in Indonesia. In order to consider whether this 
change may bring a better future for the people of West Papua, let me now 
analyse some possible socio-economic and political scenarios. 
20 See Antara News 31 October 1998: "West Papuans staying in PNG urged to return 
home," and "PNG rejects more Irian J aya refugees". 
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When political analyst observers the relationship between the OPM and the 
National Papuan Council (NPC) they conclude that the OPM has already 
defeated since the NPC was established on 5 June 2000 in Port Numbay. It is, 
therefore, the OPM will not play a vanguard role in the future. The role of 
the OPM has been overtaken by the Papuan National Council. This 
misleading assumption is not only very weak in argument, but also wrong 
judgements for obvious reasons. Let me mention briefly some similarities 
and differences. 
History has proved that Forum for Reconciliation of the people of 
West Papua (FORERI) and The National Papuan Council were born as a 
result of the OPM campaigns. The OPM as the longest and an umbrella 
organisation, it has played an important role inspiring and encouraging 
national sentiments of the people. The OPM believes there is crucial need to 
cooperate between three major components of the liberation movement: 
political bureau who responsible for diplomacy, the National Liberation 
Army (TEPENAL) who responsible for military campaigns, and popular 
movement inside West Papua who responsible for political education and 
mass mobilisation aiming at destroying the colonial power. The history of 
the struggle shows that the last component was not active in the last 33 
years, because the political circumstances inside West Papua was not allowed 
Papuan community to mobilise themselves. 
It was therefore, the OPM increased guerrilla campaigns in 1990s in 
West Papua. Flag raising ceremonies in many parts of West Papua, hostages 
taken were part and parcel of the military campaigns aiming at attracting 
public attention. Consequently, widespread of human rights abuses spread 
out in the country. Many actors played their crucial role to expose those 
crimes against humanity. Social and human rights organisation such 
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Josepha Alomang , from 
and Advocacy Port Numbay, Brother van Broek 
Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice of Jayapura Bishop Diocese, 
Willy Mandowen, and Deny Yomaki of environmental group -YAU in Port 
Numbay, and most importantly, students of University of Cenderawasih, 
both Theologies in Abepura and few Freeport employees were those forces 
and actors that played crucial role to change political situation in West 
Papua. They exposed human rights abuses and environmental destruction, 
by documenting, reporting and giving eyes witness account. The OPM in its 
cooperation, supported their works by providing networks and organised 
foreign journalists into West Papua. 
Democratisation of Indonesian politics provided new avenue where 
OPM utilised effectively. Mass mobilisation and 
independence was major political agenda. development effective 
mass movements and networks inside the country become major focus 
attention. order to encourage such establishment, the primary task of the 
OPM was to be able to problematise the situation, aimed to attract attention 
and responses. For this purpose, the OPM used both political and military 
approaches. Political education and the increased political campaigns and 
established clandestine movements both in West Papua and Indonesia and 
increased military campaigns were few examples of such approaches. These 
method have had positive impacts on the emerge of national sentiments 
which self awareness expressed in many political and social manifestations. 
Popular demands for independence inside West Papua and 
establishment of popular movements such as FORERI and the Papuan 
National Council were few examples of such achievements. The situation 
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was orchestrated by the OPM for the political purpose The OPM used the 
momentum to gain political pressures the Papuan masses. This took in 
form of increasing of military campaigns both in interiors areas and urban 
cities. Hostages drama in Mapnduma event in January 8, border region and 
Biak event in July 1998 were classical examples how the OPM was able to 
force the masses in West Papua to change their mind and act. 
As a direct response, the masses matched on the street demanding for 
respecting human rights abuses, withdraw troops and organised mass 
demonstrations and protests. They established new organisations. FORERI 
which consists of traditional council, student, women, academic and 
churches to facilitated the aspiration of the people inside West Papua and 
play a facilitator role in mediation between the people of West Papua and 
the government of Indonesia. In order to facilitate this people's aspiration in 
the political context, Papuan National Council was formed in June 5,2000. 
where member of the OPM also part of it both in Presidium and Panels. It is 
therefore, the OPM and the PNC is not separated in general political 
perception, but divided in methodical questions. Both parties are united by 
spirit of struggle, and support major goals of the movement-an independent 
West Papua, but divided in strategy- the PNC strives for peaceful solution, 
while the OPM would like to use force to achieve a peace settlement. 
Another differences is the PNC was established two years ago while the OPM 
was established 35 years ago, so it has broader experience, clear strategy, 
political program, diplomatic contact networks and military strengths which 
are missing in the PNC. It is therefore, the OPM has been backbone for the 
continuation of the aspiration of the independent movement. 
Despite this clear relationship, some power elites in the Indonesian 
administration who are now in the new popular movement, undermine 
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the OPM and believed that the movement was just started in July 1998 
which historically is very doubtful. 
7.4. The Root Causes of the Problem 
The basic cause of the disaffection in West Papua has been discussed earlier 
in this thesis; here I will merely describe the situation in the last few years 
insofar as it is relevant to any future resolution. 
There are several reasons why political movements in West Papua 
have revived in the last two years. There is general consensus that 
increasing national resentment and unequal distribution of wealth and 
development are among the major factors. Further, the OPM is now far 
better organised and more unified; though there are still problems to be 
addressed, the movement has become more outward looking and has 
clarified its objectives. It now places more emphasis on a reconstruction 
program, calling for a national dialogue, the withdrawal of the military, and 
an end to human rights abuses and immigration, and stresses the need to 
review those policies that have led to underdevelopment. As one observer 
commented in 1996: "the OPM is weak but will be a time bomb for 
Indonesia in the future" .21 Even though the OPM has gained very little 
international support, some low level of political resistance will certainly 
continue.22 The Indonesian military may be strong, but the OPM is unlikely 
to be defeated. Moreover, the collapse of the Indonesian state is likely if the 
new government continues the old pattern of policies and lacks the capacity 
to bring about an economic recovery, and fails to address the root causes of 
social and political unrest. 
21 
22 
Jakarta Post 18 January 1996. 
R.J. May (1991). "Sources of External Support for the West Papuan Movement"in R. J. 
May and KM. de Silva (eds), Internalisation of Ethnic Conflict, International Centre 
for Ethnic Conflict, London, p. 178. 
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Given the complex and conflicting views about the political status of 
West Papua (outlined in Chapter Five), finding a solution to this problem 
has always been difficult. The two conflicting parties have, over the years, 
built up social and political barriers, making it impossible to engage in any 
meaningful peace dialogue. However, the collapse of the New Order regime 
in May 1998 has created new avenues for political discussion. 
7.5. The Selective Process of Conflict Resolution 
The possible approaches to conflict resolution are many, depending on the 
type and level of the conflict to be resolved. In relation to West Papua, I 
suggest there are five key steps in any process of resolution: ceasefire, third 
party intervention, national dialogue, military withdrawal, and an end to 
immigration. The last two have already been covered in previous sections 
of this thesis; here I will discuss only the first three. 
Step I: Ceasefire 
By definition, a ceasefire is an agreement between two conflicting parties to 
lay down their weapons on a limited or permanent basis. Such an 
agreement often incorporates mutual promises to stop all fighting within a 
specific area and within a specific time. The driving force behind reaching 
such agreements is usually that at least one of the opposing parties is in a 
difficult position. 
In September 1998 the OPM factions in the north, led by Marthin 
Wenda, called for a ceasefire, and Brigadier General Sembiring, commander 
of KODAM VIII/Trikora, agreed. The exact motives behind this decision are 
not clear; it may have been seen by the military as the only tactic to avoid 
international criticism, but military experts believe that the political change 
in Indonesia and the call for national dialogue significantly influenced the 
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move and that "it indicates a good will on both sides and a recognition by 
the military of the presence of the OPM" .23 Even if nothing else results from 
this initial move, first it shows that both sides want to engage in 
constructive talks, and, secondly, it signals a recognition of the OPM by the 
Indonesian armed forces, supporting the view that "the OPM is not a 'spent 
force' but is, rather surprisingly large and well organised" .24 The OPM and 
their families are already allowed to enter Indonesian-held areas, to get 
access to medical facilities and food. There is now a crucial need for a 
pragmatic approach to finding new middle ground between Indonesia and 
West Papua. This would be "the first time the Indonesian armed forces 
have given the OPM such a degree of recognition by deigning to enter into 
the talks" .25 In the past the Indonesian military has always rejected any 
ceasefire proposal by the OPM, claiming "the military will continue to crush 
down mass protests". 
This ceasefire agreement was, however, between only one section of 
the OPM and the Indonesian armed forces. Given that (according to Jim 
Elmslie) "there is no point in negotiating with the OPM because the main 
area of disagreement-the political status of west New Guinea-is not a 
matter open for debate",26 such an agreement may have little effect on the 
OPM as a whole, which has little trust in the good faith of the military. The 
examples of East Timor in 1983 and Bougainville in July 1997 demonstrate 
that occupation forces often break ceasefire agreements after using the 
ceasefire period to reinforce their troops. The OPM fears that this pattern 
could be repeated in West Papua. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Reuters September 1998. 
Jim Elmslie (1995). Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan 
Nationalism, Masters thesis, University of Sydney, p.22. 
Carmel Budiardjo, "ABRI Common Strategy in West Papua and East Timor", T APOL, 
London, 15 October 1998. 
Elmslie, op.cit.:22. 
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On the other hand, Indonesia could take the opportunity offered by the 
ceasefire to discuss with the OPM a series of measures leading to limited 
autonomy for West Papua. Such proposals could include the Papuanisation 
of the administration, with powers devolved to the Jayapura regional 
assembly to manage certain areas of the economy, to oversee the 
implementation of the regional plan, to suggest policies for maintaining 
Papuan culture, and so on. They could entail a substantial increase in 
educational provisions for West Papua in order to build up a corps of 
trained workers for both the local economy and the local bureaucracy. Also, 
members of the OPM could be offered an amnesty, with the opportunity for 
participation in regional government. The introduction of these policies 
could be accompanied by a limited military withdrawal, the ending of the 
transmigration program, a campaign to deter human rights abuses, and the 
adoption of a general "winning of hearts and minds" or persuasive 
approach by the armed forces. 
Under the present circumstances, such developments seem rather 
remote; on the Indonesian side there is little sign of what Elmslie has 
described as evidence of a "serious intention to involve West Papua in the 
running of the political system" .27 
Step II: The Role of Third Parties 
Third party intervention in negotiating a peace settlement has in many 
cases ended in success. Such mediation is commonly undertaken by 
regional organisations, the UN, foreign governments, and sometimes 
NGOs, churches and academics. The role of a mediator is to facilitate a peace 
accord by taking on an active role in bringing the conflicting parties to the 
negotiating table. 
27 Ibid.:22. 
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West Papua has gone through a painful experience with international 
mediators. As argued earlier, the intervention of the United Nations and 
the United States of America as mediators in the conflict between Indonesia 
and the Dutch did not achieve a better outcome for the Papuans.28 Instead of 
playing a mediating role, both parties collaborated with the government of 
Indonesia, effectively denying the rights of the people of West Papua, and 
forcibly transferring power from the Dutch to Indonesia. 
The USA and the UK have recently suggested that the Decolonisation 
Commission of the UN (Committee 24), should be abandoned, arguing that 
such a body is no longer necessary because the decolonisation process in the 
world has been completed. These world powers see Committee 24 from a 
Euro-centric viewpoint, assuming that conventional colonialism ended 
with the departure of Western colonial powers. However I would disagree: 
"colonialism and imperialism are not only European diseases, but are a 
global human problem, relating to a capitalist mentality, regardless of race, 
social status and religion" .29 Special attention must be directed to the 
apparent sanctity of inherited Western colonial boundaries and the 
emergence of neo-colonialism. A large number of peoples around the world 
are still suffering from both Western and indigenous colonialism, and 
international intervention to end colonialism is still important. 
28 
29 
C. McMullen (1981). Mediation of the West Guinea Dispute in 1962, A Case Study, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC, p.79. [See also RIOP (1984:50); M.C. Terrence 
(1996). The West Irian Dispute, How the Kennnedy Administration Resolves the 'other' 
Southeast Asian Countries, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, p.63]. 
Otto Ondawame (1997). "Impact of Freeport Mining's Activities On The Amungme and 
Kamoro Peoples in West Papua" in Susan Wareham (ed.), Vision and Actions for Peace, 
Conference Paper, International Physicians and Actions on Nuclear War and the 
Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australasia), Panther Publishing & 
Printing, Canberra, pp.227-228. 
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Some international intervention on behalf of West Papua has already 
taken place. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the government of PNG, with 
Maori Kiki as Foreign Minister, offered to act as mediator in 1974. A similar 
offer was also made by the government of Vanuatu in 1985. However, both 
initiatives failed. The involvement of international peacekeeping forces is 
currently unlikely, but as West Papuan demands for independence escalate, 
the presence of such troops may be crucial. A Pacific peacekeeping force, led 
by New Zealand, would be welcomed by West Papuans; members of the 
South Pacific Forum countries, particularly the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group, might be expected to take some initiative, though such an 
expectation has been unrealised so far. Intervention by the USA, the 
European Union or the UN is currently unlikely. With the process of 
democratisation of Indonesia, however, the acceptance of peacekeeping 
forces, international monitoring groups, and foreign mass media in 
Indonesia, and in West Papua, is more likely in the future. 
Step III: National Dialogue 
National dialogue is another step in the peace process. Unlike a ceasefire, 
which is a military approach, national dialogue is a political approach. It 
seeks a middle ground where the aspirations of the people and the 
intentions of government can be heard, and alternative development 
approaches can be discussed, with a view to narrowing the social and 
political differences until some form of consensus is possible. 
In an attempt to express their aspirations openly, FORERI recently 
undertook a new initiative. The Papuans have called for national dialogue 
to discuss key issues, including military withdrawal, regional development, 
human rights, land issues, and, most importantly, satisfying the people's 
aspirations concerning the future political status of West Papua whether 
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or 
statement of people of West were contained in a 
communique 26 February 1999, following a meeting 
President Habibie: 
Firstly; We the people of West Papua want to separate ourselves from 
the Unitary Republic of Indonesia to be fully sovereign and 
independent among other nations in the world. 
Secondly; to establish as soon as possible a Transition Government in 
West Papua under the auspices of the United Nations, democratically, 
peacefully and accountably at the latest on March 1999. 
Thirdly; if there will be no solution to respond to 
Statement, specifically for the First Second statements, we 
demand: to arrange an International Dialogue between 
government of the Republic of Indonesia, the West People and 
the United Nations; (ii) We the people of West Papua hereby declare to 
abstain from the General Election of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999 
(see Appendix 3 for the full text). 
The political statement was signed by one hundred delegates representing 
various communities and social classes in West Papua.30 
This communique is significant for four reasons: first, it represented 
the true expression of the desires of the people without political 
orchestration or manipulation; secondly, it marked a new preparedness by 
the Indonesian government to listen to the voices of opposition; thirdly, 
30 Forum Untuk Rekonsiliasi Bagi Rakyat Irian Jaya. "Pernyataan Politik Bangsa Papua 
Barat Kepada Pemerintah Republik Indonesia", Document, 26 February 1999, Jakarta. 
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the Papuans clearly affirmed their political commitment, self-respect and 
confidence in proposing to take over political power, if Jakarta agrees; 
finally, it informed the world community that independence is the last 
chance for West Papuans in order to save their people and their culture, 
traditions and ways of life from extinction. 
President Habibie welcomed the statement, saying that he honoured 
the demands because he saw them as being very honest and true, arrived at 
without any pressure, and reflecting a civilised and ethical approach to the 
principles and issues in dispute.31 Even though the response of the 
Indonesian government remained unclear, the president's statement was 
significant for future debate. 
A majority of the people of West Papua, including those overseas or in 
Jakarta, and the OPM have welcomed the initiative and support the aims 
and objectives of the national dialogue. Such initiative has a number of 
advantages. It creates and contributes to any type of consensus concerning 
the future of West Papua. Inside West Papua the growing wave of Papuan 
nationalism cannot be underestimated; however, the OPM has generally 
distanced itself from the calls of FORERI for political reasons. The two forces 
are agreed on broad objectives, but divided on the choice of approach. There 
is a fear that Jakarta will use the outcome of the dialogue as confirmation of 
the people's opinion, and that the mistakes of the consultation process 
during the Act of Free Choice in 1969 will be repeated. Another concern is 
that the lack of involvement of all layers of Papuan society will fuel popular 
opposition. 
31 Pius Urbanus Adii (1999). "Rangkuman Dialog Bapak Presiden Republik Indonesia 
dengan Masyarakat Irian Jaya", Report of the Representative of Nabire Regency to the 
National Dialogue, Nabire, p.2. 
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The organisation of a Musyawarah Besar Papua 2000 was seen as a 
further step toward national dialogue, but in fact little progress has been 
made towards this goal (see Epilogue). 
To discuss the three options for resolution of the conflict in a cordial 
manner, the conditions suggested by FORERI and the other organisations 
must first be met. Among these, the most important are the presence of 
international peace monitoring groups, the participation of all layers of the 
West Papuan community, including leaders of the OPM abroad, and the 
withdrawal of the military from West Papua. These three conditions are 
vital in order to establish a basis from which to achieve a genuine 
consensus. 
7.6. Three Types of Conflict Resolution 
As has been discussed above, West Papua suffers from a lack of respect for 
the fundamental human rights of its people, from militarisation, 
immigration, and cultural domination. Its demand for independence is also 
based on incompatibility: it has a different history and no common culture 
with Indonesia. A 1991 study of Irian Jaya, in terms of conflict resolution, 
stated: 
... integration is a result of colonialism, religions are different, 
geographical structure is different from Java. The compatibility 
factors on the other hand, are that both parties have recognised 
their diverged cultural composition, both agree that a new 
political arrangement such as autonomy and federation will be to 
their best interests. Incompatibility is clearly expressed by the OPM 
rejecting incorporation in the republic, opposing 
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Indonesianisation and the immigration program which is 
generally considered to be part of military strategy. 32 
Any solution to the problem of West Papua must recognise that the 
cultural and religious identity of West Papua is distinctive, and that cultural 
differences have been used to create socio-economic and political imbalance 
in the society between centre and periphery (Indonesians and "spiritual" 
non-Indonesians). So far, there is no clear acknowledgement of these 
differences by either side. 
Over the past two years, a new approach has been widely discussed, 
involving three possible governmental forms capable of conflict resolution: 
autonomy, federation and independence. 
7.6.1. Autonomy 
Debate about autonomous status for West Papua took place even before 
annexation began, back in the 1950s when the government of Indonesia first 
declared its objectives. A report prepared by the Research Institute for 
Oppressed People (RIOP) in Amsterdam33 and a study by Djopari34 have 
both reviewed this early discussion. 
Article 6 of the decree of MPRS No.XXI/MPRS/1966 placed West Irian 
(West Papua) in the position of an autonomous region and stated, "as soon 
as the ACF is over, we will immediately start the realisation of the 
autonomous province of West Irian". The later report of the New Guinea 
Parity Commission in 1950 also affirmed: "when Indonesia has control of 
32 
33 
34 
L. Lundstom (1991). Irian Jaya; A Conflict Analysis, University of Uppsala, pp.2-3. 
Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples (1985). The Tragedy of the People and the 
International Political Order, RIOP Report No.1. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, pp.23-
29. 
John R.G. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Grasindo, 
Jakarta, pp. 65-70. 
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sovereignty area, an 
set according to the the 
state".35 Thus, four years before the West campaign, 
government of Indonesia had already promised that if West Papua became 
an integral part of Indonesia, the West Irianese would have the right to 
arrange their own affairs based on the regional administration law No. UU 
1948/22. However this assurance was nothing but propaganda to win the 
hearts and minds of the West Papuans. 
To be seen to fulfil these promises, when West Papua was being forced 
to become a part of Indonesia, President Sukarno immediately announced 
Presidential decree 1962/l, which declared West Papua an autonomous 
region in accordance with the spirit of Article 18 of the State Constitution 
1945. The people of West Papua were to be "fully autonomous"with the 
appointment of Papuans to officials posts such as governor 
establishment of a regional parliament.36 This meant all powers, except 
foreign policy, defence and financial powers, would be hands of the 
regional government. In August 1962, Sukarno made his intention dear 
that "only self-determination within Indonesia would be recognised"/7 in 
other words, autonomy. What was called "fullest autonomy"was then spelt 
out in three presidential decrees during the UNTEA period: Pen Pres 1963/l 
(which regulated the powers, responsibilities and functions of the governor, 
vice governor, parliament and executive council), In Pres 1963/2 (secret) 
and Kep. Pres 1963/57.38 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Ibid.:28. 
Ibid.:23-29 (see also pp.60-71). 
Chris Ballard (1996). Chronologies of West Papuan History, Research School of Pacific 
and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, p.l. 
RIOP, op.cit.:24. 
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The presidential decrees addressed not only decentralisation of power 
but also deconcentration. The distinction between political decentralisation, 
which refers to devolution, and administrative decentralisation, which 
refers to deconcentration, is important.39 In the first, administrative powers 
are delegated from the centre to the regional governments which then will 
manage their own home affairs. Freeman, who has studied the government 
system in Indonesia at length, argues that in Indonesia the concepts of 
decentralisation and autonomy are not distinguished in practice. Both 
imply that the regions are empowered to conduct their own development 
and manage their own affairs, consistent with national policies and 
guidance;40 except for foreign policy, defence and trade, the management of 
finance and policy lies in the hands of provincial governments. In the case 
of deconcentration, the central government delegates powers to the regional 
governments within a vertically structured hierarchy. Provincial heads 
(governors), regency heads (bupati) and heads of service are empowered as 
the local officials of the central government to carry out administrative 
affairs within their jurisdiction. 
In fact, from the beginning, West Papua has been more an 
administrative entity than an autonomous region. This is clear from the 
secret presidential decree known as In Pres 1963/2. In specifying 
responsibilities, this decree stipulated that the provincial governor, as a 
representative of the central government and head of the autonomous 
region, had full authority over the region, with responsibility for the 
establishment of rules for police and civil administration; the direction and 
39 
40 
R.J. May and A.J. Regan (1997). "Introduction: The Politics of Decentralisation in Post-
Colonial States", in R.J. May and A.J. Regan (eds), Political Decentralisation in A New 
State: The Experience of Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House 
Publishing, Bathurst, p.4. 
Mike Freeman (1993). Pemerintah Indonesia (The Indonesian Government System), 
AIDAB Community Program Division: An Introduction to Indonesia-Government 
Agencies Relevant to the Indonesia Australia Development Cooperation Program, 
pp.37-43. 
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coordination of administrative activities; the appointment of sectoral chiefs; 
and "with the approval of the President", the dissolution of existing service 
provisions and the establishment of an Advisory Council consisting of the 
governor, the heads of services, the public prosecutor, and the commanders 
of the armed forces and the police in the Regional Executive Board Council 
(Musyawarah Badan Pimpinan Daerah, MUSPIDA). In 1981, there were 38 
departments reporting directly to the central government. Surprisingly, this 
document did not mention the relationship between the governor and the 
armed forces; however, Presidential Decree 1963/l, section 8, stipulated that 
military assistance was to be given to the governor if the governor 
requested it. This means that the military forces are, in reality, controlled by 
the central government which has the power to call in reinforcements if a 
situation requires it. The composition of the MUSPIDA, the strong regional 
military presence, is particularly important in the light of the dwifungsi 
model. Another essential component of autonomy is a considerable degree 
of independence in the managing of financial resources, yet Pres Decree 
1963/2 was silent about the provincial government's responsibility for 
managing its financial planning: neither the governor nor the regional 
parliament is given powers to draw up a budget. In practice, the budget of 
the regional government is decided and approved by the central 
government. 
Closer examination of In Pres 1963/2 thus makes clear that the central 
government was not, in fact, willing to give autonomy to the West 
Papuans. The decree specified the devolution of powers only in relation to 
the maintenance of public security and order, concern for the material 
wellbeing of the population, and convincing the population of the 
correctness of the national revolution. The absence of authority for 
budgeting has been, and still is, disastrous for West Papua. Lack of financial 
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responsibility has been apparent from the beginning of the new 
administration when there was no electricity, water, food supplies, or even 
buses.41 
Presidential decree Pen Pres 1963/1, which regulated the political status 
of West Papua, included clear limitations on the provincial government's 
powers of domestic management. West Papua was considered to be a very 
sensitive region politically, and Anti Subversion Law No.11/1963 was 
introduced early (see above). These limitations were not clearly specified, as 
this decree only briefly listed, in an appendix, the responsibilities of the 
province and the regencies for agriculture, social services, health care, 
education and culture, and public works. The accountability of the governor 
was also limited by Pen Pres 1963/1, which stated that the governor was 
responsible not to the local parliament but to the central government; this 
was more clearly set out in Kep. Pres 1963/57, which regulated the 
relationship between the provincial and the central governments. This 
decree contains three important provisions: first, the governor is 
responsible to and receives direct orders from the president; secondly, the 
governor is responsible to and receives instructions from the minister for 
foreign affairs, in his capacity as First vice-premier in the cabinet; thirdly, in 
routine and technical matters ministers can contact the governor via the 
foreign minister's office.42 In the light of the provisions (Articles 1 and 2), 
the governor in West Papua can be seen as a representative of the central 
government, not head of an autonomous entity. 
The West Papuan parliament was installed on 2 May 1963; it consisted 
of 42 members of whom 33 were Papuans.43 Unlike the other regions in 
41 
42 
43 
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Indonesia, the parliament in West Papua was not given the essential 
powers to draw up a budget and to make provincial by-laws; instead such 
legislation "must be approved by the national government. It must be in 
accordance with national legislation and must follow nationally established 
guidelines".44 An additional problem has been that under Pen Pres 1963/1 
the governor is deemed to be head of the parliament, which is unusual as it 
means the governor, who is a political appointee, is head of the executive, 
with power over the members of the parliament, who are chosen through 
direct election. 
Thus, autonomy has never been implemented in any real sense in 
West Papua. It has been more a case of deconcentration than 
decentralisation. 
The question remains why was the Indonesian government so 
reluctant to implement "fullest autonomy"? Jakarta argued that West Irian 
qualified for "special consideration"on the basis of the existence of harmony 
and the balance between abilities, rights and responsibilities. But in the 
view of the central government, without West Papua having the 
appropriate levels of technical and administrative skills and knowledge, 
giving it autonomy would be an empty symbolic act that would foster 
corruption and, more dangerous, could threaten national unity. In short, 
the national government was worried that the "special status" of the region 
would lead to "self-government", undermining the political and moral 
integration through which Jakarta was maintained as the centre of power. 
44 Freeman, op.cit.:37. 
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7.6.1.1. Views on the Autonomy Proposal 
Debate about autonomous status for West Papua has been revived m elite 
circles in the last two years. The Consultative Assembly of Indonesia (MPR) 
in its decision No. XV /MPR/1998, dated 13 November 1998, decided on 
arrangements for an autonomous region, which include regulation and 
distribution, the just use of national resources, and financial balance 
between the region and the centre. Article 4 declared that financial balance 
must take into account economic potential, area, geographical position, size 
of population, and level of GDP of the local people in the region. Al though 
there is need for further clarification, under the terms of this decision West 
Papua would qualify as a candidate for the status of autonomous region. 
Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission45 and the Alumni 
Students Indonesia have called for the immediate implementation of 
autonomy, an end of the centralisation of power, and a reduction in the 
dual function (dwifungsi) of ABRI. The history of West Papua, however, 
suggests that the proposed autonomy is unlikely to solve its problems. 
Like many power elites in Indonesia, the West Papuan one is divided 
over their preferred option. Most Papuans want independence and would 
not be satisfied with autonomy (see below). However, the official view was 
expressed by Brigadier General Numberi, governor of "Irian Jaya": 
45 
46 
... a referendum for independence is not logical. The Papuans do 
not understand that West Papua has already been integrated into 
Indonesia 35 years ago ... I would only be satisfied with autonomy 
for economic reasons, not political.46 
ABC News 22 July 1998. 
Forum Keadilan 13 July 1998. "Merdeka, Otonomi Atau Bunuh Diri", Nomor 7, Tahun 
VII, p.24. 
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statement was made to a November in 
"The national dialogue not discuss independence 
because autonomy answer all problems Jaya".47 
But what is meant by the claim "it will answer all problems"? The Habibie 
government called for a special autonomous status for West Papua; but the 
meaning of "special status" is still unclear. If the intention is to follow the 
1960s model of deconcentration, then this will not bring about any 
fundamental change; instead it will fuel further social and political unrest. 
The Papuans will continue to oppose vigorously such central dominance. 
Jakarta fears that the consequences of the democratisation of Indonesia 
will break the country apart. Like many others, Jimly Asshiddiqie, a senior 
lecturer at the University of Indonesia, has argued that immediate 
implementation autonomy will prevent further escalation of social and 
political conflict. Such analyses suggest 
should not be limited to administrative 
decentralisation 
political functions, 
include cultural and economic functions as well. Critics limited 
autonomy argue that the central government will cling to its centralised 
authority, ignoring Article 11(1) of the UU No.4/1975 which regulates the 
autonomous powers of the regency (kabupaten). However, even they 
defend the centre-periphery relationship in which the regional governor is 
part and parcel of the central government. 48 Governor Numberi recently 
suggested that even the selection of candidates for the head of a regency 
(bupati) must be agreed to by the Interior Minister.49 This suggests that the 
proposed new autonomous structure will, in reality, be a continuation of 
47 
48 
49 
Cenderawasih Post 12 October 1998. 
"Power of autonomy is still in the hands of regent (Bupati) while the governor is the 
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the old power structure. If this is the case, then such a model is not the best 
alternative for the West Papuans. 
In order to prevent national disintegration, a constructive 
decentralisation of power to West Papua must be established, covering such 
matters as the withdrawal of the military, the Papuanisation of the army 
and police, and the abolition of the vertical relationship, thus empowering 
the Papuans to democratically elect members of the regional legislature and 
executive. The transfer of powers to the regional government and 
parliament should include authority over economic policy, investment, 
health, culture, education, judiciary, immigration, forestry, fisheries, and 
trade relations; but finance, defence and foreign policy would remain in the 
hands of the central government. In the area of defence, the current 
KODAM system with its dwifungsi ABRI, must be abolished and replaced 
with a system of bases for the military, in order to end military intervention 
in civilian affairs. 
In this respect, autonomy is seen not as a final outcome but as a process 
leading to more fundamental change in the future. This view is shared by 
Anne Noonan and Joe Collins, members of the Australia West Papua 
Association. They argue that because the process of gaining independence 
for West Papua will be long and complicated, autonomy is the best interim 
option; but in the long run the Papuans must enjoy independence like 
other peoples in the world.50 
Autonomous arrangements for the Moro in the Philippines, the 
Palestinians in Israel, and the Catholics in Northern Ireland demonstrate 
that, with the involvement of third parties and the will of the people on 
50 Anne Noonan and Joe Collins (20 August 1998), interviewed by the author, Sydney. 
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sides, agreement on if 
meaning of autonomy". 
But Indonesia is not the Philippines or Northern Ireland, where a 
democratic tradition is part of the political system. The following comment 
by Lagerberg is worth considering: 
More autonomy for the province of West Irian is by no means the 
only alternative in the view of the Papuan population, for 
realistic reasons: nationalist feelings and immigration threats and 
most importantly the independence of PNG has laid down deeper 
national sentiments.51 
A similar view has also been expressed by Lundstrom, who believes that the 
OPM is not likely to accept autonomy, since Indonesia and the OPM not 
trust each other.52 These experts see three stages achieving a satisfactory 
status for West Papua: dissatisfaction with proposed autonomy 
arrangements; continuation independence struggle; 
federation with Papua New Guinea. 
7.6.2. Federation 
Federalism involves a division of powers "so that the general and regional 
governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent ".53 
Frequently federations are formed by the coming together of several small 
states, for economic or security reasons, but there are different forms of 
federalism. It is often argued that a federal system is more likely than a 
unitary state to guarantee justice to all groups of peoples, large and small. 
51 
52 
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An important difference between a federal system and a unitary state is 
that in a federal system the division of powers and the sovereignty of the 
states cannot be unilaterally changed; changes can be made only through 
amendment to the constitution, in accordance with a constitutional 
formula which safeguards the rights of the states. In the USA, for example, 
an amendment must be approved by two thirds of the House of 
Representatives or by a national convention organised for this purpose, and 
must be ratified by three fourths of all states' legislatures or by a convention 
called for this purpose. The major objective of these procedures is to 
guarantee the rights of the states against arbitrary actions by those who 
happen to control the central government. In contrast, such safeguards do 
not exist in a unitary state, even for autonomous regions. The central 
government in a unitary state can generally revoke powers whenever the 
majority group in parliament so desires, without seeking consent of any 
autonomous region. 
There are several advantages of a federal system. One is that it enables 
small independent states, by joining together, to survive economically. 
Also, it promotes cooperation in nations whose populations are made up of 
different ethnic groups. Federalism is an implementation of democracy: it 
aims to harmonise diverse cultures, traditions, ways of life, economic 
concerns, races and religions in a framework which serves their common 
interests.54 The central government exercises powers in areas of common 
interest, such as foreign affairs, defence, trade and finance. The powers 
exercised by states within federal countries vary, but exceed those of an 
autonomous region in a unitary state. Substantial devolution would be 
most appropriate in the culturally divergent unitary state of Indonesia. 
54 Hassan di Tiro (1960). Democracy for Indonesia, U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, 
Washington DC, p.40. 
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suggested 
proposers was T enku Hassan 
is now leader of the National Liberation 
Sumatra. In his book Democrasi Untuk Indonesia, published 1960, 
Hassan di Tiro discussed the advantages of a federal system. He suggested 
that a federal structure would make possible the establishment of a 
government whose policies reflected the demands of all Indonesian ethnic 
groups, and not the dominant Javanese alone (as is the case with the 
present unitary state).55 
The Dutch established a number of federal states in the period 1946-9 
and Indonesia became independent in 1949 as the Republik Indonesia 
Serikat. The federal states included East Sumatra, Pasundan, East Java and 
East Indonesia. The State of East Indonesia did not include West Papua. 
However, at the Denpasar Conference (December 1946) when state was 
established, the status West Papua was one of the most bitterly contested 
issues, with nearly all the Indonesian delegates demanding that it should be 
included the state, as it had been in pre-war administrative 
arrangements. There were no Papuan representatives at Denpasar.56 
Among the reformists of the post Suharto Indonesia, some believe 
that a federal system is the best strategy to avoid disintegration. Amien Rais, 
the chairman of Amanat National Party, for example, argues that the 
political stability of Indonesia can be safeguarded if Indonesia returns to the 
federal model of the 1950s, in which the distribution of national resources 
was shared between the centre and the periphery; this is particularly 
55 
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important for resource rich regions such as Kalimantan, Riau, Irian Jaya 
and Aceh: 
Up to date, the profits of those riches are not equally distributed. 
Out of the profits of the mining exploitation in Irian Jaya, for 
example, only a small proportion returns to the region. 
Consequently, the people of Irian Jaya are still poor. In the federal 
state, the Papuans can determine their own future, using those 
resources for their own progress.57 
Rais believes that a federal system within the current state boundaries could 
give the Papuans control over their own affairs without major interference 
by the central government. It would also entail the recognition of the 
sovereign rights of the Papuans; the Papuans could manage their bilateral 
relationships with foreign countries and move towards economic 
independence. 
If federal arrangements were to be initiated in Indonesia, the USA 
model, with its presidential system, might be the most appropriate. 58 First, a 
presidential system promotes strong and clear national leadership. 
Secondly, this leadership does not diminish the roles of either house of 
Congress. In the USA, the House of Representatives and the Senate both 
have great power and influence over the policies of the president, who 
cannot implement policies without the approval of both houses. Congress 
also has great power over financial affairs. If this model were followed in 
Indonesia after the return to constitutional government, the Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) and the Parliament (DPR), which have been controlled by 
57 
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influence. In 
Indonesia should also use a vote system, so the 
must get support directly from the people. Thirdly, the federal model of the 
USA, and also that of Switzerland, promotes firmness of leadership, 
political tranquillity, a responsible cabinet, and the avoidance of recurring 
cabinet crises. 
However the system has many disadvantages, one of them being that 
"a federal system is structurally very complicated and requires vast human 
resources and capital and relatively high literacy levels".59 
Although a federal government seems to have many advantages, 
would the Papuans be happy living in a system that does not belong to 
them? Such a system might be seen as a temporary way out of the current 
impasse but not necessarily as a final outcome. Another alternative might 
a federal arrangement with PNG. bases, 
the West Papuans would probably feel more comfortable being united 
their Melanesian brothers and sisters in the east. This solution was mooted 
in the 1950s. Politically, the idea is unlikely to bear fruit in the near future, 
but according to Lundstrom60 and Lagerberg,61 this possibility is promising, 
as unification with PNG is a natural extension of the two nations' raciaL 
cultural and geographical commonalities. The reality of race and 
geographical location have become more important in the new global 
political debate than the sanctity of former Western colonial boundaries 
that are still used to legitimate the current status quo. 
59 
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There would, of course, be regional opposition to such a move. 
Canberra, for one, would be unlikely to encourage such a wild idea because 
it would have serious political implications throughout the region. In 
Indonesia, Jakarta would not wish to allow a foreign power to intervene in 
its internal affairs and territory. Both these governments would be happy to 
see the current political status quo maintained or possibly some political re-
arrangement within Indonesia. Yet the formation of a new federal state in 
the South Pacific could have many regional advantages. It might, for 
example, create a strong power base for economic and political integration, 
similar to the experience in the European Union. 
7.6.3. Self -Determination and Independence 
Self-determination is accepted as the right of all peoples in accordance with 
international laws and conventions, and in this respect Papuans have the 
same rights as other peoples. The great majority of Papuans want 
independence (see below), but we need to clarify what independence means 
in this context. There are many definitions of the term, and many 
interpretations of its practice. In political terms, most people define 
independence as the right of colonised peoples to liberate themselves from 
colonial rule. I use the term "peoples" here to refer to nations, as 
distinguished from the term "state" which can encompass several nations 
or peoples.62 More than 240 nations or ethnic communities are living in 
West Papua and each of these nations has its own traditions, ways of life 
and culture. Yet despite this diversity, as argued in Chapter Two, they 
strongly feel the truth of "One People One Soul", that they are all West 
Papuans, historically, racially, culturally and geographically. 
62 RIOP, op.cit.:24. 
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7.6.3.1. The Drive for Self-Determination and Independence in West Papua 
Self-determination may be divided into two categories, on the basis of 
sovereignty and equality: internal and external self-determination.63 In the 
first case, an authoritarian state can still undermine self-determination by 
intervention. External self-determination, on the other hand, recognises, on 
the basis of international law, the right of a nation to become a nation by 
itself or to join with another nation, partly or wholly. According to Stewart 
Firth,64 an expert on sovereignty and independence in the contemporary 
Pacific, the political status of countries in the region is unusually varied: 
there are independent states, semi-autonomous or free-associated states, 
dependent states and overseas territories. He divides them into two main 
categories: those that permit sovereignty and those that do not. The two 
principal forms of non-sovereignty are effective incorporation by a 
metropolitan state, and semi-autonomy. Semi-autonomy covers both freely 
associated states and self-determination,65 with Niue and the Cook Islands 
as examples of self-governing states in free association (with New Zealand). 
Here the distinction between a sovereign state and a freely associated state is 
clear. The Cook Islands Constitution Act provides a foundation for free-
association state formation and the Cook Islands now has a constitutionally 
independent (sovereign) state but lacks political independence.66 These 
states are economically heavily dependent on New Zealand and, therefore, 
their claim to sovereignty is questionable. 
In the process of gaining sovereignty, two principles must be upheld: 
"no state can stop a nation to organise itself, and states must recognise that 
they have no rights to transfer a nation from one colonial power to another 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Ibid. 
S. Firth (1989). "Sovereignty and Independence", in The Contemporary Pacific, A 
Journal of Islands Affairs, Vol.1, numbers 1 and 2, Spring and Fall. pp.76-85. 
Ibid.:77. 
Ibid.:76. 
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consent 67 
a 
forms foreign domination, freely and 
independently determine their own foreign policies. They have no 
hesitation demonstrating their sovereign capacity in dealing with other 
states.68 Such state formations in Melanesia include Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 
It is becoming clear that self-determination is what most Papuans 
would like to see happen. A September 1998 opinion poll conducted by 
independent observers in the Timika regency revealed that of 13,000 
participants surveyed, all except two agreed that West Papua must be freed 
from Indonesian colonialism and imperialism; the remaining two 
preferred autonomy and a non-federal state.69 Demonstrations in support of 
independence have also occurred 
urban centres the group West youth 
example, called for the independence West Papua presenting protest 
notes to the Indonesian government, parliament rights 
organisations and to the UN representative in Jakarta.70 They reminded 
people of the words of Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of the 
Republic: " ... I recognise that the Papuans have the right to be an 
independent nation" .71 Indonesian academic George Aditjondro, speaking 
from Australia, asserted "the people of West Papua should be an 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Hassan di Tiro (1985). The Case & The Cause, National Liberation Front of Acheh 
Sumatra Publication, London, p.13. (See also Firth, op.cit.:125). 
Firth, op.cit.:83. 
Germanus Onawame, Isak Onawame and Jan Onawame (1998), interviewed by the 
author, Timika. 
"We demand that our independence, proclaimed on December 1, 1961, be returned to us. 
We are not asking for a new independence, but the independence that was intentionally 
robbed from us", said Wanimbo Demianus, leader of the All Indonesian Alliance of 
Papuan Students after having a meeting with Raja, the UN representative in Jakarta, 
in "Irianese Protesters sit-in at Jakarta UN Office", The Australian 21 July 1998. 
C. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong (1988). West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 
TAPOL, London p.16. 
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independent state because it is the desire of the majority of West Papuans 
today".72 
Inspired by a statement released by fifteen US Congressmen in 1998,73 
demands for independence have intensified. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
Forum Kommunikasi-Generasi Muda Indonesia Timor (DPPFK-GMIT) 
which represents fourteen provinces in Eastern Indonesia, released a 
statement on 13 August 1998 in Jakarta calling for the independence of West 
Papua. It is generally accepted that the independence of West Papua is 
unlikely in the near future but that it is only a matter of time.74 Eighty-five 
per cent of the people from West Papua who were interviewed during my 
fieldwork in 1996/97 in Port Moresby believed that the current problems 
will end only with the independence of West Papua. Only 5 per cent, 
mainly professionals, believed that autonomy was the best route to an 
independent West Papua; no one favoured a federal system.75 
An independent West Papua would have many advantages. As a 
sovereign state, West Papua could follow an independent foreign policy and 
become a full member of the international community. Independence 
would create new opportunities to distribute national resources equitably 
and to participate in development programs without fear and uncertainty, 
72 
73 
74 
75 
G. Aditjondro (1998), interviewed by author, Canberra. 
Statement of US Congressmen, 22 May 1998 (letter addressed to President Habibie, 
regarding political status of West Papua and East Timor) and 25 February 1999 letter 
addressed to President Habibie after holding talks with International Spokesperson of 
the OPM, Otto Ondawame, in Washington on 18 May 1999 regarding the significance 
and procedure of national dialogue between the government of Indonesia and the people 
of West Papua, Washington. 
J. van der M. Kroef (1997). "Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia", Conflict Studies, 
No.79, p.6. 
Those interviewed included 20 Arnungme at 9 Mile; 4 academics and professionals; 15 
former guerillas in Port Moresby, Wewak, Maprik and Kurpianggo; Irianese refugees in 
Port Moresby; and Papua New Guinea MPs John Tekwie and John Mornis, interviewed in 
Port Moresby, January 1997. 
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and would open up new trade relationships. It would preserve the Papuan 
culture, tradition and ways of life. 
Self-determination, therefore, provides many more options than semi-
autonomy, a federal system, or the status of a dependent trust territory. 
However, the lack of physical and social infrastructure, skilled manpower, 
and economic and financial resources means that improvements in a new-
born state would be hard to achieve. The prospect of getting sponsorship 
from Black African nations is minimal, because of the geographical 
distance. Regional support would also pose problems because West Papua is 
a sensitive issue in Australia and PNG in relation to Indonesia. Yet national 
sentiment demands self-determination, and attitudes in Indonesia and 
abroad may gradually change if the OPM can demonstrate its capacity as a 
true liberation organisation.76 
7. 7. Conclusion 
The future of West Papua must be seen within the general political context 
of Indonesia. The repercussions of the current democratisation process have 
serious consequences for political change in West Papua. The advancement 
of the mass movement, the escalation of protests, limited demilitarisation, 
and the policy change of the OPM are some of the positive developments. 
On the other hand, negative consequences include the effects of the 
economic crisis, the widespread orchestration and manipulation of mass 
protests against change, and the divisions that have been created within the 
Papuan community concerning political options for peace. 
76 Cf. Nick Maclellan, October 1990. West Papua Issue: "Inside The Triangle", Strategic 
Relations Between Australia, Indonesia & Papua New Guinea, Issue No. 3, Melbourne, 
p.14. 
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Future scenarios for Indonesia are difficult to forecast, particularly 
concerning the capacity of any new government of Indonesia to promote 
genuine reform. Economic recovery will take time. Religious conflict, 
regional and racial intolerance, economic imbalance, ethnic tensions, and 
the use of state coercion may escalate. If the new government follows the 
same old policies, disintegration may follow. 
In responding to the demands of the people of West Papua for change, 
three major options for political restructuring are being widely discussed: 
autonomy, a federal system and independence. Almost all West Papuans 
want independence. The government of Indonesia and a few of the elite in 
the province want to maintain the current system, or at most to shift to 
autonomy or a federal system. 
A new consensus needs to be developed in order to save Papuan 
culture, traditions, and ways of life from total obliteration. In the short 
term, autonomy seems a logical choice but it runs counter to the demands 
of the majority of the people of West Papua. A referendum on the three 
options is called for, but it must be carried out in a manner that upholds the 
principles of democracy: it must be just, peaceful, secret, and conducted 
under international supervision. 
Papuan self-awareness and sense of separate identity will continue to 
grow. The emergence of a strong sentiment of Papuan nationalism over the 
last few years has already laid a strong foundation for frustrating Jakarta's 
policy of inclusion. It will be very difficult to eradicate the racial and 
cultural characteristics of the Papuans even if Jakarta continues to impose 
its current immigration policy; and this program has already been strongly 
criticised by the world community. Secondly, increasing awareness among 
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Papuans of the significance of indigenous, environmental and human 
rights issues has affected their way of thinking and their strategies for 
achieving their political desires. Thirdly, the role of the military will be 
significantly reduced when constitutional power is fully restored. With the 
collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998, a new society is replacing the 
old forces, and democratic values may assume a central role in the state. 
Finally, political change in Indonesia will strengthen the opposition in 
West Papua. In combination with international and national pressures, the 
OPM will pursue its demands through non-military means. 
Any decision on the future of West Papua must proceed from mutual 
agreement to hold a referendum. The government of Indonesia must show 
a strong political commitment to ending the conflict and guaranteeing 
stability, security, social progress and peace to all its citizens, including the 
Papuans. On the Papuan side, the OPM must present a constructive peace 
plan that includes a timeframe, a clear political agenda and nominated 
leaders of high quality in order to convince Jakarta that the OPM is serious 
about negotiating to end the long and painful conflict. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Reflections 
8.1. The Central Objectives of the Study 
I have attempted in this thesis to show a clear relationship between 
Indonesian colonial domination, which is manifested in high levels of 
oppression, and the emergence of the West Papuan nationalist movement. I 
have argued that the present situation is largely a consequence of denial 
politics in relation to West Papua during the period of ideological conflict 
between East and West in the 1960s. 
The study has demonstrated that the people of West Papuan are still 
suffering and are still the target of genocide. Over the last three decades they 
have waged a continuous war against the colonial power, but they have 
failed to gain substantive international support or make significant progress 
with their demands. One objective of this study is to draw lessons from past 
experiences in order to promote new debate on the future of West Papua. 
The use of a coercive approach between the Indonesian government and the 
OPM will not bring an end to the conflict. This study has considered the 
advantages and disadvantages of three alternative approaches to ending the 
conflict. While any immediate prospect of Papuan victory is remote, the 
struggle will continue and will ultimately achieve its primary political goals. 
The OPM can learn by reflecting on its past experiences and mistakes and 
engaging in a constructive redevelopment of its organisation to meet the 
changing political and socio-economic situation. 
The thesis, which presents a Papuan view of events, draws on primary 
and secondary sources, supplemented by insights based on my own 
experiences. Using a case study of my own Amungme people, I have shown 
a clear relationship between local and ethnic sentiment and Papuan 
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nationalism, and argued that local approaches might be used as a model for 
a national peace process. The objectives of ethnic nationalism at the local 
level are integral to the general objectives of the OPM, which inspires the 
wider Papuan nationalism. In terms of organisation, LEMASA, in contrast 
with the OPM, has good leadership, organisational structure, and programs 
and strategies, and the local organisation has therefore been able to gain 
local, national and international recognition and support. However despite 
its strength locally, LEMASA faces both a local military presence and a lack 
of political will in Jakarta, so that an immediate solution to the local 
struggle is unlikely in the immediate future. The unhealthy relationship 
between the landowners and the multinational company and the 
government of Indonesia has potentially serious social, economic, 
environmental and political implications that may escalate social and 
political unrest. 
In seeking to explain the emergence of Papuan nationalism and the 
failure of the OPM to obtain international support, reference was made (in 
Chapter one) to two common hypotheses: first, that when economic 
conditions in West Papua are_improved, West Papuan nationalism will die; 
and secondly, that when the OPM overcomes its internal weaknesses, 
international support will follow. 
I have considered why Papuan nationalism will not die out; why the 
Papuans are still suffering and why the OPM has failed to achieve its goals; 
what the OPM can learn from its past mistakes and how, by doing so, it can 
gain more support; whether a coercive approach can resolve the political 
problems in the country; what the real political status of West Papua is; and 
what the future prospects of the people of West Papua may be. It remains 
now to consider the results of this study. 
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8.2. The Main Findings of the Study 
According to international law, the rights of self-determination and 
independence are the rights of all peoples without exception due to colour, 
race, religion or social status. The same laws obligate all member states of 
the UN to end any form of colonialism and imperialism. However these 
rights have frequently been denied and suppressed by colonialists who have 
ratified such international laws and convenants in the name of security, 
stability and development. 
Papuans have not escaped such crimes against humanity. The 
Indonesian administration and its allies continue to deny the rights of the 
Papuan people to self-determination and independence. Despite Jakarta's 
denial of wrongdoing, the evidence that has been presented throughout this 
thesis (especially in Chapter Six) suggests that the presence of Indonesia in 
West Papua has had negative social, economic, political and environmental 
consequences. Indonesian militarisation is a major factor in the current 
problems, and has fuelled the emergence of even stronger Papuan 
sentiments, translated into an active resistance movement, under the 
coordination of the OPM. 
Yet despite its sacrifices and commitment the OPM has failed to meet 
its objectives over the years. As argued in Chapter Four, the inability of the 
OPM to mobilise resources, the organisational limitations of leadership and 
management structure, and external pressures are three major reasons for 
the movement's lack of success. (See also Chapters Three and Five.) 
This confidence of the West Papuan people in their ultimate self-
determination has been discussed in Chapters Three and Eight. 
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International instruments provide a legitimate basis for claiming self-
determination and independence. Reflecting upon the international 
controversy before, during and after what was called the Act of Free Choice 
of 1969, it is apparent that a serious denial of the Papuan rights took place 
then. This issue calls for re-examination and redress. Continuation of 
oppression will only sharpen national sentiment further. The recent 
independence of East Timor, and the new democratisation in Indonesia, 
encourage Papuan demands for secession. 
8.2.1. Theoretical Dimensions 
In Chapter Two, relevant concepts and theories were examined with a view 
to their usefulness in understanding the current political situation in West 
Papua. The principal explanation of the relationship between Indonesian 
colonisation and the West Papuan resistance movement has been that 
Papuan nationalism has emerged as a consequence of colonisation, 
exploitation and oppression during different colonial periods, although the 
levels and strategies of resistance have varied over time. 
A brief literature review showed that most studies were written by 
non-Papuans and that an ill-informed picture of the OPM has often resulted 
in a pessimistic analysis which argues that any solution to the current 
political problem must be found within the framework of the Indonesian 
nation-state, and then promotes autonomy as the best solution. This view is 
supported by John Djopari, a Papuan born writer, who believes that Papuan 
nationalism will decline as a consequence of economic and social 
improvement and advocates a radical change in the social-economic policies 
and the social behaviour of the Indonesian authorities. Those who argue 
this view believe that in this way the people of West Papua can preserve 
their culture and tradition from total destruction. They advocate a social 
361 
approach as the most promising solution, and they are reluctant to 
acknowledge the fundamental political problem or to discuss its root causes. 
I have argued that the nature of the Indonesian occupation of West 
Papua was coercive, and that this led to the challenging the status quo; the 
coercive approach, and the generally negative behaviour of the Indonesians 
towards the Papuans, reinforced the view that West Papua was actually a 
colony of Indonesia. This view was strengthened by the historical, racial and 
cultural factors that make the people of West Papua feel different. 
8.2.2. The Handover to Indonesian Control 
Dutch colonial policy did not demonstrate any real political commitment to 
decolonising West Papua. The promise of decolonisation by the Dutch in 
the beginning of the 1960s was aimed at improving their colonial image by 
presenting the Netherlands as a good and responsible guardian of its last 
colony in the Indonesian archipelago. The inherent political ambiguity 
created many problems: the Papuan community became divided along 
ideological lines between those for and against the independence of West 
Papua; this has had serious consequences from the 1960s up to the present. 
On the other hand, by initiating decolonisation the Dutch encouraged the 
growth of Papuan nationalism. 
The United Nations, as one of the key political actors at the time of the 
hand-over, failed to live up to its role as a peace-keeper. Instead of protecting 
the rights of the people of West Papua, the UN violated the international 
laws and conventions that guaranteed the rights of colonised peoples to be 
free, and without even consulting the people concerned transferred the 
territory of West Papua to the new colonial power, Indonesia, in 1962. This 
action was confirmed in 1969 as a result of the shameful Act of Free Choice. 
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Consequently West Papua became "an integral part of Indonesia", though 
most Papuans consider it merely a new colony of Indonesia. 
It is clear that West Papua became a political victim of international 
rivalry during the cold war. The main actors, the USA, Australia, Holland 
and the UN, all failed to address the key political issue, namely the rights of 
the Papuans to be an independent state. Instead they sold out the country to 
Indonesia for their own strategic, economic and political interests, violating 
the principle of one-man-one-vote that is generally applied in a plebiscite. 
The substitution of the Indonesian system of Musyawarah made a mockery 
of the process. It is also clear that the UN and its associated members ignored 
the procedures that they themselves had agreed on in the New York 
Agreement on 15 August 1969. Moreover, the result of the plebiscite was not 
debated when it was reported back to the General Assembly of the UN, but 
was merely " noted" . This implies that the UN did not actually endorse 
the result of the Act of Free Choice of 1969. Given this situation, two 
alternative scenarios are possible: first, a re-opening of the case; secondly, the 
Indonesian administration can continue to regard the whole issue as dead, 
so there is no need to debate it further. 
8.2.3 The Role of the OPM 
Papuan resistance against foreign invaders is not a recent phenomenon but, 
as outlined in Chapter Four, can be traced back to the slave trade era in the 
eleventh century. Papuan nationalism can be traced back to the early 1930s; 
and in the 1950s it was encouraged by Dutch promises of decolonisation and 
the creation of the national symbols. 
From 1965 West Papuan nationalism emerged as a resistance 
movement under the leadership of the OPM. This study shows that despite 
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the feelings colonialism, 
effective has always been The 
movement still characterised by small scale and very localised operations. 
The OPM has made many positive contributions to West Papuan 
resistance: it has aroused the nationalist aspirations of the people of West 
Papua; it has played a vanguard role in organising, promoting and 
coordinating the national liberation struggle; it has the demonstrated 
capacity to mobilise the masses and organise protests in rural and urban 
areas; and, most importantly, it has demonstrated its ability to 
internationalise the liberation issue by engaging in both military and 
political campaigns. Its successes are made possible by popular support, the 
high level of commitment, discipline and morale, ability to learn from 
other liberation movements, and local knowledge of the human situation 
and of the environment (as discussed Appendix 
been able to bring together many divergent groups. 
Nevertheless the OPM has senous organisational problems, due to 
both internal and external factors. The problems of leadership, structure, 
and political program have been a continuing issue. The OPM faced a 
serious setback in the early 1960s because of problems with regionalism, 
factionalism, power struggles, a leadership split, and the lack of a clear 
organisational structure, political program, and vision. As a result, it became 
a clandestine and highly factionalised movement. These weaknesses were 
exploited by the colonial power, which presented a caricature of the OPM as 
'Wild Gangsters', or a terrorist group consisting of a handful of dissatisfied 
people. In this way the Indonesian government was able to undermine 
support for the OPM in the international community. 
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On the other hand, the early split in the OPM had some positive results 
in decentralising power, encouraging mass participation and mobilisation 
over a wider area, increasing self-reliance and self-respect, and promoting 
stronger accountability. The OPM thus began to improve its image at the 
end of the 1960s and, with a clearer structure and political program, the 
movement gained a measure of international sympathy (if not support) and 
forced the colonial power to review its rural development policies. 
Papuan ethnic politics, disguised as regional loyalties, however, pushed 
the OPM into a new period of self-destruction that culminated in the 
leadership split in 1976. This resulted in serious social and political 
problems for many years. The continuing leadership problem, power 
struggles within the OPM, and the growth of strong regionalism leading to 
the emergence of many small factions severely weakened the OPM. 
Ethnic sentiment has played a major role in the national liberation 
movement, not always for good. The OPM has made many attempts at 
reconciliation and re-unification but efforts have failed through lack of 
commitment among rival groups, lack of managerial know-how, and 
failure to undertake consultation. These internal rivalries have diverted the 
OPM from its real objective of independence. What is now needed is 
consultation and coordination of resources and manpower, an accountable 
plan with a clear vision, and a national congress to decide on a new 
structure for the movement that will provide a strong legal foundation for 
future operations. 
8.2.4 The Military Situation 
The general perception of threats to the stability and security of the state, 
particularly in relation to political instability in West Papua, has been a 
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continuing concern for Indonesia and, as this study shows, a major reason 
why the Indonesian armed forces have been given their special position in 
the Indonesian state. The OPM itself has not been considered a significant 
threat even though West Papua has become a major target for 
militarisation. Today, although the territory is no longer regarded as Daerah 
Operasi Militer (Military Operational Zone), Jakarta continues to deploy on a 
large scale Indonesian troops in the country. This has raised serious concern. 
This study shows that there is an imbalance of power between the 
Indonesian armed forces and the OPM. Even though the Indonesian armed 
forces have weaknesses in morale and discipline and are operating in a 
foreign and hostile environment, the military enjoys a marked superiority 
in manpower, financial resources, logistics, effective organisation, 
communication networks and international support. In contrast, the OPM 
enjoys mass support, good tactics and morale in fighting and geographical 
advantages, and it is currently benefiting from the effects of democratisation 
in Indonesia, but the organisation suffers severely from lack of logistical and 
international support, and from the ineffectiveness of its organisation in 
terms of leadership, structure, programs and strategies. 
I have argued that neither the Indonesian armed forces nor the OPM 
will win an outright military victory; but for West Papuans the struggle for 
independence will continue no matter what happens. The OPM stands 
firmly on its own soil and is engaged in its own national liberation struggle, 
which involves a total system change (outlined in Chapter Two). The 
Indonesian military will not easily quit West Papua, however, because the 
country is an important source of national wealth and a destination for 
transmigration. Both parties therefore have strong political and social 
reasons for pursuing their goals. 
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status a 
There a significant division 
with Indonesia and those who oppose integration. The 
integrationist view is expounded by Indonesian nationalists, owners of 
capital, and institutions incorporated into the Indonesian state system such 
as regional governments and foreign companies. These groups believe that 
West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia, for both historical and legal 
reasons, and that any change in its political status must be within the 
framework of the existing Indonesian nation-state. Indonesians generally 
believe that West Papua is a non-issue because the international 
community has already recognised it as an integral part of Indonesia. 
However, in the last few years, this view has shifted. Particularly since the 
fall Suharto, new voices have been calling a review of Indonesian 
policies so most on 
non-contentious issues, 
destruction. 
as human rights, rights 
Against this, in the view of the people of West Papua their country is 
nothing but a colony of Indonesia. In the light of the political concepts 
presented in Chapter Two, this study argues that there is no practical 
difference between the old colonial system and the current system. The 
common characteristics of a colonial system-territorial expansion, 
exploitation, oppress10n, genocide, immigration, discrimination and 
militarisation-are still dominant in West Papua. The Papuans have 
become second class citizens in their own land. Yet despite the evidence of 
continuing colonialism, the international community fails to recognise 
West Papua as a colony and so does not look for a solution within the 
framework of the decolonisation process laid down in international laws 
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and conventions. West Papua poses a relatively minor threat to Indonesian 
stability and security, but, especially since the collapse of the New Order 
Regime in May 1998, the potential threat is growing. 
This study has demonstrated that international support for the OPM is 
insignificant, but growing. The black community throughout the world has 
continuing sympathy with the views of the Papuans. Public opinion in 
Indonesia and elsewhere has begun to change, and the OPM is now being 
recognised as an essential player in any process of negotiation. In 
comparison with East Timor, West Papua has attracted very little 
international support. East Timor had strong international sponsors, good 
leadership, a well organised political and military structure, and a clear 
political vision. These factors are still lacking in the OPM, and so long as 
they are lacking, substantial international political support is unlikely. 
8.2.6 Local Reactions 
To illustrate the complex issues of colonisation and ethnic nationalism, a 
detailed case study of the Amungme-Kamoro people in the Mimika 
Regency has been presented. 
There are fundamental differences between the state and landowners 
in perception of the meaning and value of land, distribution of wealth, and 
questions of compensation. This has created a major barrier to common 
understanding and a good relationship between the major parties. The 
Indonesian state has become increasingly interventionist in the name of 
Realpolitik, protecting the interests of the multinational Freeport McMoRan 
mining company, a primary source of state income. The Indonesian military 
has been deployed in considerable numbers and has carried out systematic 
abuses of human rights in the area. 
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The effects of the Freeport mining operation on the local people have 
been examined, including social, economic, and political disparities, and the 
implications of environmental destruction. The imbalance in job 
opportunities, in health and social services, and in economic and financial 
resources, together with the dispossession of the landowners, the 
environmental destruction, and the many human rights abuses, have 
created misery and anger among the Amungme and the Kamoro. 
This case study also throws light on the interplay between the colonial 
authoritarian state and the locally based resistance movements. The 
Indonesian government has failed to present an integrated development 
plan involving consultation and agreement among the main actors-the 
landowners and their local organisation, LEMASA, the local and provincial 
governments, and Freeport Indonesia. Instead, the government and the 
company excluded the landowners from the decision-making process. The 
local response to this top-down approach has been social and political 
unrest, which has become a major threat to the company and the state, as 
well as to the lives of the people. The resulting ethnic nationalism in the 
area has become an important contributing factor to the strengthening of 
Papuan nationalism. The local social organisation, LEMASA, has 
transformed itself into a mass political organisation taking a national stance 
and calling for an independent West Papua. 
The landowners themselves have resorted to both violent and non-
violent measures in the face of the authoritarian stance of the government 
and the company. These actions have met with little success and the 
fundamental problems remain unsolved. Local injustices have not been 
acknowledged by either the state or the company. Recognition of the 
369 
fundamental human rights of the Amungme and Kamoro, including the 
rights to land and compensation for the loss of it, and to significant 
improvement in social and economic conditions, has not occurred. Rapid 
militarisation in the region has not created peace and security but has 
actually encouraged violence and ethnic sentiment. In order to reduce the 
level of violence in the region, a new consensus must be negotiated in 
which the rights and obligations of all the interest groups must be clearly 
addressed. If the government and the company were to meet the twenty-
three demands submitted by LEMASA, an agreement might be reached; but 
the political will for such a move appears to be lacking. 
Most of the issues, problems, reactions and potential solutions that the 
Amungme case study throws up are reflected, on a larger screen, in the 
struggle of the West Papuan people for their rights, and in the role of the 
OPM as the voice and vehicle of their resistance. There is a strong 
relationship between local and national sentiments, because local sentiment 
is integral to, and a foundation for, Papuan nationalism. At the local level, 
deep understanding of traditional values, belief systems and sense of 
belonging, and strong commitment to defending such rights, becomes the 
basis for wider national sentiments. Cultural values are facing serious 
challenges from the Indonesian government and Freeport McMoRan, with 
serious social, economic, environmental, health and political consequences. 
Local resentment has transformed itself into organised political resistance. 
The OPM has encouraged such unrest and even taken a part in some 
actions. Equally, the local organisation has supported the OPM in calling for 
an independent West Papua. 
Success has been more evident at the local level than nationally. Good 
leadership, an effective organisational structure (LEMASA), and the 
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commitment of the local landowners, together with the dominant presence 
of the multinational mining company, and the associated oppression and 
exploitation, have been major reasons for the success of the local resistance. 
Such factors are still problematic at the national level. The OPM believes 
that the US, as the host government of the parent company, Freeport 
McMoRan, must accept some moral responsibility for resolving the political 
problem. Local and national resistance movements have taken up this call 
to intensify their international campaigns. 
8.2.7 Future Prospects 
The future prospects of West Papua are examined in Chapter Seven. The 
democratisation process in Indonesia will have serious implications for the 
future of West Papua. Corruption, collusion and nepotism under the 
Suharto leadership were major reasons for the collapse of the New Order 
regime. The Jakarta elites have enriched themselves at the expense of the 
periphery for almost three decades. Disintegration of Indonesia along ethnic 
and religious lines is likely if Jakarta continues to follow the same policies, if 
power remains centralised in the hands of a small elite, if excessive use of 
military power is deployed, and if the economic crisis continues. This thesis 
suggests that any lasting solution to the West Papua issue is dependent on a 
process of progression from ceasefire to third-party involvement and then 
to national dialogue. 
Three possible political solutions-autonomy, federation and 
independence-were discussed from the West Papuan perspective. For 
historical and political reasons autonomy and federalism are rejected by the 
vast majority of the Papuans. Autonomy within the existing nation-state is 
rejected because it is seen as an empty process which would permit only 
limited power within a marginally decentralised system, and because it 
to a 
guise. Autonomy was promised to West 
the support Papuans and 
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as a strategy to 
community at the 
beginning of the occupation. The people of West Papua also reject federation 
because such a structure will serve the interests of the central government, 
with only limited power to West Papua over trade and financial 
arrangements with the other sovereign countries. Ninety-five per cent of 
Papuans prefer an independent West Papua and believe that they have a 
legal right to this status in accordance with the principles set out in 
international law regarding the rights of colonised peoples. They believe 
that independence will make it possible to solve the political and economic 
problems in West Papua. As in the OPM's earlier statements, Team 100 
statement of 26 February 1999 calls for independence for West Papua as an 
ultimate political goal. 
As indicated in Chapter Three, the application in 
conflict resolution had relevance for the earlier Dutch-Indonesia 
relationship because two parties were able to negotiate agreement on the 
unconditional transfer of West Papua to Indonesia; but this agreement was a 
disaster for the people of West Papua. In the future, however, the 
application of game theory in structured conflict resolution may offer some 
hope for the people of West Papua, especially if FORERI's peace initiative 
leads to negotiations between Jakarta and the people of West Papua. The 
recent resumption of national dialogue has at least indicated goodwill on 
both sides in attempting to reach agreement on the future political status of 
West Papua. A fair and free referendum on options, with the involvement 
of third party, are vital for allowing the people of West Papua to decide their 
own future. Here the OPM can learn from the East Timor experience, in 
which third party involvement has been so important. The ongoing 
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even if Jakarta agrees to engage in some form of national dialogue 
with the people of West Papua, it will have a fundamental problem with 
the OPM: Jakarta is likely to continue to defend the status quo and reject 
international peace missions, independent monitoring groups, or third 
party involvement in the peacemaking process; as always, Jakarta will insist 
this is an internal affair and so there is no need to have third party 
interference. It will also argue that the problem is not political but rather is 
caused by dissatisfaction over economic and social development. On the 
other hand, a third party would recognise that military repression, hum an 
rights abuses, and environmental destruction encourage social and political 
unrest, which may destabilise the region. It is, important 
Jakarta can be to engage a at 
reaching a lasting agreement. 
As far as discussion of independence is concerned, however, it be 
very difficult to engage Jakarta in a constructive debate, particularly as the 
experience of East Timor has raised fears about further secessionist 
demands. The options of autonomy and federalism may remain open, but it 
is independence which the people of West Papua want. 
8.3. Implications of the Study 
One of the main themes of this study concerns the way in which social and 
political factors have impacted on the progress of the OPM. As H. Arndt 
contended in 19861, a political solution to the West Papua problem is 
H. Arndt (1986). "Transmigration to Irian Jaya" in R.J. May (ed.), Between Two 
Nations, Robert Brown and Associates (Aust), Bathurst, pp.167-169. 

Map 5: KODAM VIII-TRIKORA 
Source: O'Hare, Martin (1989). The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya, ANU, Canberra, p.29 
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The present on 
conflict-with a focus on 
relationships between different actors-state, military, company, local 
people and the international community-and the impacts of these 
relationships on the process of reaching a political solution. A major 
intention has been to provide a narrative picture of the real political 
situation in West Papua as understood from a Papuan perspective, drawing 
on my own expenences. 
The study shows that over the years the OPM has failed to achieve its 
objectives. Its inability to develop productive strategies and to strengthen its 
organisation and leadership have continually undermined its effectiveness; 
these weaknesses have been exploited by the occupation forces to shape their 
counter insurgency campaigns against the people of West Papua. the 
other reaction against Indonesian colonisation has taken root in 
West Papua. Militarisation, the exploitation of natural resources, high levels 
of immigration, and policies directed at wiping out Papuan cultures, have 
created serious social, economic, and political problems West Papua, 
fuelling Papuan nationalism as the expression of a common feeling of 
nationhood among the 250 ethnic groups. 
In order to identify the key elements in the situation, studies of 
Indonesian colonisation and the nationalist movement in West Papua 
must continue. Perspectives will vary. The government of Indonesia will 
continue to regard itself as non-colonialist. In attempting to persuade the 
world community that it is in the Papuans' own best interests to stay within 
the current political system, Jakarta promotes itself as the godfather of 
development and a force for stability which is responsible for making laws 
and regulations that guarantee the rights of the Papuans. The Indonesian 
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government will promise new reforms of the governmental system, but 
while these may include autonomy or a federal system, the West Papuan 
preference for independence will be firmly ruled out. 
The government of Indonesia, as a major power in the region, may 
seek to achieve its political goals in West Papua in a range of ways. First, it 
could try to win back the support of the Papuan people by reducing its 
military presence in West Papua and changing its strategic approach to a 
territorial one, emphasising regional development and social progress. 
Secondly, it could seek to encourage divisions within the Papuan 
community with the aim of destroying national unity and internal 
cooperation. Such a provocative strategy could result in outright civil war, 
with devastating effects for all the main actors. Thirdly, while the economic 
crisis lasts, the government could encourage multinational companies to 
invest in West Papua and exploit as much as they can of the country's 
natural resources, on the assumption that at some point the Papuans will 
simply be wiped out, as in the case of the Spanish exploitation of the 
indigenous peoples in Latin America. Fourthly, the Indonesian state could 
become even more interventionist, creating laws and regulations to protect 
foreign companies operating in West Papua, and giving the military special 
responsibility for protecting those companies; in return, such companies 
would preserve the interests of the state by providing finance and economic 
development. This strategy would be seen by Papuans as a prolongation of 
the old system, and would translate into greater political and social unrest, 
which would affect regional politics. Such a policy might also affect the 
OPM's own strategies, shifting it from a more military to a more political 
approach. 
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Papuan community disagree 
interpretations and subjective statements presented in this thesis. For 
example, I have been critical of the OPM's general policy and programs, and 
have criticised certain actors for a lack of vision, mismanagement, and abuse 
of power. Hopefully, however, these criticisms will motivate Papuans to 
rethink, reflect upon and revise their policies, strategies and approaches. 
The OPM as a liberation movement dearly requires improved leadership 
and strategies, political vision and coordination, and this must involve 
recognition and acknowledgment of the mistakes of the past. 
Since at present there is no political will on either side to reach 
consensus, nor international support to provide a mediating force, no quick 
solution is likely. The OPM must demonstrate its commitment to serious 
negotiation in order to avoid escalation of war emphasising less 
contentious issues, such as development, human rights, rights, 
indigenous peoples' rights, militarisation, immigration, and the 
environment, rather than focusing solely on the contentious issue 
independence. It might start with agreement on some form of special 
autonomy, federal system, or free association. 
This could open the way to the next step of national dialogue, with a 
referendum on independence as a potential solution. If Papuans are to be 
given a chance to reject autonomy and choose independence, then a just, 
free and fair referendum must be held under supervision of the UN, in the 
presence of international mediators and peace-keeping forces. For this, the 
OPM must present a clear peace plan, and obtain international sponsorship. 
Such a peace plan, possibly based on the model presented by the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance in East Timor, should include an 
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organisational timeframe, an agenda for discussion (including the 
referendum options), the general terms under which a peace process can 
take place, and the participation of an agreed-upon third party. 
8.4. Conclusions 
In analysing the role of the OPM in the West Papuan resistance to 
Indonesian colonial rule, it has become clear that the weakness of the OPM 
itself remains a serious and urgent problem. However, the problems of the 
situation are even more complex than merely the failings of this key player. 
First, while Papuan nationalism will never evaporate, the OPM's own 
power would decline if any dramatic easing took place in the relationship 
between Indonesia and West Papua. And even if the OPM could improve its 
organisation and image, international support is still unlikely; this is 
because the OPM is not a social movement that seeks adjustment within the 
existing state system but a liberation movement with a radical political 
agenda. Secondly, as the international community does not wish to upset 
Jakarta, they will increase pressure on the OPM to work within the status 
quo. But the OPM will continue to seek self-determination and 
independence. This will make progress difficult. Moreover the issue of 
regional stability and security is likely be a subject of concern after the 
painful experiences in East Timor, and that may affect attitudes towards the 
OPM. 
However world opinion is shifting, as can be seen in the changing 
attitudes of international NGOs and the demands for reopening the 
discussion on the Act of Free Choice of 1969. The OPM should adjust to this 
new international context by presenting a peace plan in which all possible 
solutions are canvassed, including a referendum on political options. The 
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OPM must intensify its international campaigns, in part by lobbying 
members of the South Pacific Forum. 
Jakarta must also undertake reforms in order to save face in the 
international arena. Those reforms should include demilitarisation, an 
immediate reduction m the number of transmigrants to Papua, 
encouragement of the development of Papuan culture, tradition and ways 
of life (for example, adopting Papuan place names), recognition of land 
rights and indigenous rights, and offering adequate compensation for past 
abuses. Additionally it should open the border between PNG and West 
Papua, allow PNG, the Netherlands, USA, the UN and Australia to open 
consulates in West Papua, permit international monitoring groups and UN 
agencies to operate in the country, and create new roles in West Papua for 
UN agencies and regional organisations such ASEAN and the South Pacific 
Forum. Finally, it must be ready to discuss the future of the country, 
including the question of a referendum on special autonomous status or 
independence. 
There is a responsibility on both sides to undertake reforms that will 
facilitate agreement without loss of face. The government of Indonesia must 
show a strong political will to end the conflict in order to guarantee stability 
and security, social progress and peace to all its citizens, in West Papua and 
elsewhere. On the other hand, the OPM must present a systematic and 
constructive peace plan that can convince Jakarta that the OPM is serious 
about ending the long and painful conflict. 
Inevitably, the findings of this thesis open up new areas for research. 
One of the objectives of the study was to examine the barriers to the progress 
of the OPM. Using similar theoretical approaches and concepts, a study of 
378 
movements 
success of movements. 
a 
to the 
The present study suggests a serious lack of organisational tradition in 
West Papua, particularly at the national level. The OPM and the people of 
West Papua have largely been inspired by a cult mentality, trusting that the 
liberation of West Papua will be a blessing that will come down from 
heaven; this attitude has undermined the realisation of their own aims. 
Lack of personal commitment and political vision have also seriously 
impacted on the development and progress of the OPM as the main 
liberation movement in West Papua. LEMASA has been more successful at 
the local level. If a new paradigm emerges, a further study of the OPM from 
an organisational viewpoint would be essential; this might focus on 
leadership, decision-making processes, models, 
effective communication 
Another area study concerns the status in international 
of a nation seeking its political independence. The international community 
has denied the rights of the people of West Papua. The thesis has 
commented on this denial policy but without exploring the possibility that 
the case of West Papua may be re-opened under international law. The 
attempts of LEMASA to bring their case before American courts suggests 
that this may offer West Papuans a new strategic arena. 
The myth of military supremacy as an effective means to end conflict has 
been the driving force behind most of the wars and violence around the 
world since our human ancestors first set foot on the earth. During the 
Vietnam war in 1965, and during "Desert Storm" between Iraq and the USA 
allies in 1991, this belief in a military capacity in solving conflicts was 
generally accepted, despite the devastating effects of deploying modern 
weapons of mass destruction. Yet both these wars demonstrated that armed 
force cannot always wipe out an opponent. Both the communist regime of 
Vietnam and the military regime of Saddam are still in power. 
this is so, why Indonesian armed forces 
continued to believe in the power and to give the 
such special status? The Indonesian military is the biggest armed force in 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. According to Australian Federal 
Parliament, the Indonesian armed forces in 1991 have 278,000 men of whom 
212,000 are in the army, 42,000 in the navy and 24,000 in the air force while 
800,000 are reserves.' Yet despite its size, these forces are thinly spread over 
the vast country of Indonesia, which consists of some 17,500 islands 
stretching 5,000 kilometres (3,120 miles) along the equator.2 Even so, 
Indonesia's military strength and capacity have raised concern among its 
neighbours for many years. The main concern of the people of West Papua 
is that rapid militarisation has brought serious social and political 
consequences to their country. The Indonesian military maintains the 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, of the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Indonesia, Canberra, November 1993, 
p.65. 
Reuters 9 August 1998 .. 
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strong conviction that it can wipe out the OPM. Both parties plan in the 
expectation of winning the war. By comparison with the Indonesian 
military, the OPM is very small and isolated. Despite this, the OPM also 
holds a strong conviction that the movement can, if it gets military support 
from abroad, destroy the occupation forces in West Papua. Neither 
conflicting party believes in the word "defeat". 
This chapter will analyse the perception of "threats" and will 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of the two conflicting parties. 
Indonesian Perception of Security Threats 
Perceived security "threats" have been a major concern among Indonesia's 
leadership, particularly within the armed forces, which acts as guardian of 
the state. Threats can be internal or external, and one may well lead to the 
other. 
Internal Security Threats 
As the term implies, internal security threats are those threats that come 
from inside Indonesia and tend to destabilise the state. Secessionist, secular 
or ideological motives may lie behind the movements that create such 
threats. Although actual destabilisation has traditionally been seen as only a 
remote possibility, the recent emergence of secular political movements 
under the banner of Islamic slogans has already raised fears in Jakarta in the 
post-Suharto era. 
In the view of the Indonesian armed forces, internal security threats 
come from three sources: the extreme right (nationalist fanatical Muslims), 
the extreme left (communists), and national liberation movements such as 
the OPM in Irian Jaya, formerly Fretilin in East Timor, and the National 
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Liberation Front of Aceh, all of which are termed "terrorist groups" by 
Jakarta. This last source poses some threat, but has not been assessed as of 
major significance,3 as Jakarta does not consider these liberation 
movements as potential threats to national unity and security - an ironic 
assessment in view of developments in East Timor. On the other hand, 
extremists of both the right and left wings are seen as posing major potential 
threats to the state's ideological foundations - Pancasila and the State 
Constitution of 1945. One group desires to establish an Islamic state, while 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is seen as wanting to impose a 
communist Chinese model of government. Both reject the state ideology set 
out in Pancasila. For these reasons, these groups are regarded as more 
dangerous than the liberation movements in West Papua and Aceh 
Sumatra. 
The OPM, while not considered a major "security" threat, certainly 
creates disturbances for the national development program, and so West 
Papua is often regarded as a "trouble zone". The use of coercion and the 
militarisation of West Papua are considered to be part of a preventive 
approach rather than a total offensive engagement against the OPM. 
However, the strategically important position of West Papua in relation to 
its neighbours, Papua New Guinea and Australia, means that the threat of 
the OPM in West Papua cannot be ignored. The issue has become more 
complicated than most military experts in Jakarta and Canberra expected.4 
The complexity of the local problems, and the special geo-political, social 
and economic relationships between PNG and Indonesia ensure that this 
security problem will continue. 
4 
Martin O'Hare (1989). The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, p.20. 
Ibid.:52. 
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External Security Threats 
External threats cover a range of challenges to the state's security and 
stability from foreign powers. These include territorial, economic and 
technological threats. Territorial threats often come from neighbouring 
countries, and have been a major cause of international conflict. Conflict in 
the South China Sea in 1994 between Indonesia and China, for example, 
could have escalated into a serious military confrontation. 
External economic and technological pressures create another type of 
threat. Indonesia certainly fears that domination by foreign economic 
compradors could destroy its domestic economy, making Indonesia 
dependent rather than an active participant in world affairs. 
In the view of the Indonesian military, these external threats could 
be linked to internal threats. For example, a right wing Muslim organisation 
or the liberation movements of the OPM or Aceh-Sumatra may be 
supported by foreign powers who might wish to encourage internal conflict 
in their own interests. The Indonesian military, in pursuing a preventive 
approach, might choose to challenge internal secessionist and secular 
movements in order to develop its conventional military capacity. Jakarta 
has already built up its military capacity by developing a two-divisional core 
force, through the purchase of state-of-the-art air and naval equipment, and 
by developing its own technical capabilities particularly in the weapons 
industry.5 
Ibid.:20. 
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The Structure of the Indonesian Military in West Papua 
The Indonesian armed forces are generally regarded as one of the strongest 
armed forces in the Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions. The military 
has held political power in Indonesia for more than three decades. Unlike in 
most other countries, the Indonesian armed forces have a dual function 
which means the military has the right and duty to intervene in both 
political and military affairs. Due to this special mandate, and for security 
reasons, as Jakarta normally argues, the militarisation process in Indonesia 
has been an integral part of the state's policy. 
For security reasons, Indonesia has been divided into fifteen 
regional military commands, including West Papua (Irian Jaya). The 
military regional command in West Papua, originally called Komando 
Daerah Militer XVII Cendrawasih (KODAM XVII), was formed in 1964, one 
year after the Indonesian occupation (see Map 3 above). On 8 May 1985, as a 
result of a major nationwide reorganisation, KODAM XVII Cendrawasih of 
Irian Jaya was unified with KODAM XV Pattimura of Moluccas and 
renamed KODAM VIII TRIKORA, which today operates from its new 
headquarters in Polimak, Jayapura.6 
Strengths of the Indonesian Military in West Papua 
The force strength of the Indonesian armed forces m West Papua has 
doubled since West Papua was declared a Military Operational Zone in 1965. 
The massive deployment of Indonesian troops in West Papua has been 
unique. More than 9,000 Indonesian armed forces were stationed there in 
1990, comprising 5,000 army, 3,500 police and 500 navy and air force 
personnel.7 They have increased an already tight control over the lives of 
Kommando Daerah Militer (KODAM VIII/TRIKORA) (1990). Sejarah KODAM VIII 
Maluku dan Irian Jaya, 1982-1990. KODAM XVII Cendrawasih, Jayapura, p.62. 
Ibid.:37. 
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are restricted to as 
not trust them. are 
social unrest takes place West Papua. the hostages 
cns1s Mapenduma in January 1996, for example, a rapid militarisation 
occurred in the region, greatly alarming the Papuans. More than 5,000 troops 
were deployed in Timika in the south and in Wamena in the highland 
north-east. 
The Indonesian armed forces possesses a much more effective 
institutional structure than that of other central government institutions. 
Like military structures throughout the world, the power relationship 
between the central and local levels is vertically defined, with decisions 
made at the top and passed down. Each cell of each military unit is obliged to 
carry out the orders 
control purposes, 
to it supenors. 
in 
four sub-commands.8 This extends from regency (KOREM) to military 
district commands (KODIM) to military sub-district commands (KORAMIL) 
and ends at the village level (BABINSA) which consists of a few villages 
that share in intelligence activities and report to the local military. For 
effectiveness of manpower and control, only three out of West Papua's 12 
regencies have a KOREM. KOREM 172 in Jayapura, for example, covers the 
areas of responsibility for Jayapura, Merauke and Jayawijaya. Each KOREM is 
divided into three KODIMs which in turn are divided into a number of 
KORAMIL, depending on how many sub-districts there are in each KODIM. 
For example, Merauke regency has 18 sub-districts and could be expected to 
have 18 KORAMILs (see Map No.3 KODAM VIII-TRIKORA). For 
operational purposes, KODAM VIII TRIKORA Command has one infantry 
KODAM VIII, op. cit.:67. (See also O'Hare, op.cit.:32-37 and Lander Fickformat(1985)). 
Indonesien, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, p.23. 
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soldiers a battalion are "West Papuans" with officers from outside, 
usually of Javanese or Batak origin. Most often, the battalion is assigned to 
an area of high security risk. If the local security situation deteriorates 
further, then reinforcements from the other KODAMs become necessary. In 
this case, KODAM VIII TIKORA receives reinforcements from the central 
Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD). If these two forces cannot 
overcome the security problem, additional reinforcements can be called in. 
In most emergencies the Special Elite Forces Command (KOP ASSUS) is sent 
for. 
Apart from the infantry troops, Jakarta also has navy and air forces 
on call. The military has built air force and navy bases in many parts West 
Papua. The navy headquarters is located Ambon, Moluccas, there are 
also depots Jayapura, Sarong, Biak, and Amamapare West 
and in Tual in the Kei Islands, and more limited naval support bases are 
located in Manokwari and Merauke. Unlike land and naval forces, the 
forces are located outside KODAM VIII as a part of Air Force Operational 
Command III which has its headquarters in Ujung Pandang, in south 
Sulawesi, and is responsible for all eastern regions of Indonesia. In West 
Papua, support air force bases are located in Biak, Timika, Jayapura and 
Merauke. All heavy fighter bomber aircraft are based in Java, but 
occasionally reinforcements from Java are used in other regions. The air 
force uses a range of planes, including the DC-130, the Bronco OV-10 and the 
Skyhawk; civilian aircraft are also used in operations or to supply troops and 
provide logistic support. In West Papua there are small air force bases in 
Jayapura, Biak, and Merauke. Police forces were also part and parcel of 
KODAM VIII TRIKORA. The police forces are solely responsible for law and 
388 
order, investigations and traffic control. But like the army, the police forces 
are divided into specific levels of responsibility: Regional Police Command 
(POLDA), District Police (POLRES) at regency level, and Sectoral Police 
(POLSEK) at both district and sub-district levels. 
The Indonesian military also has control over the modern 
communication system and mass media, which is another important factor 
in the defense system. Communication networks can play a very important 
role in security operations. Due to this control opposition attempts to expose 
the silent and systematic genocide perpetrated by the occupation forces have 
been unsuccessful. The Indonesians are well aware of the importance of 
mass communications and therefore tight control and censorship are 
generally imposed. In conjunction with the state, the Indonesian military 
has access to a satellite communication network through the US-assisted 
national satellite, which is called Palapa, built in 1976 in Surabaya. As it also 
exercises control over 500 commercial radio and TV stations, the military in 
the region can easily locate and monitor much of the guerilla movement. 
As the struggle in Irian Jaya involves many strategic and sensitive 
situations, the satellite is particularly vital for communications.9 During the 
operation to release the 24 hostages who had been taken by Kelly Kwalik on 
8 January 1996, for example, the use of the satellite communication system 
was particularly successful. The military could accurately locate the position 
of the guerrillas and then deploy both offensive attacks and persuasive 
approaches. The Indonesian armed forces also have control over the print 
mass media including Kompas, Post Kata, Sinar Harapan, Cenderawasih 
Post, and Suara Karya (Golkar), as well as the TV and radio stations. The 
"lrian Jaya province is not only highly dependent on satellite systems but also m small 
earth stations. There are seven operating stations in the province: four in Teminabuan, 
one in Kaimana, me in Tanah Merah, and me in Sarmi. The cost of the earth stations 
amounted to approximately Rp.2-3 million per month including salary, diesel oil and 
the other expenses" Jakarta Post 26 December 1990. 
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Cenderawasih Post, published in Jayapura and having a wide daily 
circulation, has been sponsored by the military. Notwithstanding this, any 
publication must be approved by the military. Censorship of local privately-
owned daily newspapers, such as the Catholic daily newspaper Tifa Irian'" 
and of imported video and films is commonplace. Foreign journalists are 
also restricted from entering or travelling freely around West Papua. The 
major objective of this control is to isolate the OPM; but since the reformist 
regime came to power in 1998, limited press freedom is now opening up. 
The military enjoys special political status through its dwifungsi 
(dual function). It is permitted to play a dual civilian and military role in 
politics. Unlike other members of the parliament, the military members are 
appointed by the government, most often directly by the president. In 1992, 
the military had nine seats in the Irian Jaya regional parliament out of a 
total of 45 seats.10 The military and police commanders are also members of 
the Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (MUSPIDA) or Consultation Council of 
Regional Leaders (CCRL), giving them a powerful influence in the 
parliamentary decision making process. 
The Indonesian military has the advantage of much better logistics 
than the OPM and uses modern weapons supplied by foreign countries, 
giving it the mobility to engage rapidly in both offensive and conventional 
warfare. It is difficult to trace how much material and technical support the 
military receives but supplies come from many Western countries. 
According to an analysis by Budiardjo and Liem, Indonesia had, for many 
years, relied on the Eastern bloc countries for material support during the 
Sukarno regime but thereafter the greater part of such aid came from 
JO Kerjasama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah Tingkat I dan Kantor Statistik 
Provinsi Irian Jaya (1991). Irian Jaya Dalam Angka, Jayapura, p.35. 
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over West arms 
came socialist (see 
Chapter One). After General Suharto took power 1965 through a 
coup d'etat, all support came from Western countries such as 
USA, United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Australia. West Papua 
become a major target of sophisticated weaponry, including American 
supplied warships and planes, helicopter gunships, armoured personnel 
carriers, M16 rifles, and a variety of small arms. 
The intensity of the campaigns in West Papua in which these 
advanced weapons were used has been described as alarming. 12 In the 1970s, 
the USA supplied 16 AHE Skyhawks from surplus stock in Israel and 16 OV-
10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes (low flying, slow moving aircraft used 
13 to spray bullets on 
the late 1970s, the used 
Manokwari, Paniai, Jayapura, 
the counter-insurgency 
to 
Mimika regencies, where guerrilla 
uprisings occurred. The US also supplied Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, 
machine guns, motors, mortars, cannons, smoke and tear gas, and rocket 
launchers. In the late 1970s, it supplied another 16 Skyhawks, and 16 Bell UT 
Huey helicopters. 14 These helicopters were used in strafing operations 
against the OPM, as recorded earlier in this thesis, and were also used in 
many operations across the border into Papua New Guinea. During the 
period 1974-1984, US military aid was valued at 504.5 million pounds. In 
1988, the United States supplied 12 F-16 fighter strike and four F16-fighter 
aircraft. However, its military aid was subsequently reduced from a value of 
II 
12 
13 
14 
Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Lie (1988). West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 
TAPOL, London, p.115. 
Ibid.:115-117. 
Ibid.:115. 
Ibid.:116. 
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22 million pounds in 1988 to 11.9 million pounds in 1989, a decrease of 50 
per cent.15 M16 rifles continue to be imported into Indonesia from South 
Korea. From the French government, Indonesia purchased Puma and Super 
Puma helicopters, AMX tanks, infantry combat vehicles (MICV), and a large 
number of Exocet missiles and launchers.16 From West Germany, Indonesia 
purchased two submarines, while from the Netherlands it obtained three 
frigates and more than a squadron of helicopters. Sweden has supplied 
Indonesia with 150 RBS-70 guided missiles. For the United Kingdom, 
weapon sales to Indonesia have been a profitable affair. 17 In 1978, based on a 
military bilateral agreement between the two countries, the UK supplied 8 
Hawks, 3 refurbished naval frigates, seacat landing craft, and 700 Rapier 
missiles. One year later, British Aerospace (BAe) was handling a contract 
with Indonesia worth US$220 million, including a battery command post 
computer software system. Another British company, Plessey, signed a 
contract with Indonesia to supply a computer for defence commanders to 
collect information about enemy forces in the air, at sea and on land,1 8 
which was successfully used in counter insurgency operations. Indonesia 
also signed a contract to purchase 600 Scorpion tanks. When the Blair 
Labour government came to power in Britain, the United Kingdom 
continued to increase its arms sales to Indonesia and the government still 
permits the sale of howitzers, mortars and flame-throwers to Indonesia.19 
Apart from this extensive external support, Indonesia itself has 
modernised its armed forces with advanced weapons systems and technical 
training. The British have offered training facilities to Indonesia since 1985. 
In 1988, BAe decided to set up its first overseas technical training college in 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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contact 
now developing 
aerospace Technical and training 
supplied by the West Germany aircraft manufacturer, 
Messerschmidt Boelkow Blohm, a project that was also supported by 
20 The IPTN has already concluded a number of joint production 
ventures. For example, the Spanish company CASA has constructed CN 235 
military aircraft in Indonesia. Indonesia also has contracts with France, West 
Germany, and the USA for producing helicopters. Some countries, such as 
Ireland, Holland and Sweden are prohibited by their own state laws from 
exporting weapons to a state that represses its own citizens or might possibly 
use the weapons to oppress its opposition; despite this, these countries have 
sold weapons to Indonesia, which have been used in support of repression 
in East and West Papua. Even worse, certain countries, including 
Australia, have established cooperation agreements 
Military cooperation Indonesia Australia has been going on 
over three decades. Australia regularly provided two week 
courses the Indonesian Special Forces (KOP ASSUS) and Special Air 
Regiment,21 and the two countries have held joint military exercises the 
Arafura sea north of Australia. Canberra also assisted in military mapping 
in West Papua in 1977 /78. In 1998, 100 Australian troops were deployed in 
relief operations in West Papua. This is justified as preventive diplomacy. 
Indonesia has also received continuing financial aid from Western 
and Asian countries. Seventeen Western countries, including the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have provided a significant amount of 
financial aid to Indonesia. In the 1980s, foreign aid reached US$2,000 million 
20 
21 
Ibid.:117. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australian 
Parliament) (1993). Australia's Relations With Indonesia. Canberra, pp.68-79. 
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per year.22 World Bank funding was US$2,519 million in 1986-1987 and was 
then increased to $3,165 million in 1990, an increase of 21 per cent. At the 
end of 1987, bilateral aid from the United States, France, the UK and Japan 
increased by 60 per cent over the previous year. In 1988, Japanese aid was 
reported at $2.3 billion per year, while its special aid in the same year was 
US$1.7 million. Japan is currently Indonesia's leading creditor, providing 35 
per cent of the total foreign aid received. Australian aid to Indonesia in 
1994/95-1997 /98 totalled AUS$420 million dollars, as reported by Margaret 
Regnault, Counsellor of the Australia International Development Bureau 
(AIDAB), during a seminar in Jakarta.23 This included US$70 million in the 
previous three years for special training programs, scholarships, hum an 
rights work, food aid, drought relief operations and small projects.24 
Responding to the current economic crisis, in April 1998 the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) released US$3 billion to Indonesia out of its total 
commitment of US$43 billion dollars (ABC News, 27 July 1998). The World 
Bank also pledged financial assistance to Indonesia with a total sum of US$6 
billion during the financial years 1992-1995). 
Half of the total aid has been used for military and transmigration 
expenses. During the Fourth Development Program, or Pelita IV, from 1985 
to 1989, US$500 million was used for transmigration expenses.25 
The major strengths of the Indonesian armed forces can, therefore, 
be summarised as: a large force and a well-organised structure for operations 
in West Papua; the enormous potential of its weaponry, including planes 
and helicopters, and financial aid from Western countries; a good 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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new personnel, high and to 
Weaknesses the Indonesian Military in West Papua 
Despite the strengths of manpower capacity, economic and financial 
resources, and technical capacity, the Indonesian armed forces have shown 
significant weaknesses in West Papua. Unlike Singapore, for example, 
which has a relatively small population but is technically highly advanced, 
the Indonesian weapons industry is relatively small and its technical skills 
are heavily dependent on foreign assistance. During the New Order period, 
the Suharto regime attempted to develop high technology weaponry and 
aircraft industries but these plans failed as a consequence of corruption, 
nepotism and collusion that have for a long been debilitating cancers 
within established structure. Indonesian forces 
operating 
foreign military assistance 
on 
local loyalists. 
Since the collapse of the New Order regime, the Indonesian armed 
forces have become weak and divided. The future role of the Indonesian 
military is uncertain; but there are two possible scenarios that might restore 
its power and influence. If power is not handed over to a truly democratic 
movement, then new political leaders and democratic forces could take to 
the streets and encourage more mass unrest. In the face of such a 
development the military could have its power restored in the name of state 
stability and security. On the other hand, the Indonesian military could pull 
back, reflect on its past mistakes and attempt to restore its image by 
recognising and supporting public demands. "Redefining ABRI's role in 
politics is a must in this period of political transition in Indonesia. ABRI's 
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involvement in politics must be changed and its new role must be as a 
source of ideas for public policy".26 
The Indonesian armed forces also currently suffer from morale and 
discipline problems. This was confirmed by its own military sources which 
reported in August 1998 that "morale is very low within the army".27 
Because of these failings, the military presence in West Papua is heavily 
criticised for its high record of human rights violations including killings, 
torture, and other human rights abuses in its areas of operation. Similarly, 
"the army has been under growing pressure to withdraw from politics and is 
facing a myriad of criticisms over human rights abuses, poor discipline and 
its failure to quell ongoing religious riots in the eastern Island of Ambon" .28 
The army is now in a very difficult position because of the disclosure of its 
many misdeeds during the Suharto regime. 
The reasons for these problems are diverse. There is a lack both of 
education, particularly in human rights issues, and of professionalism. 
Many rural dwellers and former convicted criminals from Indonesia joined 
the military, because it was seen as a good job prospect in a country with an 
alarmingly high record of unemployment. For these illiterate youths, 
joining the military was a golden opportunity for survival and promotion. 
In order to hold their jobs in the military and to qualify for promotion, 
soldiers must obey all orders even if these may involve immoral and 
unethical actions, and they remain very loyal to their superiors. Due to 
these factors and to their own social backgrounds, soldiers have killed a 
26 
27 
28 
J. Kristiadi (1999) "The Future Role of the ABRI in Politics" in Geoff Forrester (ed.) 
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women, 
in Hoea 
Mapenduma 1996 and 
killing of 19 soldiers and officers by a member of the 752 Battalion on 15 
April 1996 Timika airport, are all signs of low morale, lack of discipline or 
direct disobedience.29 
Most importantly, the Indonesian armed forces are content for the 
conflict in Irian Jaya to continue at its present low-intensity level. It 
provides troops with combat practice and enables commanders to gain 
promotion through military achievements in engaging and capturing OPM 
and in controlling dissent. Indeed, many current Indonesian military 
officers have earned their stripes as a result of their actions in East Timar 
and West Papua. The successful killing members of a political opposition 
are traditionally rewarded Former General 
gained promotion success Mandala Operation as 
a colonel during the confrontation the Dutch Indonesia in 
1962. Similarly, General Prabowo, a son-in-law of former President Suharto, 
and five other officers of the KODAM VIII TRIKORA were promoted in 
Jayapura on 2 May 1996 for their efforts in releasing the 26 hostages taken by 
the Kelly Kwalik group in Mapenduma on 8 January 1996.30 General 
Prabowo himself promised: "all participants (cadres) in the release operation 
will be promoted".31 
Any democratisation of Indonesian politics will also weaken the 
role of the Indonesian armed forces, and this will have a serious impact on 
future military structure and strategies generally and in the occupied 
29 
30 
31 
Indonesia Media Network, 7 April 1996. 
Suara Pembaharuan 2 May 1996. 
Suara Pembaharuan 8 May 1996. 
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territories such as West Papua in particular. There are two possible 
scenarios. First, although any withdrawal of the military from West Papua 
will affect the military capacity there, in order to improve its image, a 
limited withdrawal may well occur. Three years ago, the general command 
of the Indonesian armed forces at both the central and regional levels 
demonstrated a more moderate approach to the situation in Irian Jaya; the 
convicted soldiers in the Hoea case were courtmartialled in Jayapura, and in 
August 1998 eight soldiers who were suspected of involvement in shootings 
in cities of West Papua were identified. The withdrawal of more than 1,000 
soldiers, mainly members of KOP ASSUS, in Mimika recently is an instance 
of pulling back. Secondly, a limited shift in the military's regional approach 
over the last two years indicates that the Indonesian armed forces in West 
Papua are under tremendous pressure. The shift from their customary 
coercive approach to a more humanist approach, described as a social 
approach by Djopari,32 will also affect the role of the military in the future. 
Such fundamental changes may force the military to return to barracks; they 
have already been under media scrutiny for their involvement in civil 
affairs and have been criticised for becoming more bureaucratized, 
unprofessional and corrupt, and of taking over the political system rather 
than being its guarantor. The younger generation of generals is concerned 
about such criticisms and is more interested in its status as professional 
soldiers than in acting as politicians. For this new generation, continuation 
of the old Suharto style policies seems problematic and they urge the older 
officers to either retire or step down. 
When the Indonesian economy recovers, the position of the 
military will also be affected. With recovery, and the development of a more 
export-oriented economic structure, there will probably be an attempt to 
32 John R. Djopari (1993). Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Grasindo, Jakarta, 
p.160. 
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reduce the high level of military expenditure. There will be a move to 
develop a more professional army, less corrupt, and less wasteful of 
resources, in an attempt to improve Indonesia's international image. In 
these circumstances, the military would return to barracks and regain its 
professionalism, intervening only when the state is facing serious threats. 
The natural environment of West Papua also poses many 
disadvantages for conventional military operations, by restricting the 
deployment of the Indonesian army and the mounting of an offensive 
operation against the OPM. The terrain, which consists of swamps, deep 
valleys, tropical rainforests, long and dangerous rivers, and high 
mountains, makes its own unique contribution to the West Papua struggle 
and gives an advantage to the mobile local guerrilla units. These 
geographical features have played an important role in protecting the OPM 
from attacks; as General Prabowo Subianto himself admitted: "the field in 
Irian Jaya is so heavy" .33 
The Indonesian armed forces have undertaken many campaigns 
aimed at eliminating the OPM but for various reasons none of them has 
succeeded. My own experiences in 1978 proved to me that the soldiers could 
not operate in deep jungle on their own.34 Also the geographical position of 
West Papua gives the OPM access to a relatively safe haven in PNC. Even 
though the Indonesian military have violated the sovereignty of PNC 
territory on many occasions, Indonesia is careful not to escalate the conflict 
to the extent that another flood of refugees pours into PNC, as this would 
33 
34 
Kompas 18 May 1996. 
"When the guerrillas held hostages in 1978, 75 kilometres from our camp, the military 
could reach our camp. They were very afraid of getting out from their camp which was 
our old camp. They spent ammunition by shooting on the air for nothing. This is normal 
practice for the Indonesian military. When they report to their superiors, they say 
that they spent ammunition in weapon confrontation with the OPM. This episode 
indicates how fearful they are, their low morale and the lack of commitment", Otto 
Ondawame (1999). 
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generate much adverse international publicity and would expose as false 
Indonesia's oft repeated claims that the OPM is a spent force. 35 Offensives 
against the OPM's strongholds in remote areas along the border and in the 
highlands have always failed. The military failed to release hostages taken 
by the OPM in many cases despite its massive resources. A full-scale 
deployment of the military in West Papua therefore seems unlikely. 
Indonesian military air strikes, however, may be continued. By combining 
infantry troops and intensive air bombardments, ABRI has been able, in the 
past, to capture OPM bases and destroy civilian property. In most situations, 
the civilians eventually become the main target. Harrassment, threats, and 
intimidation of unarmed civilians by the Indonesian military will probably 
continue in cities and rural areas. 
A Four Corners program of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
in 1999, titled "Blood On The Cross", raised serious allegations against the 
International Red Cross Committee, South African and British mercenaries, 
British SAS and military advisers, and Dutch advisers, over the 
controversial hostages crisis and human rights abuses in the Mapenduma 
district of West Papua on 9 April 1996. This damaging report exposed how 
these forces violated the symbol of the International Red Cross, 
manipulating the name of the organisation for military purposes during a 
desperate hostages release attempt.36 Deploying foreign mercenaries with 
the military demonstrated the inability of the Indonesian military to release 
the hostages on its own, and damaged the credibility and reputation of the 
Indonesian armed forces. 
35 
36 
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it 
to hunting the can 
'-H-'C"'"''-'u counter insurgency activities of the military, such as orchestrating 
social and political unrest, hostage taking, rape and other forms of 
intimidation, will continue in an attempt to discredit the power of the OPM. 
The military will also undertake counter-propaganda campaigns by 
publicising OPM defeats and claiming that the OPM has been wiped out, 
labelling it as a mere terrorist group comprising a handful of people. But 
without forcing the involvement of the people of West Papua who have so 
often demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate, the Indonesian 
military will continue to fail to crush the OPM and its spirit. The political 
atmosphere today is different from that in the 1960s; the Papuans now have 
higher levels of political awareness and much stronger commitment 
to and are no longer so 
The are now well aware that 
have serious problems, including low 
Indonesian 
and lack 
forces 
discipline. 
Moreover, the forces now face national and international scrutiny of their 
record of oppression, manipulation, provocation, and high occurrence of 
human rights abuses. Helicopters and aircraft are now used not merely to 
transport troops and equipment but also in the counter-insurgency 
campaigns in an effort by the Indonesian military authorities to boost the 
morale of their forces. Reliance on foreign mercenaries and Wes tern 
military in operations such as the Mapenduma case, indicates serious 
weaknesses in the Indonesian armed forces' capacity to release hostages by 
their own efforts. Every attempt by the Indonesian army to crush the OPM 
has been unsuccessful, and an outright victory for Indonesia, as advocated 
by the Indonesian military, is unlikely in the future. 
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The Military Capacities of the OPM 
Like the Indonesian military, the OPM has its strengths and weaknesses as a 
fighting force. Before analysing these factors, let me first describe the present 
situation in the field. 
The OPM's guerrilla forces have been decentralised into more than 
eight strategic areas. Over the last 30 years, these forces have been able to 
increase their tactical operations in both urban and rural areas. Each 
guerrilla unit in the region must follow general principles and guidelines in 
operating flexibly to maintain sufficient strength to increase its guerrilla 
activities independently. Military activities have to be localised within 
certain directions; in most cases, the regional command can plan most 
appropriately for local defensive and offensive guerrilla campaigns. From 
the end of December 1989 to June 1990, for example, the OPM withdrew its 
guerrilla units from physical confrontation with the enemy troops, and 
engaged more heavily in propaganda work, such as mass political awareness 
programs and training, and in psychological warfare. This defensive strategy 
was necessary because the enemy had already intensified its clean-up 
operation against the OPM in response to the events of 18 December 1989 
when the OPM attacked transmigration site IV Arso in Jayapura district, 
killing 30 people and seriously wounding 30 others. In August 1990, the 
OPM resumed its military operations, first attacking Kiwirok ABRI outpost 
in Oksibil district in Wamena province, where 20 Indonesian soldiers were 
killed and two Indonesians were captured. Later, in the East Mimika region 
Kelly Kwalik engaged in guerrilla campaigns in 1994/95 and 1996, and 
Marthin Wenda, in the headquarters of the OPM, undertook a range of 
guerrilla activities, as described in chapter 4, between 1995 and 1999. Lastly, 
Bernard Mawen's group in the Merauke region resumed its guerrilla 
activities in Muting village, taking 109 Indonesians as hostage of war in 
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these to 
campaigns to at 
military campaigns m the border region have had a range of 
political and social consequences. More than 12,000 West Papuan refugees in 
1984, 640 in 1990, and 2,000 in 1995 have sought political asylum in Papua 
New Guinea. The sovereignty of Papua New Guinean territory has been 
repeatedly violated by the Indonesian armed forces. In 1990, the Indonesian 
army crossed the border into PNG while seeking OPM. Using aircraft and 
infantry troops, they bombed villages and destroyed property. Sixteen Papua 
New Guineans were killed in Yapsie and Bewani districts. In August 1990, 
an Indonesian joint land and air forces operation again crossed the border 
into PNG and bombed nearby villages, killing five people the Imnai 
refugee camp and destroying property. Despite these violations, 
government of PNG kept Instead lodging a protest, a 
and Indonesian force intensified counter-attacks on the and the PNG 
people the border areas, particularly the Sandaun (West Sepik) 
East Sepik provinces in the north and the Western Province in the south of 
Papua New Guinea. Local reaction was massive. Local youth joined the 
OPM and systematic attacks took place. Earlier, in 1988, the OPM blew up 
bridges along the Trans Irian Highway, being built to connect Jayapura in the 
north to Merauke in the south of the country. But the OPM could not 
maintain its control over the area and the enemy regained control of the 
highways and doubled the number of its troops, with two battalions of the 
Special Command of the Cendrawasih Division deployed along the road. 
These incidents demonstrate that the OPM has the ability to regionalize the 
issue of West Papuan nationalism, even militarily; but can the OPM 
maintain its military capacity? 
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Many factors have played a maintaining the struggle over 
analysing military strengths of I focus on 
fighting capacity, natural environment (or co-existence with nature) mass 
support, the use of effective guerrilla tactics, learning from other liberation 
movements, and the impacts of the political and economic crisis in 
Indonesia as among the most significant factors. 
Military Strengths of the OPM 
Fighting capacity and individual commitment are two major strengths of 
the OPM. The qualities of bravery, nationalist feeling and willpower are 
supported by technical fighting skills in the field. Yet despite these strengths, 
the OPM has been forced into a defensive position. It has sought to 
minimise this problem by trying out alternative tactics, including attacking 
the enemy when he is on the move, concentrating and operations 
on main target areas, implementing more tactical 
increasing solidarity with the opposition in Indonesia. To successfully 
specific targets, there is a need for solidarity and coordination among 
guerrilla units, regional commands and even with the other liberation 
movements in Indonesia. Since the OPM reform program was introduced 
in 1976, guerrilla campaigns have been intensified. Bridges, installations, 
electric lines, radio stations, oil tanks, and harbours have been targeted in 
major operational actions. The success of such activities has been a direct 
result of cooperation, concentration and a well-planned defensive strategy. 
Familiarity with the natural environment is another great strength 
for the OPM. In combination with higher fighting morale and improved 
mobility, it is because of their intimate knowledge of local conditions and 
situations, and, most importantly, their ability to adapt to the natural 
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environment, that the OPM has felt confident to conduct military 
campaigns on its own soil. This knowledge of natural conditions has both 
negative and positive outcomes. The local terrain creates massive 
difficulties for coordination of activities and in the delay of information 
flows and the movement of personnel and goods. On the other hand, the 
environment protects the patriots in the field, and provides them with their 
basic needs such as food (for example the abundance of sago palms, which 
provide a Papuan staple food). Consequently, the Indonesian military has 
difficulties in deploying against the OPM in rural areas. It has little 
knowledge of the local terrain and natural conditions in West Papua, and is 
dependent on the local people, often forcing them to serve as guides and be 
incorporated into the occupation forces. In the release operation in 
Mapenduma, for example, the Indonesian occupation forces forced the Dani 
people in Tiom town to take a "pig oath" to confirm their cooperation with 
the Indonesian military in the release operation. The food preferences of the 
two parties also influence their ability to survive and continue their 
military campaigns in the rural areas. The Indonesian military depends on 
food supplies from its headquarters, particularly rice and tinned fish. On the 
other hand, the OPM relies on readily available local foods such as sweet 
potatoes and sago. The undeveloped communications network in West 
Papua can also be an advantage for the OPM, as the mobility of the 
Indonesian military is severely reduced because of the bad condition of the 
road network. As a consequence, the Indonesian military mostly has to 
depend on aircraft in its counter-insurgency operations against the OPM, 
bombing camps and food stocks. 
The OPM also enjoys mass support. Most West Papuans support the 
struggle directly or indirectly. The OPM enjoys widespread sympathy and 
support among the population in the very heartland of the colonial regime. 
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Many Papuan civilians who are working in the Indonesian administration 
or at Cendrawasih University have proved to be active OPM supporters.37 
Papuans in the army, police, the public administration, intellectuals, 
students, women, and people in the towns and villages all support the idea 
of independence. The forms of support vary but include, according to 
Djopari;38 active participation in OPM activities (physical action, distribution 
of information and pamphlets, the provision of information, and taking 
part in secret meetings); the provision of materials such as food, medicines, 
clothes, money and cigarettes, and assistance in maintaining the 
communication network, and providing security and transport; 
encouraging and recruiting others by telling about the OPM's objectives, its 
heroic experiences and its social value; and providing critical social and 
political feedback to the OPM's leaders. The OPM is confident that with such 
mass support the national liberation struggle can never be stopped. 
Another important factor is the OPM's ability to use guerrilla tactics 
and local materials which are appropriate to a particular time and location.39 
Any wastage of limited resources is regarded as a serious abuse and is not, 
therefore, acceptable within OPM general policy. In line with this view, 
guerrilla campaigns are a particularly appropriate strategy for the OPM: they 
make limited demands on resources of manpower and materials, and the 
local conditions of the people do not permit engagement in large scale 
confrontations. 
In the post-Suharto period, the mass movement inside the country 
has taken firm root. Team-100 of the Forum for Reconciliation for the 
37 
38 
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a new 
of delegates to the 
nor the people West Papua opposed this proposal. Moreover, a 
opinion poll taken in West Papua in February 1999 indicated 99 per cent 
of the Papuans want independence. Neles Tebay reported on this first public 
opinion poll as follows: 
Public opinion poll was taken in West Papua before national 
dialogue taken place Jakarta. Taken examples, in Mimika 
regency: out of 13,755 people, only three wanted autonomy. In 
Japen Waropen in the north: out of 16,281 people, only 200 
wanted autonomy and only five agreed to federal system. In 
Manokwari: out of 24 districts, only two districts wanted 
autonomy.40 
The general public in West Papua fully understands that the OPM is waging 
a war against the Indonesian occupation forces. They are 
aware that the community denied to 
freedom and independence York Agreement 1962 again 
in the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Most importantly, the experience 
colonisation, exploitation and human rights abuses in the country has 
created a deep-seated resentment against the occupation forces, which will 
continue for generations. There is a world of difference in morale between 
the people of West Papua and the occupying Indonesians. The OPM is 
waging a war for their survival and dignity and waging it on their own soil. 
In contrast, the occupation forces are a foreign power and they are forced to 
defend Jakarta's political ambitions and brutalities at any cost. Thus, the 
level of moral obligation is also different between the OPM and the 
occupation forces. The moral duty of every Papuan is to defend his or her 
land, country and dignity. The OPM enjoys mass support because the OPM is 
40 Jakarta Post 19 February 1999. "Irianese poll snub of General Election". 
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not fighting its own government for social change but is fighting against an 
external occupation force in order to achieve a fundamental change. 
Lessons from the successes of liberation movements elsewhere in 
the world have also inspired the OPM and strengthened its firm conviction 
that the movement will achieve victory in the end, no matter how long it 
takes. Many of the national liberation struggles of the colonised and 
oppressed peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America against powerful 
Western colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s succeeded in achieving 
victory. This historical evidence convinces the people that their national 
liberation struggle in West Papua will achieve the same success. The defeat 
of the United States in the Vietnam War and of France in the Algerian War 
provide inspiration. The willpower of the people and their stand on their 
own soil were two major factors in these victories. Also the United States 
and France had their own sophisticated weapons, whereas Indonesia is 
heavily dependent on external assistance. 
The current political and economic crisis and the emerging process 
of democratisation in Indonesia will also affect the Indonesian military 
structure, functions and strategies. Today the different ethnic groups that 
comprise "Indonesia" (the various people that comprised the "Dutch East 
Indies") are still struggling to regain their freedom and independence from 
Javanese colonial domination. The fate of the unitary state is under serious 
challenge. The Dayak people in West Kalimantan, the Moluccans, the 
Acehnese, the West Papuans, the people of Riau, and the East Timorese 
have openly stated their political desires during the post-Suharto period. 
The ease of recruitment to the OPM has been another important 
factor. While the occupation forces portray the OPM as a "handful of 
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majority the indigenous population identify with (them)" .41 
provides a where the general aspirations of the people can be 
expressed; all segments of Papuan society support the aims and objectives of 
the movement. It is, truly, a mass movement. In all of the OPM's nine 
military regional commands, the masses are fully aware that in their 
villages, towns, districts and regions a war for freedom and independence is 
being waged. Such political awareness is an important tool for mass 
mobilisation, as regular or irregular (militia) units. The handful of regular 
guerrilla units is supported by several hundred irregular and militia 
guerrilla units operating in West Papua. 
The OPM cadres possess three distinctive 
bravery, deep and to continue 
make sacrifices to defend the very survival of the nation. These are 
driving forces for success, these qualities alone cannot end 
domination; they must be supported by armed struggle. Regular basic 
military training, with high levels of discipline, has given positive results. 
The OPM has attracted a considerable number of soldiers who have deserted 
from the Indonesian military; these can offer new recruits valuable training 
and experience. 
The capability of the OPM can also be measured in terms of 
recruitment and replacement of leaders. When a leader has been captured 
there has been no difficulty in identifying a suitable replacement. The OPM 
has the capability to produce new qualified cadres for leadership positions 
41 Sunday Tasmanian 7 March 1999. "Man who made dreams reality". 
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and has no problems in recruiting new cadres.42 The Papuan youth who 
have suffered from colonial repression, in refugee camps and in liberated 
areas, have high morale and willpower and are highly motivated to join the 
national liberation struggle. In the last few years, the numbers of trained 
operational leaders has increased in the rural areas. 
Military Weaknesses of the OPM 
Despite these strengths, the OPM has some continuing weaknesses as a 
military organisation, particularly in relation to: logistical capacity, 
communications, personnel capacity and distribution, organisational 
structure, leadership, political vision and strategic choices. 
Logistical capacity in any organisation is vital; without logistical 
support, a national movement cannot survive and progress. The OPM still 
suffers from a seriously limited logistical capacity. As the OPM has not 
received foreign support it has had to rely on its own efforts and local 
support. A very significant source of logistics has been the seizure, or 
purchase, of arms from the Indonesian military. The OPM has a slogan: "the 
enemy's arms are ours".43 But these weapons are used only when there is 
real necessity or if there is a good chance of success. For the most part, the 
guerrilla units of the OPM are equipped only with traditional weapons -
namely bows and arrows. Yet in guerrilla warfare these traditional weapons 
have been remarkably successful. During the uprisings which occurred in 
the highlands in the 1960s-1990s, in Paniai, Wamena, Akimuga and Haga for 
example, traditional weapons played a significant role. These have been 
supplemented by home-made guns and explosives. During the uprising in 
Freeport in 1977, a pipeline, bridges and an electricity station were 
42 
43 
Budiardjo and Liem, op. cit.:64. 
Marthen Tabu (1978), the former Chief of Staff of Tentara Pembebasan Papua Barat 
(TEPENAL), Markas Pemka, 1978. 
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successfully blown up. Nevertheless, the lack of logistical support is a major 
problem, the OPM often cannot defend liberated territories and most actions 
are necessarily tactical operations, with hit and run raids an important tactic. 
The OPM is fully aware that traditional weapons alone cannot repel an 
enemy which continues to acquire more lethal weapons. Other supplies 
such as food and medicines have also been limited, but the OPM has mostly 
been able to rely on the local environment. 
Access to an effective communications network is also vital to any 
liberation movement, and here also the OPM has a serious weakness. Lack 
of press freedom and tight security measures imposed by the Indonesian 
authorities,44 combined with lack of access to foreign and national mass 
media personnel and the limited mass media facilities, has ensured that 
events in West Papua are seldom reported accurately. In the 1970s the OPM 
attempted to improve this situation by building up communications 
networks inside and outside West Papua. Besides a regular courier network, 
radio communication networks were established inside West Papua, 
facilitating communication among guerrilla units at regional and district 
levels. Despite the low level of technology, such measures were effective in 
exposing the brutality of the occupation forces. A radio communication 
centre was also established in Vanautu with the same objective. However 
the local communication networks were destroyed by the Indonesian 
military during its counter-insurgency campaigns against the OPM. Using 
OV-10 Broncos, the Indonesian forces bombed the OPM camp in the north 
in 1978 and destroyed these vital assets. 
44 Beverley Blaskett (1993). "Resistance Movement As a Nationalist Force: A Brief 
History of the OPM", in Garry Trompf (ed.), Islands and Enclaves: Nationalism and 
Separatist Pressures in Islands and Littoral Context, Sterling Publishers Private 
Limited, New Delhi, p.313. 
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In terms of structural communications, as mentioned earlier, the 
country's infrastructure is also very poorly developed. There are few roads, 
and air traffic (which is expensive) is controlled by the Indonesian military. 
It has therefore been very difficult for the OPM to coordinate regional 
activities effectively as information flows have always been subject to delays. 
The OPM does have a few trained technical personnel but their skills have 
not been used effectively. There is still need for higher levels of education 
and more training, particularly in technical communications areas. 
Due to these weaknesses, even when events are reported accurately, 
the OPM's communications are regarded as unreliable and propagandist, 
leaving the OPM with low credibility. 
The OPM has a loose organisational structure, without clear 
directives, lines of control, or effective leadership. Ideally, such a movement 
should have a national congress, whose decisions would be executed by 
some form of national executive council, with bureaux providing sectoral 
leadership at national and regional levels. However, this does not exist in 
the OPM. For operational purposes, the OPM is divided into two major 
bureaux: one political and one military. The major tasks of the political 
bureau are engaging in political campaigns abroad, encouraging mass 
political education, seeking support, and giving advice to the military wing 
inside the country. Currently, the OPM political bureau operates from an 
office in Malmo, Sweden. The military wing, which is also called the 
National Liberation Army of West Papua (NLAWP), is located within the 
country with the primary task of engaging in military campaigns and 
training, and the secondary task of providing support for political action. For 
operational and geo-political reasons, the OPM is necessarily a highly 
decentralised organisation. There are nine regional commands in West 
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Papua, as outlined in Chapter Four, but only five of these are consistently 
active. The regional commands have been given full autonomy to 
implement central policy in accordance with regional capacity, needs and 
conditions. They have responsibility for carrying out basic military training, 
implementing guerrilla warfare, and launching political campaigns. At the 
district level, a squad of regular units can cooperate with other units to carry 
out the orders of the regional command, such as military operations in the 
districts and villages, and development programs in the rural areas. There 
are also special commands which have equal status with the regional 
commands. These include the West Papuan Intelligence Service (PIS) and 
the Special Headquarters Command. Apart from carrying out their regular 
duties, these commands are also involved in civilian activities such as rural 
development programs, health care, education, and building houses, 
bridges, and schools for the local community. Yet despite this well-
conceived command structure, the OPM's organisational capacity is still 
constrained by the lack of national unity, strong leadership, and clear 
political vision. 
The lack of national unity, leadership and political vision has many 
roots. First, the OPM is a highly factionalised organisation,45 largely because 
of the traditional strength of regionalism and ethnic sentiments. 
Discrimination frequently occurs between different groups within the 
Papuan community on the basis of ethnic, religious, social class and gender 
differences. One group of people believes itself to be superior to another; for 
example, the Papuans of the islands and coastal areas believe that they have 
the right to control the other groups because they were the first 
communities to be civilised. This leads to the second problem: leadership 
disputes within the OPM. The major leadership split that occurred in the 
45 Osborne, op. cit.:77-113. (See also Blaskett, op.cit.:320-326). 
was a these 
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chapter 
was based not on political ideology on differences. 
as no leaders political vision and high personal 
integrity and discipline have gained the support the masses, certain 
ethnic groups in West Papua believe that leadership of the OPM must be in 
their hands. The struggle over leadership and representation has become an 
endemic problem within the OPM.46 
Constant leadership struggle within the movement helps to create 
the third problem, namely that of presenting a unified political vision and 
strategy to the world community that can become a basis for international 
trust and support What is needed is a dear definition of the OPM's main 
objectives and aims, together with strategies and tactics to achieve these 
goals. The OPM has a dear vision of the type of society it would like to 
establish 
independence 
enjoy the 
an independent West Papua, but the gaining 
not mean that every citizen can immediately 
of the struggle. Issues of social justice and 
political 
remain major problems in every independent state, because political elites 
are seldom tuned in to the real motivation of their people in their struggle 
for liberation from the colonial powers. The OPM and its entire leadership 
must understand this and begin to establish a mechanism for minimising 
the dangerous social gaps that are likely to emerge in the future. In the last 
fifteen years, the OPM has attempted to improve internal cohesion by 
organising seminars, workshops and conferences, but as described 1n 
Chapter Three, these attempts have been hampered by financial difficulties 
and the lack of knowledge about how to resolve such problems. This failure 
then becomes a strategic problem. In the ongoing struggle for independence, 
these social divisions have been used by the occupation forces in their 
46 Blaskett, op. cit.:312. 
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divide-and-rule policy. Manipulation, orchestration of social and political 
activities, and bribery have been deployed to achieve Indonesian political 
objectives. 
The OPM has demonstrated its ability to maintain the struggle over 
all these years without getting any strong external support, but it has failed 
to maintain its focus on selective strategic choices. For example, the 
organisation has not consistently worked on the regionalisation of the 
struggle; this has thus become only a periodic interest, leaving room for 
factional disputes. The OPM has been unable to develop effective 
organisation and leadership that could convince the regional powers to 
cooperate and coordinate. In order to improve its image, a new initiative 
has called for yet another attempt at national reconciliation and yet another 
restructuring of the OPM. However the question remains whether even if 
the OPM were able to resolve its internal problems, the international 
community will then support the OPM. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The Indonesian military's perception of "threats" has regularly been used to 
justify the occupation forces' building up of their military capacity and 
gaining special status for their operations in West Papua. As a consequence, 
an unhealthy relationship between the OPM and the occupation forces has 
existed for many years, and high levels of brutality and mass destruction 
have been widely reported. The Indonesian armed forces have both 
strengths and weakness. The occupation forces have large numbers of 
personnel, an effective organisational structure, an efficient communication 
network, a good logistical support, and enjoy lavish foreign aid. Yet despite 
such advantages, they have still been unable to crush the OPM. The 
combination of low morale, discipline problems, geographical obstacles and 
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the hostile attitudes of the local people has contributed to their failure to 
defeat the OPM. Despite its apparent superiority, the Indonesian military is 
unlikely to be victorious in West Papua. 
On the other hand, the OPM also its problems. Despite high morale, 
better knowledge of the local situation, mass support, inspiration from the 
experiences of other liberation movements in the world, and the ability to 
take advantage of the current political and economic crisis in Indonesia, the 
movement has weaknesses that pose obstacles to its progress. Lack of 
logistical support, an effective communications network, well-trained 
personnel, an effective organisational structure, and of national unity, 
leadership and political vision, and international support makes any hope 
for outright military victory untenable in the immediate future. The OPM is 
alone; no external backer is likely to oppose Indonesia on behalf of the 
Papuans. According to Elmslie, an independent West Papua remains a 
remote possibility, in the context of a possible collapse of the Indonesian 
state.47 
In order to achieve its political goals, the OPM must overcome its 
internal weaknesses. The issues of organisational structure, national unity, 
leadership and political program must be redefined clearly, and the OPM 
must counter the divide-and-rule policy of the colonial power by 
undertaking an intensified international political campaign in order to gain 
support. However, in the foreseeable future the only developments which 
might enable the OPM to make a breakthrough militarily would be either a 
significant upsurge of the separatist movements in Aceh, the Moluccas, 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi or, more likely, a Balkanisation of Indonesia 
involving prolonged conflict between military factions in Java. It is unlikely 
47 Elmslie, op. cit.:17. 
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a outcome to occur 
Papua is not on 
is accepted nearly as being an 
integral part Indonesia; secondly, West Papua does not have 
advantage of a guilty former colonial power to champion its cause in the 
international arena, as Portugal does for East Timor; thirdly, West Papua 
does not at present have regional support - the South Pacific Forum (SPF) 
has declined to offer support as it has in the case of Kanaky; fourthly, West 
Papua is so rich in land, gold, oil, forests and mineral resources that 
Indonesia will not give it up without struggling to the bitter end; finally, any 
opposition within the country is also still weak, even though there is 
momentum for change coming from non-violent groups such as the Forum 
for Reconciliation of the People of West Papua (FORERI). 
Despite these obstacles, the as a nationalist movement 
stands on own and is by a majority people 
Papua. The intensification colonial oppression has merely 
public sentiments; this can be seen the increase in opposition to 
occupation forces in the post-Suharto period. 
Epilogue 
Following the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998 and the opening of 
some democratic space in Indonesian politics, and especially after East 
Timor's vote for independence, West Papuans began more openly 
discussing their aspirations for independence. Amongst other 
developments, in July 1998 a Forum for the Reconciliation of the People of 
Irian Jaya (FORERI) was established among a group of church leaders, NGO 
activists and intellectuals, to press for a national dialogue on the future 
status of West Papua (see Chapter 7). The following year, in February, a 
group of 100 representatives from various sectors of West Papuan society 
met with President Habibie in Jakarta. The "Team-100", led by LEMASA 
chair Tom Beanal, presented a list of demands, including a demand for 
national dialogue, but surprised President Habibie when Beanal also called 
for West Papua's independence. 
In February 2000 supporters of West Papuan independence organized 
a "Great Consultation" (Musyawarah Besar Papua 2000) at Sentani, in which 
350 delegates participated. This meeting repudiated the 1969 so-called Act of 
Free Choice and created a thirty-person Papuan Presidium Council (Dewan 
Presidium Papua), with Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal as co-chairs. (The 
Presidium was subsequently expanded to thirty-one members.) Theys, a 
traditional chief from Sentani, had been, before the fall of Suharto, a senior 
official in the provincial government and a prominent local member of the 
ruling Golkar Party; in 1998 he emerged as an opponent of the regime and a 
strong advocate of Papuan independence. The Presidium Council was 
mandated to organize a Second Papuan Congess (Kongres Papua)-the First 
Papuan Congress having been held in December 1961. This Second Congress 
was held in Port Numbay (Jayapura) in May-June, with financial assistance 
from President Wahid. Eluay emerged from this meeting as sole chairman, 
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with Beanal as vice chairman. The Second Congress declared that West 
Papua had been independent since December 1961, when the Morning Star 
flag had first been raised in the West Papuan capital. It spoke of a new unity 
within the national movement and tasked the Presidium with seeking 
international support. 
Although the OPM is represented on the Presidium Council, neither the 
leaders of FORERI nor the organisers of the Second Congress consulted 
adequately the OPM about policies, programmes or strategy. Eluay has said 
that that the Presidium Council seeks a diplomatic solution to the West 
Papuan struggle, not a military one. The OPM, in contrast, advocates both a 
military and a political approach. There are also differences within the 
Presidium between the Eluay and Beanal factions, concerning questions of 
leadership and of strategy. 
Shortly after the Second Congress several West Papuan leaders, including 
Eluay, were arrested and now face charges of treason. The Indonesian 
military has also reimposed the ban on the flying of the Morning Star flag. 
As 2000 came to a close the prospects for meaningful national dialogue 
appeared to be diminishing. 
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Appendix 2: The Demands of LEMASA 
I. Recognise the Existence of the Amungme and their 
Fundamental Rights 
1. Recognition of and respect for the existence of the Amungme 
and their traditional rights over resources including land, 
mountains, valleys, forest, secret places and all their integrity in 
Amungsa. 
2. Denounce the cooperative plan to dispossess the Amungme 
from their traditional land. The Amungme have rights to preserve 
their own dignity and the future of coming generations including 
deciding on places where they want to live in Amungsa, whether 
in foothills, valleys or low land. Foreigners do not have rights to 
determine their future or to dispossess them. 
3. Protection for the Amungme and their traditional secret places, 
including those of the Kamoro and the other indigenous people of 
Irian Jaya, from all types of exploitative development activities. 
4. Guaranteed freedom of movement for the Amungme to visit 
their relatives in all villages between Jigi-Mugi and the new 
Delamatagal resettlement, and to practise gardening, hunting and 
all aspects of their culture in Amungsa. 
5. An ending of all types of discrimination, humiliation and 
repression that undermine the existence, dignity and self-respect 
of the Amungme and Kamoro and other indigenous peoples of 
West Papua (Irian Jaya). 
6. The cessation of all types of oppression, repression, and 
intimidation, and of all empty promises made to the Amungme in 
return for releasing their traditional land, forestry, mountains, 
stones, coast and other natural resources. 
7. Any release of the traditional land, mountains, forest, rivers, 
stones, and so on which have been or are owned by individuals or 
the Amungme in Amungsa in the past years, in the present and in 
the future, will only be valid when the Amungme Naisorei, the 
Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA), has agreed to it. 
8. Ultimate priority in any opportunity of education, training and 
employment must be given to the Amungme, Kamoro and the 
other indigenous West Papuans (Irianese) in every development 
activity in Amungsa and Mimika. 
9. Improvement of the social, economic and cultural conditions of 
the Amungme to be conducted under the direction of the 
Amungme Naisore in cooperation with other selected 
institutions. 
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the Indonesian Armed Forces 
particularly from Amungsa Mimika. 
activities and tight controls over the daily of 
Increase quality of the function of the police 
accordance with law and valid regulations. 
2. Stop all types of human rights abuses against civilians, 
particularly the Amungme, Kamoro, Dani, Ekagi/Me and Moni 
and the other indigenous peoples in Irian Jaya (West Papua). 
3. Stop all types of politics and practices of divide-and-rule policy 
which attempt to divide people in Irian Jaya, whether within a 
tribe or between tribes, as experienced in the cases of the killing of 
11 Amungme civilians in Hoea perpetrated by a soldier of the 
Indonesian armed forces originating from Moni, and of the killing 
of Notomkal Janapa, an Amungme, in Aroanop perpetrated by a 
group of Dani after the OPM flag raising and demonstration on 
25December1994 in Tembagapura. 
4. Discard and cease all types of false labelling, such as the 
Security Disturbance Movement for the OPM, of any struggle for 
justice and democracy made by the Amungme and Kamoro and 
other indigenous peoples in Irian as citizens of Indonesia. 
5. Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold as a multinational 
operating Indonesia must be brought to face charges 
in court both the USA and Indonesia in relation to its 
involvement in all types of human rights abuses the 
destruction of the environment since its presence in Irian Jaya, 
starting from 1967. 
6. The Commission of Human Rights and the Working Group for 
Indigenous Peoples of the United Nations must be called on to 
investigate the issues of human rights abuses perpetuated by the 
apparatus of the government, the Indonesian armed forces and 
transnational companies operating in Irian Jaya province, 
particularly in Amungsa and Mimika. 
7. Prosecute and expose the identity and crimes of all persons 
who have been involved in human rights abuses in Irian Jaya. 
8. Proceed against and prosecute persons who have been 
involved in human rights abuses, whether as individuals or on 
behalf of an institution, in accordance with the valid law. 
9. Persons who are found fully accountable for human rights 
abuses must pay compensation to victims or the family of the 
victims and restore their credibility, whether individual, 
institution or tribe. 
10. Persons who are found accountable for human rights abuses 
must immediately release prisoners and return "the disappeared 
persons" (if they are still alive) or the bodies or bones of the 
victims to their families to bury them peacefully. 
11. Freeport Indonesia must immediately stop all indiscriminate 
dumping of wastes and clean up all tailing wastes from the rivers 
and the overburden of rocks and soil in valleys and lakes in the 
mountain ranges of Amungsa and Mimika. 
12. Allow international independent institutions to monitor and 
investigate the destruction of the environment in Amungsa and 
Mimika and its impacts on the indigenous peoples caused by 
Freeport Indonesia since its initial presence in 1967. 
13. Freeport Indonesia must pay full and fair compensation for its 
exploitation of mineral resources (copper, gold, silver and so on) 
and for the land it has confiscated and exploited between 1967 
and 1995 (the present). 
14. Freeport Indonesia must pay full and fair compensation for 
the environmental destruction of mountains, rivers, land, forest 
and so on it has caused in Amungsa and Mimika since its 
presence from 1967 until 1995 (the present). 
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Appendix 3: Political Communique From the People of West Papua 
to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
The basic problems which have caused political instability and insecurity in 
West Papua (Irian Jaya) from 1963 to today are not solely due to failure of 
the Development Programs but due to the Political Status of West Papua 
which on December 1, 1961 was proclaimed as an independent nation 
among other nations in the world. The Declaration should have marked 
the realization of the hopes and expectations of the West Papuans, who 
were then annexed by the Republic of Indonesia. 
On this basis, we honestly declare to the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia that there is no possibility of consenting to the desire of the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia to develop the People of West 
Papua in the context of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in the future. 
On this day, Friday, 26 February 1999, we the People of West Papua declare 
to the President of the Republic of Indonesia that: 
Firstly, we the people of West Papua want to separate ourselves from the 
Unitary Republic of Indonesia to be fully sovereign and independent 
among other nations in the world. 
Secondly, to establish as soon as possible a Transition Government in West 
Papua under the auspices of the United Nations, democratically, peacefully 
and accountably, at the latest by March 1999. 
Thirdly, if there is no response to this Political Statement, specifically to the 
First and Second Statements, we then demand: 
i. an International Dialogue between the government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the West Papuan People and the United Nations; 
ii. that we the people of West Papua hereby declare our intention to abstain 
from the General Election of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999. 
This Political Statement is made and handed to the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta. 
Prepared in: Jakarta on the day of February 26th 1999 
(Signed on behalf of the people of West Papua) 
100 delegates from West Papua. 
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